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Deception Algorithm
Final Technical Report
APPENDICES

30 JUNE 1994

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
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APPENDIX A
HUMAN FACTORS QUESTIONNAIRE DATA

1303 80003 HF8 COMMENTS PMCS WAS NOT BEING CARRIED OUT BY CREWS. THIS WAS NOT CRITICAL AS UNIT/DIRECT MAINTAINERS PATCHED THINGS UP AT THE LAST MINUTE.

1302 80003 HF8 REPAIR THE REPAIR KIT IS NOT GOOD.

1301 80003 HF8 REPAIR REPAIR KIT WOULD BE ADEQUATE AT UNIT LEVEL.

1300 80003 HF8 IMPBLUE IF THE BLUEFOR HAD BEEN IN A DELIBERATE DEFENSE INSTEAD OF A HASTY DEFENSE, THEY COULD HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE.

1299 80003 HF8 OBSBLUE THE BLUEFOR DID A GOOD JOB PLACING THE DECOYS TO BEST SUPPORT THE COMMANDER'S INTENT.

1298 80003 HF8 IMPRED IF REDFOR HAD IDENTIFIED THE DECOYS AND NOT FIRED ON THEM THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN POTENTIAL MCCD IMPACT ON REDFOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

1297 80003 HF8 OBSRED MCCD HAD NO IMPACT ON REDFOR BECAUSE REDFOR WAS FIRING AT ALL HOT SPOTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

1296 80003 HF8 HFE I THINK THE TWO MAN LIFT NEEDS TO BE RE-LOOKED.

1295 80002 HF8 DOCTRINE THE DOCTRINE WAS GOOD FOR SURVIVABILITY BUT DOES NOT COVER DECEPTION ENOUGH. FOR TACTICS YOU NEED TO LOOK AT COMMANDER INTENT AND METT-T. EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES LEAVE A LOT UP TO THE PLATOON LEADER ON WHERE HE WANTS TO PLACE THE DECOY.

1294 80002 HF8 IMPBLUE THE POTENTIAL MCCD IMPACT ON BLUEFOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IS GOOD.

1293 80002 HF8 OBSBLUE THE MCCD DREW FIRE, THAT HELPS THE BLUE FORCE.

1292 80002 HF8 IMPRED THERE IS GOOD POTENTIAL IMPACT ON REDFOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

1291 80002 HF8 SAFETY FINGER PINCHING IN HINGES IS A POTENTIAL SAFETY PROBLEM WITH THE MCCD.

1290 80002 HF8 HFE HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING WAS NOT OPTIMUM.

1289 80002 HF8 DOCTRINE NOT PARTICULARLY GOOD EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES DURING THE EARLY PART OF PHASE III. DECOYS WERE PLOPPED OUT IN THE OPEN IN A FEW CASES.

1288 80001 HF8 IMPBLUE THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BLUEFOR EFFECTIVENESS IS ADDRESSED IN COMMENTS REGARDING THE ACTUAL BLUEFOR EFFECTIVENESS.

1287 80001 HF8 OBSBLUE IN THE FEW TRIALS THAT I ACTUALLY OBSERVED, I NOTED A TRIAL BY TRIAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE TACTICAL USE OF THE DECOYS BY THE BLUEFOR COMMANDER. AS IS KNOWN, THE BLUEFOR HAD THEIR PLAN CLEANED FOR SEVERAL TRIALS AFTER I LEFT. SO, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER IT WAS DECOYS, MUD, WEATHER, BAD TERRAIN AND USE OF IT, POOR TACTICS AND FIRE DISCIPLINE, HORRENDOUS BAD LUCK OR SCREWED UP PK'S THAT CAUSED THE OUTCOME. WHERE THE DECOYS CAME IN AND IMPACTED, I'LL WAIT TO LOOK AT THE DATA.

1286 80001 HF8 IMPRED THE DECOYS DREW ROUNDS!! THE BETTER THE "EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES" AND "TACTICS" USED AGAINST THE OPFOR ARE, THE MORE SHOTS AT THE DECOYS, THE MORE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS THE MCCD HAS. A BETTER DECOY (BRDEC'S JOB AND STILL TO COME) WILL WORK AGAINST EVEN AN EXPERIENCED AND TRAINED OPFOR. YOU CAN FOOL SOME OF THE OPFOR ALL OF THE TIME; YOU CAN EVEN FOOL ALL OF THE OPFOR SOME OF THE TIME; BUT YOU CAN'T FOOL ALL THE OPFOR ALL OF THE TIME.

1285 80001 HF8 OBSRED I DIDN'T ACTUALLY OBSERVE ENOUGH TRIALS TO ASSESS AN IMPACT ON THE OPFOR. THE SCORE WAS TWO TO TWO WHEN I ROTATED. HOWEVER, THE "BRDEC PARTY LINE" SAYS, EVERY ROUND FIRED AT A DECOY WAS ONE THAT MAY HAVE BEEN A SHOT THAT MIGHT HAVE HIT A FRIENDLY VEHICLE AND THUS SAVED CREW LIVES AND MONEY. THE MONEY SAVED BY NOT LOSING ONE TANK WOULD NEARLY PAY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE MCCD. THE LIVES SAVED AND THE COST OF THEIR TRAINING WOULD BE GRAY.

1284 80001 HF8 HEALTH TRIPPING OVER GUY LINES, ESPECIALLY IN THE DARK.

1283 80001 HF8 SAFETY HINGES ARE PINCH POINTS.

1282 80001 HF8 HFE DECOY FRAME HINGES ARE, TO SOME EXTENT, STILL PINCH POINTS. DECOY IS TOO HEAVY. DUCTS FROM THE HEATER TO BACK OF DECOY ARE ILL DESIGNED. THE PRESENT DESIGN CAUSES THEM TO KINK; THEY ARE NOT SIZED PROPERLY FOR CORRECT HOT AIR FLOW; AND (ALONG WITH THE HEATER) DO NOT ALLOW FOR SIMPLE, QUICK AND RELIABLE ADJUSTMENT OF THE THERMAL IMAGE. THEY ALSO DO NOT GIVE THE SOLDIER ANY FEEDBACK AS TO WHAT THERMAL IMAGE IS BEING PROJECTED. THE HEATER IS TOO HEAVY AND NOT BALANCED TO CARRY CONVENIENTLY.

1281 80001 HF8 DOCTRINE THERE ARE SOME SIMPLE RULES FOR MCCD USE: SITE THEM IN REALISTIC POSITIONS, DON'T HAVE REAL & DECOY IN SAME SIGHT PICTURE. SOME KNOWLEDGE OF VEHICLE AND DECOY THERMAL REGION SIGNATURES MAY HELP CONCEAL THE REAL VEHICLE AND MAKE THE DECOY MORE CONVINCING TO THERMAL SIGHTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DETERMINE WHAT PARTS OF REAL VEHICLE GET HOTTEST/BRIGHTEST AND HAVE CREWS MAKE SURE THE DECOY PROJECTS THE SAME SIGNATURE AS A TANK OR, IF DESIRED, DIFFERENT TYPES OF TARGETS SUCH AS "HOT" TANKS OR UNMOVED TANK.

1280 37103 HF7A ACREDIMP IT WORKED MOSTLY AT NIGHT BECAUSE REDFOR WAS LOOKING FOR HOT SPOTS AND LIGHTING THEM UP.

1279 37124 HF7A PMCSMT PMCS, TROUBLESHOOTING, AND MAINTENANCE WAS ALL VERY SIMPLE. NOT MUCH WAS NEEDED TO FIX THEM. JUST A LOT OF IT TO FIX. ONLY A COUPLE OF TIMES DID WE NOT FIX THE HEATERS.

1278 37114 HF7A SETUPMT THE BEST TECHNIQUE IS THE ONE THAT THE CREW THINKS IS THE BEST FOR THEM AND LESS TIME CONSUMING.

1277 37114 HF7A POBLUIMP COMBAT SURVIVABILITY IN THE TIME IT BUYS TO MAKE LAST SECOND DECISIONS.

1276 37114 HF7A ACRLUIMP I THINK THE MCCD DID ITS JOB FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THE TIME WE USED IT.

1275 37114 HF7A POREDIMP I THINK IT HAD A GREAT IMPACT AT NIGHT WHERE YOU GAIN TIME. IT TOOK TIME FOR THEM TO IDENTIFY THE MCCD OR REAL TANK, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY WERE ON THE MOVE OR ROUGH TERRAIN. I THINK IT REALLY SCREWS UP THEIR ABILITY TO IDENTIFY AS A MCCD DURING THEIR OFFENSIVE OPS.

1274 37114 HF7A ACREDIMP IT REALLY BOUGHT US SOME TIME. BY THE TIME THEY REALIZED THE TARGETS WERE DECOYS AND ENGAGED THEM WE HAD A BIT MORE TIME TO DRAW THEM IN CLOSER TO THE ENGAGEMENT AREA AT CLOSER RANGE, IDENTIFY TANK AND FIRE THEM UP.

1273 37114 HF7A EMPLCMT TERRAIN AND IMAGINATION PLAYED A BIG PART. FOR EXAMPLE PLACING IT BETWEEN TREES/ROCK FORMATIONS AND VARIATIONS OF TERRAIN ROADS AND TANK TRAILS MADE SOME DIFFERENCE. THE MCCD WASN'T TOO BAD EITHER TO ARTIFICIALLY CAMOUFLAGE.

1272 37114 HF7A TACTCMT CONSIDERING THE COMMANDER'S INTENT, THE TACTICAL DECISION PORTION GIVEN DOWN TO THE PSG/PL WITH VARIATION OF DECOY AND REAL TANK POSITIONING FOR BETTER DAY OR NIGHTTIME OPERATIONS WHERE CONDUCT AND METT-T WERE THE VARIABLES. A GOOD EXAMPLE: PLACING THE 4 DECOYS NO LESS THAN 100M APART OR AT A NOT SO FAR LOCATION FROM THE ACTUAL TANKS, ADDING FORWARD/BACKWARDS TO ONES LEFT/RIGHT VIEWS FROM THE ACTUAL TANKS WORKED FAVORABLY FOR US RATHER THAN INTERMINGLING THE DECOYS AMONG THE TANKS.

1271 37114 HF7A DOCTCMT AS AN OVERALL PRINCIPLE THAT GAVE US THE WINNING EDGE WAS TO DILIGENTLY PLACE THEM ON LOCATIONS THAT MADE SENSE. THE MAJOR IDEA WAS TO THINK LIKE THE ENEMY AND PUT OURSELVES IN THEIR SHOES AND THEN MAKE A GOOD ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

1270 37114 HF7A PMSCMT OPERATORS PMCS WAS NO PROBLEM. TROUBLESHOOTING WAS NO PROBLEM. MAINTENANCE RAN OK BUT SINCE THE BACK MATERIAL WAS WEAKER, MORE ATTENTION HAD TO BE PAID TO THE BACK AREA.

1269 37114 HF7A SHCMT WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE MCCD IS PLACED ON A DECENT LOCATION WHERE THE TERRAIN PROVIDES COVERAGE SO THE DECOY AND GENERATOR WORK PROPERLY WITHOUT PUTTING THE SOLDIERS IN JEOPARDY.

1268 37114 HF7A HFCMT OF COURSE THE MOPP4 LEVELS OF OPERATIONS WERE THE "BUTT KICKER" AND TIME CONSUMING. THE ARCTIC AND BLACK GLOVES WERE NOT SO HARD TO WORK WITH.

1267 37114 HF7A RECCMT NOT A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, AT NIGHT THE OPERATION WAS A LITTLE SLOWER.

1266 37114 HF7A OPCMT OPERATING THE EQUIPMENT ONCE ON SITE WAS NO PROBLEM, THOUGH THERE WAS NOTHING WRONG WITH CHECKING OUT PERIODICALLY.

1265 37114 HF7A MVCMT TRANSPORTING MCCD ON TOP OF VEHICLE WASN'T MUCH OF A PROBLEM. WE HAD TO FIGURE HOW TO SECURE SO IT WON'T FALL OFF TANK. ALSO, TACTICAL COMBAT CONFIGURATION DID NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE HAVING THAT KIND OF EQUIPMENT ON TOP OF VEHICLE. FACTORS OF TERRAIN, TACTICAL SITUATION, ETC, MADE US USE WHEEL VEHICLES TO MOVE FROM TANK TO DEPLOYMENT SITE CONSIDERING TIME WAS CRITICAL. DELIBERATE DEFENCE OPERATION WAS KEY FOR TIME EFFECT AND SUCCESS OF OPERATION. ONCE ON LOCATION, REST WAS OLD STORY.

1264 37112 HF7A SETUPCMT ONE MAN ON HEATER, ONE ON DECOY.

1263 37112 HF7A POBLUIMP IT WOULD HELP IN THE BEGINNING BUT THEN BE A WASTE OF TIME.

1262 37112 HF7A ACBLUIMP AGGRAVATING.

1261 37112 HF7A POREDIMP IT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE FOR THE FIRST FEW BATTLES.

1260 37112 HF7A ACREDIMP MANY REDFOR SAID THAT AFTER A WHILE THEY COULD TELL TANK & DECOY APART. IT WAS ONLY GOOD IN EARLY STAGES.

1259 37111 HF7A SETUPCMT ONE PERSON CARRY: ONE PERSON HEATER, ONE PERSON DECOY (SET UP).

1258 37111 HF7A POBLUIMP COULD BE SMALLER FOR EASIER TRANSPORT.

1257 37111 HF7A ACBLUIMP TAKES A LOT OF TIME TO FIND POSITIONS & SETUP.

1256 37111 HF7A POREDIMP COULD BE A GOOD WEAPON.

1255 37111 HF7A ACREDIMP WHEN USED SMARTLY WE "KICKED BUTT", IMPROPERLY WE GOT STOMPED.

1254 37111 HF7A TACOPCMT OWN PLATOONS SHOULD BE ABLE TO EMLACE THEM, THAT'S THE ONLY WAY IT CAN BE EFFECTIVE. BN COMMANDER SHOULDN'T BE ABLE TO GIVE YOU A SIX DIGIT GRID, ONLY A VICINITY.

1253 37111 HF7A EMPLCMT BASICALLY, ONCE THE PROPER POSITION IS FOUND AND ALL INSTRUCTIONS ARE FOLLOWED PROPERLY, MCCD SHOULD BE VERY EFFECTIVE.

1252 37111 HF7A TACTCMT AS USED IN THIS DEFENSE, IT WAS USED TO FAKE MORE TANKS. IT MAKES THE ENEMY EXPOSE THEMSELVES QUICKER. VERY EFFECTIVE.

1251 37111 HF7A DOCTCMT VERY EFFECTIVE, IF USED PROPERLY.

1250 37111 HF7A MVCMT CAN BE LIFTED BY ONE PERSON. NEEDS LONGER STRAPS FOR EASIER MOVEMENT.

1249 37115 HF7A SETUPCMT IF BOTH TEAM MEMBERS WORK EQUALLY HARD, YOU CAN EMPLOY THE MCCD JUST AS FAST USING ANY TECHNIQUE.

1248 37115 HF7A ACBLUIMP GAVE FLANK SHOTS AT REDFOR BECAUSE REDFOR WAS ORIENTED TOWARD THE DECOY.

1247 37115 HF7A EMPLCMT I WAS INFORMED BY HIGHER COMMAND WHERE TO PUT THE MCCD AND CARRIED OUT THAT MISSION TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY.

1246 37126 HF7A SETUPCMT THE FASTEST TECHNIQUE IS AS THE ONE IN THE MANUAL.

1245 37126 HF7A POBLUIMP IF MORE DETAIL WAS BROUGHT OUT FOR THERMAL SIGNATURE IE: .50 CAL. MOUNT, M2 40 MOUNT, GUN TUBE, AND COMMANDER'S CUPOLA TO MAKE IT LOOK MORE REAL IT WOULD INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS MANY TIMES OVER.

1244 37126 HF7A ACBLUIMP DEPENDING ON HOW LONG WE COULD MAINTAIN CONFUSION IN REDFOR RANK, WAS IN DIRECT

1243 37126 HF7A POREDIMP PROPORTION TO OUR DEFEAT OR VICTORY.
IF MORE DETAIL WAS BROUGHT OUT FOR THERMAL SIGNATURE IE: .50 CAL. MOUNT, M2 40 MOUNT, GUN TUBE, AND COMMANDERS CUPOLA TO MAKE IT LOOK MORE REAL IT WOULD INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS MANY TIMES OVER.

1242 37126 HF7A ACREDIMP DEPENDING ON HOW LONG WE COULD MAINTAIN CONFUSION IN REDFOR RANK, WAS IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO OUR DEFEAT OR VICTORY.

1241 37126 HF7A TACTCMT WE MODIFIED THE TEXTBOOK TACTICS TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN SEVERAL CAMPAIGNS AGAINST AN ENEMY SUPERIOR IN TECHNOLOGY AND NUMBERS. PUT THE DECOYS WHERE WE WERE NOT IN ORDER TO SURPRISE THE ENEMY. BUT EVEN WITH THIS, MOST BATTLES ENDED WITH 25-75% LOSSES.

1240 37126 HF7A MVCMT TWO PEOPLE TO MOVE THE MCCD IS APPROPRIATE, ALTHOUGH FOR SET-UP IT IS NOT.
1236 37113 HF7A SETUPCMT TAKE OUT OF BAG (BOTH PEOPLE), PULL AND EXTEND, LASH ALL ELASTIC STRAP IN PLACE, PUT POLE IN PLACE. UNWRAP ROPE AND STAKE IN MIDDLE STAKES. RAISE TARGET. ONE PERSON HOLDS TARGET WHILE OTHER DRIVES IN OTHER STAKES AND ADJUSTS. THEN BOTH SET UP RADAR ASSEMBLY. THEN START UP GENERATOR. TO TAKE DOWN, DO IN REVERSE ORDER.

1235 37113 HF7A PMSCMT TOO MANY SCREWS ON THE GENERATOR. USE STRONGER ROPE FOR STRINGS. MAKE A BETTER HOLDING CASE FOR REPAIR KIT.

1234 37113 HF7A SHCMT FINGERS GET CUT AND CRUSHED TOO EASILY ON THE FRAME AND ELASTIC BAND HOLDER.
1233 37113 HF7A HFCMT IT WOULD GO UP A LOT FASTER WITH THREE PEOPLE INSTEAD OF TWO. GLOVES MAKE THE JOB OF SETTING UP AND TAKING DOWN VERY DIFFICULT.

1232 37113 HF7A RECCMT WHEN FOLDING THE DECOY TO MAKE THE "W" SHAPE, THEY SHOULD MAKE IT SO THAT IT ALIGNS EASIER FOR FOLDING.

1231 37113 HF7A OPCMT THE ELASTIC BANDS SHOULD BE STRONGER OR USE VELCRO INSTEAD. THEY BREAK TOO EASILY. THE DECOY IMAGE SHOULD BE MADE OF A STRONGER MATERIAL AS IT WEARS OUT TOO FAST.

1230 37113 HF7A MVCMT MCCD SHOULD HAVE A BETTER CARRYING HANDLE ON STRAP SO THAT ONE PERSON CAN CARRY IT. IT MAKES THE SET UP OF THE DECOY A LOT FASTER.

1229 37125 HF7A SETUPCMT THE FASTEST WAY TO SET UP MCCD IS TO HAVE ONE PERSON LAY OUT MCCD AND ATTACH FASTENERS WHILE THE OTHER SETS UP RADAR CONES. RADAR CONES WILL BE FINISHED FIRST, AND THEN THAT PERSON CAN HELP THE OTHER WITH MCCD. BY THIS TIME MCCD SHOULD BE READY TO LIFT UP. AFTER LIFTED STAKE DOWN AND ATTACH HEATER.

1228 37125 HF7A HFCMT THE AGGRAVATION OF PUTTING UP THE MCCD COULD DRIVE A SOLDIER TO DESTRUCTION.
1227 37125 HF7A OPCMT THE HEATER IS UNRELIABLE AND MCCD IS WORTHLESS IN WINDY OR ARCTIC CONDITIONS.
1226 37125 HF7A MVCMT THE MCCD IS BULKY AND TAKES UP VALUABLE SPACE ON A BRADLEY. IT IS ALSO DANGEROUS TO CARRY FUEL INSIDE THE VEHICLE. DON'T BUY THE MCCD AND USE THE MONEY THE ARMY WOULD SAVE TO DESIGN A BETTER BRADLEY. THE BRADLEY NEEDS A LOT OF HELP.

1225 37128 HF7A SETUPCMT BY STARTING OUT WITH ONE MAN ON DECOY AND THE OTHER ON THE HEATER DOING THE 2404.
1224 37128 HF7A SHCMT THE ONLY THING THAT ISN'T VERY SAFE ON THE MCCD IS YOU CAN GET YOUR FINGERS PINCHED IN IT REALLY EASY.

1223 37128 HF7A RECCMT THE DECOYS GOT RIPPED A LOT ON THE HINGES. THE FABRIC IS TOO EASY TO RIP.
1222 37128 HF7A OPCMT IN THE MUD IT IS VERY HARD TO KEEP THE PEGS IN THE GROUND. YOU NEED TO HAVE SOME WAY TO BE ABLE TO KEEP THEM ON THE GROUND.

1221 37128 HF7A MVCMT IF THE DISTANCE IS NOT THAT FAR YOU CAN CARRY THE STUFF ONE MAN ON EACH. YOU NEED TO PUT THE TOOL IN WITH THE BASIC ISSUE.

1220 37124 HF7A OPTRCMT IN ALL ACTUALITY, THE TRAINING WAS OVERDONE. THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT THAT HARD TO FIGURE OUT AND LEARN. THAT'S ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH TODAY'S ARMY. YOU TEACH US LIKE WE ARE 3RD GRADERS, SO WE TEND TO THINK AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.

1219 37124 HF7A SETUPCMT IT IS BETTER TO LET THE GUYS THEMSELVES DEVELOP THEIR OWN PLAN. ALL PEOPLE FIND DIFFERENT WAYS TO MAKE THINGS EASIER. WE USUALLY NEVER DID IT THE SAME WAY TWICE.

1218 37124 HF7A SHCMT THERE WERE NO SAFETY/HEALTH HAZARDS.
1217 37124 HF7A HFCMT THIS IS DESIGNED FOR BIGGER PEOPLE, I NOTICED SOME OF THE SMALLER GUYS HAD PROBLEMS WITH ITS SIZE.

1216 37124 HF7A RECCMT THE BULKINESS OF THE FRAME AND THE ROPES ALWAYS BREAK DURING OPERATION. IT MADE IT A HASSLE. OTHER THAN THAT IT IS QUITE GENERIC. FOR THE PRICE IT SHOULD DO ALL THE WORK ITSELF. EVERYTHING WAS ALWAYS GETTING TANGLED UP. THE MANIFOLD AND THE IMAGE ITSELF ALWAYS GET CAUGHT IN THE FRAME.

1215 37124 HF7A OPCMT THE BULKINESS OF THE FRAME AND THE ROPES ALWAYS BREAK DURING OPERATION. IT MADE IT A HASSLE. OTHER THAN THAT IT IS QUITE GENERIC. FOR THE PRICE IT SHOULD DO ALL THE WORK ITSELF.

1214 37124 HF7A MVCMT MOVING THE DECOY IS FAIRLY SIMPLE, ONE MAN CAN CARRY BOTH PIECES FOR A VERY SHORT DISTANCE, ON THE OTHER HAND IT IS TOO HEAVY TO BE A MAN-PORTABLE UNIT.

1212 37127 HF7A SETUPCMT REMOVE AND TURN ON POWER SUPPLY. REMOVE MCCD FROM BAG AND SET DECOY. HOOK UP POWER SUPPLY TO DECOY.

1211 37127 HF7A PMSCMT HAD NO PROBLEM.
1210 37127 HF7A SHCMT NO PROBLEM.
1209 37127 HF7A HFCMT TOO MANY SCREWS IN THE POWER SUPPLY UNIT. REPLACE SCREWS WITH WING NUTS.
1208 37127 HF7A RECCMT RECOVERY AND REPACKAGING DECOY WASN'T A PROBLEM.
1207 37127 HF7A OPCMT OPERATING THE MCCD DECOY WASN'T A PROBLEM.

1206 37127 HF7A MVCMT MOVING THE DECOY AS A TWO MAN TEAM ISN'T NEEDED. TO SETUP THE DECOY, YOU NEED A TWO MAN TEAM.

1205 37123 HF7A SETUPCMT WHILE DEPLOYING THE MCCD, IT WENT THE BEST IF YOU ASSEMBLED WHILE INSPECTING. THIS WAS THE FASTEST WAY.

1204 37123 HF7A POBLUIMP THE MCCD COULD HAVE A GREAT IMPACT IF BLUEFOR HAD TIME TO HAVE PLATOON LEADER CHECK EACH POSITION OF THE MCCD TO SEE IF IT WAS DEPLOYED WITH HIS INTENT IN MIND.

1203 37123 HF7A ACBLUIMP THE MCCD ALLOWED US TO WIN SEVERAL BATTLES BECAUSE REDFOR WAS ATTACKING AWAY FROM BLUEFOR POSITIONS.

1202 37123 HF7A POREDIMP IT MAKES REDFOR SLOW DOWN AND TAKE A LOOK WHILE DIVERTING HIS ATTENTION FROM OUR BATTLE POSITION.

1201 37123 HF7A ACREDIMP AT NIGHT REDFOR ALMOST ALWAYS WENT FOR MCCD AND WAS SUCKED INTO OUR KILL ZONE.

1200 37123 HF7A EMPLCMT OUR DEPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES WERE LIMITED TO FT KNOX STANDARDS AND WE WERE TOLD NOT TO DEVIATE FROM THAT (IE: CHANGING HEAT SIGNATURE BY ADJUSTING HEAT FLOW).

1199 37123 HF7A TACTCMT THE MCCD WORKED WELL AT NIGHT AS IT WAS ALWAYS SHOT AT. DURING THE DAY IT WAS EASIER FOR THE ENEMY TO RECOGNIZE. WHEN PLACING THE MCCD BEHIND OUR BATTLE POSITIONS THE ENEMY USUALLY ASSUMED THAT WE WERE FURTHER BACK THAN WE ACTUALLY WERE.

1198 37123 HF7A DOCTCMT THE MCCD DOCTRINE WORKED WELL BUT WE WERE RESTRICTED TO USING THE MCCD THE FT KNOX WAY AND WERE NOT ALLOWED THE CHANGE THE HEAT SIGNATURE ON THE MCCD.

1197 37129 HF7A SETUPCMT YOUR OWN, EACH TEAM DEVELOPED THEIR OWN TECHNIQUE.

1196 37129 HF7A TACDOCMT WHEN DEPLOYING, USE A COMMON SENSE APPROACH.

1195 37129 HF7A POBLUIMP WHEN USED AS A DECEPTIVE PLAN AND HAVING GOOD TERRAIN TO USE, THE POTENTIAL IS ENDLESS.

1194 37129 HF7A ACBLUIMP I WOULD SAY IT HELPED US OVER 50% OF THE TIME. YOU MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT WE TRIED VARIOUS METHODS TO SEE WHAT WAS OR WAS NOT WORKING.

1193 37129 HF7A POREDIMP I THINK WE MAXED OUT IT'S USE DURING THIS TEST GIVEN THE SAME TERRAIN TO DEFEND FROM. THE POTENTIAL OF THE MCCD WAS DEFINITELY USED. WE TRIED AND USED VARIOUS METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT, DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND NATURALLY HAD DIFFERENT RESULTS EVERY TIME BE IT GOOD OR BAD.

1192 37129 HF7A ACREDIMP REDFOR DEFINITELY TOOK THE TIME TO LOOK AT THE MCCD AND IN MOST CASES FIRED AMMO AT THE MCCD.

1191 37129 HF7A EMPLCMT HAD BEST RESULTS WITH MCCD WHEN 75% OR LESS OF MCCD WAS EXPOSED, INTERMINGLED WITH SURROUNDING VEGETATION.

1189 37129 HF7A DOCTCMT MCCD SUCCESSFUL WHEN USED AS A DECEPTIVE PLAN AT UNEVEN SPACING DETERMINED BY TERRAIN OF WHERE I WANTED TO PUT THEM IN RELATION TO WHERE OUR M1A1 WERE POSITIONED.

1183 37129 HF7A MVCMT NEED TO HAVE A SEPARATE VEHICLE, IE HMMV VS. TANK, TO TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND MCCD. IT WILL SAVE TIME BY DEPLOYING MCCD WITH INDIVIDUAL HIT TEAMS.

1182 37122 HF7A OPTRCMT NEED TO TRAIN A SPECIAL UNIT FOR MCCD USE.

1181 37122 HF7A SETUPCMT THE FASTEST TECHNIQUE IS TO DO IT BY THE BOOK.

1180 37122 HF7A TACDOCMT THE MCCD MAY WORK WELL IF DEPLOYED BY A SPECIAL UNIT.

1179 37122 HF7A POBLUIMP THE POTENTIAL MCCD IMPACT ON BLUEFOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WAS HINDERED GREATLY.

1178 37122 HF7A ACBLUIMP IT TOOK TOO MUCH MANPOWER AWAY FROM PLATOONS.

1177 37122 HF7A POREDIMP THE MCCD IMPACT ON REDFOR AT NIGHT WAS THAT IT WORKED WELL.

1176 37122 HF7A ACREDIMP THE MCCD IMPACT ON REDFOR AT NIGHT WAS THAT IT WORKED WELL.

1174 37122 HF7A EMPLCMT SHOULD HAVE A UNIT TRAINED FOR THE USE OF A MCCD, NOT TANKERS.

1172 37122 HF7A DOCTCMT THE DOCTRINE WORKS WELL AT NIGHT.

1168 37122 HF7A OPCMT MCCD SHOULD BE DEPLOYED AND OPERATED BY DIVISION.

1167 37122 HF7A MVCMT THERE IS NO ROOM ON A TANK TO CARRY OR STORE THE MCCD. DEPLOYMENT BY TANK CREW WILL RENDER THE TANK SECURITY FAR BELOW NORMAL.

1166 37121 HF7A POBLUIMP TOO MUCH EQUIPMENT TO CARRY TO COMBAT AND BECAUSE IT TAKES TWO CREW MEMBERS TO PUT UP, IT TAKES AWAY FROM THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TANK.

1165 37121 HF7A ACBLUIMP MY ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTUAL MCCD IMPACT ON BLUEFOR IS TIME!!

1164 37121 HF7A ACREDIMP THE ACTUAL MCCD IMPACT ON REDFOR IS VERY GOOD, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHTTIME.

1163 37121 HF7A TACTCMT MOVING THE MCCD ON THE TANK IS NOT GOOD. IN MY PAST EXPERIENCES IN COMBAT, WITH ALL THE TANK'S AMMO AND THE CREW'S EQUIPMENT, THERE IS NO PLACE TO PUT THE MCCD. MOVING AS FAST AS WE DO AND TACTICALLY, IT IS THE WAY. THE MCCD, IF PURCHASED BY THE ARMY, SHOULD HAVE A MOS JUST FOR IT OR A H9 SECTION ON WHEELS.

1162 37121 HF7A MVCMT MOVING THE MCCD ON THE TANK IS NOT GOOD. IN MY PAST EXPERIENCES IN COMBAT, WITH ALL THE TANK'S AMMO AND THE CREW'S EQUIPMENT THERE IS NO PLACE TO PUT THE MCCD. MOVING AS FAST AS WE DO AND TACTICALLY, IT IS THE WAY. THE MCCD, IF PURCHASED BY THE ARMY, SHOULD HAVE A MOS JUST FOR IT OR A H9 SECTION ON WHEELS.

1161 37120 HF7A SETUPCMT HAVING ONE MAN SET UP RADAR CONES WHILE THE OTHER FASTENS THE STIFFENERS. USE THE "2 MAN" TO ERECT THE MCCD.

1160 37120 HF7A EMPLCMT THE EMPLOYMENT WENT FINE.

1159 37120 HF7A DOCTCMT THE HEAT SILHOUETTE WAS NEVER STABLE.

1158 37120 HF7A PMCSCMT HAD NO PROBLEM WITH PMCS NOR TROUBLESHOOTING. MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, THE GLUE DID NOT WORK PROPERLY AND THE PATCHES DIDN'T HOLD AFTER A COUPLE OF USES.

1157 37120 HF7A SHCMT THE ONLY SAFETY HAZARD IS DEALING WITH THE FUEL.
1156 37120 HF7A HFCMT THE TWO MAN CREW IS CORRECT.
1155 37120 HF7A RECCMT THE RECOVERY/REPACKING WAS EASILY DONE, ALTHOUGH THE JOINTS ON THE FRAME WOULD TWIST, COMPLICATING THE "TEAR DOWN" PROCEDURE.
1154 37120 HF7A OPCMT THE HEATER SEEMED TO OPERATE PROPERLY, ALTHOUGH THE HEAT SILHOUETTE CHANGED EACH TIME. THE MATERIAL THAT IS USED ON THE MCCD ALSO TORE EASILY AND THE PATCHES WOULD NOT STAY ON AFTER 2 OR 3 USES.
1153 37120 HF7A MVCMT THIS CAN BE A ONE MAN CARRY FOR SHORT DISTANCES. IT SEEMS EASIER TO ASSEMBLE IF ONE MAN ASSEMBLES THE RADAR CONES WHILE THE OTHER MAN IS FASTENING THE STIFFENERS. THE CORDS NEED TO BE MADE OF BETTER NYLON, THEY FRAY TOO EASILY.
1152 37110 HF7A SETUPCMT SPLIT THE TASKS. ONE MAN CAN ASSEMBLE THE RADAR REFLECTORS AND START THE POWER WHILE THE OTHER RAISES THE DECOY. THE DECOY IS VERY LIGHT, IT DOES NOT TAKE TWO MEN TO ACTUALLY GET IT UPRIGHT. THE SEQUENCE IS FINE AS IT GOES.
1151 37110 HF7A EMPLCMT MCCD IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO EMPLOY WITH GLOVES. STRAPS ON TRANSPORT BAGS SHOULD BE LONGER.
1150 37110 HF7A PMSCMT STIFFENER LOOPS ARE DIFFICULT TO REPAIR.
1149 37110 HF7A SHCMT SHOULD PAINT STAKES SO THEY CAN BE SEEN. MAYBE ATTACH ENGINEER TAPE OR CHEM LIGHTS WITH BLINDERS, SO THEY CAN ONLY BE SEEN FROM THE REAR. ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO EMPLOY MCCD WITHOUT LIGHT. SHOULD HAVE SOME KIND OF ILLUMINATING PAINT ON THE REAR, FOR EMPLOYING THE STIFFENERS.
1148 37110 HF7A RECCMT VARIOUS ELEMENTS DO NOT PACK EASILY.
1147 37110 HF7A OPCMT EASY TO OPERATE.
1146 37110 HF7A MVCMT BAG IS DIFFICULT TO CARRY. A DUFFLE BAG WITH A LENGTHWISE OPENING WOULD BE MUCH SIMPLER.
1145 37119 HF7A SETUPCMT THE FASTEST TECHNIQUE FOR SETTING UP THE MCCD IS TO KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING.
1144 37119 HF7A PMSCMT THE PMCS WAS DONE TOO OFTEN FOR THE AMOUNT OF TIME IT WAS USED.
1143 37119 HF7A SHCMT THERE WERE NOT ANY MAJOR SAFETY OR HEALTH HAZARDS.
1142 37119 HF7A RECCMT TO RECOVER THE MCCD WAS NOT HARD. BUT WHEN RAINING IT WAS HARD TO RECOVER.
1141 37119 HF7A OPCMT THERE WERE TOO MANY PARTS THAT WERE FALLING OFF THE MCCD DURING OPERATION.
1140 37119 HF7A MVCMT IT WAS NOT HARD TO MOVE OR DEPLOY THE MCCD.
1139 37109 HF7A SETUPCMT YOU MUST HAVE WHEEL ASSETS TO DEPLOY THEM QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY.
1138 37109 HF7A ACREDIMP DURING NIGHT ENGAGEMENTS, IF WE DID NOT COMMIT OURSELVES TOO EARLY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MCCD WORKED 88% OF THE TIME.
1137 37109 HF7A TACTCMT FROM THE TACTICAL SIDE IT WORKS AT NIGHT.
1136 37109 HF7A DOCTCMT FROM THE BATTLES THAT WE FOUGHT, THE MCCD IS A GOOD DECOY AT NIGHT.
1135 37109 HF7A MVCMT WHEN CARRYING THE POWER SUPPLY OVER LONG DISTANCES IS MOST DIFFICULT.
1134 37118 HF7A SETUPCMT ONE TEAM MEMBER WOULD OPEN UP, REMOVE AND START UP THE GENERATOR WHILE THE OTHER MEMBER REMOVED THE IMAGE AND STRETCHED IT OUT FOR SET-UP. BOTH MEMBERS HOOK-UP THE FASTENERS, PUT IN THE ANTENNA, EMPLACE THE STAKES AND ERECT THE MCCD. ONCE IT IS ERECTED, BOTH MEMBERS CONSTRUCT THE RADAR REFLECTORS AND STAKE THEM IN. BOTH MEMBERS PUT THE GENERATOR IN PLACE AND HOOK IT UP.
1133 37118 HF7A TACDOCMT I AM CONCERNED WITH THE FACT THAT AN ACTUAL TANK HAS ANTENNAE TIED DOWN, THE DECOY CAN'T.
1132 37118 HF7A POBLUIMP IMPROVED RESULTS COULD OCCUR WITH PLENTY OF TIME FOR EMPLACEMENT, DELIBERATE DEFENSE VERSUS HASTY DEFENSE.
1131 37118 HF7A ACBLUIMP THE USE OF THE FOUR DECOYS IN A PLATOON SIZED ELEMENT, AS WE DID, GIVES AN APPEARANCE OF TWICE AS MANY VEHICLES. WHICH PUTS THE ODDS IN BLUFOR'S FAVOR, AS FAR AS TAKING HITS.
1130 37118 HF7A POREDIMP THE POTENTIAL IS THE ACTUAL IMPACT MAGNIFIED. WITH TRAINING AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS AND THE DIFFERENCE IN SITUATIONS, THE MCCD COULD WORK REAL WELL.
1129 37118 HF7A ACREDIMP REDFOR REPEATEDLY ENGAGED THE MCCD. FIRING AT A DECOY NOT ONLY GIVES AWAY THEIR POSITION BUT IT EXPENDS THEIR AMMUNITION. BETTER THE MCCD THAN ME.
1128 37118 HF7A EMPLCMT PLACING THE DECOYS IN A PLACE WHERE YOU WOULD PARK A TANK, INTERMINGLING THEM WITH TANKS OR PLACING THEM IN FRONT OR BEHIND.
1127 37118 HF7A TACTCMT PLACING A DECOY IN A PLACE WHERE YOU MIGHT EXPECT TO FIND A REAL TANK. ALSO THE DIFFERENT PLANS OF PLACEMENT TO DIVERT THE ENEMY'S ATTENTION.
1126 37118 HF7A DOCTCMT THE DOCTRINE STATED THE MINIMAL DISTANCE BETWEEN TWO DECOYS OR A DECOY AND A TANK, AND THE TIMES AND PLACES BEST SUITED FOR MCCD USE.
1125 37118 HF7A MVCMT WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE A WHEELED VEHICLE TO MOVE/DEPLOY THE MCCD. WITHOUT THE AID OF A VEHICLE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT TO HAUL THE MCCD AROUND.
1124 37108 HF7A SETUPCMT START WITH THE DECOY, THEN THE HEATERS.
1123 37108 HF7A ACBLUIMP IT WORKS.
1122 37108 HF7A ACREDIMP IT WORKS.
1121 37108 HF7A RECCMT LONGER STRAPS FOR THE HEALIR CARRYING BAG.
1120 37107 HF7A SETUPCMT TEAMWORK.
1119 37107 HF7A ACBLUIMP AT TIMES IT HELPED OUT. SOME PLACES WHERE WE PUT THE MCCD WERE POSITIONS WE WOULD NEVER PUT A REAL TANK.
1118 37107 HF7A POREDIMP IF IT IS DONE RIGHT, IT CAN BE VERY EFFECTIVE.
1117 37107 HF7A ACREDIMP I BELIEVE THEY WERE SECOND GUESSING A LOT.

1116 37107 HF7A EMPLCMT	AT TIMES I DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE DECOYS WERE EMPLOYED IN THE POSITIONS THAT THEY WERE PLACED.
1115 37107 HF7A TACTCMT	WORKED WELL IN DRAWING THE ENEMY IN. MADE ENGAGEMENTS CLOSER BUT VERY SUCCESSFUL.
1114 37106 HF7A SETUPCMT	NONE REALLY, JUST DEPENDS ON THE PEOPLE SETTING IT UP.
1113 37106 HF7A PMSCMT	NO PROBLEMS.
1112 37106 HF7A SHCMT	IN THE DARK OR DAY IN MOPP OR NOT. THE RAIN AND MUD MADE QUITE SLIPPERY. COULD HAVE BEEN QUITE A FEW INJURIES WHEN LUGGING THE DECOY AROUND.
1111 37106 HF7A HFCMT	IN MOPP4 IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE AND PUT TOGETHER THE DECOY. IN THE DARK IT MAKE PEOPLE ANGRY AND READY TO TEAR IT APART.
1110 37106 HF7A RECCMT	WHEN RECOVERING THE DECOY, THE FOLD UP OF THE CANVAS AND TOWER TUBES WOULD BIND, CATCH, AND DIDN'T WANT TO BEND PROPERLY.
1109 37106 HF7A OPCMT	ONLY THING WAS THAT IT TOOK A WHILE FOR THE GENERATOR TO ACTUALLY START. MAYBE A DIFFERENT STARTER SWITCH WOULD BE IN ORDER SO START UP WOULD GO FASTER.
1108 37106 HF7A MVCMT	THE GENERATOR BOX STRAPS MADE IT HARD TO OPEN THE D RINGS WHEN WET OR IF GLOVES WERE USED. ALSO NEITHER OF THE ITEMS WERE A TWO MAN LIFT. IF THERE WAS A NEED TO GO FAST CARRYING THE BAG, IT WOULD TAKE TOO MUCH TIME TO TAKE ONE TO THE SPOT, THEN GO BACK FOR THE OTHER. THE GENERATOR BOX IS HARD TO MOVE BY ONE PERSON.
1107 37117 HF7A SETUPCMT	IT IS FASTEST TO SET UP THE MCCD WHEN YOU HAVE A TWO MAN CREW BECAUSE YOU CAN CHECK ON EACH OTHER.
1106 37117 HF7A EMPLCMT	THE FRONTAL VIEW IS GREAT, BUT IF NOT LOOKING HEAD ON, THE ENEMY WILL KNOW IT IS A DECOY.
1105 37117 HF7A PMSCMT	OPERATOR PMCS, TROUBLESHOOTING, AND MAINTENANCE SHOULD NOT BE DONE ON THE LINE. IF IN THE REAR, GREAT.
1104 37117 HF7A RECCMT	FOR RECOVERY/REPACKING TIME IS THE KEY. IT SHOULDN'T TAKE 15 MINUTES TO BE READY TO MOVE.
1103 37117 HF7A OPCMT	IN THE MANUAL IT SAID TO STORE THE DECOY DRY, A LOT OF TIMES THERE ISN'T TIME TO DRY IT.
1102 37117 HF7A MVCMT	THE MCCD DECOY ITSELF IS TOO BULKY.
1101 37105 HF7A SETUPCMT	START THE GENERATOR FIRST IN ORDER FOR IT TO WARM UP AND THEN SET UP THE IMAGE ASSEMBLY.
1100 37105 HF7A ACBLUIMP	DECOY IS EFFECTIVE. BUT TIME IS NEEDED TO SET IT UP AND TIME TO SET IT UP IN A HASTY DEFENSE MIGHT NOT BE ADEQUATE.
1099 37105 HF7A POREDIMP	I FEEL THE MCCD COULD BE USEFUL AND WOULD HELP DRAW FIRE AWAY FROM THE ACTUAL VEHICLES. I THINK IT COULD HELP SAVE LIVES! DRAW FIRE!
1098 37105 HF7A ACREDIMP	THE DECOY SEEMED TO WORK FAIRLY WELL AT NIGHT BUT WAS LESS EFFECTIVE IN DAY OPERATIONS.
1097 37105 HF7A EMPLCMT	SETTING THE DECOY UP AS THOUGH IT WERE A REAL TANK ADDED TO THE EFFECTIVENESS, ESPECIALLY CAMOFLAGING AND HULL-DOWN POSITIONS.
1096 37105 HF7A TACTCMT	MCCD PROVED TO BE EFFECTIVE ON SEVERAL BATTLES, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. THE DECOY AIDED IN SHIFTING THE ENEMY IN THE WRONG DIRECTION AND IN TURN WE WERE ABLE TO SHOOT THE OPFOR IN THE FLANKS.
1095 37105 HF7A DOCTCMT	AT OPERATOR LEVEL I HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE TACTICS. I JUST SET IT UP AS WE WERE INSTRUCTED. NIGHT PLAYERS SEEMED BETTER THAN DAY OPERATIONS.
1094 37116 HF7A SETUPCMT	I FEEL THAT THE FASTEST TECHNIQUE FOR SETTING UP THE MCCD IS THAT EACH PERSON DOES EXACTLY HALF OF THE MCCD THEN GOES TO THE RADAR REFLECTORS.
1093 37116 HF7A PMSCMT	OPERATOR PMCS, TROUBLESHOOTING, AND MAINTENANCE WOULD BE BETTER IF YOU COULD GET RID OF THE TWENTY SCREWS.
1092 37116 HF7A RECCMT	RECOVERY/REPACKING WOULD BE EASIER IF THERE WAS A SEPARATE BAG FOR ALL LOOSE PARTS.
1091 37116 HF7A OPCMT	OPERATING THE MCCD IS EASY ENOUGH.
1090 37104 HF7A SETUPCMT	NEVER DID IT TAKE SAME WAY TWICE; START GEN, SET UP IMAGE, CONNECT MANIFOLD.
1089 37104 HF7A POBLUIMP	GOOD DEPENDING EMPLOYMENT.
1088 37104 HF7A ACBLUIMP	REDUCES TIME FOR OTHER IMPORTANT DEFENSIVE TASKS.
1087 37104 HF7A POREDIMP	WAS GOOD DEPENDING ON EMPLOYMENT.
1086 37104 HF7A ACREDIMP	THEY SHOT THEM A LOT; SOMETIMES HARD.
1085 37104 HF7A EMPLCMT	THIS WORKED MOST OF THE TIME. GOOD OVERALL.
1084 37104 HF7A TACTCMT	GOOD.
1083 37104 HF7A DOCTCMT	SEEMS TO BE EFFICIENT IN GETTING GUNNER'S ATTENTION.
1082 37104 HF7A PMSCMT	GLUE DOESN'T HOLD WHEN IT GETS WET, REPAIR KIT EASY TO LOSE. NEEDS MORE TOOLS.
1081 37104 HF7A HFCMT	HEATER & MCCD BUCKS FOR CARRYING TO SITE.
1080 37104 HF7A RECCMT	FOLDING IMAGE USUALLY TEARS IMAGE.
1079 37104 HF7A OPCMT	DIFFICULT IN DARK IN MOPP4.
1078 37104 HF7A MVCMT	USE OF WHEELED VEHICLES IS GOOD FOR MOVING.
1077 37103 HF7A TRADQCMT	I DIDN'T SET IT UP THAT MUCH.
1075 37103 HF7A TACTCMT	IT MADE THE ENEMY LOOK AWAY FROM US AND GAVE US GOOD FLANK SHOTS.
1074 37103 HF7A DOCTCMT	IT WORKED AT NIGHT LIKE IT WAS SUPPOSED TO, BUT NOT TOO MUCH DURING THE DAY.
1073 37103 HF7A PMSCMT	IT'S GOOD TO DO IT BECAUSE THE DECOY FALLS APART EASY AFTER AWHILE.
1072 37103 HF7A MVCMT	ONE PERSON CARRY IS FINE, BUT IF YOU'RE IN A HURRY, ONE PERSON IS JUST AS GOOD AND FASTER.

1071 3702 HF7A SETUPCMT SET UP IMAGE FIRST, THE HEATER USE, TECHNIQUES, I.E. ONE PERSON ALWAYS TIGHTENS THE STRAPS OR TURNS HEATER ON.

1070 3702 HF7A POBLUIMP DEFINITELY WILL HELP.

1069 3702 HF7A ACBLUIMP VERY GOOD, USEFUL PIECE OF EQUIPMENT.

1068 3702 HF7A POREDIMP REDUCES EFFECTIVENESS OF REDFOR. THEY DEPLOYED EARLY GIVING US FLANK SHOTS, MCCD IS MORE EFFECTIVE AT NIGHT.

1067 3702 HF7A ACREDIMP VERY EFFECTIVE, THEY SHOT THEM ALL THE TIME.

1066 3702 HF7A EMPLCMT TOO HOT WITH THE HEATER ON. EVEN WITH ALL PORTS CLOSED. RECOMMEND NOT ALWAYS USING THE HEATER.

1065 3702 HF7A TACTCMT GOOD, MCCD CAN ALWAYS HELP.

1064 3702 HF7A DOCTCMT MORE TRAINING FOR LEADERS IN PROPER DEPLOYMENT FOR MCCD.

1063 3702 HF7A MVCMT DIFFICULT WITHOUT A WHEELED VEHICLE.

1062 37101 HF7A SETUPCMT FULL TEAM LAY OUT MCCD, ONE PERSON MOVE TO RADAR REFLECTORS WHILE OTHER PERSON OPENS ALL STIFFENERS AND TIGHTENS STRAPS, ENT, GUY WIRES ETC. BOTH RAISE DECOY, ONE STAKE IT DOWN WHILE OTHER PREPS HEATER.

1061 37101 HF7A POBLUIMP IT SEEMS TO ME THE ACTUAL IMPACT ON BLUEFOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS WASN'T AS HIGH AS I THOUGHT THE POTENTIAL WOULD BE.

1059 37101 HF7A ACREDIMP THE REDFOR SEEMED TO FALL FOR THE DECOY AT NIGHT MORE THAN IN THE DAY.

1058 37101 HF7A TACTCMT SOMETIMES THEY WORKED, SOMETIMES THEY DIDN'T.

1056 37100 HF7A SETUPCMT GO BY THE BOOK.

1055 37100 HF7A TACDOCMT I HAVE NONE. I DON'T WRITE THE DOCTRINE. I'M AN E-3.

1054 37100 HF7A POREDIMP I FEEL IF THEY DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING LIKE THEY JUST CAME OFF THE PLAIN, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE.

1053 37100 HF7A ACREDIMP HELPED AT NIGHT. DAY WASN'T AS EFFICIENT.

1052 37100 HF7A EMPLCMT I FEEL IT COULD HAVE IMPROVED MATERIAL, CORDS AND BRACES. I WOULDN'T PAY \$10,000 FOR IT.

1051 37100 HF7A DOCTCMT I FEEL WE DID A GOOD JOB AT USING THE DECOY LATER ON IN THE TEST. THE FIRST TIME WE USED IT WE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO DO.

1050 37100 HF7A PMSCMT NEED MORE SPARE PARTS. EASY TO TROUBLESHOOT.

1049 37100 HF7A HFCMT WHEN WE LOOKED AT THE DECOY IT WAS GLOWING TOO BRIGHT.

1048 35219 HF5B INTERCMT I REALLY HAD NO INTERFERENCE. ALL MY SYSTEMS WORKED WELL.

1047 35219 HF5B MVCMT ON THE MOVE IT TOOK MORE TIME TO IDENTIFY TARGETS BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS BOUNCING BUT, YOU COULD TELL THE DIFFERENCE FAIRLY QUICKLY. I FEEL THE DECOY IS GOOD FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH. IF DEPLOYED DURING COMBAT, IT WOULD MAKE ME TURN MY TURRET WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ENEMY THAT EXTRA SECOND OR TWO TO KILL ME.

1046 35219 HF5B SRCMT AT THE SHORT RANGE IT TOOK MORE TIME TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. DURING THE DAY THE SHAPE AND COLOR PLAYED A BIG ROLE BECAUSE THE "OBJECT" WOULD BE A DIFFERENT COLOR GREEN AND THE SHAPE OF THE TURRET WAS MORE ROUNDED. AT NIGHT THE HEAT SIGNATURE GAVE IT AWAY.

1045 35219 HF5B MRCMT AT THE MEDIUM RANGE IT TOOK MORE TIME TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. DURING THE DAY THE SHAPE AND COLOR PLAYED A BIG ROLE BECAUSE THE "OBJECT" WOULD BE A DIFFERENT COLOR GREEN AND THE SHAPE OF THE TURRET WAS MORE ROUNDED. AT NIGHT THE HEAT SIGNATURE GAVE IT AWAY.

1044 35219 HF5B LRCMT AT THE LONG RANGE IT TOOK MORE TIME TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. DURING THE DAY THE SHAPE AND COLOR PLAYED A BIG ROLE BECAUSE THE "OBJECT" WOULD BE A DIFFERENT COLOR GREEN AND THE SHAPE OF THE TURRET WAS MORE ROUNDED. AT NIGHT THE HEAT SIGNATURE GAVE IT AWAY.

1043 35217 HF5B SRCMT AT CLOSE RANGE YOU CAN PICK UP DECOY IN THAT DISTANCE.

1042 35217 HF5B MRCMT SOME TIMES YOU CAN MAKE OUT TARGET ON MEDIUM RANGE.

1041 35217 HF5B LRCMT NOT SURE FROM LONG DISTANCES.

1040 35216 HF5B LRCMT DURING DAY LIGHT AT LONG RANGE THESE DECOYS CAN BE HELPFUL. ALSO VS AN ENEMY WHO HAS NEVER EXPERIENCED THEM BEFORE. AS RANGE DECREASES OR AT NIGHT, THESE DECOYS HAVE LITTLE VALUE AGAINST AN EXPERIENCED CREW.

1039 35215 HF5B MVCMT ON THE MOVE THE DECOYS WORK BECAUSE OF TIME ON TARGET.

1038 35215 HF5B SRCMT AT THE SHORT RANGE THE DECOYS ARE NOT VERY GOOD.

1037 35215 HF5B MRCMT AT THE MEDIUM RANGE YOU START TO TELL THE DECOYS.

1036 35215 HF5B LRCMT AT THE LONG RANGE THE DECOYS ARE VERY EFFECTIVE.

1035 35214 HF5B INTERCMT ALL OF THESE INTERFERENCES ARE PART OF NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE AND ARE JUST SOMETHING TO BE DEALT WITH.

1034 35214 HF5B LRCMT AT NIGHT, SIGNATURE, TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST AND THERMAL IMAGE ARE THE ONLY WAYS TO IDENTIFY THE TARGET. IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION THEY WILL SEE YOU PRETTY MUCH AT THE SAME TIME. IF THEY DON'T SEE YOU FIRST AND MOVE YOU INTO A TRIGGER LINE.

1033 35211 HF5B SRCMT SAME AS MEDIUM RANGE EXCEPT FOR NOW YOU CAN TELL SOME THINGS ARE A WHOLE NOW INSTEAD OF BEING SEPARATED.

1032 35211 HF5B MRCMT AT THIS RANGE (MEDIUM) DURING DAY TRIALS THE TARGET WAS TOO PERFECT. SOMETIMES THE THERMAL WOULD PICK UP SEVERAL DIFFERENT OUTLINES AT NIGHT. ALSO THE COLOR OF THE DECOYS DIFFERED FROM THE REAL TANKS DUE TO THE TERRAIN THEY HAD TO GO THROUGH GETTING INTO POSITION.

1031 35211 HF5B LRCMT AT LONG RANGE THE DECOYS INITIALLY WERE EFFECTIVE. HOWEVER, THE LONGER THE TEST WENT ON THE EASIER IT BECAME TO IDENTIFY DECOYS AT LONGER RANGES. (LEARNING EFFECT).

1030 35119 HF5A YGTCMT THE HEAT SIGNATURE WAS TOO EVENLY DISTRIBUTED. ON A REAL TANK SOME PARTS ARE HOTTER THAN OTHERS. HEATER EXHAUST, ROAD WHEELS, CREW SERVED WEAPONS, TRACK AND SOME PARTS OF THE TURRET WOULD BE HOTTER THAN OTHER PARTS.

1029 35119 HF5A INTERCMT FOR THE MOST PART, I HAD NO TROUBLE IN TELLING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN REAL OR DECOY.

1028 35119 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED A TARGET I FELT WAS A DECOY BECAUSE THE DECOY WOULD BE BEHIND A TREE OR ROCK AND ALL I COULD SEE WAS A "HOT SPOT" SO I WOULD ENGAGE IT. BETTER TO BE SAFE THAN SORRY. THIS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 3 TIMES.

1027 35119 HF5A FFCMT DURING THE DAY TRIAL I WOULD PICK UP AN "OBJECT" AND TURN MY TURRET TOWARDS IT. IT WOULD TAKE A SPLIT SECOND FOR ME TO DETERMINE THAT IT WAS A DECOY. DURING THE NIGHT TRIAL IT WOULD TAKE ME A LITTLE LONGER TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY, BUT I COULD TELL THE DIFFERENCE BECAUSE OF "EVEN" HEAT SIGNATURE.

1026 35209 HF5B INTERCMT AS THE DRIVER DURING FORCE ON FORCE I PLAYED A MINIMAL PART IN TARGET IDENTIFICATION.

1025 35209 HF5B MVCMT DURING THE FORCE ON FORCE I COULDN'T REALLY TELL THE VEHICLES APART BEING IN THE DRIVER'S HATCH.

1024 35209 HF5B LRCMT EVEN AT THE LONG RANGE, THE DAYTIME VIEW OF THE DECOYS SHOWED THEIR AWKWARD SHADE AND COLOR WHILE AT NIGHT THE VEHICLES SEEMED MORE EFFECTIVE.

1023 35118 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS THAT I FELT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE AT NIGHT IT IS A LITTLE HARDER TO TELL IF IT WAS A REAL OR DECOY TARGET. THIS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 3 TIMES.

1022 35118 HF5A FFCMT THE COLOR HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY. AFTER BEING IN THE FIELD FOR A WHILE OUR TANKS WERE MORE OF A TAN COLOR BECAUSE OF THE MUD.

1021 35118 HF5A FFOTHCMT SOMETIMES THE DECOY IS IN A POSITION WHERE I WOULD NOT EXPECT A TANK TO BE. IT HELPED ME TO DECIDE IF IT IS REAL OR DECOY.

1020 35117 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED 4 TARGETS THAT I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE ON LONG RANGE WHEN I PICK UP A TARGET AND I'M NOT SURE WHAT IT IS, I WILL ENGAGE IT. IN A REAL LIFE SITUATION, THERE IS NO CHANGE.

1019 35207 HF5B MVCMT SOMETIMES COULD NOT ID BECAUSE OF BACKGROUND AND ANGLE OF DECOY.

1018 35207 HF5B SRCMT ON A CLEAR DAY COULD ID BECAUSE OF TARGET BACKGROUND, COLOR AND SHAPE.

1017 35207 HF5B MRCMT COULD ID MOST OF TIME BECAUSE OF SHAPE AND BACKGROUND OF TARGET.

1016 35207 HF5B LRCMT FROM LONG RANGE COULD NOT ID IF REAL OR DECOY.

1015 35116 HF5A TGTCMT AT LONG DISTANCE THE DECOYS LOOK LIKE BIG HOT BOXES WITH NO HEAT DEFINITION. THEY WERE HOT, BRIGHT, RED. THEY HAD NO CORNERS, ANGLES, PEOPLE, WATER CANS, OR ANY THINGS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT TEMPERATURES.

1014 35116 HF5A FFENGCMT WE ENGAGED TARGETS WE THOUGHT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD TO ENGAGE EVERYTHING. ALSO, IN COMBAT, YOU NEVER KNOW WHAT IT MAY REALLY BE. THIS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 5-6 TIMES.

1013 35205 HF5B INTERCMT GETTING ON A TRACK WITH POOR SIGHTS CAUSED PROBLEMS WITH IDENTIFYING TARGETS.

1012 35205 HF5B SRCMT AT SHORT RANGE IT WAS MUCH EASIER TO SEE THE BALLOON SHAPE OF THE DECOYS AND THEIR EXTREMELY BRIGHT COLORS.

1011 35115 HF5A INTERCMT HEAT, THE THERMAL IMAGERY IS DARKER.

1010 35115 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS THAT I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE THE CHAIN OF COMMAND ENCOURAGED SHOOTING EVERYTHING. THIS OCCURRED APPROXIMATELY 10 TIMES.

1009 35115 HF5A FFCMT THE TARGET BACKGROUND HELPED GIVE AWAY THE DECOYS BECAUSE THEY WERE PUT UP ON THE SIDE OF A HILL. COLOR WAS DARKER. THEY SHOULD HAVE BROKEN UP THE SHAPE. SIGNATURE WAS DARKER.

1008 35114 HF5A TGTCMT MANY TIMES WE DESTROYED DECOYS BECAUSE OF COMPANY S.O.P., TOTALLY CLEAN THE AREA, JUST TO BE SAFE.

1007 35114 HF5A INTERCMT ALL OF THESE FACTORS ARE A PART OF THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE VEHICLE IN THE EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENT. EXAMPLE, DUST CAN GIVE THIS ENEMY AWAY AS WELL AS OBSERVING THE TARGET.

1006 35114 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS I FELT WERE DECOYS AT NIGHT TO GET THEM OUT OF THE WAY, TO CLEAR THE AREA. I DID THIS IN EVERY TRIAL.

1005 35114 HF5A FFCMT THE DECOYS LOOKED REAL AT EXTREME DISTANCES (LONG RANGE), BUT CLOSE UP THEY JUST LOOKED LIKE PICTURES OF TANKS.

1004 35203 HF5B MVCMT DECOY LOOKS LIKE A TANK THRU THERMAL.

1003 35203 HF5B SRCMT SHAPE OF DECOY NOT SLOPED AS TANK OR BRADLEY. DECOY MOVES UNDER WINDY CONDITION.

1002 35203 HF5B MRCMT SHAPE OF DECOY NOT SLOPED AS TANK OR BRADLEY, DECOY MOVES UNDER WINDY CONDITION.

1001 35203 HF5B LRCMT COLOR ON DECOY IS NOT REAL LOOKING AS TANKS. SHAPE OF DECOY IS NOT SLOPED AS REAL BRADLEY OR TANK.

1000 35113 HF5A TGTCMT THE DECOY NEEDS TO BE 3-DIMENSIONAL.

999 35113 HF5A FFCMT AT A DISTANCE IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO TELL IF TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.

998 35201 HF5B INTERCMT THERE WAS A LOT OF WASTED TIME DURING THE WHOLE TEST. IT SEEMED LIKE IT WAS PLANNED OUT. IT WAS HURRY UP AND WAIT.

997 35201 HF5B MVCMT MOST IMPORTANT DAYTIME IS THE SHAPE OF THE DECOY. IT'S BIGGER THAN THE REAL VEHICLES. NIGHTTIME: IT'S THE HEAT SIGNATURE THAT GAVE THE VEHICLES AWAY. THE

DECOYS WERE HEATED UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE.

996 35201 HF5B SRCMT MOST IMPORTANT DAYTIME IS THE SHAPE OF THE DECOY. IT'S BIGGER THAN THE REAL VEHICLES. NIGHTTIME: IT'S THE HEAT SIGNATURE THAT GAVE THE VEHICLES AWAY. THE DECOYS WERE HEATED UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE.

995 35201 HF5B MRCMT MOST IMPORTANT DAYTIME IS THE SHAPE OF THE DECOY. IT'S BIGGER THAN THE REAL VEHICLES. NIGHTTIME: IT'S THE HEAT SIGNATURE THAT GAVE THE VEHICLES AWAY. THE DECOYS WERE HEATED UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE.

994 35201 HF5B LRCMT MOST IMPORTANT DAYTIME IS THE SHAPE OF THE DECOY. IT'S BIGGER THAN THE REAL VEHICLES. NIGHTTIME: IT'S THE HEAT SIGNATURE THAT GAVE THE VEHICLES AWAY. THE DECOYS WERE HEATED UP LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE.

993 35112 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS ABOUT 3 TIMES BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD TO ENGAGE ALL TARGETS.

992 35200 HF5B MVCMT SPEED OF MOVEMENT AND ROUGHNESS OF TERRAIN. VIEWING THE CREW ON THE REAL TANKS, OFTEN YOU WOULD PICK THE PEOPLE BEFORE YOU WOULD SEE THE TANKS.

991 35111 HF5A TGTCMT THE ONLY THING I THINK MIGHT HAVE MADE IT A LITTLE BETTER IS IF THE DECOYS WERE MIXED IN WITH THE REAL TANKS.

990 35111 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS THAT I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD TO ENGAGE ALL TARGETS UNTIL THE LAST PART OF PHASE 3. A LOT OF THE TIME WE WOULD STOP IN THE RECORDER LETTING THEM KNOW IT'S DECOY WE ARE GOING TO ENGAGE. THIS HAPPENED ABOUT 12 TIMES.

989 35111 HF5A FFCMT DURING FORCE ON FORCE WE DISCOVERED THE DECOYS HAD TO BE PLACED IN CERTAIN AREAS WHEREAS THE REAL TANKS WERE ALL OVER THE HILLS. DECOYS WERE IN MORE OPEN AREAS, MORE OBVIOUS.

988 35111 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE POSITION OF THE TARGET SOMETIMES MADE IT EASIER TO DISCERN IF TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.

987 35110 HF5A INTERCMT THE SUN GLARE HELPED TO DISTINGUISH TARGETS. THERMAL IMAGERY, IF THE THERMALS WERE NOT GOOD IT WOULD BE HARD TO DISTINGUISH. MAGNIFICATION LEVEL OF OPTICS, THE FARTHER AWAY THE DECOY IS THE BETTER IT IS.

986 35110 HF5A FFENGCMT DUE TO THE FACT THAT SOMETIMES WE ARE MOVING SO FAST YOU DON'T HAVE TIME TO HESITATE WHETHER THE TARGET IS REAL OR DECOY. SO I ENGAGED TARGETS I THOUGHT MIGHT BE DECOYS.

985 35110 HF5A FFCMT TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST AND COLOR MADE THE TARGETS STAND OUT CLEAR IN FIELD-OF-VIEW. THE SHAPE APPEARS SMALLER AND 2-DIMENSIONAL. IF YOU CAME FROM THE FLANK OF THE DECOY (AT AN ANGLE) IT WAS A GIVE-AWAY BECAUSE YOU COULD SEE IT WASN'T 3-DIMENSIONAL. THE SUN CAUSES A REFLECTION OFF THE FACE OF THE DECOY. THE IR HEAT SIGNATURE IS EXTREMELY "HOT", IT IS REAL BRIGHT ON THE IR THERMALS.

984 35110 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE HEAT SIGNATURE ALWAYS HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.

983 35109 HF5A FFCMT AS A DRIVER I COULD ONLY HELP MY CREW BY TELLING THEM WHERE THE REAL VEHICLES WERE BY THE GUNFIRE FLASHES I SAW THROUGH MY PERISCOPES.

982 35109 HF5A FFOTHCMT IF VEHICLE WAS FIRING, IT ALWAYS HELPED ME TO DECIDE IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.

981 35108 HF5A FFCMT I SAW THE TARGET MOVING AND THE TRACK RUNNING. I ALSO SAW EXHAUST HEAT AND DUST WHICH HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF THE TARGET WERE REAL OR NOT.

980 35107 HF5A TGTCMT THE COLOR OF THE TARGET ON A BRIGHT DAY HELPED ME TO DECIDE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY.

979 35107 HF5A INTERCMT DURING PHASE 1 AT LONG RANGE I COULD NOT DECIDE BECAUSE THE RAIN AND FOG PREVENTED ME FROM SEEING THE TARGET CLEARLY.

978 35107 HF5A INOTHCMT THE RAIN INTERFERRED WITH MY ABILITY TO IDENTIFY TARGETS AS REAL OR DECOY.

977 35107 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS THAT I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS APPROXIMATELY 10 TIMES BECAUSE OF RANGE TO TARGET. I COULD NOT DECIDE MOST OF THE TIME AT NIGHT AT LONG RANGE AND BACKGROUND.

976 35107 HF5A FFCMT THE HEAT SIGNATURE AND BRIGHT GREEN COLOR WHEN DECOY WAS HEATED LOOKED LIKE A GUNNERY TARGET.

975 35106 HF5A TGTCMT HEAT SIGNATURES ARE TOO PERFECT AND UNIFORM ON THE DECOYS.

974 35106 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED A TARGET I FELT WAS A DECOY BECAUSE WE WERE TOLD TO SHOOT ALL TARGETS REGARDLESS OF THEIR NATURE.

973 35106 HF5A FFCMT DECOYS ARE ONLY EFFECTIVE IF THEY ARE SEEN. SO THEY ARE PUT UP IN SPOTS WHERE THEY CAN BE EASILY SEEN. TANKS ARE ALWAYS HIDDEN AS GOOD AS POSSIBLE, SO IF A TARGET WAS OUT IN THE OPEN, OR NOT IN A GOOD DEFENSIVE FIGHTING POSITION, WE KNEW IT WAS A DECOY.

972 35105 HF5A FFENGCMT ONCE WHEN WE WERE 10 METERS AWAY FROM A DECOY WE ENGAGED IT JUST FOR THE SPORT OF IT. WE DID KNOW THAT IT WAS A DECOY. I DID THIS ONCE.

971 35105 HF5A FFCMT IF TIME ALLOWED YOU COULD STOP YOUR TRACK AND LISTEN FOR THE SOUND OF THE TANKS ENGINE WAS RUNNING.

970 35105 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE MOVEMENT OF THE TARGET ALWAYS HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF THE TARGET WERE REAL OR DECOY.

969 35104 HF5A TGTCMT ONE TIME I DROVE RIGHT PAST TWO OF THEM AT ABOUT 200 METERS AND DIDN'T SEE THEM. IT MADE ME THINK DECOYS ARE NO GOOD UNLESS THEY ARE SEEN.

968 35104 HF5A FFENGCMT APPROXIMATELY 3 TIMES I ENGAGED A TARGET I THOUGHT WAS A DECOY BECAUSE WE WERE

967 35104 HF5A FFCMT ENGAGING EVERY HOT SPOT WE SAW.
AFTER A WHILE YOU COULD TELL INSTANTLY WHETHER OR NOT THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY. PROBABLY BECAUSE WE DID SO MANY BATTLES.

966 35103 HF5A TGTCTM DECOY PLACEMENT GAVE YOU A FULL PICTURE TO SHOOT AT. WHILE REAL TANKS WERE WELL CAMOUFLAGED.

965 35103 HF5A FFENGCMT TWICE I ENGAGED A TARGET I THOUGHT WAS A DECOY, I DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO TAKE A CHANCE IF IT WAS REAL.

964 35103 HF5A FFCMT DECOYS WERE ALWAYS PLACED WHERE THEY WERE VERY EASY TO SEE.

963 35103 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE PLACEMENT OF THE TARGET ALWAYS HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.

962 35102 HF5A TGTCTM SOMETIMES THE DECOY APPEARS TO PUT OFF MORE HEAT THAN THE TANK OR MORE OF A GLOW (CLEAR). SOMETIMES THEY HAD A PROP EFFECT.

961 35102 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS I FELT WERE DECOYS 50% OF THE TIME. THEY WERE INITIALLY IDENTIFIED AS A THREAT TARGET.

960 35102 HF5A FFCMT SOMETIMES DECOYS WOULD BE LOCATED ON A SLOPE THAT A TANK COULD NOT BE LOCATED ON, OR THERE WOULDN'T BE ANY TRACKS LEADING UP TO THE DECOY. ALSO THE REAL TANK ALMOST ALWAYS HAS SOMETHING THAT BREAKS THE OUTLINE, IE: A SWAYING ANTENNA OR SOMETHING.

959 35102 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE LOCATION OF THE TARGET HELPED ME TO DECIDE IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY.

958 35101 HF5A TGTCTM THE DECOY DOES NOT MOVE, WHICH IS THE BIGGEST GIVE-AWAY. IF THEY COULD MAKE IT MOVE SOMEHOW, IT WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC.

957 35101 HF5A FFENGCMT I ENGAGED TARGETS I FELT WERE DECOYS BECAUSE I WAS ORDERED TO SHOOT EVERYTHING IN THE AREA, REAL OR DECOY. THIS HAPPENED A LOT.

956 35101 HF5A FFCMT THE LIVE MIAS WERE DOING BERM DRILLS, SO YOU KNEW THAT IF THE ENEMY WAS STATIONARY, IT WAS A DECOY.

955 35101 HF5A FFOTHCMT THE MOVEMENT OF THE TARGETS ALWAYS HELPED ME TO DISCERN IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY.

954 35100 HF5A INTERCMT IF YOU ARE TRAVELING TOO FAST OVER ROUGH TERRAIN IT IS HARD TO KEEP A STEADY SIGHT PICTURE. YOUR HEAD KEEPS MOVING AROUND.

953 35100 HF5A INOTHCMT SPEEDING AND MOVEMENT INTERFERRED WITH MY ABILITY TO ID TARGETS AS REAL OR DECOY.

952 35100 HF5A FFENGCMT I WAS TOLD TO ENGAGE TARGETS THAT I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS THROUGH MOST OF THE TRIAL. ON THE LAST NIGHT I SAW SEVERAL DECOYS ON THE HILL, I WAS BEING FIRED AT BY AN UNKNOWN SOURCE SO I DECIDED TO SHOOT AT ALL THE HOT SPOTS, EVEN THE DECOYS TO RULE THEM OUT SO WE COULD SEARCH FOR REAL TANKS.

951 35100 HF5A FFCMT A COUPLE OF TIMES, THERE WERE MCCDS IN PLACES WHERE A M1 COULD NOT GO.

950 35100 HF5A FFOTHCMT SOMETIMES THE LOCATION HELPS TO DISCERN WHETHER THE TARGET IS REAL OR DECOY.

949 37038 HF7 RPKPCMT EASILY LOST SOME COMPONENTS AT NIGHT AND IN MOPP4.

948 37039 HF7 SHDEPLOY TWO MEN CARRYING TWO PIECES DOESN'T WORK WELL OVER LONG DISTANCES, MAKES FOR TWO TRIPS.

947 37043 HF7 PROCCMT OPERATOR PMCS MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS.

946 37043 HF7 LABELCMT NEVER NOTICED ANY WARNING LABELS OR STICKERS.

945 37043 HF7 TWORQCMT TWO SOLDIER REQUIREMENT IS APPROPRIATE FOR ASSEMBLY, TWO SOLDIER MOVEMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE. ONE SOLDIER CAN MOVE IT.

944 37044 HF7 LABELCMT SAFETY IS SELF EVIDENT.

943 37044 HF7 TWORQCMT IT'S AWKWARD, BUT MCCD CAN BE LIFTED BY ONE MAN. ONE MAN CAN ALSO DO SETUP.

942 37047 HF7 LABELCMT THERE AREN'T MANY THINGS THAT COULD GO WRONG & CAUSE AN EMERGENCY ANYWAY.

941 37047 HF7 TWORQCMT ONE SOLDIER IS NOT ENOUGH AND THREE SOLDIERS ARE TOO MANY.

940 37036 HF7 TWORQCMT ONLY FOR SHORT DISTANCES.

939 37045 HF7 TWORQCMT TEAM WORK AND IDENTIFYING BEFOREHAND WHO DOES WHAT WORKS JUST FINE.

938 37052 HF7 INSCMT I HONESTLY DIDN'T NOTICE ANY OF THE DECALS. THE BOOK IS SUFFICIENT & WITHIN DAYS TANK STEPS ARE MEMORIZED.

937 37052 HF7 TWORQCMT THIS IS ALL YOU COULD AFFORD TO USE. THIS LEAVES A TANK CREW WITH 50% STRENGTH LEFT ON THE TANK.

934 37052 HF7 ASBCMT USED ALL THE GLUE. NEED TO HAVE AN ADDITIONAL TUBE.

933 37051 HF7 KITCMT CONTINUALLY RUNNING OUT OF GLUE FOR REPAIRS. THERE WAS NO RESUPPLY ON REPAIR KITS.

932 37051 HF7 PMCSMT DECOY PRONE TO TEARS IN HOSES & ON BACK OF IMAGE.

931 37050 HF7 KITCMT NOT ENOUGH MATERIAL.

930 37050 HF7 PMCSMT DECOY IS ALWAYS RIPPED. REPAIR KIT DOES NOT CONTAIN ENOUGH REPAIR MATERIAL.

929 37050 HF7 CONCERNS DECOY IS CONSTANTLY GETTING RIPS AND TEARS FROM BEING TAKEN DOWN AND FOLDED UP. (REPAIR KIT CAN HANDLE THE TEARS).

928 37050 HF7 DASBPCMT STILL NO RESUPPLY ON REPAIR KITS.

927 37050 HF7 ASBCMT DECOY IS WOBBLY AND LOOSE FROM BEING PUT UP AND DOWN.

926 37049 HF7 DASBPCMT CARRYING BAG SHOULD HAVE POCKETS FOR ANTENNA AND STAKES SO THEY CAN BE EASILY FOUND AND REPAIRED AND ACCOUNTED FOR. THE SAME FOR THE RADAR REFLECTORS.

925 37049 HF7 DASBCMT NEED TO FIND A WAY TO PUT THE MCCD ON A TANK (LOAD PLAN).

924 37049 HF7 DEPLCMT MCCD SHOULD BE MADE SO IT CAN BE CARRIED BY ONE CREWMAN TO SAVE TIME.

923 37049 HF7 TWORQCMT MCCD SHOULD BE MADE SO IT CAN BE CARRIED BY ONE CREWMAN TO SAVE TIME.

922 37049 HF7 ASBCMT CARRYING BAG SHOULD HAVE POCKETS FOR ANTENNA AND STAKES SO THEY CAN BE EASILY FOUND AND REPAIRED AND ACCOUNTED FOR. THE SAME FOR THE THE RADAR REFLECTORS.

921 37049 HF7	ASBGCMT	CARRYING BAG SHOULD HAVE POCKETS FOR ANTENNA AND STAKES SO THEY CAN BE EASILY FOUND AND REPAIRED AND ACCOUNTED FOR. THE SAME FOR THE RADAR REFLECTORS.
920 37049 HF7	MVCMT	MCCD SHOULD BE MADE SO IT CAN BE CARRIED BY ONE CREWMAN TO SAVE TIME.
919 37047 HF7	KITCMT	ADEQUATE UNTIL IT RUNS OUT.
918 37047 HF7	MAINTCMT	THEY COVER EVERYTHING WE CAN REPAIR AT OUR LEVEL.
917 37047 HF7	PROCCMT	THEY COVER EVERYTHING NEEDED TO CHECK.
916 37047 HF7	PMSCSMT	TOO MANY SCREWS.
914 37047 HF7	HFECMT	IMPROVEMENTS COULD DEFINITELY BE MADE, BUT IT'S ADEQUATE.
913 37047 HF7	OPPROB	WHEN IN THE DEFENSE, A TANK'S ANTENNAE ARE FIRED DOWN; BUT THE DECOY ANTENNAE AREN'T MEANT TO BE TIED DOWN.
911 37047 HF7	ASBCMT	THE 2 PIECE ANTENNA OFTEN FALLS APART WHEN ERECTING THE DECOY. THE REPAIR KIT CONTINUALLY SPILLS ITS CONTENTS.
910 37046 HF7	RPKCMT	A LOT OF THE CORDS WERE BREAKING, WHEN YOU TAKE EVERYTHING OUT OF THE BAG, THE REPAIR KIT SEEMS TO OPEN UP AND EVERYTHING FALLS OUT.
909 37046 HF7	DASBCMT	A LOT OF THE CORDS WERE BREAKING, WHEN YOU TAKE EVERYTHING OUT OF THE BAG, THE REPAIR KIT SEEMS TO OPEN UP AND EVERYTHING FALLS OUT.
908 37046 HF7	ASBCMT	A LOT OF THE CORDS WERE BREAKING, WHEN YOU TAKE EVERYTHING OUT OF THE BAG, THE REPAIR KIT SEEMS TO OPEN UP AND EVERYTHING FALLS OUT.
907 37046 HF7	ASBODES	ELASTIC CORDS.
906 37046 HF7	ASBGCMT	HARD TO SEE WITH MASK ON.
905 37046 HF7	MVCMT	HARD TO SEE WITH MASK ON.
904 37045 HF7	PMSCSMT	NO SUCCESS PATCHING THE IMAGE ON ADVERSE CONDITIONS. AS THE REFLECTORS WERE CUT THEY FALL APART AFTER PUTTING THEM TOGETHER. NOT ENOUGH GLUE. THE HOLES ON THE BACK OF THE IMAGE ARE ALMOST IN THE SAME PLACE ALL THE TIME.
903 37045 HF7	SHSETUP	THERE ARE SAME SHARP COVERS AND EDGES ON THE ASSEMBLY FRAME THAT ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT WE MUST BE EXTRA CAREFUL.
902 37045 HF7	DASBCMT	THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION INSIDE THE BAG.
900 37045 HF7	ASBCMT	ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT WHEN HAVING THE IMAGE ALREADY ERECTED IT TAKES A COUPLE SECONDS TO FIND THE SMALL HOLE TO FIT THE ANTENNA. THE REFLECTOR ASSEMBLY WEARS OUT IF SAND OR DIRT GETS ON IT AND IT TAKES MORE TIME TO ASSEMBLE.
899 37045 HF7	ASBGCMT	SINCE WE HAVE DONE IT SO MANY TIMES IT WAS ALMOST A SECOND NATURE TO ASSEMBLE IT AT NIGHT.
898 37045 HF7	MVCMT	WHILE CARRYING THE EQUIPMENT FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER THE WEIGHT DISTRIBUTION WASN'T QUITE EVEN. IT GOT A BIT MORE DIFFICULT WHILE DOWNLOADING TO THE GROUND FROM THE TOP OF THE TANK SINCE THE WEIGHT IS NOT EVEN FOR A 2 MAN CARRY. IT GOT RATHER DANGEROUS TO MAINTAIN BALANCE ON TOP OF THE TANK. NEED 2 TO 3 POINTS OF CONTACT WITH VEHICLE FOR SAFETY AT NIGHT.
897 37044 HF7	TRBLCMT	IT'S EASY IN DETAIL.
896 37044 HF7	PROCCMT	EASY TO DO.
895 37044 HF7	PMSCSMT	NOT ENOUGH GOOP IN REPAIR KIT. TOO MANY SCREWS.
893 37044 HF7	HFECMT	THE DECOY SEEMS FLIMSY, EASILY BROKEN.
892 37044 HF7	DASBPCMT	REPAIR KIT DOESN'T HAVE ENOUGH GOOP. POWER SUPPLY HAS TOO MANY SCREWS.
890 37043 HF7	KITCMT	THE REPAIR KIT NEEDS MORE EQUIPMENT IN IT (PLIERS, KNIFE, SCREWDRIVER).
889 37043 HF7	MAINTCMT	NEVER DID OPERATOR MAINTENANCE, EXCEPT PMCS.
888 37043 HF7	TRBLCMT	NEVER DID TROUBLESHOOT ANYTHING.
886 37043 HF7	HFECMT	CONSIDER THE SCREWS (20) & THE STRAPS.
885 37043 HF7	CONCERNS	AGAIN THE STRAPS ARE DIFFICULT.
884 37043 HF7	DASBPCMT	THE STRAPS WERE DIFFICULT TO USE ON CARRYING BAGS.
882 37042 HF7	PMSCSMT	IT'S HARD TO PATCH HOLES WITHOUT GLUE. STILL NO RESUPPLY ON REPAIR PARTS.
881 37042 HF7	PSACMT	INSTEAD OF HOLDING IT DOWN FOR 2 TO 3 SECONDS YOU HAVE TO HOLD IT DOWN FOR 5 TO 6 SECONDS.
880 37042 HF7	ASBCMT	HARD TO FIND THE HOLES FOR ANTENNAE.
879 37042 HF7	ASBGCMT	I ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS WHEN ASSEMBLING WITH FAULTY PARTS.
878 37041 HF7	PMSCSMT	GUIDE WIRE RIPS OFF.
876 37041 HF7	ASBCMT	GUIDE WIRE RIPS OFF.
875 37041 HF7	ASBGCMT	IN MOPP4 YOU CAN'T SEE WITH THE MASK ON AT NIGHT.
874 37040 HF7	DASBCMT	REPAIR BACK.
873 37040 HF7	ASBCMT	20 SCREWS. GUY WIRES BROKE TOO EASILY, BUNGEE CORDS ALSO.
872 37040 HF7	ASBODES	GUY WIRES. BUNGEE CORDS.
871 37040 HF7	ASBGCMT	CANNOT COMMUNICATE WITH PARTNER.
870 37040 HF7	MVCMT	CANNOT SEE AT NIGHT.
869 36015 HF6	NKNOWCMT	AT LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE.
868 36015 HF6	INTERCMT	THE DARKNESS SEEMED TO SLOW DOWN THE PROCESS. MAKING IT LONG PERIOD BETWEEN TRIALS CREATING BOREDOM.
867 36015 HF6	MVCMT	DIDN'T PARTICIPATE.
866 36015 HF6	SRCMT	DIDN'T PARTICIPATE.
865 36015 HF6	MRCMT	ALL DECOYS SEEMED TO BE FRONTAL VIEW.
864 36015 HF6	LRCMT	ALL DECOYS SEEMED TO BE FRONTAL VIEW.
863 36014 HF6	TGTCMT	IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT THE DECOY WOULD MAKE ME TURN MY TURRET TOWARDS IT, WHICH

WOULD COST IT ITS LIFE.

862 36014 HF6 NKNOWCMT ONCE AT MEDIUM RANGE, ONCE AT LONG RANGE.

861 36014 HF6 MVCMT ON THE MOVE IT IS A LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE BECAUSE VEHICLE IS BOUNCING, BUT THE HEAT SIGNATURE STILL GIVES IT AWAY.

860 36014 HF6 SRCMT AT SHORT RANGE IT IS A DEAD GIVEAWAY THAT THE TARGET WAS A DECOY, BECAUSE OF HEAT SIGNATURE.

859 36014 HF6 MRCMT THE HEAT SIGNATURE GIVES IT AWAY.

858 36014 HF6 LRCMT LOOKING THROUGH THERMALS, THE SHAPE IS TOO PERFECT, THE HEAT SIGNATURE IS EVENLY DISTRIBUTED.

857 36013 HF6 NKNOWCMT WHEN ON THE MOVE, HILLS WOULD MOMENTARILY BLOCK MY VIEW NOT GIVING ENOUGH TIME TO OBSERVE.

856 36013 HF6 MVCMT I COULD TELL BECAUSE THE GUN TUBE WAS STILL AND THEY WERE PLACED IN AREAS I WOULD NOT EXPECT A TANK TO GO.

855 36013 HF6 SRCMT AT CLOSER RANGES THE DECOYS LOOKED TOO CRISP AND CLEAN. YOU COULD TELL A DECOY BECAUSE THE GUN TUBE WAS OFF AND IT WAS TOO STILL.

854 36012 HF6 TGTCMT OCCASIONALLY DECOY IS ROUNDED WHERE REAL VEHICLE HAS SHARP ANGLES AND LINES.

853 36012 HF6 INTERCMT AT NIGHT THE ONLY PROBLEM WAS THE MALFUNCTION OF THE THERMAL. MASTER GUNNER WAS EVENTUALLY ABLE TO HELP WITH ADJUSTMENT.

852 36012 HF6 SRCMT THE SHAPE OF THE VEHICLE AND THE SHAPE OF HEAT SIGNATURES.

851 37039 HF7 OPTRNCMT IF YOU DON'T COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND TACTICS WITH THE MCCD IT CAN WORK AGAINST YOU!

849 37039 HF7 DASBCMT THERE WAS A TIME IN MOPP4 WHEN THE DECOY WOULDN'T FOLD PROPERLY AND TOOK A LOT OF TIME.

848 37039 HF7 DEPLCMT DECOY CAN BECOME VERY HEAVY IF YOU HAVE TO MOVE IT LONG DISTANCES WITH NO VEHICLE. ALSO THE DECOY IS 2 PIECES. IF YOU HAVE A 2 MAN LIFT ON EACH PIECE THIS CONSTITUTES 2 TRIPS.

847 37039 HF7 ASBGCMT ONE NIGHT ON LINE THE DECOY WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO SET UP IN MOPP4 AND TAKES A LOT MORE TIME AND CAN BE VERY FRUSTRATING.

846 36011 HF6 TGTCMT SOMETIMES, REAL OR DECOY, YOU STILL STOP AND THINK ABOUT IT, DECOY OR REAL? THAT MAY TAKE 10 TO 15 SECONDS.

845 36011 HF6 DCFOFCMT ONCE DURING BLOCK II AT FT HUNTER LIGGETT, CA.

844 36010 HF6 NKNOWCMT I COULDN'T FIND FLASHING LIGHT, ESPECIALLY AT LONG RANGE.

843 36010 HF6 INTERCMT THERE WAS ONE FOG BANK, AND A COUPLE TIMES THERE WAS A CUCV THAT FROM A DISTANCE WAS DECEIVABLE, THERE WERE PATTERNS OF THE HOT SPOTS (LIGHTS) AND ON THE FAR RANGE YOU COULD BARELY SEE A BLUR OF LIGHT.

842 36010 HF6 SRCMT YOU COULD ALWAYS TELL THE ANGLE OF A REAL TARGET AND THAT OF A DECOY.

841 36010 HF6 MRCMT THERMAL PATTERN ON DECOY IS TOO UNIFORM AND DOESN'T LOOK LIKE REAL VEHICLE. AT NIGHT THE THERMAL SIGNATURE APPEARED STRONGER ON THE DECOYS. THERE APPEARED TO BE A PATTERN OF HEAT ON THE DECOYS. YOU COULD SEE THE ANGLE EASIER AT MEDIUM RANGE. DECOYS WERE ALWAYS FRONT VIEWS. SOME ASPECT VIEW OF REAL VEHICLE WAS ALMOST ALWAYS VISIBLE.

840 36010 HF6 LRCMT AT NIGHT THE THERMAL SIGNATURE SOMETIMES APPEARED STRONGER ON THE DECOYS. THERE APPEARED TO BE A PATTERN OF HEAT ON THE DECOYS.

839 37038 HF7 KITCMT TOO MANY SCREWS. EASILY LOST. REPAIR GLUE DOESN'T HOLD UP IN WATER. NEEDS PLIERS.

838 37038 HF7 PMCSMT TOO MANY SCREWS. EASILY LOST. REPAIR GLUE DOESN'T HOLD UP IN WATER.

837 37038 HF7 HFECMT THIS IS VERY FRUSTRATING TO SET UP. THE ROUTINE REPAIR BECOMES EXTENSIVE DUE TO POLES RIPPING IMAGE & ELASTIC BREAKING.

835 37038 HF7 RPKCMT EASILY LOST.

834 37038 HF7 DASBPCMT DURING PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT AND DISASSEMBLY I EASILY LOST SOME OF THE COMPONENTS.

833 37038 HF7 DASBCMT IT CAN BE HARD TO FIND ALL THE SEPARATE PIECES.

832 37038 HF7 PSACMT WHEN CONNECTING MANIFOLD IT IS EASY TO ACCIDENTALLY SWITCH IT TO OFF. SWITCH IS IN BAD PLACE.

831 37038 HF7 TWORQCMT IT SIMPLY TAKES TWO TO START IT UP.

830 37038 HF7 ASBCMT POWER SUPPLY SWITCH IS IN A BAD LOCATION. IT IS EASILY ACCIDENTALLY SWITCHED TO OFF WHEN CONNECTED TO MANIFOLD ELASTIC CORDS BREAK EASILY. ANTENNAE ARE EASILY BENT & HOLES ARE FRUSTRATING TO FIND ON MANIFOLD POLE. REPAIR KIT IS EASILY LOST, COVER DOESN'T HOLD UP IN WATER. POLES ROTATE MAKING IT HARD TO FOLD UP IN MOPP4, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FIX.

829 37038 HF7 ASBGCMT THERE ARE TOO MANY SMALL PARTS OR THINGS TO CONNECT (ELASTIC CORDS).

828 36009 HF6 TGTCMT IT IS HARD TO FIND TARGETS THROUGH THERMALS ON HIGH MAGNIFICATION, 1.5 DEGREES OF VISIBLE AREA, VERY SMALL AT DISTANCE.

827 36009 HF6 NKNOWCMT THE VEHICLE COMMANDERS SIGHTS ARE NOT AS CLEAR AS THE GUNNERS, THEREFORE THE GUNNER SHOULD MAKE THE CALL IF THERE ARE ANY DOUBTS.

826 36009 HF6 INTERCMT AGE OF EQUIPMENT AND HIGH HUMIDITY AFFECT OUR EQUIPMENT.

825 36009 HF6 SRCMT PERFECT BOX ON THERMALS BRIGHT OR NON-EXISTENT, ONLY AT SHORT RANGE IT IS MORE PRONOUNCED.

824 36009 HF6 MRCMT PERFECT BOX ON THERMALS BRIGHT OR NON-EXISTENT.

823 36009 HF6 LRCMT PERFECT BOX ON THERMALS BRIGHT OR NON-EXISTENT.

822 36008 HF6 TGTCMT IF THERE WAS A WAY YOU COULD PUT SIDES ON THE DECOY THEN THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING

821 36008 HF6	INTERCMT	BECAUSE NOW IT LOOKS LIKE A TANK TARGET WITH JUST A FRONTAL VIEW. ONE TIME I HAD A THERMAL SHADOW IN MY SIGHTS BUT I DIDN'T SEE ANY DECOYS THAT MISSION.
820 36008 HF6	MVCMT	THE SHAPE AND THERMAL SIGNATURE IS TOO PERFECT, LIKE A TANK TARGET, BUT IF REAL TANKS GUN TUBE IS DEPRESSED WHILE JUDGING IT IS A HARD CALL TO MAKE.
819 36008 HF6	SRCMT	THE SHAPE AND THERMAL SIGNATURE IS TOO PERFECT, LIKE A TANK TARGET, BUT IF REAL TANKS GUN TUBE IS DEPRESSED WHILE JUDGING IT IS A HARD CALL TO MAKE.
818 36008 HF6	MRCMT	THE SHAPE AND THERMAL SIGNATURE IS TOO PERFECT, LIKE A TANK TARGET, BUT IF REAL TANKS GUN TUBE IS DEPRESSED WHILE JUDGING IT IS A HARD CALL TO MAKE.
817 36008 HF6	LRCMT	THE SHAPE AND THERMAL SIGNATURE IS TOO PERFECT, LIKE A TANK TARGET, BUT IF REAL TANKS GUN TUBE IS DEPRESSED WHILE JUDGING IT IS A HARD CALL TO MAKE.
816 36007 HF6	MVCMT	TOO PERFECT IN SHAPE AND HEAT SOURCES.
815 36007 HF6	SRCMT	THE DECOY TARGETS ARE ALSO TOO HOT, THEY SHOW UP MUCH BRIGHTER THAN REAL TANKS.
814 36007 HF6	MRCMT	THE DECOY TARGETS ARE ALSO TOO HOT, THEY SHOW UP MUCH BRIGHTER THAN REAL TANKS.
813 36007 HF6	LRCMT	WHEN OBSERVING THE TARGET THROUGH THE THERMALS IT LOOKS TOO PERFECT. REAL TANK DOESN'T SHOW ITS FORM THAT PERFECTLY IN THERMALS. YOU COULD ALSO SEE OTHER HEAT SIGNATURES FROM A REAL TANK SUCH AS THE HEATER, THE CREW MEMBERS AND SUCH THINGS.
812 36006 HF6	TGTCMT	THE DECOY SEEMED TO WORK BETTER AT NIGHT BECAUSE EVEN WITH THE BOXED HEAT PLATES IT WAS STILL DIFFICULT TO TELL AT FARTHER DISTANCES. BETTER AT LONG RANGE THAN AT MEDIUM.
811 36006 HF6	MRCMT	THE HEAT PLATES ON THE DECOYS SEEMED TO BE SQUARED UNLIKE THE REAL.
810 36006 HF6	LRCMT	THE SIGNATURE ON THE DECOYS SEEMED TO BE BRIGHTER OR HOTTER THAN THE REAL.
809 36005 HF6	TGTCMT	SOME TARGETS FELL DOWN OR WERE NOT THERE. HAD TROUBLE DISTINGUISHING AT LONG RANGE.
808 36005 HF6	INTERCMT	HAD TROUBLE WITH THERMALS, MAYBE NOT ADJUSTED RIGHT. 18 HOUR DAY MADE FOR FATIGUE. THE FOG AND DARKNESS WAS A SMALL PROBLEM.
807 36005 HF6	SRCMT	THE DECOYS ARE BRIGHT AND HAVE NO SIGNATURE. THE REAL BRADLEY, YOU CAN SEE THE DARK TRIM VANE.
806 36005 HF6	MRCMT	AT MEDIUM RANGE WE COULD IDENTIFY THEM EASIER. IT WAS A GOOD RANGE, WE WERE MORE SURE. AT MEDIUM RANGE I STILL FELT THAT THE DECOY WAS SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE.
805 36005 HF6	LRCMT	THE DISTANCE OF LONG RANGE IS TOO FAR TO BE SURE IF TARGET IS REAL OR DECOY. THE TRAINED EYE CAN SOMETIMES TELL THE DIFFERENCE WITH THE SIGNATURE. EVENTUALLY I GOT BETTER AT DISTINGUISHING MCCDS, USUALLY HAD BRIGHT THERMAL IMAGE.
802 37037 HF7	SHOTHR	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
801 37037 HF7	SHREPKG	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
800 37037 HF7	SHMOVE	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
799 37037 HF7	SHOPER	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
798 37037 HF7	SHSETUP	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
797 37037 HF7	SHDEPLOY	HAVEN'T REALLY WORKED WITH IT THAT MUCH SINCE WE STARTED THE FORCE ON FORCE.
795 37037 HF7	OPPROB	NEED TO GET RID OF THE 20 SCREWS ON THE POWER SOURCE.
794 37037 HF7	DEPLCMT	NEED TO TRANSPORT IT OFF WHEELED VEHICLES INSTEAD OF TANKS BECAUSE IT FALLS OFF TANKS REAL EASY.
793 37037 HF7	TWORQCMT	IT MAKES IT EASIER TO SET UP IF YOU HAVE TWO PEOPLE.
792 37037 HF7	MVCMT	IT'S NOT REAL EASY TO WORK WITH BECAUSE YOU'RE ALWAYS TRIPPING OVER THINGS AND IT'S HARD TO SEE THE REST OF THE EQUIPMENT.
791 36004 HF6	INTERCMT	IN RAIN AND FOG COULD NOT ID REAL OR DECOY FROM LONG AND MEDIUM RANGE.
790 36004 HF6	MVCMT	THE HEAT OF THE DECOY AT SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE IS DIFFERENT FROM A REAL TANK.
789 36004 HF6	SRCMT	AT SHORT RANGE THE COLOR AND SHAPE OF THE DECOY COULD BE ID BECAUSE OF BRIGHT GREEN COLOR.
788 36004 HF6	MRCMT	THE TARGET LOOKED LIKE A GUNNERY TARGET.
787 36004 HF6	LRCMT	HEAT SIGNATURE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TARGET DECOY AND A REAL TANK.
786 37036 HF7	OPTRNCMT	LEADERS CONTINUE TO SET UP IN THE SAME SIGHT PICTURE AS REAL TANKS. THIS DEFEATS THE PURPOSE. MOVE DECOY AWAY FROM PLATOON BATTLE POSITIONS.
785 37036 HF7	OPTRNCMT	MCCD IS EFFECTIVE WHEN USED PROPERLY, SUGGEST A MORE IN-DEPTH CLASS ON TACTICS USING THE MCCD, ESPECIALLY FOR LEADERS. USE SAND BOARDS, SLIDES AND PICTURES TO SHOW HOW TO USE IT EFFECTIVELY. INCORPORATE MCCD IN 17-15, 17-12, AND 19K SOLDIER MANUALS. BIGGEST PROBLEM IS DEPLOYING DECOY WHERE IT WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE. KEY LEADERS ARE HAVING A HARD TIME DEPLOYING DECOY IN KEY POSITIONS. USE MCCD WHEN THERE IS ENOUGH TIME AFTER OTHER MISSIONS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
784 37036 HF7	PSACMT	THE POWER SUPPLY IS A VERY GOOD, RELIABLE UNIT. MAKE THE REST OF THE DECOY AS GOOD AND DEPENDABLE AND YOU WILL HAVE A VERY GOOD SYSTEM.
782 37036 HF7	ASBCMT	IMAGE CONTINUES TO TEAR IN SAME SPOTS. SUGGEST LEATHER PATCHES SEWN ON CRITICAL POINTS. ANTENNAE ARE GETTING BENT, SUGGEST SAME AS ON TANK (FIBERGLASS). RADAR REFLECTORS HAVE LOST ALL STIFFNESS AND CONTINUALLY FALL APART, NOT ENOUGH GLUE IN REPAIR KITS. POLES CONTINUE TO LOSE SCREWS.
781 37036 HF7	MVCMT	WHEN MOVING ON FOOT FROM ONE MOUNTAIN TO ANOTHER IT IS VERY CUMBERSOME AND BULKY. NOT A GOOD IDEA AND VERY TIME CONSUMING. (PUT IT IN A BAG THAT CAN BE CARRIED ON THE SOLDIER'S BACK.)
780 37036 HF7	MVOTHDES	LONG DISTANCE ON FOOT.

779 36003 HF6 INTERCMT PEOPLE WERE OUT WALKING AROUND THE ENGAGEMENT AREA DURING FORCE ON FORCE. THERE IS TOO MUCH TIME WASTED BETWEEN AND AFTER TRIALS, SO WE ENDED UP STAYING OUT FOR A LONG TIME.

778 36003 HF6 LRCMT THE HEAT SIGNATURE OF THE DECOYS IS EVEN, REAL VEHICLES HAVE HOT AND COLD SPOTS ON THEM.

777 36002 HF6 NKNOWCMT DUE MOST TO ISU PROBLEMS, HAPPENED AT LONG RANGE.

776 36002 HF6 MVCMT WE NEVER ENGAGED TARGETS ON THE MOVE.

775 36001 HF6 TGT CMT DECOY LOOKS LIKE GUNNERY TARGET THROUGH THERMALS. WHEN YOU LOOK AT IT, IT LOOKS LIKE IT'S LOOKING BACK AT YOU. I FIGURE IF I CAN SEE IT, IT CAN SEE ME SO I SHOULD BE DEAD. SINCE THEY ARE THE DEFENSE THEY SHOULD SEE ME FIRST SO WHEN YOU SEE THE DECOY IT'S A FRONTAL SHOT. HIS GUN IS ALREADY ON ME SO THAT GIVES AWAY THAT IT'S A DECOY. ONE PROBLEM IS "TARGET FIXATION" I HAVE TO CONSTANTLY TELL MY GUNNER TO DISREGARD THE DECOY AND CONTINUE TO SCAN, YOU STILL DON'T KNOW WHERE THE REAL DEFENSE IS.

774 36001 HF6 INOTH CMT TREES INTERFERED WITH MY ABILITY TO IDENTIFY TARGETS AS REAL OR DECOY.

773 36001 HF6 DCFOFCMT PARTICIPATED IN FORCE-ON-FORCE WITH MCCD 3 TIMES IN KIRCHGOENS, GERMANY.

772 37035 HF7 LABELCMT NEVER SEEN THEM.

771 37035 HF7 ASBCMT REPAIR KIT FALLS APART CONSTANTLY. WHEN YOU DUMP DECOY OUT, REPAIR KIT FALLS ALL OVER THE GROUND.

770 36000 HF6 TGT CMT SCOPE AND PURPOSE CONFUSES THE SGT MAJOR, AND ME TOO. WE ARE NOT CLEAR ON WHAT OUR MISSION IS.

769 36000 HF6 INTERCMT THE STROBE LIGHTS WERE A VISUAL DISTRACTION AND THE DARKNESS WAS ALSO.

768 36000 HF6 MVCMT DID NOT ID ANYTHING DUE TO SITUATION AND FLASHING STROBE LIGHTS AND BAD TERRAIN.

767 36000 HF6 SRCMT DID NOT ID ANYTHING DUE TO SITUATION AND FLASHING STROBE LIGHTS AND BAD TERRAIN.

766 36000 HF6 MRCMT DID NOT ID ANYTHING DUE TO SITUATION AND FLASHING STROBE LIGHTS AND BAD TERRAIN.

765 36000 HF6 LRCMT DID NOT ID ANYTHING DUE TO NIGHT CONDITIONS AND MOVING FLASHING LIGHT CANNOT BE ID THROUGH THERMALS DUE TO BAD TERRAIN.

764 37034 HF7 SHCMT SOLDIER TOLD TO PINCH FINGER IN JOINT OF COLLAPSING PARTS OF MCCD.

763 37034 HF7 LABELCMT CAN BE SEEN CLEARLY.

762 37034 HF7 SHSETUP STAKE ROPES ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH.

761 37034 HF7 SHDEPLOY MCCD IS A TWO MAN CARRY SO CARRYING STRAPS NEED TO BE RELOCATED TO PROVIDE COMFORT TO THE SOLDIER.

760 37034 HF7 TWORQCMT IF THERE IS ANY MORE REQUIREMENT FOR PERSONNEL, THEY WILL JUST BE IN THE WAY.

759 35025 HF5 TGT CMT MOST OF THE TIME IF I HAD ANY DOUBT I STILL ENGAGED AND KILLED. NOTE: I WAS ONLY PRESENT FOR 3 DAYS OF TRIALS.

758 35025 HF5 NKNOWCMT I COULD SEE A TARGET BUT COULDN'T TELL IF IT WERE REAL OR A DECOY AT MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE.

757 35025 HF5 MVCMT I DIDN'T TAKE PART IN ANY MOVING TRIALS.

756 35025 HF5 SRCMT I DIDN'T TAKE PART IN ANY SHORT RANGE.

755 35025 HF5 MRCMT IT WAS STILL HARD TO DISTINGUISH REAL OR DECOY AT MEDIUM RANGE.

754 35025 HF5 LRCMT IT SEEMED ALL THE ONES I THOUGHT WERE DECOYS HAD ONLY A FRONT VIEW.

753 35024 HF5 TGT CMT I WAS ONLY IN ONE DAY TRIAL AND I DIDN'T OBSERVE ANY TANKS OR DECOYS.

752 35024 HF5 LRCMT DIDN'T SEE ANY TANKS OR DECOYS DURING THE ONLY DAY TRIAL I WAS IN.

751 35023 HF5 NKNOWCMT AT LONG RANGE I COULD SEE A TARGET, BUT COULDN'T TELL IF IT WAS REAL OR DECOY.

750 35023 HF5 INTERCMT FACTORS THAT INTERFERED WITH THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE VEHICLES WERE THE WEATHER CONDITIONS SUCH AS FOG, HEAVY RAIN.

749 35023 HF5 SRCMT AT SHORT RANGE SOME OF THE DECOY TARGETS LOOKED LIKE PAINTINGS BECAUSE OF THE ROUND FEATURES OF THE VEHICLES.

748 35023 HF5 MRCMT AT MEDIUM RANGE THE TARGETS WERE MORE DISTINGUISHABLE BY SHAPE AND SIGNATURE.

747 35023 HF5 LRCMT THE TARGET'S SHAPE WAS NOTICEABLE ALONG WITH ITS SIGNATURE IN IDENTIFYING TARGETS.

746 37033 HF7 TRHAD CMT I KNEW THE EQUIPMENT BY HEART. YOU HAVE TO HAVE A SYSTEM AND MEMORIZE IT SO YOU CAN SET IT UP AT NIGHT. I DON'T THINK I COULD SET IT UP UNLESS I WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH IT.

745 37033 HF7 KITCMT I RAN OUT OF GLUE ON THE LAST PMCS CLEAN UP. A LOT OF HOLES.

744 37033 HF7 MAINTCMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

743 37033 HF7 TRBL CMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

742 37033 HF7 PROCCMT BOOK NEEDS TO BE SMALL AND WATERPROOF SO YOU CAN PUT IT IN YOUR POCKET.

741 37033 HF7 PMCS CMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

740 37033 HF7 SHCMT IT'S VERY SAFE.

739 37033 HF7 LABELCMT THEY NEED TO BE BRIGHTER.

738 37033 HF7 HFECMT IT'S PRETTY GOOD FOR A WHILE THEN IT STARTS GOING TO HELL.

737 37033 HF7 CONCERNS WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

736 37033 HF7 RPKCMT WE HAVE REALLY ONLY BEEN PUTTING IT UP IN MOPPO FOR THE PAST WEEK.

735 37033 HF7 OPPROB WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF

734 37033 HF7 DEPLCMT THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.
I FEEL IT NEEDS TO BE STRONGER MATERIAL OR JOINTS NEED TO BE PADDED SO IT WOULDN'T RIP THE DECOY.

733 37033 HF7 TWRQCMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

732 37033 HF7 ASBCMT RADAR REFLECTORS HAVE GOTTEN TO THE POINT WHERE THEY COLLAPSE BECAUSE THE ELASTIC HAS LOST ITS ELASTICITY. (RAN OUT OF GLUE). (NEEDS BACK PACK).

731 37033 HF7 ASBGCMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

730 37033 HF7 MVCMT WE CARRIED OUR EQUIPMENT ABOUT A QUARTER OF A MILE UP HILL. IT WOULD BE NICE IF THEY HAD A BACK PACK SET UP.

729 35022 HF5 TGTCMT ORIENTATION OF THE TARGET LINE. IT HELPS IF RANGE CARDS ARE USED LIKE ON THE LAST NIGHT. (FINDING TARGET TO BEGIN WITH).

728 35022 HF5 INTERCMT FOG PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART, THERMALS GETTING COLD, THEY SOMETIMES FAILED (ISU MECHANICAL ADJUSTMENTS).

727 35022 HF5 MVCMT I WASN'T INVOLVED WITH ANY MOVEMENT TRIALS.

726 35022 HF5 SRCMT UP CLOSE IT LOOKS LIKE A PAINTING WITH NO ANTENNA AND THE COLOR IS TOO BRIGHT.

725 35022 HF5 MRCMT THE DECOYS WERE ONE EXTREME OR ANOTHER WHEN IT CAME TO THERMAL IMAGE. THE LINES ARE TOO SHARP, THE REAL BRADLEY HAS SMOOTH OUTLINE AND BLENDS, THE DECOY LOOKS LIKE A CUT OUT. THERMAL ENGINE WILL BE THE ONLY BRIGHT PORTION OF A BRADLEY. OVERALL IMAGE IS TOO HOT ON MCCD.

724 35022 HF5 MROTHCMT THE DECOY IS NOT 3-D, AND THE OUTLINE IS TOO SHARP.

723 35022 HF5 LROTHCMT THE TURRET SHAPE IS NOT 3-D. THE OUTLINE IS TOO SHARP. FROM A DISTANCE THE DECOY'S OUTLINE IS REAL EVIDENT. A REAL BRADLEY DOESN'T HAVE ANY SHARP EDGES FOR SOME REASON.

722 35021 HF5 TGTCMT IF YOU CAN ADD SIDES AND SHAPE DEFINITION LIKE A GUN TUBE, TURRET, HULL DEPTH ETC.. THE DECOY WOULD BE MORE CONVINCING.

721 35021 HF5 INTERCMT SOMETIMES, IN THE TREES YOU THINK YOU SEE A TARGET.

720 35021 HF5 MVCMT AT SHORT RANGE THE DECOY IS VERY EASY TO IDENTIFY. THERE IS STILL NO DEPTH TO THE DECOY (GUN TUBE, ETC...).

719 35021 HF5 SRCMT AT SHORT RANGE THE DECOY IS VERY EASY TO IDENTIFY.

718 35021 HF5 MRCMT THE COLOR OF THE DECOY IS LIKE A NEW TANK COMPARED TO ALL THE REAL TANKS, WHICH ARE ALL DIRTY PLUS THE DECOY HAS NO DEPTH, YOU CAN TELL IT IS FLAT.

717 35021 HF5 LRCMT THE COLOR OF THE DECOY IS LIKE A NEW TANK COMPARED TO ALL THE REAL TANKS, WHICH ARE ALL DIRTY PLUS THE DECOY HAS NO DEPTH, YOU CAN TELL IT IS FLAT.

716 35020 HF5 TGTCMT THE SYSTEM DIDN'T SEEM TO WORK TOO WELL IN DAYTIME UNLESS WEATHER CONDITIONS WERE BAD. APPLIED TO DECOYS MORE THAN REAL VEHICLES.

715 35020 HF5 INTERCMT THE HEAVY RAINS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE AND ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL REAL OR DECOY.

714 35020 HF5 LRCMT THE GREENER COLOR AND THE ROUNDNESS OF THE TURRET GIVES THE DECOYS AWAY, THE COLOR IS BRIGHTER.

713 35019 HF5 INTERCMT RAIN AND FOG INTERFERED WITH IDENTIFYING IF TARGETS WERE REAL OR DECOY.

712 35019 HF5 SRCMT COULD IDENTIFY ALL DECOYS BECAUSE COLOR OF REAL TANK AND DECOY IS DIFFERENT.

711 35019 HF5 MRCMT IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECOY THERE WAS A BRIGHT GREEN COLOR ON A CLEAR DAY.

710 35019 HF5 LRCMT I COULD NOT ID FROM LONG RANGE.

709 35018 HF5 NKNOWCMT AT SHORT RANGE THE ISU WAS BAD, THERE WAS HEAVY FOG.

708 35018 HF5 INTERCMT THE LONGER WE WORKED, THE LESS PRODUCTIVE OUR RESULTS WERE.

707 35018 HF5 MRCMT DECOYS ARE TOO ROUNDED.

706 35018 HF5 LRCMT THE COLOR AND SHAPE ALWAYS GAVE MY CREW EASY AND QUICK TARGET DETECTION. DECOY COLORS LOOK TOO NEW. GUNNER COULD EASILY IDENTIFY DUCTS FOR HEAT ON DECOYS.

705 35017 HF5 TGTCMT MISSION OPORD AND GRAPHICS LED REDFOR INTO SITUATION WHERE BLUEFOR APPEARED "OUT OF SECTOR" OR FROM VANTAGE POINT OTHER THAN INDICATED OBJECTIVE.

704 35017 HF5 INTERCMT THE TERRAIN INTERFERED WITH OUR MISSION BECAUSE IT DICTATED WHERE WE COULD GO. IT INTERFERED WITH OUR MISSION BECAUSE WE HAD TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE TERRAIN THAN THE MISSION ITSELF.

703 35017 HF5 DCFOFCMT PARTICIPATED IN MCCD 10 TO 12 TIMES IN GERMANY.

702 35017 HF5 MVCMT I DID NOT ID BECAUSE OF BAD TERRAIN, I HAD TO FOCUS ON KEEPING VEHICLE ON SAFE GROUND.

701 35017 HF5 SRCMT I DID NOT ID BECAUSE OF BAD TERRAIN, I HAD TO FOCUS ON KEEPING VEHICLE ON SAFE GROUND.

700 35017 HF5 MRCMT I DID NOT ID BECAUSE OF BAD TERRAIN, I HAD TO FOCUS ON KEEPING VEHICLE ON SAFE GROUND.

699 35017 HF5 LRCMT I DID NOT ID BECAUSE OF BAD TERRAIN, I HAD TO FOCUS ON KEEPING VEHICLE ON SAFE GROUND.

698 35003 HF5 TGTCMT AT LONG RANGE, WITH BINOCULARS, I WOULD HAVE SHOT AT EVERYONE. BUT IF I HAD BEEN IN MY TANK I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LOOK THROUGH THE SIGHTS AND SHOOT ONLY THE REAL ONES. BUT BEING UNCERTAIN IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR A DECOY I WOULD HAVE FIRED JUST TO BE SAFE. DURING THE HAIL STORM IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE AND DETERMINE IF GENUINE AT MEDIUM AND LONG RANGE.

697 35003 HF5 INTERCMT WE COULDN'T EVEN SEE WHEN THE WEATHER WAS BAD, ALL YOU COULD SEE WAS A VEHICLE.
696 35003 HF5 SRCMT THE DECOYS LOOKED LIKE BLOW-UP TANKS AT SHORT RANGE.
695 35003 HF5 MRCMT SOMETIMES WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING HARD ENOUGH I COULD SEE THE DECOY MOVING.
694 35003 HF5 MROTHCMT AT MEDIUM RANGE THE WIND SOMETIMES HELPED ME TO KNOW IF THE TARGET WAS REAL OR DECOY.
693 35003 HF5 LRCMT AT LONG RANGE WITH BINOCULARS I COULD HARDLY TELL IF IT WAS A TANK OR A BRADLEY, DEFINITELY NOT REAL OR DECOY.
692 37002 HF7 KITCMT THE CLAMPS ARE NOT GOOD NOR ARE THE CLAMPS THAT HOLD THE PULL ROPES.
691 37002 HF7 TRBLCMT TROUBLESHOOTING WILL LEAD YOU TO THE PROBLEM.
690 37002 HF7 PROCCMT THE OPERATOR PMCS IS OK FOR ARMY EQUIPMENT.
689 37002 HF7 PMCSMT THESE DECOYS THAT ARE HERE TESTING FOR THE ARMY HAD MANY DEFECTS THAT HAD TO BE REPAIRED FROM THE BEGINNING.
688 37002 HF7 LABELCMT THE WARNING LABELS ARE IN GOOD PLACES WHERE THEY CAN BE SEEN.
687 37002 HF7 SHOPER THE JOINTS CATCH YOUR FINGERS WHEN OPERATING THE MCCD.
686 37002 HF7 SHSETUP ONCE THE ARMY BUYS THIS MCCD, IF IT DOES BUY IT THE SOLDIER WILL DEPLOY IT IN MUCH MORE REALISTIC PLACES, NOT SOME WHICH ARE DICTATED TO YOU WHERE AND WHEN AND HOW.
685 37002 HF7 HFECMT THE ARMY WILL PUT THIS EQUIPMENT THROUGH SERIOUS AMOUNTS OF UNPREDICTABLE CONDITIONS, THIS EQUIPMENT WILL NOT HOLD-UP FOR VERY LONG. MATERIAL IS TOO EASY TO DAMAGE AND HARDWARE COMPONENTS BEND TOO EASILY.
684 37002 HF7 CONCERNS THE FRAME TENDS TO TURN AT JOINTS, MAKING IT SO THAT IT CAN'T BE FOLDED-UP.
683 37002 HF7 TWORCMT THERE IS NO NEED FOR MORE THAN TWO SOLDIERS TO DEPLOY THE MCCD.
682 37002 HF7 ASBCMT THERE ARE TOO MANY UNNECESSARY SCREWS IN THE POWER SUPPLY. THE DECOY IS CHEAP, IT WILL NOT LAST THROUGH THE WEAR AND TEAR, THE MATERIAL IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH. THERE IS NOT ENOUGH EQUIPMENT IN THE REPAIR KIT, PLUS THE CLAMPS FOR THE CORDS ARE THE WRONG TYPE.
681 37002 HF7 ASBODES DURING ASSEMBLY I ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS WITH THE ROPE.
680 37002 HF7 ASBGCMT AS A TANKER, WEARING A M25A1 PROTECTIVE MASK (WHICH IS NOT DESIGNED FOR DISMOUNTED OPERATIONS), THE VISION TENDS TO GET LIMITED. I.E. THE MASK FOGS-UP FROM CONDENSATION ETC. PLUS BEING IN THE DARK WITH NO LIGHT, NO LIGHT FROM THE SKY AND TRYING TO PUT-UP THE MCCD, IT'S DIFFICULT.
679 37053 7777 DEBRIEF4 MAINT DEBRIEF, DAY 036: I REALLY LIKE THE SYSTEM. SIMPLICITY IS A STRONG POINT AND THE THERMAL SIGNATURE IS VERY GOOD. I HAVE A CONCERN ABOUT WHERE IT WILL BE CARRIED. THERE IS NO ROOM INSIDE OR OUTSIDE OF THE TANK. IF IT IS ON THE TURRET IT WOULD BLOCK VISION BUT I DON'T SEE WHERE ELSE THEY COULD PUT IT. AT THE UNIT LEVEL THERE IS NO OTHER TRANSPORTATION. SO THEY WOULD NEED ANOTHER CARGO TRUCK.
678 37053 7777 DEBRIEF3 MAINT DEBRIEF, DAY 036: THE -13 MANUAL SHOULD SEPARATE OPERATORS MANUAL FROM THE REST OF IT OR THE OPERATORS WILL DO ALL THE UNAUTHORIZED MAINTENANCE. TANKERS HAVE THAT KIND OF MENTALITY BECAUSE OF WORKING ON TANKS. THEY WOULD PROBABLY EVEN REBUILD THE MCCD. SO IF YOU DON'T WANT THE OPERATOR TO DO ALL THE MAINTENANCE IN THE -13, TAKE THE INFORMATION OUT.
677 37053 7777 DEBRIEF2 MAINT DEBRIEF, DAY 036: MY GUESS IS THE UNIT IS AUTHORIZED GLOW PLUGS, BATTERIES AND FUSES. THEY CAN'T DO REPAIRS INVOLVING ANYTHING ELSE. IF UNIT MAINTENANCE IS ALLOWED TO PERFORM MORE REPAIRS ON THE MCCD THEY WOULD NEED THE APPROPRIATE TOOLS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN TIGHTEN FUEL LINES BUT WE CAN'T REPLACE THEM. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER AND QUICKER IF WE JUST HAD A PIECE OF HOSE.
676 37053 7777 DEBRIEF1 MAINT DEBRIEF, DAY 036: THE ORGANIZATIONAL MANUAL RESTRICTS THE TROUBLESHOOTING AND REPAIR. THE UNIT SHOULD DO ALL OF THE D.S. LEVEL REPAIRS. THEY ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF DOING IT. THE DOWN TIME WOULD BE TOO GREAT IF THE UNIT HAS TO TURN THE MCCD INTO D.S. MAINTENANCE FOR REPAIR. TANK MECHANICS DO MUCH MORE COMPLICATED PROCEDURES WITH THE TANKS THAN IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE MCCD. IN FACT, THE TIME IT TAKES TO JOB ORDER THE MCCD TO HAVE D.S. REPAIR IT, THE UNIT COULD HAVE FIXED IT THEMSELVES.
675 37001 HF7 PROCCMT IT IS WRITTEN SO ANYONE COULD UNDERSTAND.
673 37032 HF7 KITCMT NEED STIFFENER PIN WITH SCREW AND WASHER AND AN ADDITIONAL TUBE OF GLUE.
672 37032 HF7 TRBLCMT ADEQUATE FOR OPERATOR LEVEL MAINTENANCE, ITEMS CAN BE FIXED BY USING COMMON SENSE.
671 37032 HF7 PROCCMT ADDITIONAL ITEMS NEED TO BE ADDED TO THE REPAIR KIT, LIKE STIFFENER PIN COMPLETE WITH SCREW AND WASHER.
670 37032 HF7 PMCSMT STIFFENER PIN LOOSES ITS SCREW AND WASHER EASILY, FASTENERS TEND TO BREAK AFTER CONTINUOUS USE, IMAGE TEARS EASILY UNDER NORMAL USE.
669 37032 HF7 PMCSODES STIFFENERS AND FASTENERS.
668 37032 HF7 LABELCMT I NEVER EVEN NOTICED NOTES OR WARNINGS OTHER THAN THE ONES POSTED IN THE OPERATORS MANUAL.
667 37032 HF7 HFECMT THE OVERALL DESIGN IS CHEAPLY MADE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS THE REASON WHY SO MUCH MAINTENANCE IS NEEDED.
666 37032 HF7 INSCMT HAD NO REASON TO USE DECALS, THE BOOK IS ADEQUATE.
665 37032 HF7 ASBCMT MCCD RIPS WHEN IT IS CONTINUALLY USED.
664 37032 HF7 ASBGCMT MCCD BREAKDOWN: STIFFENERS AND FASTENERS, SLOWED THE ASSEMBLY PROCESS PLUS

663 37031 HF7 PMSCMT OBVIOUS VISIBILITY PROBLEMS DURING NIGHT OPERATIONS IN THE RAIN.
662 37031 HF7 RPKCMT ONE OF THE SCREWS WAS STRIPPED SO I COULDN'T PUT IT BACK.
661 37031 HF7 DASBPCMT THE GLOVE WERE IN THE WAY AGAIN.
660 37031 HF7 DASBCMT ONCE THE POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT SHUT OFF. HAD TO TAKE OUT A FUSE TO TURN IT OFF. THIS WAS DURING TRAINING.
659 37031 HF7 ASBCMT THE GLOVES MADE IT DIFFICULT TO STRAP IT DOWN.
658 37031 HF7 ASBGCMT THE ROPES ON THE STAKE SNAPPED OFF A LOT. FRONT COVER LATCH STICKS A LOT, DIFFICULT TO POP OFF. HAD TO USE SCREWDRIVER. HAD TO REMOVE GLOVES TO REMOVE SCREWS.
657 37030 HF7 MAINTCMT GLOVES MADE IT HARDER TO USE THE STRAPS. IF GLOVES WERE WET THEY WERE SLIPPERY.
656 37030 HF7 PROCCMT THE ENDS OF GLOVES GET STUCK IN THE DECOY STRAPS.
655 37030 HF7 PMSCMT POWER SUPPLY HAS TOO MANY SCREWS.
654 37030 HF7 OPPROB MANUAL NEEDS WORK. JUMPS FROM ONE TOPIC TO ANOTHER AND THEN BACK TO FIRST TOPIC, IT'S CONFUSING.
653 37030 HF7 TWORQCMT 20 SCREWS ARE TOO MANY, ESPECIALLY DURING PMCS AT NIGHT. NEEDS CLAMP OR WING NUTS SO THEY DON'T COME OFF.
652 37030 HF7 ASBCMT POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY WOULDN'T START, MIGHT HAVE BEEN BROKEN.
651 37030 HF7 ASBGCMT DURING MCCD ASSEMBLY ONLY, DON'T NEED TWO MAN CARRY.
650 37029 HF7 KITCMT THE WIND WAS VERY STRONG FOR THE DECOY IMAGE ASSEMBLY. IT BLEW OVER A LOT AND REALLY NEEDED TWO MEN BECAUSE THE WIND WAS SO STRONG.
649 37029 HF7 MAINTCMT DIDN'T USE A FLASHLIGHT DURING ASSEMBLY OF THE MCCD. IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT TO ASSEMBLE IN THE DARK. DUMPED EVERYTHING ON RAMP OF VEHICLE AND FELT AROUND FOR IT.
648 37029 HF7 TRBLCMT ALL MATERIALS NEEDED ARE ON HAND EXCEPT THAT MORE GLUE IS REQUIRED.
647 37029 HF7 PROCCMT EVERYTHING IS CLEARLY EXPLAINED.
646 37029 HF7 PMSCMT EVERYTHING IS CLEARLY EXPLAINED.
645 37029 HF7 LABELCMT IT COVERS ALL MAJOR COMPONENTS THAT AN OPERATOR COULD READILY FIND.
644 37029 HF7 HFECMT FEWER SCREWS ON THE POWER SUPPLY.
643 37029 HF7 RPKCMT THE LABELS QUITE CLEARLY EXPLAIN THE HAZARD OF THE DECOY'S OPERATION.
642 37029 HF7 DASBCMT I FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD BE FEWER SCREWS ON THE HEATER, AND THE DECOY COULD BE MORE USER FRIENDLY.
641 37029 HF7 TWORQCMT THE NIGHT ROBS YOU OF YOUR SENSE OF SIGHT AND THE GLOVES ROB YOUR SENSE OF TOUCH.
640 37029 HF7 ASBGCMT I SET IT UP WITH BOTH CONDITIONS, AND IT WAS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO REMOVE MY GLOVES TO DO MORE ARTICULATE WORK, SUCH AS RELEASING STRAPS, TO MEET WITH ANY KIND OF REALISTIC ABILITY TO ASSEMBLE THE DECOY.
639 37028 HF7 KITCMT THE NIGHT ROBS YOU OF YOUR SENSE OF SIGHT AND THE GLOVES ROB YOUR SENSE OF TOUCH, I SET IT UP WITH BOTH CONDITIONS, AND IT WAS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO REMOVE MY GLOVES TO DO MORE ARTICULATE WORK, SUCH AS RELEASING STRAPS, TO MEET WITH ANY KIND OF REALISTIC ABILITY TO ASSEMBLE THE DECOY.
638 37028 HF7 PMSCMT I FEEL THAT MOVING THE DECOY TO ITS DEPLOYMENT SIGHT SHOULD REQUIRE TWO SOLDIERS, BUT THAT SETUP ONLY NEEDS ONE.
637 37028 HF7 SHOTHR THE NIGHT ROBS YOU OF YOUR SENSE OF SIGHT AND THE GLOVES ROB YOUR SENSE OF TOUCH, I SET IT UP WITH BOTH CONDITIONS, AND IT WAS SOMETIMES NECESSARY TO REMOVE MY GLOVES TO DO MORE ARTICULATE WORK, SUCH AS RELEASING STRAPS, TO MEET WITH ANY KIND OF REALISTIC ABILITY TO ASSEMBLE THE DECOY.
636 37028 HF7 HFECMT KIT IS CHEAP, BAG IT IS CARRIED IN DETERIORATES AND DOESN'T HOLD THE EQUIPMENT INSIDE. THE GLUE OZZED THROUGH THE TUBE AND CAUSED EVERYTHING TO STICK TOGETHER. CORD DOES NOT KEEP THE KIT CLOSED SECURELY.
635 37028 HF7 RPKPCMT IMAGE RIPPED EASILY AND THE CORDS TO THE STAKES BROKE. THE REPAIR KIT GLUE LEAKED.
634 37028 HF7 RPKCMT THE ONLY SAFETY CONCERN WOULD BE CARRYING FUEL FOR GENERATOR.
633 37028 HF7 INSCMT MORE THOUGHT MUST BE PUT INTO THE RELIABILITY OF THE DECOY. EXPERIENCED MANY TEARS AND RIPS AND CORDS ARE CONSTANTLY BREAKING.
632 37028 HF7 DEPLCMT DECOY TWISTS IN FRAME AND CAN BE DIFFICULT TO FOLD.
631 37028 HF7 ASBCMT DIFFICULT TO SEE AT NIGHT.
630 37028 HF7 ASBGCMT NEVER HAD TO READ THEM, KNEW WHAT TO DO FROM TRAINING.
629 37027 HF7 OPTRNCMT BUNGEE CORDS BREAK AND THE MCCD IS DIFFICULT TO SET UP IN HEAVY WINDS. MANIFOLD COMES OFF POWER SUPPLY EASILY, ESPECIALLY IF VELCRO GETS DAMP.
628 37027 HF7 KITCMT IMAGE TWISTS IN ASSEMBLY AND RIPS EASILY. REPAIR KIT GLUE LEAKS THROUGH SEAMS OF THE TUBE AND KIT BAG STUCK TO EQUIPMENT.
627 37027 HF7 MAINTCMT LIGHT TO SEE WAS INSUFFICIENT. STRAPS AND TIGHTENERS ARE HARD TO DEAL WITH AT NIGHT.
626 37027 HF7 TRBLCMT THE MCCD IS A VERY GENERIC PIECE OF EQUIPMENT AND MINIMAL TRAINING IS REQUIRED.
625 37027 HF7 PMSCMT NOT ENOUGH MATERIAL TO MAKE ALL THE REPAIRS.
624 37027 HF7 MAINTCMT WE HAVE MORE COMMON SENSE THAN YOU GIVE US. OPERATORS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO ENOUGH.
623 37027 HF7 TRBLCMT THE MANUALS SPEND MORE TIME EXPLAINING UNIMPORTANT THINGS WHEN THEY COULD TROUBLESHOOT MORE.
622 37027 HF7 PMSCMT TOO MANY REPAIRS TO BE MADE ON IMAGE ASSEMBLY.

624 37027 HF7	SHREPKG	WITH THE DIFFICULTY OF THE COLLAPSE PHASE, THE HANDS GET INJURIES TO KNUCKLES.
623 37027 HF7	HFECMT	THIS DESIGN WAS MADE FOR PEOPLE OF A STRONGER NATURE. THE SMALLER PEOPLE APPEAR TO HAVE SOME PROBLEMS WITH IT'S BULKINESS. IT IS HARD TO FOLD OUT, IT FELL ON AN OPERATOR ONCE.
622 37027 HF7	RPKPCMT	DECOY IMAGE DOES NOT COLLAPSE EASILY AND HITS THE CARD THAT IS ATTACHED TO THE BAG WITH ROPE.
621 37027 HF7	RPKCMT	THE DECOY IMAGE DOES NOT COLLAPSE EASILY. FABRIC OBSTRUCTS THE HINGES. MURAL SHOULD BE REINFORCED WITH WIRE MESH AT FOLD POINTS.
620 37027 HF7	DASBPCMT	THE CARD ON BAG WAS NOT NEEDED AND GOT IN THE WAY.
619 37027 HF7	OPPROB	THE MCCD OPERATES GOOD IN THE BEGINNING BUT ONCE USED A COUPLE OF TIMES IT IS USELESS. MULTIPLE REPAIRS RUIN DIRECT VIEW OF IMAGE, OFTEN TEARS GO ACROSS ORIGINAL COLORS.
618 37027 HF7	INSCMT	NOT SO MUCH IS NEEDED FOR THIS EQUIPMENT. IT WAS A HASSLE FOR THE CARD ATTACHED TO THE BAG. NO ONE LOOKS AT THE CARD AND THE ATTACHING ROPE IMPEDED STORAGE.
617 37027 HF7	DEPLCMT	ONCE UP, THE DECOY HAD A PROBLEM WITH WRINKLES IN THE IMAGE AND WAS UNSTABLE WHEN WIND WAS BLOWING. THE ROPES CONTINUALLY BROKE AFTER SEVERAL REPAIRS.
616 37027 HF7	ASBCMT	DECOY HAD ROPES AND STIFFENERS BREAK VERY EASILY. DECOY IMAGE TORE SEVERAL TIMES IN SEVERAL PLACES. NOT ENOUGH GLUE OR MATERIAL TO MAKE ALL REPAIRS. MULTIPLE PARALLEL TEARS OCCURRED.
615 37027 HF7	ASBGCMT	THE DECOY BECAME WEAK AND BROKEN IN MANY PLACES. THEREFORE, IT WAS VERY AWKWARD IN HANDLING. THE IMAGE WOULD TEAR ON FOLDED SPOTS, ROPES WOULD BREAK WHEN WET. STIFFENER WOULD STRETCH AND BREAK IN WET WEATHER.
614 37026 HF7	KITCMT	REPAIR KIT DOES NOT ALWAYS HAVE WHAT YOU NEED. STRAPS ARE CONSTANTLY BREAKING, NOT ENOUGH OF REPAIR PARTS.
613 37026 HF7	MAINTCMT	THERE IS VERY LITTLE OPERATOR MAINTENANCE WHICH IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND AND EXECUTE.
612 37026 HF7	TRBLCMT	ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS READ AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS.
611 37026 HF7	PROCCMT	THEY ARE SIMPLE AND EASY TO UNDERSTAND.
610 37026 HF7	PMCSMT	TOO MANY SCREWS, FOUR LATCHES WOULD HAVE WORKED FINE.
609 37026 HF7	LABELCMT	ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS ADHERE TO WARNING LABELS.
608 37026 HF7	SHREPKG	MCCD IS SLIPPERY AND MUDDY.
607 37026 HF7	SHMOVE	SITES SLIPPERY AND MUDDY.
606 37026 HF7	SHSETUP	SITES FULL OF WATER, MUDDY AND SLIPPERY.
605 37026 HF7	SHDEPLOY	SITE IS SLIPPERY AND MUDDY.
604 37026 HF7	HFECMT	MCCD DOESN'T ACCOUNT FOR SMALLER SOLDIERS WHO DON'T POSSESS UPPER BODY STRENGTH TO HANDLE MCCD UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS SUCH AS WIND.
603 37026 HF7	RPKPCMT	IMAGE CONSTANTLY GETS RIPPED AND TORN DURING REPACKING.
602 37026 HF7	RPKCMT	MOPP4 IS TOO BULKY AND CLUMSY.
601 37026 HF7	DASBCMT	IN MOPP4 YOU ARE TOO BULKY AND CLUMSY DURING DISASSEMBLY OF MCCD. COLD WEATHER GLOVES ARE TOO BULKY WITH SMALL PARTS.
600 37026 HF7	DEPLCMT	MCCD IS USELESS IN HIGH WIND AS IMAGE IS CONSTANTLY FLAPPING.
599 37026 HF7	TWORCMT	THREE SOLDIERS WOULD MAKE PROCESS EASIER TO HANDLE IN BAD WEATHER.
598 37026 HF7	ASBCMT	DURING ASSEMBLY MCCD IMAGE IS CONSTANTLY BEING RIPPED AND TORN. STAKES GUIDE WIRES ARE CONSTANTLY BREAKING.
597 37026 HF7	ASBGCMT	IN MOPP4 EVERYTHING IS IN THE WAY. MOPP SUIT AND MASK ARE TOO BULKY AND CLUMSY. GLOVES ARE BULKY AND HARD TO USE AS SOME PARTS ARE SMALL. NIGHTTIME IS VERY DIFFICULT AS YOU ARE TRYING TO WORK WITH ONE HAND AND HOLD A FLASHLIGHT WITH THE OTHER. IN COLD RAINY AND WINDY WEATHER A SMALL SOLDIER OF UNDER 180 POUNDS CANNOT HOLD MCCD WITHOUT IT COLLAPSING OR BLOWING AWAY.
596 37026 HF7	ASBOTDES	COLD AND RAINY WEATHER.
595 37026 HF7	MVCMT	GLOVES ARE BULKY AND HARD TO USE ON MCCD AND MAKE IT HARD TO POSITION IT. WHEN IT'S PITCH BLACK, TWO PEOPLE CANNOT MOVE IT EFFICIENTLY.
594 37026 HF7	MVOTDES	WINDY AND RAINY WEATHER.
593 37025 HF7	OPTRNCMT	THE ARMY NEEDS TO GET SOME KIND OF STANDARD FOR THE MOVEMENT, STORAGE, AND DEPLOYMENT OF DECOY FROM DIVISION TO PLATOON LEVEL.
592 37025 HF7	KITCMT	NEED MORE REPAIR PARTS IN BAG AND A BETTER PLACE TO PUT IT SO IT DOESN'T GET LOST. HAVE TONS OF LITTLE RIPS ALL OVER THE PLACE, ALREADY OUT OF GLUE (WHICH D.S. DOESN'T HAVE) AND REPAIR CANVAS. NO ROPES TO REPAIR STAKE ROPES, THEY WERE NEVER IN KIT.
591 37025 HF7	PMCSMT	POWER SUPPLY WOULD NOT START; DECOY IMAGE IS BENT; ANTENNA ASSEMBLY HAS BENT STAKES; ROPES BROKEN, RADAR REFLECTOR IS HARD TO PUT TOGETHER WHEN DIRTY; REPAIR KIT IS EASILY LOST; POLES COME APART TOO EASILY; TRANSPORT BAG RIPS EASILY. I LOST A REPAIR KIT BECAUSE I COULDN'T FIND IT AT NIGHT. NEED TO MAKE A POCKET ON THE MAIN BAG OR PUT IN GENERATOR KIT.
590 37025 HF7	SHCMT	NEED A WARNING ABOUT SETTING UP IN HIGH WIND.
589 37025 HF7	LABELCMT	NEED A WARNING ABOUT SETTING UP IN HIGH WIND.
588 37025 HF7	SHMOVE	HIGH WINDS MAY BLOW DECOY INTO SOMEONE.
587 37025 HF7	SHOPER	HIGH WINDS MAY BLOW DECOY INTO SOMEONE.
586 37025 HF7	SHSETUP	HIGH WINDS MAY BLOW DECOY INTO SOMEONE.

585 37025 HF7 HFECMT MORE R&D ON THE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY AND DETAIL OF IMAGE OF TANK.
584 37025 HF7 RPKPCMT DECOY IS HARD TO FOLD IN HALF CAUSING IT TO TEAR THE BACK OF THE DECOY (THE CANVAS). ALSO THE POLES RIP THE BAG.

583 37025 HF7 DASBPCMT DECOY IS HARD TO FOLD IN HALF CAUSING IT TO TEAR THE BACK OF THE DECOY (THE CANVAS). ALSO THE POLES RIP THE BAG.
582 37025 HF7 DASBCMT DECOY IS HARD TO FOLD IN HALF CAUSING IT TO TEAR THE BACK OF THE DECOY (THE CANVAS). ALSO THE POLES RIP THE BAG.

581 37025 HF7 OPPOB ANTENNAS ARE ON THE WRONG SIDE. POWER SUPPLY NEEDS TO BE IMPROVED FOR EASY MAINTENANCE AND PMCS.
580 37025 HF7 DEPLCMT DECOY SUPPORT ASSEMBLY IS NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO HANDLE THE REPEATED ASSEMBLY AND DISASSEMBLY.

579 37025 HF7 TWORQCMT ONE FOR POWER SUPPLY, ONE FOR GETTING IMAGE ASSEMBLED.
578 37025 HF7 ASBCMT DECOY IMAGE HAS BENDS IN IT. ANTENNA ASSEMBLY BENDS TOO EASILY, POLES WOULD COME APART OR GET BENT.

577 37024 HF7 PMCSCMT TOO MANY SCREWS TO CHECK THE POWER SUPPLY.
576 37024 HF7 HFECMT THE WAY THE ANTENNAE ARE TO THE REAL TANK. THE BIG ANTENNA IS ON THE LEFT SIDE ON THE MCCD AND IS ON THE RIGHT ON THE REAL TANK.

575 37024 HF7 MVCMT AT NIGHT I LOST SOME PARTS AND THEY WERE HARD TO FIND.
574 37023 HF7 KITCMT NEED MORE DESIGN COLORS FOR REPAIR. NEED MORE NYLON CORD, CORD BREAKS TOO EASILY.

573 37023 HF7 MAINTCMT SHOULD INCLUDE EXTRA BATTERIES FOR REPLACEMENT.
572 37023 HF7 TRBLCMT NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO ENOUGH.
571 37023 HF7 PMCSCMT SCREWS STRIPPED EASILY, SHOULD BE BUTTERFLY, IMAGE CRACKED AND TORE EASILY.
570 37023 HF7 HFECMT SEVERAL ITEMS COULD HAVE BEEN BUILT MORE EFFICIENTLY. THE SCREWS ON THE POWER SUPPLY; MATERIAL IS NOT RUGGED ENOUGH; TANK SEEMS EASIER BECAUSE OF THE SHAPE.

569 37023 HF7 RPKPCMT SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO FOLD UP. THE IMAGE NEEDS HEAVIER MATERIAL TO MAKE IT BETTER. PRACTICE MAY'S FOLDING ACHIEVABLE.
568 37023 HF7 DASBPCMT THE IMAGE TORE EASILY AND THE POLES WOULD OFTEN NOT ALIGN CORRECTLY (DIDN'T MATCH JOINTS).

567 37023 HF7 OPPOB IMAGE DOES NOT HOLD UP TO SEVERAL ERECTIONS, TEARS EASILY.
566 37023 HF7 DEPLCMT MORE MAINTENANCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED AT OPERATOR LEVEL (I.E. BATTERY).
565 37023 HF7 ASBCMT SEVERAL SCREWS STRIPPED ON POWER SUPPLY, FABRIC STRETCHED ACROSS HINGES.
564 37023 HF7 ASBODES SUPPORT ROPES; THE SUPPORT ROPES KEPT BREAKING.
563 37023 HF7 ASBGCMT TOO MANY STRAPS, NIGHTTIME MAKES IT MORE TIME CONSUMING.
562 37022 HF7 KITCMT IT DOES NOT MATCH THE COLOR OF THE MCCD ITSELF.
561 37022 HF7 PMCSCMT THE STAKES ARE NOT LONG ENOUGH TO HOLD INTO THE GROUND BETTER, ESPECIALLY IN MUD.

560 37022 HF7 SHSETUP THIS WAS ALSO A PROBLEM BECAUSE AREAS HAD BEEN DUG UP AND GROUND WAS SOFTER.
559 37022 HF7 HFECMT THE CORNER OF THE MCCD CAN CUT YOU UP (THE METAL FRAME).
558 37022 HF7 DEPLCMT IT FALLS APART WHEN PUTTING IT UP AND TAKING IT DOWN, JUST NOT DURABLE ENOUGH.
557 37021 HF7 KITCMT THE MCCD IS NOT MADE FOR HIGH WINDS, THEY BLEW OVER.

556 37021 HF7 PROCCMT IN MOST INSTANCES NOTHING GETS A HOLE IN IT, BUT IN THE EVENT SOMETHING DOES HAPPEN IT IS ADEQUATE.
555 37021 HF7 PMCSCMT THE PMCS PROCEDURES COVER ALL THE IMPORTANT CHECKS.
554 37021 HF7 LABELCMT THE 20 SCREWS ARE A HASSLE.
553 37021 HF7 CONCERNS THERE JUST AREN'T TOO MANY SAFETY HAZARDS INVOLVED IN THE MCCD.

552 37021 HF7 RPKPCMT SOMETIMES THE BASE OF THE FRAME GETS TURNED IN SUCH A WAY THAT YOU CAN'T FOLD IT UP FOR REPACKAGING.
551 37021 HF7 TWORQCMT WHEN TRYING TO REPACKAGE THE MCCD YOU OFTEN HAVE TO PICK PARTS FROM THE REPAIR KIT THAT SPILLED OUT.
550 37021 HF7 ASBCMT WITH ONE PERSON IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ERECT AND SECURE, WITH MORE THAN 2 PEOPLE THINGS WOULD GET CROWDED.

549 37021 HF7 ASBODES THE DECOY IMAGE ASSEMBLY IS HARD TO MANAGE AND KEEP ERECT IN HIGH WINDS. THE ANTENNA ASSEMBLY IS UNSTABLE AND WEAK, EVEN AFTER THE IMAGE IS UPRIGHT. WE HAD TROUBLE WITH THE REPAIR BAG SPILLING ITS CONTENTS EITHER WHEN DUMPING OUT OF THE TRANSPORT BAG OR WHEN TRYING TO PUT IT BACK IN THE TRANSPORT BAG. STIFFENERS, ACTUALLY THE BUNGEE CORDS THAT SECURE THE STIFFENERS, ARE A PROBLEM BECAUSE THEY BREAK FAIRLY EASILY. THE PINS OR BOLTS THAT HOLD THE STIFFENERS TO THE FRAME COME LOOSE AND FALL OUT.
548 37021 HF7 ASBGCMT STIFFENERS.
547 37020 HF7 KITCMT I HAD TROUBLE AT NIGHTTIME ON THE PMCS OF THE GENERATOR. THOSE 20 SCREWS ARE HARD TO MANAGE IN THE DARK.

546 37020 HF7 MAINTCMT EXCEPT FOR ALL THE SCREWS, IT GOES PRETTY SMOOTHLY BUT WE WILL SPEND MORE TIME ON REPAIRS.
545 37020 HF7 TRBLCMT EXCEPT FOR ALL THE SCREWS, IT GOES PRETTY SMOOTHLY BUT WE WILL SPEND MORE TIME ON REPAIRS.

544 37020 HF7 PROCCMT EXCEPT FOR ALL THE SCREWS, IT GOES PRETTY SMOOTHLY BUT WE WILL SPEND MORE TIME ON REPAIRS.

543 37020 HF7 PMCSMT TOO MANY SCREWS, THEY ARE REAL TIME CONSUMING. IT TAKES TOO LONG TO LOOK AT EVERYTHING IN THE BAG.

542 37020 HF7 CONCERNS THE DECOY DOESN'T FOLD REAL EASILY, THE FRAME HAS TO BE JUST RIGHT.

541 37020 HF7 RPKPCMT POWER SUPPLY TAKES TOO LONG TO COOL, CAN'T PUT IT IN CARRY CASE. TRANSPORT BAG IS TOO HARD TO WORK WITH, HAVE TO HOLD IT OPEN AND ANOTHER PERSON PUTS THINGS AWAY IN IT.

540 37020 HF7 DASBPCMT POWER SUPPLY TAKES TOO LONG TO COOL, AND WE CAN'T PUT IT IN CARRY CASE.

539 37020 HF7 OPPROB WE NEED A PALLET TO KEEP POWER SUPPLY OUT OF WATER. WE WON'T ALWAYS HAVE ONE. POWER SUPPLY SHOULD HAVE LEGS.

538 37020 HF7 DEPLCMT IT IS STARTING TO FALL APART ALREADY, HAS HOLES IN IMAGE AND ROPES SNAP. I DON'T THINK IT WILL LAST FOR 40 TIMES.

537 37020 HF7 TWORQCMT ANY MORE PEOPLE WILL GET IN EACH OTHERS WAY.

536 37020 HF7 ASBCMT WIND PULLS STAKES OUT OF GROUND. EVERYTHING IN REPAIR KIT IS ALL JAMMED INTO A LITTLE BAG, TO GET A LITTLE PIECE OF STRING I HAD TO DUMP EVERYTHING OUT. THE TRANSPORT BAG IS HARD TO CARRY USING TWO MAN LIFT, SHOULD MAKE A CARRIER LIKE THE ONE FOR POWER SYSTEM.

535 37019 HF7 PMCSMT WIRE LEADING TO BATTERY CAME DISCONNECTED, WOULDN'T START.

534 37019 HF7 CONCERNS THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE BAG FOR THE REPAIR KIT, STAKES AND REFLECTOR CORNERS. THE SEPARATE BAG COULD GO INTO THE MAIN BAG. IT WOULD BE BETTER BECAUSE YOU COULD KEEP ALL THE LITTLE LOOSE STUFF TOGETHER.

533 37018 HF7 KITCMT GIVES SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT TO MAKE THE REPAIRS NEEDED.

532 37018 HF7 PMCSMT THE 20 SCREWS ARE A PAIN IN THE NECK.

531 37018 HF7 RPKCMT LIMITED VISIBILITY WITH YOU'RE PROTECTIVE MASK ON.

530 37018 HF7 TWORQCMT I THINK IF MORE THAN TWO PEOPLE WERE DEPLOYING THE MCCD THEY WOULD ONLY GET IN EACH OTHERS WAY.

529 37018 HF7 ASBGCMT IN MOPP4 IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT YOU'RE DOING, ESPECIALLY IN THE RAIN AND MUD, IT MAY HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF IT WAS A SUNNY, DRY DAY.

528 37018 HF7 MVCMT WITH THE MASK ON IT IS HARD TO SEE WHAT YOUR DOING, ESPECIALLY IN RAIN AND MUD.

527 37017 HF7 PMCSMT THE 20 SCREWS MUST GO.

526 37017 HF7 SHREPKG THREE FOLDS ONLY FOR THE IMAGE, OTHER THAN THAT THE HARDWARE WILL CUT AND RIP THE REAR AND FRONT OF THE IMAGE.

525 37017 HF7 SHMOVE PMCS ON THE POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY IS TEDIOUS, THE 20 SCREWS MUST GO.

524 37017 HF7 SHSETUP MUST WATCH CAREFULLY WHERE YOU PLACE YOUR FINGERS, THEY COULD GET CUT.

523 37017 HF7 CONCERNS WHILE DISASSEMBLING AND FOLDING THE DECOY WE MUST MAKE SURE WE FOLD THE IMAGE NOT MORE THAN THREE TIMES, IF ANY MORE, THE METAL FRAME WILL MAKE CUTS ON THE MATERIAL OF THE IMAGE.

522 37017 HF7 INSCMT THE ANTENNAE ARE SHORT, LONG IS WRONG.

521 37017 HF7 ASBCMT SOME OF THE ASSEMBLY IS WEAK, RUBBER STRAPS ARE WEAK.

520 37016 HF7 KITCMT COULD BE IN BETTER CARRYING CASE.

519 37016 HF7 SHMOVE FINGERS SOMETIMES GET CRUSHED OR PINCHED.

518 37016 HF7 SHSETUP WHEN PUTTING UP THE DECOY, FINGERS HAVE THE HABIT OF GETTING IN THE WAY WHEN EXTENDING THE DECOY.

517 37016 HF7 RPKCMT WHEN GLOVES ARE WET IT MAKES STRAPS HARD TO HANDLE.

516 37016 HF7 RPKOTDES MUDDY CONDITIONS.

515 37016 HF7 DASBCMT WHEN GLOVES ARE WET IT MAKES STRAPS HARDER TO HANDLE.

514 37016 HF7 DASBODES MUDDY CONDITIONS.

513 37016 HF7 OPPROB WHEN PUTTING TOGETHER THE DECOY THE ELASTIC STRAPS BREAK TOO EASILY, SHOULD USE VELCRO.

512 37016 HF7 DEPLCMT EQUIPMENT FALLS APART TOO EASILY.

511 37016 HF7 TWORQCMT WEATHER/TERRAIN DICTATES. IF THE WIND IS BLOWING REALLY HARD IT IS EASIER FOR 3 PEOPLE TO DEAL WITH IT. WHEN IT'S MUDDY OUT AND THE MUD IS VERY DEEP IT IS A LOT SAFER AND EASIER IF 3 PEOPLE ARE WORKING ON IT.

510 37016 HF7 ASBCMT DECOY IMAGE ASSEMBLY IS DIFFICULT TO SET UP WHEN IT IS RAINING. ANTENNA ASSEMBLY WHEN PUTTING ON THE DECOY: THE ANTENNA HAS A TENDENCY TO FALL APART WHEN RAISING THE DECOY.

509 37016 HF7 ASBGCMT DURING MOPP4 IT IS A LITTLE DIFFICULT SEEING THINGS AS CLEARLY, ALSO, WITH THE GLOVES ON, IT MAKES THE GRIP ON SOME PARTS A LOT MORE DIFFICULT.

508 37016 HF7 ASBOTDES OTHER: MUD AND COLD WEATHER.

507 37016 HF7 MVOTHDES OTHER: MUD; THE MUD MAKES THINGS A LOT MORE DIFFICULT TO TRANSPORT AROUND. FEET GET STUCK IN MUD AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO SLIP AND FALL.

506 37015 HF7 OPTRNCMT WE NEED TO SET THEM UP EVERY DAY SO I DON'T SEE THE NEED TO PRACTICE IT 3 TIMES OUT AT SITE JUDY.

505 37015 HF7 KITCMT USED IT TWICE AND IT WORKED PERFECTLY.

504 37015 HF7 TRBLCMT WENT INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL ON THE DECOY AND IS EASY TO REMEMBER.

503 37015 HF7 PROCCMT WENT INTO DETAIL ON THE DECOY AND IS EASY TO REMEMBER.

502 37015 HF7 SHCMT DIFFICULT TO MOVE, SET-UP, OR RECOVER IN ALL THE RAIN AND FLOOD.

501 37015 HF7 LABELCMT DIDN'T NOTICE MANY.

500 37015 HF7 HFECMT IT WAS A LIKENESS.
499 37015 HF7 DEPLCMT THE ANTENNAE WERE ON THE WRONG ENDS, MAKING IT A GIVEAWAY.
498 37015 HF7 ASBCMT A FEW OF THE BUNGEE CORDS THAT HOLD THE EXTENSIONS WERE TOO SMALL. THE 20 SCREWS WERE A PROBLEM.
497 37014 HF7 KITCMT SHOULD INCLUDE MORE BUNGEE CORDS FOR THE STRAPS AND MORE ROPE, BECAUSE THE ROPES AND BUNGEE CORD KEEPS RIPPING.
496 37014 HF7 PMCSMT TOO MANY SCREWS ON POWER SUPPLY, AND THEY STRIP EASILY. IMAGE WOULD TEAR A LOT (THE CANVAS IMAGE).
495 37014 HF7 HFECMT THE TWO MAN REQUIREMENT FOR CARRYING WASTES TIME, DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT TOO HEAVY.
494 37014 HF7 DEPLCMT TOO HARD TO DEPLOY IT IN WINDY CONDITIONS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT ACTS LIKE A BIG KITE.
493 37014 HF7 TWORCMT IT MAKES IT EASY TO SET UP THE IMAGE.
492 37014 HF7 ASBCMT IMAGE ASSEMBLY TEARS TOO EASY, NOT DURABLE.
491 37013 HF7 KITCMT THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH SUPPLIES. NEED CLIPS, BANDS, PLIERS, AND A HAMMER.
490 37013 HF7 MAINTCMT IT IS ADEQUATE.
489 37013 HF7 PROCCMT IT IS ADEQUATE.
488 37013 HF7 PMCSMT RADAR IS DIFFICULT. 20 SCREWS ARE DIFFICULT. ANTENNA HOLES ARE HARD TO FIND.
487 37013 HF7 SHOPER THE STRAPS ARE TIME CONSUMING.
486 37013 HF7 SHSETUP WIND FACTOR.
485 37013 HF7 HFECMT NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY OR FLASHY, BORING OLE' ARMY EQUIPMENT.
484 37013 HF7 CONCERNS THE STRAP FASTENERS ARE TROUBLESOME.
483 37013 HF7 RPKCMT THE STRAP FASTENERS ARE TROUBLESOME.
482 37013 HF7 RPKCMT THE STRAP FASTENERS ARE TROUBLESOME.
481 37013 HF7 DASBPCMT THE STRAP FASTENERS ARE TROUBLESOME.
480 37013 HF7 DASBCMT THE TYPE OF STRAP FASTENERS ARE A PAIN, HOW ABOUT BUCKLES?
479 37013 HF7 PSACMT DURING PMCS, FREQUENT PROBLEMS.
478 37013 HF7 DEPLCMT ELIMINATE 20 SCREWS, STIFFENERS ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH.
477 37013 HF7 TWORCMT SAVES DEPLOYMENT TIME AND WEAR AND TEAR ON BOTH PERSON AND EQUIPMENT.
476 37013 HF7 ASBCMT RADARS ARE A PAIN TO LINE-UP. REPAIR KITS: NOT ENOUGH. POLES ARE FLIMSAY. ANTENNA HOLES ARE HARD TO FIND.
475 37013 HF7 ASBGCMT NIGHTTIME WITH 20 SCREWS IS DIFFICULT ESPECIALLY WITH GLOVES ON.
474 37013 HF7 MVMCMT MOPP4 LIMITS ALL COORDINATION.
473 37012 HF7 PMCSMT TOO MANY SCREWS IN POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY, TAKES UP TIME.
472 37012 HF7 RPKCMT REPAIR KIT ITEMS ARE EASILY LOST. MAKE BAG BIGGER, TOO FULL NOW BECAUSE IT IS TOO SMALL AND CAN'T PULL STRAP TIGHT TO CLOSE IT.
471 37012 HF7 RPKCMT STRAPS ARE DIFFICULT TO FASTEN OR UNFASTEN ON TRANSPORT BAGS, WHILE WEARING GLOVES.
470 37012 HF7 INSCMT THE INSTRUCTION SHEET IN THE DECOY TRANSPORT BAG SHOULD BE SOMEWHERE ELSE, IT GETS IN THE WAY.
469 37012 HF7 TWORCMT POWER SUPPLY UNIT SHOULD NOT BE A 2 MAN LIFT, SHOULD BE A ONE MAN LIFT.
468 37012 HF7 ASBCMT STRAPS ARE DIFFICULT ON TRANSPORT BAGS. STIFFENER LOOPS BREAK TOO EASILY, REPAIR KIT BAG IS TOO SMALL AND RIPS EASILY.
467 37012 HF7 ASBGCMT IN COLD WEATHER AND STANDARD WORK GLOVES THE STRAPS ON TRANSPORT BAG AND DECOY ARE DIFFICULT TO RELEASE OR FASTEN.
466 37011 HF7 KITCMT IN ORDER TO USE THE CLAMPS YOU NEED PLIERS.
465 37011 HF7 MAINTCMT A LOT OF THE PARTS OF THE DECOY YOU CAN REPAIR YOURSELF, INSTEAD OF SENDING IT TO ORGANIZATIONAL MAINTENANCE.
464 37011 HF7 TRBLCMT GOOD
463 37011 HF7 PROCCMT IT TELLS YOU HOW TO DO IT BUT YOU CAN DO PMCS AS YOU SET IT UP.
462 37011 HF7 PMCSMT REPLACE THE SCREWS ON THE POWER SUPPLY WITH LATCHES, YOU CAN DO PMCS AND SET THE DECOY UP AT THE SAME TIME.
461 37011 HF7 SHCMT WATCH OUT FOR THE JOINTS TO THE POLES TO THE DECOY ITSELF, BECAUSE IT WILL PINCH YOUR FINGERS OR SKIN.
460 37011 HF7 LABELCMT NEVER LOOKED AT THEM.
459 37011 HF7 SHREPKG IT IS GOOD ONCE YOU WORK OUT A SYSTEM ON HOW TO DO IT.
458 37011 HF7 SHMOVE THE MCCD IS EASY TO TAKE DOWN AND TRANSPORT ON A TANK WITH TIE DOWN STRAPS.
457 37011 HF7 SHOPER THE PMCS OF THE POWER PACK IS NOT REALISTIC, YOU CAN CHECK EVERYTHING WITH THE COVER OFF AND THERE ARE TOO MANY SCREWS.
456 37011 HF7 SHSETUP STRONG WINDS MADE IT HARD TO SET UP AT TIMES.
455 37011 HF7 SHDEPLOY VERY MUDDY, VERY SLIPPERY.
454 37011 HF7 HFECMT IT IS A SIMPLE THING TO SET UP BUT IT IS NOT VERY DURABLE.
453 37011 HF7 INSCMT EXCEPT FOR HOLDING THE SWITCH FOR 3 SECONDS, IT TAKES 5 TO 7.
452 37011 HF7 PSACMT THE DIRECTIONS SAY TO HOLD THE START SWITCH UP FOR 2 TO 3 SECONDS AND IT TAKES ABOUT 5 TO 7 TO GET IT STARTED.
451 37011 HF7 DEPLCMT CAUTION, WITH STRONG WINDS, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SET UP.
450 37011 HF7 TWORCMT THE TWO MAN LIFT IS NOT NECESSARY.
449 37011 HF7 ASBCMT THE DECOY ITSELF TEARS TOO EASY, SCREWS COME LOOSE, THE ANTENNA HOLES ARE HARD TO FIND. THE GUIDE ROPES TO THE STAKES ARE NOT STRONG ENOUGH. GET RID OF THE 20

SCREWS.

448 37011 HF7 ASBGCMT THE ELASTIC EXTENSIONS BREAK, THE GUIDE ROPES BREAK, THE SCREWS TO THE EXTENSIONS COME LOOSE.

447 37010 HF7 KITCMT NEED MORE TOOLS (PLIERS).

446 37010 HF7 PMCSCMT POWER SUPPLY HAS TOO MANY SCREWS.

445 37010 HF7 ASBCMT REPAIR KIT NEEDS MORE TOOLS (PLIERS).

444 37009 HF7 KITCMT EVERYTHING YOU NEED BUT NOT ENOUGH OF WHAT YOU NEED. A LOT OF LITTLE THINGS WENT WRONG, DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH REPAIR PIECES TO FIX THE MCCD AND COMPONENTS. NEED MORE GLUE.

443 37009 HF7 MAINTCMT EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

442 37009 HF7 PROCCMT EASY TO READ BUT SOME STEPS ARE OUT OF ORDER.

441 37009 HF7 PMCSCMT 20 SCREWS ON POWER SUPPLY, IS TIME CONSUMING.

440 37009 HF7 LABELCMT EASY TO READ AND UNDERSTAND.

439 37009 HF7 HFECMT NOT COMPLICATED, EASY TO UNDERSTAND.

438 37009 HF7 RPKOTDES WEATHER

437 37009 HF7 DASBCMT IN MOPP4 CANNOT SEE OR COMMUNICATE, DIFFICULTY DOING THE LITTLE THINGS WITH GLOVES ON. CANNOT SEE AT NIGHT.

436 37009 HF7 DASBODES WEATHER

435 37009 HF7 OPPOB NO PROBLEMS OPERATING THE MCCD.

434 37009 HF7 DEPLCMT THE DECOY AND COMPONENTS NEED TO BE BUILT STRONGER. THE DECOY DOES GET BUMPED AROUND; THROWN AROUND ETC.

433 37009 HF7 TWORQCMT BUT CONDITIONS SHOULD DICTATE.

432 37009 HF7 ASBCMT POLE TWISTED AND RIPPED EASILY.

431 37009 HF7 ASBODES GUY WIRES BROKE

430 37009 HF7 ASBGCMT IN MOPP4 HAD DIFFICULTY SEEING AND COMMUNICATING WITH PARTNER. WITH BOTH SETS OF GLOVES, IT IS HARD TO UNDOING STRAPS AND DOING STRAPS. NIGHTTIME CANNOT SEE ANYTHING.

429 37009 HF7 ASBOTDES WEATHER: WIND, RAIN, MUD, DIFFICULTY PUTTING UP THE DECOY. IT IS LIKE A KITE IN THE WIND.

428 37008 HF7 OPTRNCMT THE POLES ON THE BOTTOM TEND TO BIND AND NOT BEND WHEN WRAPPING UP THE DECOY, THE STRAPS ON THE BAG ARE NOT LONG ENOUGH TO CLOSE THE BAG PROPERLY.

427 37008 HF7 PMCSCMT THE SCREWS WERE STRIPPING AND TWENTY TINY SCREWS ARE A LOT OF SCREWS TO KEEP TRACK OF.

426 37008 HF7 SHOPER SLIPPERY AND HARD TO MOVE, MUD AND WATER, FALLING DOWN.

425 37008 HF7 SHSETUP SLIPPERY AND HARD TO MOVE, MUD AND WATER, FALLING DOWN.

424 37008 HF7 SHDEPLOY SLIPPERY AND HARD TO MOVE, MUD AND WATER, FALLING DOWN.

423 37008 HF7 DASBCMT THE MOPP4 MAKES MOVEMENT AND TAKE DOWN DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF BULKY AND DIFFICULT TO SEE.

422 37008 HF7 OPPOB THE SCREWS TEND TO STRIP EASILY AND NEED LATCHES INSTEAD OF SCREWS.

421 37008 HF7 DEPLCMT THE DECOY IS ONLY GOOD HEAD ON (FRONT VIEW). WON'T BE AS GOOD IF THEY GET TO THE SIDE OR GET TOO CLOSE.

420 37008 HF7 TWORQCMT UNDER HARSH CONDITIONS (LIKE WHEN WINDY) TWO CAN GET IT DONE BUT THREE WOULD MAKE IT GO SMOOTHER.

419 37008 HF7 ASBCMT CANVAS IMAGE WOULD CATCH AND RIP TIPS ON FRAME WHEN ARMS WOULD BEND. RADAR POLES TEND TO NOT WANT TO GO IN HOLES.

418 37008 HF7 ASBGCMT HARD TO MOVE, TOO MUDDY TO MOVE QUICKLY.

417 37008 HF7 MVCMT IN MOPP4 IT WAS TOO BULKY AND HARD TO MOVE IN THE MUD, THE GLOVES MADE THE LATCHES HARD TO OPEN AND HARD TO FIND THINGS WITH THE MASK ON.

416 37007 HF7 KITCMT REPAIRING TEARS AND HOLES WAS EASY.

415 37007 HF7 PROCCMT VERY SIMPLE, NEED TO DEVISE A WAY TO REMOVE THE LID TO THE POWER SUPPLY, 20 SCREWS TAKES A LOT OF TIME.

414 37007 HF7 HFECMT IT SEEMED TO BE A FAIRLY SIMPLE DESIGN, BUT ELASTIC STRIPS NEED TO BE STRONGER.

413 37007 HF7 DASBPDES THE ELASTIC BANDS USED TO ATTACH THE STIFFENERS TO THE DECOY BREAK SOMETIMES.

412 37007 HF7 OPPOB WIND SEEMED TO BLOW THE DECOY DOWN IF THE GROUND WAS SOFT AND YOU DIDN'T USE SEVERAL SANDBAGS TO ANCHOR IT.

411 37007 HF7 ASBCMT ON ONE TRIAL THE POWER ASSEMBLY FAILED TO START.

410 37007 HF7 ASBGCMT THE DECOY IS A BIT FRUSTRATING TO SET UP IN MOPP4 AND REQUIRES A LOT MORE TIME AND PATIENCE.

409 37006 HF7 KITCMT NOT ENOUGH OF GLUE. GLUE IS NOT EFFECTIVE. NEED PLIERS FOR CRIMPING ELASTIC BANDS.

408 37006 HF7 PROCCMT COVERS NECESSARY ITEMS.

407 37006 HF7 PMCSCMT TOO MANY SCREWS, POLES, FABRIC TEARS, ANTENNA BENDS, REPAIR KIT NEEDS BETTER AND MORE GLUE.

406 37006 HF7 SHSETUP WIND CAN BE DANGEROUS.

405 37006 HF7 HFECMT FRUSTRATING TO USE (STAKING, TUBES ROTATE).

404 37006 HF7 TWORQCMT 2 SOLDIERS ARE NECESSARY.

403 37006 HF7 ASBCMT TUBING WOULD ROTATE AND COLLAPSE ONCE ERECTED WITH ALL STRAPS AND STIFFENERS.

402 37006 HF7 ASBGCMT TIGHTENING STRAPS TOO SHORT FOR MUD.

COMMUNICATION WITH ASSISTANT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE.

401 37006 HF7 MVCMT DOING ANYTHING IN MOPP4 IS DIFFICULT ESPECIALLY, IN KNEE DEEP MUD, AND CAN BE HAZARDOUS BECAUSE YOU CAN'T SEE HOLES WHILE CARRYING IT.

400 37005 HF7 KITCMT KIT NEEDS MORE ROPE AND LITTLE CLIPS TO REPAIR THE DUNGEE STRAPS.

399 37005 HF7 TRBLCMT THE ONLY TROUBLESHOOTING IS ON THE POWER SUPPLY AND IT IS SIMPLE.

398 37005 HF7 PROCCMT IT IS COMPLETE, IN DETAIL.

397 37005 HF7 PMCSCMT TAKING 20 SCREWS OUT IS A PROBLEM.

396 37005 HF7 SHMOVE THERE ARE REALLY NO PROBLEMS.

395 37005 HF7 SHOPER OPERATING IT IS NO PROBLEM.

394 37005 HF7 SHSETUP THE MCCD IS NO PROBLEM SETTING UP EXCEPT AT NIGHT.

393 37005 HF7 SHDEPLOY I DON'T SET IT UP ON THE TARGET LINE.

392 37005 HF7 HFECMT IT TEARS AND RIPS TOO EASILY.

391 37005 HF7 DASBCMT IT WAS HARD TO SEE WHAT YOU'RE DOING AND HARD TO FIND EVERYTHING.

390 37005 HF7 TWRQCMT BECAUSE WHEN YOU ERECT THE MCCD YOU NEED TO MAKE PROPER ADJUSTMENTS TO IT AND THE OTHER PERSON HOLDS IT UP.

389 37005 HF7 ASBCMT THE DECOY, AFTER BEING USED A LOT, WOULD START LOOSING PARTS AND ALSO START FALLING APART.

388 37005 HF7 ASBGCMT IT WAS HARD TO WORK WITH THE BLACK GLOVES AND AT NIGHT BECAUSE BLACK GLOVES ARE HARD TO WORK WITH AND AT NIGHT BECAUSE IT IS HARD TO SEE MCCD.

387 37005 HF7 MVCMT IT WAS HARD TO WORK WITH THE BLACK GLOVES AND AT NIGHT BECAUSE BLACK GLOVES ARE HARD TO WORK WITH AND AT NIGHT IT IS HARD TO SEE MCCD.

386 37001 HF7 MVCMT WEARING WORK GLOVES: THE GLOVES ARE TOO BULKY AND MAKES IT HARD TO GET STRAPS UNDONE AND STIFFENERS IN PLACE. ARCTIC GLOVES: THEY WEREN'T AS HARD TO USE AS THE WORK GLOVES, I GUESS, BECAUSE THEY WERE THINNER. WIND CONDITION: WIND WAS FIERCE, DECOY WERE GETTING THRASHED, STIFFENER BOLTS WERE COMING LOOSE AND GUIDE WIRES WERE COMING OUT OF THE GROUND.

385 37004 HF7 KITCMT PIECE OF JUNK, MAKE IT BIGGER, INCLUDE SCREWS AND SCREWDRIERS, VELCRO, MORE GLUE, MORE PATCHES, AND ROPE.

384 37004 HF7 MAINTCMT WE CAN DO MORE.

383 37004 HF7 PROCCMT OPERATOR CAN DO ALMOST ALL REPAIRS LIKE REPLACE A SCREW!

382 37004 HF7 PMCSCMT 20 SCREWS, IMAGE TEARS TOO EASILY, REPAIR KIT VERY INADEQUATE, POLES LOOSE SCREWS ALL THE TIME.

381 37004 HF7 LABELCMT MAKE ALL WARNING LABELS SO SIMPLE ANYONE CAN UNDERSTAND.

380 37004 HF7 HFECMT CAN BE GREATLY IMPROVED, GOOD IDEAS, BUT NEEDS SOME HONING DOWN.

379 37004 HF7 RPKPCMT TEARING OF IMAGE.

378 37004 HF7 DASBPCMT ALL ITEMS IN REPAIR KIT GET LOST OR USED UP. LOST SCREWS ON POLES, OUT OF GLUE.

377 37004 HF7 DASBCMT SLOW, BUT CAN BE DONE.

376 37004 HF7 OPPROB MAKE REPAIR KIT LARGER AND IN A ZIPPER BAG, INCLUDE SCREWS, SCREWDRIERS AND MORE GLUE, AND PLIERS.

375 37004 HF7 DEPLCMT DURING MUDDY CONDITIONS YOU CAN'T CLEAN MCCD. HARD TO STAKE, CONSTANTLY MAKING REPAIRS TO ROPES AND IMAGE, 2 TO 3 TIMES A DAY.

374 37004 HF7 TWRQCMT ANY MORE THAN TWO IS A HINDRANCE.

373 37004 HF7 ASBCMT 20 SCREWS WERE A NIGHTMARE. DECOY IMAGE TEARS TOO EASILY. ANTENNAS NEED TO BE REVERSED. REPAIR KIT IS TOO SMALL AND GETS LOST. ALL PIECES FALL OUT. SCREWS FALL OUT OF POLES.

372 37004 HF7 ASBGCMT VERY SLOW AND TIME CONSUMING. RAIN AND WIND WERE EXTREME FACTORS. VERY HARD TO SET UP AND KEEP UP. MUD MADE DECOY VERY MESSY AND HARD TO HANDLE.

371 37004 HF7 ASBOTDES RAIN AND WIND.

370 37003 HF7 OPTRNCMT RUSHED THROUGH IT TOO FAST.

369 37003 HF7 KITCMT IT'S OK IF YOU LIKE A PAPER BAG THAT FALLS OPEN ALL THE TIME. GOOD THING YOU DON'T KEEP YOUR LUNCH IN THAT BAG.

368 37003 HF7 MAINTCMT TOO TIME CONSUMING, IF A DECOY HAD TO BE UP RIGHT NOW IN WARTIME YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TIME TO BE PATCHING HOLES.

367 37003 HF7 PMCSCMT BENT STIFFENERS; BROKEN ELASTIC BANDS.

366 37003 HF7 LABELCMT DON'T REMEMBER SEEING ANY.

365 37003 HF7 TWRQCMT MORE TIME EFFICIENT.

364 37003 HF7 ASBCMT ELASTIC BANDS FOR STIFFENERS ALWAYS BREAK.

363 37003 HF7 MVCMT WHILE RAINING MOPP4 GETS HEAVY AND MASK FOGS UP.

349 37000 HF7 KITCMT REPAIR KITS IS NOT GOOD. EVERYTHING ALWAYS FALLS OUT. DOES NOT CONTAIN ADEQUATE TOOLS TO DO THE JOB CORRECTLY, PLIERS, STRAPS, SEWING KIT.

348 37000 HF7 MAINTCMT TELLS YOU HOW TO DO IT AND WHERE TO PUT IT.

347 37000 HF7 TRBLCMT TROUBLESHOOTING IS WRITTEN EASY, NOT TOO MUCH TO TROUBLESHOOT.

346 37000 HF7 PMCSCMT THE MUD AND WIND MADE THINGS HARDER TO DO.

345 37000 HF7 LABELCMT I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY WARNING HAZARDS ON THE BAG TO THE DECOY ITSELF, THE HEATER IS GOOD TO GO.

344 37000 HF7 SHREPKG VERY EASY TO DO, EVERYTHING FITS GOOD.

343 37000 HF7 SHMOVE EASY TO OPERATE.

342 37000 HF7 SHOPER EASY TO ASSEMBLE/DISASSEMBLE.

341 37000 HF7 SHSETUP VERY WINDY, VERY WET.

340 37000 HF7 SHDEPLOY I CAUGHT A COLD.

339 37000 HF7 HFECMT THE SIZE OF THE DECOY SEEMS SMALLER THAN THE REAL THING.
 338 37000 HF7 CONCERNS THE MUD AND WIND MADE DISASSEMBLING AND REPACKING DIFFICULT.
 337 37000 HF7 RPKPCMT THE MUD AND WIND MADE THINGS HARDER TO DO.
 336 37000 HF7 RPKCMT WORKING IN THE MUD AND WIND MADE THINGS DIFFICULT.
 335 37000 HF7 DASBPCMT STRAPS WERE HARD TO FASTEN WHEN GLOVES WERE WORN.
 334 37000 HF7 DASBCMT WORKING IN THE MUD AND WIND MADE THINGS DIFFICULT.
 333 37000 HF7 DASBODES WINDY CONDITIONS.
 332 37000 HF7 OPPOB NEED A BETTER REPAIR KIT AS FAR AS TOOLS. PLIERS FOR CRIMPING STRAPS TOGETHER, STIFFENER STRAPS BREAK TOO EASILY.
 331 37000 HF7 PSACMT I ONLY HAD TROUBLE WITH THE VELCRO ON THE HEATER. IT DIDN'T WANT TO STICK WHEN I CONNECTED IT TO THE DECOY (DUE TO THE MUD).
 330 37000 HF7 DEPLCMT IF I DROPPED THE DECOY OFF MY TANK, WOULD IT STILL BE COMBAT READY? WHEN WE GO OVER BIG BUMPS THE DECOY LOOKS LIKE IT IS GOING TO FALL OFF.
 329 37000 HF7 TWORQCMT YOU NEED AT LEAST 2 PEOPLE TO SET THE DECOY UP, 3 PEOPLE WOULD BE FASTER.
 328 37000 HF7 ASBCMT POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY: HARD TO SET UP IN WINDY, MUDDY CONDITIONS. DECOY IMAGE ASSEMBLY: THE BOLTS LIKE TO FALL OUT. ANTENNA ASSEMBLY: THEY LIKE TO BEND. REPAIR KIT: NEEDS PLIERS FOR CLAMPING. TRANSPORTATION BAG: NEEDS BETTER HANDLES FOR 2 PERSON CARRY.
 327 37000 HF7 ASBGCMT MOPPO WASN'T HARD EXCEPT TRYING TO SET IT UP IN THE MUD. SANDBAGS WERE USED AND MAKING THE MCCD LEVEL WAS DIFFICULT. IN A REAL BATTLE YOU WOULDN'T HAVE SANDBAGS AT YOUR SIDE TO HELP YOU.
 326 37001 HF7 ASBOTDES WINDY CONDITIONS.
 324 35016 HF5 TGTCMT AT LONG OR MEDIUM RANGE THE TARGETS WOULD SERVE THEIR PURPOSE. AT CLOSE RANGE IT IS A WASTE OF TIME.
 323 35016 HF5 NKNOWCMT THE OPTICS WOULD FOG UP AND YOU COULD BARELY SEE THE TARGET.
 322 35016 HF5 INTERCMT FOG WOULD COVER THE VALLEY AND YOU COULDN'T SEE TARGET LINE. RAIN AND MUD WOULD DIRTY THE LENSES.
 321 35016 HF5 SRCMT WHEN THE WIND WOULD BLOW, THE TARGET WOULD RIPPLE. REALLY DIDN'T NEED BINOCULARS TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE, THE ANGLES WERE NOT AS DEFINED AS THE ANGLE OF THE TURRET ON THE M1 OR BRADLEY.
 320 35016 HF5 MRCMT THE COLOR WAS DIFFERENT. SOMETIMES YOU COULD SEE BEHIND THE TARGET, NO 3-DIMENSIONAL EFFECT WHEN LOOKING ACROSS LANES.
 319 35016 HF5 LRCMT THE DECOY HAD A DIFFERENT COLOR GREEN, ESPECIALLY THE M1 DECOY, THAN THE REAL VEHICLE.
 318 35015 HF5 SRCMT COLOR: THE COLOR WAS TOO GREEN SO IT HELPED; BACKGROUND: GAVE IT AWAY SOMETIMES.
 317 35015 HF5 MRCMT COLOR: THE COLOR WAS TOO GREEN SO IT HELPED; BACKGROUND: GAVE IT AWAY SOMETIMES.
 316 35015 HF5 LRCMT SOMETIMES YOU CAN SEE FROM LONG RANGE BUT NOT ALL THE TIME.
 315 35014 HF5 TGTCMT AT LONG RANGES I'M NOT ATTEMPTING TO TELL IF A VEHICLE IS A DECOY. I'M GOING TO ENGAGE ALL TARGETS IN MY SECTOR AS THE RANGE DECREASES I WOULD NOTICE THAT THE DECOY LOOKED DIFFERENT AND MIGHT TAKE A LONGER LOOK, DISCARD AS A THREAT. SO AT LONG RANGE IT IS VIABLE AS THE RANGE DECREASES SO DOES IT'S VALUE.
 314 35014 HF5 INTERCMT FATIGUE: EARLY WAKE-UP TO MAKE TEST TIMES, GOT 3-4 HOURS OF SLEEP PER NIGHT AND THEN JUST WAIT FOR ACTION.
 313 35014 HF5 INOTHCMT OTHER: RAIN; RAIN WAS SOMETIMES HEAVY ENOUGH TO DROWN OUT THE THERMALS.
 312 35014 HF5 MVCMT (PILOT TEST) PLATFORM STABILITY WAS A PROBLEM.
 311 35014 HF5 MVOTHCMT OTHER: BARREL SIGNATURE.
 310 35014 HF5 SRCMT REFLECTION: RAIN CAUSED REFLECTION ON TOPS OF VEHICLE AND ISU. ON A REAL VEHICLE (I.E. TANK) THERE IS A THERMAL BLACK HOLE FOR THE BARREL, THERE IS NONE FOR THE DECOY; SIGNATURE: THERMAL GAVE OFF DOUBLE AND TRIPLE SIGNATURES.
 309 35014 HF5 SROTHCMT OTHER: BARREL SIGNATURE.
 308 35014 HF5 MRCMT REFLECTION: RAIN CAUSE REFLECTION ON TOPS OF VEHICLE AND ISU. ON A REAL VEHICLE (I.E. TANK) THERE IS A THERMAL BLACK HOLE FOR THE BARREL, THERE IS NONE FOR THE DECOY.
 307 35014 HF5 MROTHCMT OTHER: BARREL SIGNATURE.
 306 35014 HF5 LRCMT SHAPE: DECOY TURRET WAS MORE ROUNDED LIKE A SOVIET; SIGNATURE: THERMAL; ASPECT ANGLE: IF NOT STRAIGHT ON, SIDE VIEW WAS A GIVE-A-WAY.
 305 35013 HF5 TGTCMT WE NEED TO SCAN ON LOW MAGNIFICATION TO PICK UP THE TARGET AND THEN GO TO HIGH MAGNIFICATION TO ID. YOU CAN'T SEE THE LIGHT IN THERMAL AND THERE IS SOME CONFUSION GOING FROM TARGET TO TARGET FROM THE RADIO OPERATOR.
 304 35013 HF5 NKNOWCMT FOG AND THE THERMAL IMAGERY.
 303 35013 HF5 INTERCMT DAMAGED SIGHTS: THE SIGHTS WERE FOGGED UP. THERMAL IMAGERY WAS NOT GOOD AND THE THERMAL WAS NOT WORKING VERY GOOD. ORIENTATION OF LIGHTING: TARGET ID LIGHTING INTERFERED.
 302 35013 HF5 DCFOFCMT ONCE AT FT CARSON, COLORADO.
 301 35013 HF5 MVCMT PILOT TEST. ON THE MOVE MY GUNNER WAS NOT ON TARGET LONG ENOUGH. PLATFORM NOT STEADY ENOUGH.
 300 35013 HF5 SRCMT COLOR: THE COLOR IS A LITTLE SHARPER, NO DIRT. THE REAL VEHICLE GAVE OFF A GOOD SIGNATURE. THE DECOY WAS SQUARE. ACQUISITION PLAN CAUSED US TO ACQUIRE TARGETS LATE. SWINGING TURRET AROUND IN HIGH MAGNIFICATION CAUSED LOSS OF TARGET.

299	35013	HF5	MRCMT	REFLECTION: DECOYS LOOKED NEWER, SHINIER. I COULD SEE THE SIDES OF SOME OF THE VEHICLES AND THE TRACKS.
298	35013	HF5	LRCMT	AT LONG RANGE THE SIGNATURE HELPED SOMETIMES WHEN USING THERMAL; ASPECT ANGLE HELPED WHEN I COULD SEE THE TARGET FROM AN ANGLE TO THE SIDE. THE WEATHER WAS NOT CLEAR OUTSIDE, AND THE TARGETS WERE NOT HOT ENOUGH.
297	35012	HF5	TGTCMT	THE DECOY WAS VERY EFFECTIVE AT LONG RANGE. THE TANK DECOY WAS BETTER THAN THE BRADLEY DECOY AND AT SHORT RANGE IT COULD ALMOST ALWAYS BE DETERMINED REAL OR DECOY. ALSO COLD BRADLEYS GAVE A POOR HEAT SIGNATURE WHICH ENABLED DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DECOY AND THE REAL VEHICLE.
296	35012	HF5	NKNOWCMT	COULDN'T TELL ON FIRST AND SECOND DAYS.
295	35012	HF5	INTERCMT	CONDENSATION ON LENSES DURING RAIN; FATIGUE: LONG HOURS SOMETIMES.
294	35012	HF5	SRCMT	BALLISTIC SHIELDS ON DECOY ARE ALWAYS CLOSED.
293	35012	HF5	MRCMT	TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST: MADE IT HARDER; SIGNATURE: WEAK FOR BOTH AT TIMES.
292	35012	HF5	LRCMT	REAL BRADLEY GETS SHINY WHEN WET. DECOY HAS HIGH SPOTS; DIMENSIONS OF DECOY SEEM TO BE OFF; SOMETIMES COULD SEE SIDES OF REAL VEHICLE. TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST: MADE IT HARDER.
291	35011	HF5	TGTCMT	ONCE AGAIN I'LL TRY TO REINFORCE THAT THE WEATHER CONDITIONS ARE GOING TO THROW OFF THE DATA. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN IT'S WARM OUT THE THERMALS CANNOT PICK UP THE DECOY HEAT GENERATORS BECAUSE THEY ARE ONLY SOMEWHAT ADEQUATE IN WARMER CONDITIONS.
290	35011	HF5	NKNOWCMT	I DID RESPOND SEVERAL TIMES WITH "TARGET UNIDENTIFIABLE"
289	35011	HF5	INTERCMT	COMPLETELY RIDICULOUS WEATHER CONDITIONS. EVEN ELEMENTARY THINKING WOULD CONCLUDE THAT WE ARE WORKING IN IMPRACTICAL AND EVEN DANGEROUS CONDITIONS. NEED TO POSTPONE. VISUAL DISTRACTIONS: NOT CLEAR AS TO WHICH DECOY WAS TO BE "ID". PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT: COLD.
288	35011	HF5	INOTHCMT	OTHER: DISTRACTED BY POSSIBILITY OF VEHICLE RECOVERY AHEAD.
287	35011	HF5	SRCMT	SIGNATURE: THERMAL GIVES A PERFECT OUTLINE.
286	35011	HF5	LRCMT	ASPECT ANGLE: DECOYS ARE ALWAYS HEAD ON, NO SIDE VIEW.
285	35011	HF5	LROTHCMT	OTHER: CLEANLINESS OF DECOYS, THE MUD WASHED OFF OF THE DECOYS IN THE RAIN.
284	35010	HF5	TGTCMT	THE MCCD IS TOO HOT WHEN USING THERMALS. IF YOU COULD LOWER THE TEMPERATURE OF THE GENERATOR OR TURN IT OFF JUST BEFORE THE TRIALS START THE SIGNATURE OF THE DECOY WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED AND MORE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY.
283	35010	HF5	NKNOWCMT	COULDN'T SEE THE TARGET AT ALL BECAUSE OF FOG. COULDN'T TELL IF REAL OR DECOY: JUST COULDN'T TELL.
282	35010	HF5	INTERCMT	ORIENTATION OF LIGHTING: THE BLINKING BEACON (STROBE) SOMETIMES COULDN'T BE SEEN, TIME WAS TOO SHORT THAT IT WAS ON.
281	35010	HF5	LRCMT	THE REAL BRADLEY'S COLOR IS DULLER.
280	35009	HF5	TGTCMT	I WOULD SUGGEST A BETTER ANCHORING SYSTEM THAT WOULD KEEP THE DECOY FROM MOVING AS MUCH DURING WINDY CONDITIONS.
279	35009	HF5	NKNOWCMT	PRIMARILY IN FOG.
278	35009	HF5	INTERCMT	PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT: THE WEATHER (RAIN AND WIND) PLAYED A LARGE ROLE IN HOW OBSERVATION WENT. RAIN OBSCURED BINOCULARS.
277	35009	HF5	SROTHCMT	OTHER: WIND MOVEMENT; AT CLOSE RANGE THE WIND MOVEMENT WAS VERY NOTICEABLE.
276	35009	HF5	MRCMT	YOU COULD NOTICE WIND MOVEMENT BETTER FROM A CLOSER RANGE.
275	35009	HF5	MROTHCMT	OTHER: WIND MOVEMENT; WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING HARD ENOUGH YOU COULD NOTICE SLIGHT MOVEMENT IN THE DECOY.
274	35009	HF5	LRCMT	AT TIMES YOU COULD TELL THE DIFFERENCE BECAUSE OF THE SHAPE OF THE TURRET ON SOME DECOYS. YOU COULD ALSO NOTICE A COLOR DIFFERENCE AT TIMES.
273	35009	HF5	LROTHCMT	OTHER: WIND MOVEMENT; WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING HARD ENOUGH YOU COULD NOTICE SLIGHT MOVEMENT IN THE DECOY.
272	35008	HF5	TGTCMT	HAVING DECOY TARGETS SO CLOSE TO REAL TARGETS MAKES IT EASY TO COMPARE HEIGHT, STRUCTURE, NARROWNESS, AND SOME LITTLE THINGS LIKE GAP BETWEEN THE TOW PLATE AND BRADLEY. THE DECOYS DOES NOT HAVE A GAP BETWEEN THE TOW PLATE AND THE BODY OF THE BRADLEY. ONCE A BARREL ON A REAL BRADLEY WAS DEPRESSED AND THAT WAS ENOUGH TO TELL ME IT WAS REAL. LIGHT TOWERS PROVIDE A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR HEIGHT COMPARISON.
271	35008	HF5	NKNOWCMT	COULDN'T SEE TARGET AT ALL AND IF IT COULD BE SEEN, I COULDN'T DETERMINE IF IT WERE REAL OR A DECOY. THIS NORMALLY OCCURRED AT LONG RANGE AND ESPECIALLY WHEN USING THERMALS.
270	35008	HF5	INTERCMT	WEATHER IN COMBINATION WITH MONOTONY, IN SOME CASES I FEEL I MADE QUICKER DECISIONS; DIRTY DAMAGED SIGHTS: CONDENSATION VARIED FROM VEHICLE TO VEHICLE.
269	35008	HF5	INOTHCMT	OTHER: REPETITIOUS (ATTITUDES).
268	35008	HF5	SRCMT	SOMETIMES GIVES OFF MORE THAN ONE OUTLINE IN THERMALS; GIVES OFF A DIFFERENT COLOR COMPARED TO ITS COUNTERPARTS AND SOMETIMES ITEMS ON DECOY ARE HEATED TOO MUCH (IE: TOW LAUNCHER); DECOY GIVES HALO EFFECT. TOW LAUNCHER IS OVERHEATED ON DECOY. SHORT RANGE SEEMED EASY TO TELL BOTH THERMAL AND DIRECT; THERMAL M1 LOOKS MORE ROUNDED ON DECOY.
267	35008	HF5	SROTHCMT	OTHER: IMAGE IN THERMALS; OTHER: (A) ID IN THERMALS.
266	35008	HF5	MRCMT	SOMETIMES A TOW LAUNCHER PLATE LOOKS SOLIDLY ATTACHED AT ALL TIMES. BRADLEY DECOY

265 35008 HF5 MROTHCMT SEEMS NARROWER THAN THE REAL BRADLEY.
OTHER: TOW LAUNCHER; OTHER: HEIGHT COMPARED TO LIGHT TOWER. A REAL TOW LAUNCHER, WHEN UP, ALLOWS DAYLIGHT BETWEEN THE HEAD AND VEHICLE BODY.

264 35008 HF5 LRCMT DISTANCE AND WEATHER MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE ANYTHING; REAL VEHICLES HAVE MUD, DECOYS ARE LIKE NEWLY PAINTED VEHICLES.

263 35007 HF5 TGT CMT ON THERMAL SIGHTS THE DECOYS WERE EXTREMELY HOT IN COMPARISON WITH LIVE TARGETS; AT SHORT RANGE THE TANK DECOYS DIDN'T HAVE MATCHING UNITS FOR ANTENNAE. BRADLEY DECOYS ARE NOT PROPORTIONED WELL, THEY APPEAR THINNER AND TALLER. IF BRADLEY BALLISTIC SHIELD DOORS ARE OPEN YOU CAN SEE THE REFLECTION OFF THE PLATES DURING DAY.

262 35007 HF5 NKNOWCMT DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND QUALITY OF THERMALS IT WAS HARD TO IDENTIFY.
261 35007 HF5 INOTH CMT RAIN: RAIN ON VEHICLE MADE IT EASIER TO IDENTIFY DECOY OR TARGET.

260 35007 HF5 SRCMT DECOYS ARE MORE ROUNDED AND LESS ANGULAR.

259 35007 HF5 SROTHCMT MATCHING UNIT: NO "MATCHING UNIT" ON ANTENNAS (USED FOR SWITCHING FREQUENCIES) ON THE DECOY; AT SHORT RANGE YOU COULD REALLY NOTICE THE ANTENNA.

258 35007 HF5 LRCMT TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST: DEPENDED ON WEATHER, IF IT WAS CLEAR, TARGET WAS DULLER THAN DECOY; ASPECT ANGLE: ON REAL COULD SEE 3-DIMENSIONS, DECOY APPEARED FLAT.

257 35006 HF5 TGT CMT IN BATTLE EVEN IF I THOUGHT IT WAS A DECOY I WOULD STILL SHOOT TO MAKE SURE. I DON'T WANT TO BE WRONG AND HAVE HIM SHOOTING AT ME.

256 35006 HF5 NKNOWCMT MOSTLY AT LONG RANGE. SOMETIMES VC WOULD SEE.

255 35006 HF5 INTERCMT SUN GLARE: INTERFERED 2 OR 3 TIMES DURING FOG.

254 35006 HF5 MVCMT COULD NOT BE DONE BECAUSE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS.

253 35006 HF5 SRCMT SOMETIMES COULD TELL A REAL TANK BECAUSE IT WAS SHINY DUE TO THE RAIN THAT DAY; REAL VEHICLES ARE ALWAYS COOLER. SLITS ON BRADLEY TRIM VANE ARE ALWAYS COOL.

252 35006 HF5 MRCMT AT MEDIUM RANGE THE SIGNATURE (THERMAL) LOOKED LIKE SEPARATE PANELS WHILE REAL VEHICLES LOOK LIKE A SOLID BODY.

251 35006 HF5 LRCMT TANK DECOY IS MORE ROUNDED AT TOP. BRADLEY WAS BETTER THAN M1 (THE VC AND I DISAGREED ON MORE BRADLEY CALLS). THE WEATHER AFFECTED THE THERMALS.

250 35005 HF5 TGT CMT AT THE CLOSE RANGE IT IS PRETTY POINTLESS TO USE THE DECOYS. THEY ARE EASILY IDENTIFIABLE AT CLOSE RANGE. AT THE LONG AND MEDIUM RANGES IT IS GOOD TO USE THE DECOYS I WOULD ENGAGE THEM.

249 35005 HF5 NKNOWCMT WHEN FOG SET IN WITH DIRECT SIGHTS YOU COULD BARELY SEE A VEHICLE. WITH THERMAL IT WAS JUST A SQUARE OF HEAT WITH OUTLINE OF VEHICLE.

248 35005 HF5 INTERCMT DARKNESS: ACQUISITION PROBLEM; DAMAGED SIGHTS: THERMAL, HARD TO FOCUS. THE FOG WAS A BIG INTERFERENCE WITH THE THERMALS. IN DARKNESS YOU CAN'T GET A GOOD VISUAL, ALL YOU SEE IS HEAT BLOTS. THE TANKS WE USED NEED NEWER SIGHTS.

247 35005 HF5 MVCMT IT'S HARD TO IDENTIFY THE TARGETS ON THE MOVE. YOU CANNOT GET A GOOD PLATFORM TO GET GOOD VIEW. IT WAS A PILOT TEST.

246 35005 HF5 SRCMT SIGNATURE: (THERMAL) DECOYS HAD CENTER HOT SPOT AND OUTLINE, REAL ARE HOT ALL OVER; COLOR: MORE NEW THAN OUR VEHICLES; THE SHAPE OF THE DECOYS ARE ROUNDED; SIGNATURE: YOU CAN SEE OUTLINE AND HEAT INSIDE.

245 35005 HF5 MRCMT SHAPE: DECOYS WERE NARROW AND HIGH AND HAD ROUNDED EDGES.

244 35005 HF5 LRCMT COLOR: IN RAIN THE VEHICLES BECAME SHINY, DECOYS STAYED THE SAME, DRY DECOYS LOOKED NEWER; ASPECT ANGLE: VEHICLES HAVE VISIBLE SIDES, NOT DECOYS. WITH THE SIDE VIEW YOU CAN SEE THE WHOLE SHAPE AND DIMENSIONS OF THE TRACK. THESE COMMENTS ALSO APPLY TO THE MEDIUM RANGE.

243 35004 HF5 TGT CMT WAITING FOR THE LIGHT TO FLASH SO WE CAN ANSWER IS RIDICULOUS BECAUSE WE ALREADY KNOW WHICH ONE IS NEXT AND ARE VIEWING IT BEFORE THE LIGHT COMES ON.

242 35004 HF5 NKNOWCMT FOG AROUND TARGET, FOG ON BINOCULAR LENSES.

241 35004 HF5 INTERCMT SUN GLARE: THERE WAS NO MUD ON DECOY SO SUN WOULD SHINE OFF OF IT; PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT: COLD AND WET. MAGNIFICATION LEVEL OF OPTICS: LONG RANGE AT 7X CAN'T EVEN TELL VEHICLES APART.

240 35004 HF5 SRCMT IT WAS VERY EASY TO TELL, SOMETIMES DIDN'T EVEN NEED BINOCULARS TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE.

239 35004 HF5 MRCMT ASPECT ANGLE: CLOSER UP COULD SEE THE ANGLE AND GET A BETTER VIEW.

238 35004 HF5 LRCMT COLOR: DECOYS WERE A LIGHTER GREEN (COLOR OF CREME DE MENTHE ICE CREAM), THE TANKS WERE VOMIT GREEN; SHAPE: DECOYS ARE MORE ROUNDED THE TANKS HAVE SHARPER CORNERS; DECOYS LOOK KIND OF BALLOONED, NOT AS SHARP; REFLECTION: THE DECOYS WEREN'T MUDDY. ALL COMMENTS FOR LONG RANGE ALSO APPLY TO MEDIUM RANGE.

232 35002 HF5 TGT CMT LOOKS LIKE BOTH BRADLEY AND M1A1 DECOY TURRET SHAPES AREN'T SLOPPED AS REAL TO ME.

231 35002 HF5 NKNOWCMT DID NOT KNOW 50% OF THE TIME AT LONG RANGE, 20% AT MEDIUM RANGE.

230 35002 HF5 INTERCMT BINOCULARS ONLY 7X.

229 35002 HF5 LRCMT DECOY IS LIGHTER IN COLOR.

228 35001 HF5 TGT CMT HEAT SIGNATURE OF THE TARGETS; MOUNTING BRACKETS ON THE TANK; TURRET ON DECOY TANK LOOKS LIKE M60 TURRET. THE SIZE OF THE BRADLEY DECOY IS LONGER AND TALLER. DECOY BRADLEY HAS ONLY ONE ANTENNAE. BALLISTIC SHIELD DOORS WHEN OPEN THERE'S A GLARE BUT NOT ON THE DECOY, I COULD SEE MUD ON REAL TANKS BUT NOT ON DECOYS.

227 35001 HF5 NKNOWCMT WHEN I SAW REAL VEHICLES SOMETIMES I WASN'T SURE BECAUSE IT COULD HAVE BEEN THE DECOY TURNED OFF AND NOT AS HOT.

226 35001 HF5 INTERCMT DIRTY OR DAMAGED SIGHTS, QUALITY OF THERMAL IMAGERY: NIGHT SIGHTS WERE MESSED UP ON SOME VEHICLES. WHEN RAINING THEY DO NOT LET THE VEHICLES ON THE LINE HEAT UP LONG ENOUGH, ON DECOYS CAN SEE THE BOX EXACTLY WHERE HEATED, ON REAL ONES NOT HEATED UP AS WELL.

225 35001 HF5 MVCMT WE WERE JUST PRACTICING ID ON THE MOVE AND GOT STUCK SO IT REALLY IS N/A.

224 35001 HF5 MRCMT MORE ROUNDED SHAPE OF TURRET ON TANK, MCCD IS SHARPER AND COLOR IS BRIGHTER AND LOOKS BRAND NEW.

223 35001 HF5 LRCMT COLOR: ON REAL TARGETS I COULD SEE MUD BUILD-UP, MCCDS DON'T HAVE MUD (DVO). SHAPE: DECOYS ARE LONGER AND TALLER. REFLECTION: WHEN RAINING REAL TARGETS ARE SHINY AND WATER BEADS OFF OF THEM. ALL COMMENTS FOR LONG RANGE APPLY TO MEDIUM RANGE ALSO.

222 35000 HF5 TGTCMT HOW WARM THE TARGETS WERE. SOMETIMES THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH HEAT SIGNATURE REAL OR DECOY, ESPECIALLY AT FAR RANGES, SOMETIMES A REAL HAD FAINT SIGNATURE, EVEN AT FAR RANGE AND REAL HOT, HARD TO TELL.

221 35000 HF5 NKNOWCMT I DON'T KNOW, I DIDN'T KEEP TRACK.

220 35000 HF5 INTERCMT RAIN HURT DAY VISION.

219 35000 HF5 SRCMT TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST: HELPS MORE OFTEN AT CLOSE RANGE BECAUSE LESS ENVIRONMENT IMPACT IE; LESS FOG. ASPECT ANGLE: ALMOST ALWAYS WHEN YOU ARE CLOSE, AND IF AT A SLIGHT ANGLE (NOT SQUARE ON) THE ENTIRE SIDE OF REAL VEHICLE COULD BE SEEN. ALL COMMENTS FOR MEDIUM RANGE APPLY TO SHORT RANGE AS WELL.

218 35000 HF5 MROTHCMT OTHER: DAYLIGHT BETWEEN ROAD WHEELS. SHAPE: COULD SEE SSL'S ANTENNAE ON REAL TARGETS. ALSO DECOYS START TO HAVE A SOFTER IMAGE (ESPECIALLY ON M1), LESS ANGULAR.

217 35000 HF5 LRCMT ON A DECOY THERE WILL NEVER BE SUNLIGHT SHOWING UNDER THE VEHICLE. REFLECTION: ONE DAY IT WAS REAL BRIGHT FOR A WHILE AND I THOUGHT I SAW A REFLECTION ON A REAL VEHICLE.

216 35000 HF5 LROTHCMT OTHER: SOMETIMES I COULD SEE SUNLIGHT COMING BETWEEN THE ROAD WHEELS UNDERNEATH THE TRACK. COLOR: SOMETIMES THE DECOY LOOKED LIKE "BRAND NEW BDU'S" IF LIGHT WAS GOOD, IE ON A CLEAR DAY. TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST: DEPENDING ON ENVIRONMENT IF WEATHER WASN'T RIGHT CONTRAST DIDN'T HELP, BEING CLOSER AND BETTER WEATHER CONTRAST IS IMPORTANT. SIGNATURE: SOMETIMES DECOY HAD SQUARE BOX THERMAL SIGNATURE IE; ALL ONE COLOR, BRADLEY WASN'T AS EVEN.

215 34402 HF4E TRCMT THERE IS NO NEED FOR TIMING THE MCCD ERECTION DURING PMCS. AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE ANY TIME LIMIT ON ANYTHING.

214 34120 HF4B GENCMT THE OVERALL BLOCK OF INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN A LITTLE MORE IN DEPTH. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION SOLDIERS E-5 AND BELOW AND I FEEL THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO COMPARE THE OTHER TYPE OF DECOY TO THE PRESENT, BECAUSE THE MAJORITY OF THE NCO'S HAVE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE WITH THE OTHER TYPE IN GERMANY.

213 34119 HF4B TRCMT I DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY TERM WAS TOO TECHNICAL TO UNDERSTAND, ALTHOUGH I NEED TO DO SOME BRUSHING UP ON A FEW OF THEM.

212 34118 HF4B TRCMT I'M NOT SURE ON WHAT THE FRAMEWORK OF THE HIGHER COMMANDERS' INTENT IS. DON'T KNOW REQUIREMENTS AND METHOD FOR REPORTING USE TO ADJACENT UNITS AND HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

211 34118 HF4B TIMECMT SHOULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME ON TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT.

210 34118 HF4B GENCMT THE CLASSROOM PORTION WAS GOOD IN EXPLAINING HOW TO SET-UP AND OPERATE THE MCCD. THE TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT PORTION OF THE CLASS I THOUGHT WAS GIVEN TOO QUICKLY. I THINK MORE TIME COULD HAVE BEEN SPENT ON TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT INSTEAD OF THE QUICK "HERE IT IS, THIS IS HOW IT IS DEPLOYED, ANY QUESTIONS?" APPROACH THAT WAS TAKEN.

209 34117 HF4B TRMANCMT TRAINING MANUAL NEEDS SOME WORK.

208 34117 HF4B TOPICMT NEED GOOD, SOUND AR, TM, FM FOR MCCD.

207 34117 HF4B GENCMT TO MY KNOWLEDGE THE ARMY HAS NO FM, TM, OR AR ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MCCD AT THE PLATOON LEVEL. MCCD WILL WORK BUT FIRST THEY MUST FIGURE OUT WHO, HOW MANY, AND WHAT UNITS WILL CARRY THEM.

206 34116 HF4B TRCMT GOOD CLASS.

205 34115 HF4B TRCMT I HAD NO TROUBLE UNDERSTANDING WHAT THE INSTRUCTOR WAS TEACHING.

204 34114 HF4B TRCMT I FEEL THE CLASS ON TACTICS WAS PERFORMED AT A TC OR PLATOON SGT LEVEL.

203 34114 HF4B GENCMT THE REASON FOR SAYING NO IS BECAUSE I FEEL THAT SOME OF THESE TASKS ARE AT A HIGHER LEVEL THAN MINE.

202 34113 HF4B TRCMT THE MANUFACTURER OF THIS THING IS A LITTLE BEHIND ON THE NEW STUFF WE HAVE IE; A FULLY COMBAT LOADED TANK HAS MORE DETAILS THAN THE IMAGE THEY PRESENT. THE TRAINING PROGRAM WAS SWELL, HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO PREPARE FOR TESTING. THE TRAINERS AND EVALUATORS DID A SWELL JOB.

201 34113 HF4B TRMANCMT SOME STEPS ON THE PMCS IS BOGUS.

200 34113 HF4B GENCMT I HOPE THAT THE COMMAND LETS US USE OUR OWN CREATIVENESS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT. GIVEN THAT METL, COMMANDERS INTENT ETC. I FEEL THAT WE SHALL USE OUR OWN INITIATIVE ACCORDING TO THE SITUATION (COMMON SENSE REVIEW).

199 34111 HF4B TRMANCMT USE OF OLDER MATERIALS, IS THERE ANY NEWER?

198 34110 HF4B TRCMT THIS IS MY FIRST TIME WITH DECOYS SO I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW MORE ABOUT THE OLDER DECOYS.

197 34110 HF4B TRMANCMT COULD SHOW MORE SITUATIONS, SCENARIOS.

196 34110 HF4B TOPICCMT THE TOPICS COVERED SHOULD HAVE BEEN COVERED WITH MORE DETAIL.

195 34109 HF4B TRCMT THE CLASS WAS AT THE ARMY STANDARD LEVEL AND I UNDERSTOOD FAIRLY WELL.

194 34108 HF4B TRCMT WORDS AND TERMS USED IN THE CLASS WERE ABOVE MY KNOWLEDGE. CLASS SHOULD BE FULLY UNDERSTANDABLE BY PRIVATES AS WELL AS OFFICERS.

193 34108 HF4B PROBCMT HAD PROBLEMS UNDERSTANDING TERMINOLOGY IN THE CLASS.

192 34108 HF4B GENCMT ISN'T THE MCCD SUPPOSED TO TRICK THE ENEMY TO THINK IT IS A REAL VEHICLE?

191 34107 HF4B TRCMT ALTHOUGH I DID UNDERSTAND THE CLASS ON TACTICS OF THE MCCD, I FEEL MORE TRAINING WOULD BE NEEDED SO I WOULD FEEL CONFIDENT USING IT IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THE CLASS SEEMED DIRECTED AT PLATOON SERGEANT, LEADER LEVEL.

190 34106 HF4B GENCMT TRAINING IS GOOD FOR THOSE WITH EXPERIENCE. COULD BE ABOVE THE LEVEL OF NEWER SOLDIERS WHO HAVEN'T HAD MUCH EXPERIENCE WITH DECOYS.

189 34105 HF4B TRCMT MCCD IS A WASTE OF GOVERNMENT MONEY, SHOULD BE USED FOR OTHER THINGS, LIKE BILLETS, TRAINING, ETC.

188 34105 HF4B TRMANCMT SHOULD HAVE MORE TACTIC MANUALS.

187 34105 HF4B TIMECMT NOT ENOUGH TIME SPENT ON TOPIC.

186 34105 HF4B TOPICCMT GOOD, BUT MORE EMPLOYMENT TACTICS.

185 34104 HF4B TRCMT HOW DO WE INCORPORATE MCCD IN OUR LOAD PLAN?

184 34104 HF4B TRMANCMT NEED BETTER MANUALS. INCORPORATE TASKS IN PLATOON SOP AND METL, 17-12, 17-15 ETC.

183 34104 HF4B TIMECMT NOT ENOUGH USE OF CRAWL, WALK, RUN PRINCIPLE.

182 34104 HF4B TOPICCMT MAKE THE CLASS MORE EXCITING.

181 34104 HF4B GENCMT HIGHER COMMANDS INTENT SHOULD BE OUTLINED IN A SOP SO WE CAN HAVE A GENERAL IDEA WHAT HE EXPECTS. USE MORE TIME ON INDIVIDUAL AND PLATOON SETUP AND DECEPTION TECHNIQUES. BREAK IT DOWN TO THE LOWEST PRIVATE SO HE MAY UNDERSTAND WHAT IS EXPECTED.

180 34103 HF4B TRCMT EVERYTHING EXPLAINED IN CLASS WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDABLE.

179 34103 HF4B TIMECMT COULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME ON IT.

178 34103 HF4B TOPICCMT WE RUSHED THROUGH IT.

177 34102 HF4B TRCMT I THINK THAT THE INSTRUCTION WAS TO A POINT TO WHERE EVERYONE UNDERSTOOD WITH NO PROBLEMS.

176 34102 HF4B GENCMT THE ONLY THING THAT I WOULD ADD IS TO MAKE THE MCCD APPEAR MORE REALISTIC TO THE ENEMY BY, TIME PERMITTED DETAIL CAMOUFLAGE. MAYBE A SOLDIERS HEAD IN A HATCH VERSUS DIFFERENT TYPES OF MCCD SOME WITH HATCHES OPENED, SOME WITH HATCHES CLOSED.

175 34406 HF4E TRCMT DURING AND AFTER PMCS SHOULD BE COVERED MORE.

174 34406 HF4E TOPICCMT DURING AND AFTER PMCS SHOULD BE COVERED BETTER, PO1 DIDN'T COVER IT AT ALL.

173 34405 HF4E TRCMT WHEN PERFORMING PMCS ON THE TEST IT SHOULD NOT BE IN SEQUENCE. AS LONG AS IT IS COVERED. WHEN WRITING-UP 24-4 IT DOESN'T NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE IN SEQUENCE. MECHANICS HAVE THEIR OWN WAY OF DOING THINGS, THEIR OWN SEQUENCE.

172 34405 HF4E TRMANCMT MANUAL SHOULD BE SEQUENCE TO COVER M2 WHEN I FIRST SAW THE MANUAL I GOT LOST BECAUSE IT RAN INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT VEHICLES TOGETHER.

171 34403 HF4E IMPOICMT SHORTEN THE TIME ON SOME OF THE LESSONS, LIKE THE INTRODUCTION, IT IS TOO LONG (ONE HOUR).

169 34402 HF4E TRMANCMT NEED TO RE-WRITE THE MANUAL IN SOME PLACES, SHOULD GO INTO ERECTING THE MCCD FIRST AND THEN GO INTO PMCS.

168 34401 HF4E TRCMT SOLDIERS WILL GET MORE OUT OF TRAINING IF THEY CAN SEE THROUGH A THERMAL AT WHAT THE TANKERS SEE WHEN LOOKING THROUGH THE SIGHT AFTER HE REPAIRS THE IMAGE OR MCCD POWER SUPPLY. THEY WILL SEE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REPAIRS THEY MAKE.

167 34202 HF4C TRCMT WHEN DISCONNECTING THE FUEL LINE, WE NEED TO BE ABLE TO TAKE DC CONVERTOR BOX OFF BECAUSE HAND AREA IS TOO SMALL TO REACH IT.

166 34202 HF4C TRMANCMT DON'T HAVE PROPER TOOLS FOR THERMAL SWITCH. TOOLBOX REQUIRED IS FUEL AND ELECTRICAL TOOL KIT. D.S. WOULD ALREADY HAVE THIS. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE PROPER TOOL BOX, IT WOULD MAKE WORKING ON THIS MCCD A LOT EASIER.

165 34202 HF4C CTCMT SOME TASK STEPS IN THE TM COULD BE COMBINED, IN TROUBLE SHOOTING THE POWER SUPPLY, EG. IF START WITH "FUEL" GO ALL THE WAY THROUGH IT JUMP BACK AND FORTH TO OTHER TOPICS. THE TWO BLOCKS ON INSTRUCTION COULD HAVE BEEN COMBINED.

164 34201 HF4C CTCMT ORGANIZATIONAL (UNIT) AND D.S. LEVEL SHOULD BE COMBINED. FOR THE REAL THING IT SHOULD BE SPLIT.

164 34201 HF4C CTCMT INSTEAD OF 20 PHILLIPS HEAD SCREWS, REPLACE THEM WITH 12 FASTENERS, SLOTTED HEAD, NSN: 5325-00-290-3972, PN: 13211E6914(98403) TM 5-6115-275-24P, F1617, ITEM 38, 6ENBET, 10KW, 6ED.

163 34101 HF4B TRCMT CLASS WAS GOOD, I GOT A LOT OUT OF IT. BUT WHEN THE COLONEL CAME IN, THE TALK THEN WAS AT BATTALION LEVEL, NO LONGER AT PLATOON LEVEL. I WOULD PREFER A SEPARATE CLASS FOR OFFICERS, EM'S, NCO'S, THEN WE COULD GET MORE OUT OF IT AT OUR LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE.

162 34101 HF4B TRMANCMT BASIC MANUALS.

161 34101 HF4B TIMECMT TOO MUCH TIME TALKING ABOUT "HIGHER" TACTICS, NOT ENOUGH TIME ON PLATOON TACTICS.

160 34101 HF4B TOPICMCT SPENT TIME ON TOPICS AT PLATOON LEVEL.
 159 34101 HF4B PROBCMT HAVE NOT USED IT YET IN A FIELD ENVIRONMENT.
 158 31083 HF1 COURSES MCCD IKP TRAINING, FT BELVOIR, VA., 18/12/92 TO 22/12/92.
 157 31083 HF1 MCCDTRN FT BELVOIR, VA. 12/92.
 156 31082 HF1 COURSES IKP TRAINING, FT BELVOIR VA., 30/11/92 TO 03/12/92.
 155 31082 HF1 MCCDTRN IKP TRAINING.
 154 31081 HF1 COURSES A CO 2/72 ARMOR, CAMP CASEY, KOREA. 02/90 TO 06/90. WE USED THE EARLIER MCCD.
 153 31081 HF1 MCCDTRN FROM 30/11 TO 03/12 I WAS TRAINED ON THE MCCD.
 152 31080 HF1 CMBTEXPD VIETNAM, 1971 TO 1972.
 151 31079 HF1 COURSES 52D POWER GENERATOR COURSE INSTRUCTOR, FT BELVOIR VA., 06/92 TO 12/92; 63J
 QUARTER MASTER HEAVY EQUIPMENT STUDENT, AP6 MD, 07/73 TO 01/74.
 150 31077 HF1 COURSES INTRODUCTION TO MCCD, FT BELVOIR, VA., 03/12/92 TO 07/12/92.
 149 31077 HF1 MCCDTRN HAVE HAD TRAINING AT FT BELVOIR, VA.
 148 31076 HF1 CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA, 19/12/90 TO 22/06/91.
 147 31076 HF1 COURSES INTRODUCTION, FT BELVOIR, VA., 30/11/92 TO 03/12/92.
 146 31076 HF1 MCCDTRN TRAINING AT FT BELVOIR AND USED THE OLD DECOY IN 1989, IN GERMANY.
 145 34075 HF1 COURSES I & KPT, FT BELVOIR VA., 3/12/92 TO 7/12/92.
 144 34075 HF1 MCCDTRN INSTRUCTOR AND KEY PERSONNEL TRAINING (I & KPT) AND TEST INTEGRATIONAL WORKING
 GROUP MEETING (TIWG).
 143 34032 HF4A RECOVCMT THE ANTENNAE NEED TO BE SWITCHED. DURABILITY SEEMS TO BE A PROBLEM, SPECIFICALLY
 WITH THE STIFFENERS COMING UNSECURE WHERE BOLTED AND THE ELASTIC STIFFENER
 FASTENER.
 142 34031 HF4A TRCMT THE TRAINING PROGRAM WAS SOMEWHAT TEDIOUS, BUT WELL PREPARED AND INFORMATIVE. I
 FELT THIS SUBJECT COULD HAVE BEEN TAUGHT AND TESTED FASTER.
 141 34030 HF4A TRMANCMT TRAINING MANUALS ON DOING PMCS COULD BE BETTER ORGANIZED TO INSPECT THE POWER
 SOURCE, I.E. REPLACE COVER THEN INSPECT THE BATTERIES, WHEN BATTERIES COULD HAVE
 BEEN INSPECTED WITH COVER OFF.
 140 34030 HF4A RECOVCMT ON THE POWER SOURCE, I BELIEVE THAT CLIPS COULD HAVE BEEN USED INSTEAD OF THE 20
 SCREWS. IF CLIPS WERE USED INSTEAD OF SCREWS IT WOULD SAVE SEVERAL MINUTES IN
 PERFORMING YOUR MAINTENANCE. AS WHEN YOU ARE DOING YOUR BEFORE AND AFTER
 OPERATIONS CHECKS YOU ARE CONSTANTLY HAVING TO REMOVE AND INSTALL THE SCREWS.
 139 34029 HF4A RECOVCMT THE LONG ANTENNA IS ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE DECOY. IF YOU PUT A HINGE ON BOTH
 SIDES OF THE HEATER AND THE SAME LATCH ON THE TOP SO BOTH SIDES WILL FOLD DOWN SO
 PMCS WOULD BE EASY.
 138 34028 HF4A RECOVCMT 20 SCREWS TO DO PMCS ON THE GENERATOR ARE TOO MUCH. THEY SHOULD MAKE ONE SIDE
 WITH A DOOR SO THAT PMCS IS FASTER TO DO.
 137 34027 HF4A TRCMT EVERYTHING ON THE MCCD AND ITS GENERATOR ARE EASY TO WORK WITH, BUT THE 20 SCREWS
 ARE A HASSLE. A MORE EXPEDIENT SYSTEM OF ASSEMBLING THE COVER SHOULD BE DEvised.
 136 34026 HF4A TRCMT THE QUALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT DOESN'T LOOK TOO GOOD. EXTRA CARE MUST BE USED SO
 THAT SOME OF THE PARTS WON'T GET BROKEN DUE TO MISHANDLING. IT FEELS FRAGILE. THE
 HEATER ITSELF DOESN'T SEEM TOO "HIGH SPEED" ESPECIALLY WHILE CONDUCTING PMCS, THE
 BOLTS NEED TO GO.
 135 34025 HF4A RECOVCMT NEED TO GET RID OF THE 20 SCREWS.
 134 34024 HF4A PROBCMT TAPE DOWN THE WIRES THAT HANG LOOSE NEXT TO THE BATTERIES.
 133 34024 HF4A RECOVCMT GET RID OF THE SCREWS AND REPLACE THEM WITH LATCHES.
 132 34022 HF4A TRMANCMT GOOD
 131 34022 HF4A TIMECMT GOOD
 130 34022 HF4A TOPICMCT GOOD
 129 34020 HF4A TRCMT THIS WAS VERY EASY TO LEARN. REMOVING 20 SCREWS AND REPLACING 20 SCREWS ON THE
 POWER SUPPLY IS TOO TIME CONSUMING.
 128 34019 HF4A TRCMT ON THE PMCS OF THE HEATER, TIME COULD BE SAVED IF A QUICK TYPE DISCONNECT WAS
 USED INSTEAD OF REPLACING 20 SCREWS EACH TIME YOU HAVE TO DO PMCS.
 127 34018 HF4A RECOVCMT THE 20 SCREWS ARE TIME CONSUMING AND COULD BE EASILY LOST IN A TACTICAL
 ENVIRONMENT, THEY'RE NOT A GOOD IDEA.
 126 34017 HF4A TRCMT NEED TO CHANGE THE HATCHES, BECAUSE ON REAL TANKS HATCHES ARE ALMOST ALWAYS
 OPENED. ALSO NEED TO SWITCH AROUND THE ANTENNAS. ON THE GENERATOR, NEED TO TIE
 DOWN THE CABLE WHERE THE BATTERY COVER IS SO IT WON'T GET TORN UP AND FRAYED.
 ALSO SHOULD PUT QUICK RELEASE CLIPS INSTEAD OF 20 SCREWS TO MAKE IT EASIER TO DO.
 125 34017 HF4A TRMANCMT PLENTY OF MANUALS.
 124 34017 HF4A TIMECMT GOOD HANDS ON TRAINING.
 123 34017 HF4A TOPICMCT GOOD
 122 34016 HF4A TRCMT GET RID OF THE 20 SCREWS, THEY ARE TIME CONSUMING AND WON'T LAST. BATTERY POWER
 CONNECTOR NEEDS TO BE SECURED BETTER, IT'S GOING TO GET CAUGHT ON THE COVER AND
 GET DAMAGED.
 121 34014 HF4A TRCMT THE INSTRUCTORS COULD HAVE GONE INTO MORE DETAIL ABOUT DEPLOYING THE MCCD AS FAR
 AS REALISTIC EMPLACEMENT AS YOU WOULD A REAL TACTICAL TANK. I KNOW THAT THE
 TACTICAL MANUAL WAS LIMITED.
 120 34014 HF4A TOPICMCT DEPLOY TO TACTICAL AREA.
 119 34014 HF4A RECOVCMT COMMUNICATIONS ANTENNA WAS ON WRONG SIDE, SHORT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON THE RIGHT AND

118 34013 HF4A TRCMT LONG SHOULD HAVE ON THE LEFT SIDE TO COINCIDE WITH THE REAL TANK. WHEN WE GO OUT IN THE FIELD, WHERE ARE WE GOING TO PUT THE HEATER AND THE DECOY? THE BUSTLE RACK IS ALREADY FULL OF PERSONAL GEAR. WE DON'T HAVE LONG ENOUGH STRAPS TO TIE THE MCCD DOWN TO BLOW OUT PANELS EITHER. ALSO I HAD SCREWS FALL OUT OF THE FRAME AND ARMS, IT NEEDS RIVETS OR SOMETHING PERMANENT.

117 34013 HF4A TRMANCMT GOOD TRAINING MANUALS.

116 34013 HF4A TIMECMT GOOD TEACHING.

115 34013 HF4A TOPICCMT ALL TOPICS COVERED IN DETAIL.

114 34013 HF4A PROBCMT REMOVING 20 SCREWS IS A WASTE OF TIME. SHOULD HAVE 4 TO 6 SNAPS OF SOME SORT.

113 34012 HF4A TRCMT THERE ARE TOO MANY SCREWS IN THE HEATER CONTROL BOX. YOU SHOULDN'T NEED TO TAKE OFF THE COVER TO THE HEATER. IT ISN'T HEAVY ENOUGH TO HAVE IT BE A TWO MAN LIFT. THE TOOLS TO PUT UP THE MCCD SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ASSEMBLY KIT.

112 34011 HF4A TRCMT I BELIEVE THAT TRAINED SOLDIERS WILL KNOW THAT IT IS A DECOY.

111 34010 HF4A TRCMT THERE ARE TOO MANY SCREWS ON THE HEATER, AND IT IS TOO BIG TO CARRY WITH YOU.

110 34009 HF4A TRCMT IF I WERE TO SEE THIS I, MYSELF, COULD SPOT IT FAR AWAY BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE TO PAY ATTENTION TO ALL THE DETAIL THAT A REAL BRADLEY HAS WHEN IT IS OPERATING.

108 34009 HF4A TRCMT TRAINING COULD BE COMBINED INTO FEWER DAYS. THIS EQUIPMENT IS NOT THAT COMPLICATED. ALL COULD BE LEARNED AND TESTED INTO TWO DAYS. SCREWS ON THE HEATER SHOULD BE QUICK RELEASE BUTTERFLIES. MATERIAL CRACKS AND TEARS TOO EASY AND THE IMAGE IS NOT SURVIVING. WHAT WAS SO HARD ABOUT PUTTING 2 ANTENNAS ON THE TOP? I THINK THE HEATER IS NOT EFFECTIVE FOR IT'S \$5,000 PRICE TAG.

107 34009 HF4A TRMANCMT TOO MUCH MONEY WAS SPENT ON THE MANUALS, THIS DOES NOT NEED THIS MUCH PAPER.

106 34008 HF4A TRCMT PROBLEMS WITH THE EQUIPMENT: FOLDING MAIN JOINTS BECAME WEAK AND TWISTED AFTER FEW INSTALLMENTS. MATERIAL ON DECOY BEGAN TO CRACK SHOWING IMAGE LINES. SCREWS ON HEATER NEED TO BE QUICK SNAPS OR BUTTERFLY SCREWS FOR SPEED. 2 TO 3 FEET LONG SIDE FLAPS WILL IMPROVE THE DECOY AND COULD MAKE THE DECOY STURDIER. MAKE THE DECOY LARGER, THE WEIGHT FOR TWO MEN IS NOT A PROBLEM.

105 34008 HF4A RECQVCMT TRAINING BY FT KNOX CADRE WAS EXCEPTIONAL AND THOROUGH. ALTHOUGH SOME TRAINING COULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED MORE REALISTICALLY IN A FIELD ENVIRONMENT.

104 34007 HF4A TRCMT MCCD IS GOOD FOR THE UNTRAINED SOLDIER, BUT IT IS NOT GOOD FOR THE TRAINED SOLDIER, HE ALREADY KNOWS WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN TERMS OF THE VISUAL AND THERMAL SIGNATURE.

103 34006 HF4A TRCMT POWER SOURCE SHOULD HAVE LOCK LATCHES LIKE ON THE BATTERY COVER INSTEAD OF SCREWS. SECURE STRINGS BREAK TOO EASILY. IT'S HARD AND TIME CONSUMING TO RESTRING THEM THROUGH THE HOLES. WHEN FOLDING THE DECOY, MATERIALS GET CAUGHT IN THE HINGES AND RIPS VERY EASY.

102 34005 HF4A TRCMT LATCHES INSTEAD OF SCREWS ON THE HEATER TO MAKE IT FASTER AND WON'T LOOSE SCREWS. LIGHTER, SMALLER HEATERS FOR FASTER EMPLOYMENT, THE HEATER IS TOO BIG TO STORE. TOOL KIT AS PART OF MCCD. DECOY IS TOO BIG TO STORE ON BRADLEY.

101 34004 HF4A TRCMT TRAINED SOLDIERS KNOW WHAT TO LOOK AT ON A BRADLEY TO ID IT FROM A DECOY.

100 34004 HF4A TRMANCMT THEY NEED TO BE EASIER TO READ, MORE CLEAR. THE -13 IS NOT ORGANIZED WELL. IT COMBINES POWER SOURCE AND DECOY AND THEY SHOULD BE SEPARATE.

99 34003 HF4A TRCMT THERE ARE TOO MANY SCREWS ON THE POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY. NOT PART OF OPERATOR MAINTENANCE. IF THE LOOP WAS A LITTLE LONGER SO IT COULD BE TIED IF BROKE THAT MIGHT IMPROVE IT. BECAUSE IF LOOP BREAKS IT PUTS THE ENTIRE SYSTEM "DOWN"

98 34003 HF4A TRCMT THE POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE A ONE MAN LIFT. MCCD SHOULD INCLUDE A SCREWDRIVER AND HAMMER, WHEN REPLACING THE GUY WIRES THE CORD MUST BE INSERTED THROUGH A PLASTIC TUBE AND THEN THROUGH THE FRAME OF THE DECOY. THE HOLES IN THE FRAME SHOULD BE LARGER AND HAVE A WASHER TO KEEP THE CORD FROM BREAKING/ FRAYING. IT IS LIKE THREADING A NEEDLE. THE STIFFENERS ARE HELD BY LOOPS ATTACHED TO THE DECOY CLOTH. THESE LOOPS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO REPAIR WHEN THEY BREAK.

97 34002 HF4A TRCMT THE TWO PIECES OF THE ANTENNA SHOULD BE TIGHTENED SO THAT THEY STAY TOGETHER BETTER. WHEN YOU PUT THEM ON THE DECOY AND ERECT THE DECOY THEY CAN FALL APART.

96 34002 HF4A TRCMT TAKE OUT THE SCREWS FOR THE GENERATOR AND PUT IN VELCRO OR QUICK RELEASE LATCHES. IN THE FIELD A LOT OF SCREWS WILL BE LOST. IF YOU HAD ANOTHER WAY TO HAVE THE COVER ON THE GENERATOR. MAKE A MORE DURABLE DECOY FABRIC, PLASTIC RIPS WAY TO EASILY. THE LITTLE ELASTIC STRAPS TO HOLD THE OUTSIDE FRAME EXTENSIONS BREAK TOO EASILY. CHANGE THE STRING THAT IS USED TO TIGHTEN DOWN THE DECOY. USE 550 CORD, THAT SHOULD BE CAMOUFLAGED.

95 34002 HF4A TRCMT BY FOLDING AND STORING AWAY THE DECOY IT BENDS AND RIPS THE PICTURE FASTER. AFTER A FEW TIMES OF SETTING IT UP IT IS GOING TO DISTORT THE PICTURE. FIND A BETTER WAY TO STORE THE DECOY WITHOUT HAVING TO FOLD IT. WHEN LOOKING AT THE MCCD IN ANY OTHER ANGLE THAN STRAIGHT ON YOU CAN TELL IT IS A DECOY BECAUSE THERE IS NOT A 3-DIMENSIONAL LOOK TO IT. I SUGGEST TO PUT UP LITTLE FLAPS ON THE SIDES TO GIVE IT A 3-DIMENSIONAL LOOK TO IT.

94 34002 HF4A TRMANCMT THE MANUAL NEEDS TO INCLUDE PICTURES OF SET-UP IN A STEP BY STEP MANNER.

93 34001 HF4A TRCMT THE TRAINING WAS GOOD

92 34001 HF4A TRMANCMT TRAINING MANUALS WERE EXCELLENT

91 34001 HF4A TIMECMT TIME SPENT ON TOPIC WAS VERY GOOD

90 34001 HF4A TOP.CMT EVERYTHING WAS EXPLAINED VERY WELL.
 89 31073 HF1B PLATES 9,10,11,12,15
 88 31070 HF1B PLATES 10
 87 31063 HF1B PLATES 1
 86 31057 HF1B PLATES 11,12
 85 31056 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/99 TO 03/99 AND 08/99 TO 12/99
 84 31056 HF1B MCCDTRN ACTUALLY SHOT AT THEM DURING A EUROPEAN TOUR.
 83 31052 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHEAST ASIA 08/99 TO 12/99
 82 31074 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90 TO 07/91
 81 31073 HF1B PLATES 9,10,11,12,15
 80 31071 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHEAST ASIA 12/90 TO 05/91
 79 31070 HF1B PLATES 10
 78 31069 HF1B PLATES 10,12
 77 31069 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHEAST ASIA 08/91 TO 12/91
 76 31066 HF1B PLATES 10,11
 75 31065 HF1B PLATES 3,4,6,9,10,11,12,15
 74 31065 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90 TO 06/90
 73 31065 HF1B MCCDTRN IN HOHENFELS, GERMANY WE USED THEM IN A HASTY DEFENSE
 72 31064 HF1B PLATES 9,10
 71 31063 HF1B PLATES 11
 70 31062 HF1B PLATES 10
 69 31062 HF1B CMBTEXPD MIDDLE EAST 01/91 TO 05/91
 68 31061 HF1B PLATES 12
 67 31057 HF1B PLATES 11,12
 66 31056 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/99 TO 03/99 AND 08/99 TO 12/99.
 65 31056 HF1B MCCDTRN ACTUALLY SHOT AT THEM DURING A EUROPEAN TOUR.
 64 31054 HF1B PLATES 10,11
 63 31054 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90 TO 06/91
 62 31054 HF1B COURSES ARTEP/ 3/11 ACR, GERMANY, 10/91 TO 12/92
 61 31054 HF1B MCCDTRN EXTENSIVE USE IN GERMANY. EACH TANK SECTION I.E. A AND B HAD ONE DECOY.
 60 31054 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90 TO 07/91
 59 31053 HF1B PLATES 12
 58 31052 HF1B CMBTEXPD KUWAIT 08/99 TO 12/99
 57 31004 HF1B PLATES THIS IS A TEST
 56 31033 HF1A BVISCOR NOTE: SOLDIER WEARS GLASSES BUT THE GLASSES ARE AT SOMEONE'S HOUSE SO CORRECTED
 VISION COULD NOT BE TESTED. SOLDIER SAYS VISION IS 020/020 WITH THE GLASSES.
 55 31049 HF1A MCCDTRN ONE TIME THE MCCD WAS SET UP IN FRONT OF THE CHOW LINE WHILE I WAS IN GERMANY.
 54 31049 HF1A PLATES 10, 11
 53 31048 HF1A CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/91-06/92
 52 31047 HF1A CMBTEXPD SAUDI ARABIA 06/91-09/91
 51 31046 HF1A COURSES 2/32 ARMOR CO GERMANY 03/90-08/92
 50 31030 HF1B MCCDTRN I USED THE MCCD IN GERMANY FOR 2 YEARS WITH THE 1/69 ARMOR CO.
 49 31030 HF1B COURSES 1/69 ARMOR GERMANY 88-90; MASTER GUNNER SCHOOL FT KNOX 07/87-09/87.
 48 31030 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/91-04/91
 47 31029 HF1B MCCDTRN THE MCCD WAS USED AGAINST US ON THE OPFOR. WE LEARNED TO TELL THE DECOY APART
 FROM THE REAL VEHICLE.
 46 31029 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 01/92-06/92
 45 31028 HF1B COURSES UCFT FT KNOX 06/85-07/85
 44 31028 HF1B CMBTEXPD SAUDI ARABIA 12/90-05/91
 43 31026 HF1B MCCDTRN DURING PREVIOUS DUTY ASSIGNMENT WE USED THE MCCD AS PART OF OUR TRAINING
 EQUIPMENT. WE LEARNED HOW TO GET THEM UP, POSITIONED THEM TO OUR ADVANTAGE
 ACCORDING TO OUR TRAINING MISSION AND GUIDELINES.
 42 31026 HF1B COURSES 4/66 ARMOR CO 3RD ID GERMANY 86-91
 41 31026 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90-05/91
 40 31025 HF1B COURSES OSUT FT KNOX 06/91-09/91
 39 31022 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 12/90-06/91
 38 31019 HF1B MCCDTRN USED MCCD IN GERMANY ALL THE TIME.
 37 31019 HF1B COURSES 3RD ID 2/64 ARMOR CO GERMANY 06/90-08/90
 36 31019 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/91-04/91
 35 31018 HF1B COURSES URBAN COMBAT TRAINING GERMANY 11/89-01/92
 33 31017 HF1B MCCDTRN ROTATIONAL TRAINING HOHENFELS, GERMANY
 32 31017 HF1B COURSES C 2/37 ARMOR GERMANY 11/88-11/91
 31 31017 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/91-04/91
 28 31040 HF1A PLATES 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15
 27 31039 HF1A COURSES UCFT FT IRWIN 10/92
 26 31038 HF1A COURSES 11H (TOW GUNNER) GERMANY 08/90-04/91
 25 31037 HF1A COURSES LIGHT LEADER FT BENNING; PCT GERMANY; BNOC FT RILEY; CLC FT ORD; AIR
 ASSAULT FT ORD; SPECTOR SCHOOL FT ORD. NO DATES WERE GIVEN FOR ANY OF THE
 TRAINING.

24 31037 HF1A CMBTEXPD PANAMA 12/89-03/90
 23 31035 HF1A PLATES 10
 22 31034 HF1A PLATES 10, 11
 21 31033 HF1A COURSES UCFT FT IRWIN 09/92
 20 31033 HF1A PLATES 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15
 18 31032 HF1A COURSES PLDC KOREA 05/76; BNOC GERMANY 06/91-07/91; ANOC FT BENNING 12/86-01/87;
 NBC SCHOOL GERMANY 04/81.
 17 31032 HF1A CMBTEXPD SAUDI ARABIA 12/90-05/91
 16 31032 HF1A PLATES 9, 10
 14 31013 HF1B CMBTEXPD SAUDI ARABIA 12/90-04/91
 13 31010 HF1B CMBTEXPD PANAMA 02/90-04/90
 10 31003 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/92-03/92
 4 31001 HF1B MCCDTRN PLDC GERMANY 11/20/91 - 12/20/91
 3 31001 HF1B CMBTEXPD SOUTHWEST ASIA 02/01/91 - 04/01/91

APPENDIX B

AUDIO-VISUAL ANALYST COMMENTS

1159	8125	EA3	EACMT	TT5 WAS OUT OF PLAY AT 21:45 DUE TO MECHANICAL FAILURE.
1158	50002	EA3	EACMT	ACQUISITION AND DETERMINATION TIMES FROM STOP WATCH.
1156	11215	EA3	EACMT	NO TIME BAR ON VIDEO TAPE. ACQUIRE TIME FROM STOP WATCH.
1155	11192	EA3	EACMT	NO TIME BAR ON VIDEO TAPE. ACQUIRE TIME FROM STOP WATCH.
1154	12296	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1153	12295	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1152	12294	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1151	12292	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1150	12291	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1149	12243	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1148	12242	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1147	12241	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO LOST AT 16:16:48.
1146	12455	EA3	EACMT	POOR VIDEO, TIME BAR VERY HARD TO SEE.
1145	12454	EA3	EACMT	POOR VIDEO, TIME BAR VERY HARD TO SEE.
1144	1216	MD3	MDFCMT	DMC CMT: SETUP TIMES INVALIDATED DUE TO REPAIR DELAYS BY DS MAINT. NO TEST SETUP TIMES.
1143	1253	MD3	MDFCMT	SETUP: FALK4942 WAS WEARING WORK GLOVES W/LINERS. IRBY0241 WASN'T WEARING ANY GLOVES. TAKEDOWN: BOTH CREW WEARING WORK GLOVES WITH LINERS. DMC CMT: EVENT SPLIT INTO TWO RECORDS: RECORD FCN 1172 HAS SETUP WITH NO GLOVES; RECORD FCN 1253 HAS TEARDOWN WITH WORK GLOVES AND LINERS.
1142	11918	EA3	EACMT	HIT P3 (DT1) AT 22:12:48 AND MOVED TO P1 (DT2) AND FIRED AND WENT TO P2 (DT4) AFTER THIS SHOT. DETERMINED BY USING ICC DIAGRAM.
1141	10736	EA3	EACMT	TT1 WAS TRAVELING ALONG AND THE VCO TOLD GUNNER TO JUST FIRE. DIDN'T FIRE AT ANY TARGET.
1140	13747	EA3	EACMT	THIS RECORD WAS MISSED DUE TO CHANGE IN STOP TRIAL TIME AFTER TRIAL WAS PROCESSED IN DATA PRODUCTION.
1139	13746	EA3	EACMT	THIS RECORD WAS MISSED DUE TO CHANGE IN STOP TRIAL TIME AFTER TRIAL WAS PROCESSED IN DATA PRODUCTION.
1138	13745	EA3	EACMT	THIS RECORD WAS MISSED DUE TO CHANGE IN STOP TRIAL TIME AFTER TRIAL WAS PROCESSED IN DATA PRODUCTION.
1137	10851	EA3	EACMT	AT 20:28:34 OBSERVED WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS A DECOY BUT TOOK NO ACTION AS IT WAS BEING FIRED ON BY ANOTHER UNIT.
1135	13726	EA3	EACMT	AT 22:03:16.343 (ASSESSMENT TIME 22:03:16.591) BMP5 WAS KILLED.
1134	6997	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULDN'T FIND STROBE, GOT LOST AND FOUND P4 (DB3) AND USED IT AS THE SECOND TARGET.
1133	7010	TD3	TDCMT	VCO SAID, "TARGET IS TOO BRIGHT, HAS TO BE A DECOY."
1130	50057	EA3	EACMT	RTCA SHOWS SHOOTING AT DEAD TARGET, BUT TAPE ANNOUNCED MOBILITY KILL.
1129	50048	EA3	EACMT	VCO ACQUIRED AND DETERMINED TARGET FROM HOFFMAN FLASH.
1128	50047	EA3	EACMT	RTCA SHOWS TOTAL KILL, BUT TAPE ANNOUNCES MOBILITY KILL.
1126	50044	EA3	EACMT	IT DOESN'T SEEM THAT CREW HAS ACTUALLY IDENTIFIED ANY TARGETS. THERE IS NO INDICATION ON TAPE THAT FIRING OCCURRED.
1125	50040	EA3	EACMT	RETURNED TO SAME TARGET.
1124	50037	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER DETERMINED "DEAD TANK" BUT HE FIRED ON IT ANYWAY.
1123	50007	EA3	EACMT	NO FIRING FLAG ON TAPE.
1122	50005	EA3	EACMT	NO FIRING FLAG ON TAPE. GUNNER SAID HE HAD 30 UP SO WE CODED 30MM.
1121	50004	EA3	EACMT	THIS WAS RED 3; FIRED ON DEAD TARGET. RTCA SHOWS SEVEN FIRINGS OF ATGM; TAPE SHOWS TWO ATGM FIRINGS. ACQUISITION AND DETERMINATION TIME FROM STOP WATCH.
1120	13685	EA3	EACMT	FIRING AT ALL HOT SPOTS.
1119	13684	EA3	EACMT	SAME FIRING, ALL HOT SPOTS.
1118	50001	EA3	EACMT	WE COULD MAKE NO DETERMINATIONS FROM TAPE BECAUSE OF BRIGHT SPOTS.
1117	13681	EA3	EACMT	STILL FIRING AT ALL HOT SPOTS.
1116	13676	EA3	EACMT	FIRING AT ALL HOT SPOTS.
1115	13673	EA3	EACMT	JUST FIRING AT EVERY HOT SPOT.
1114	8121	EA3	EACMT	ALL RTCA FIRINGS ARE AFTER TRIAL ENDS.
1113	8120	EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 15:47.
1112	8119	EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 15:50:00.
1111	13671	EA3	EACMT	JUST FIRING AT RED SPOT OR HOT SPOT.
1110	13659	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SAID "FORGET IT! I'AM SHOOTING AT EVERY HOT SPOT."
1108	13580	EA3	EACMT	KILLED T12 AT 21:43:29.
1107	13565	EA3	EACMT	DID NOT ID TARGET AS FRIENDLY.
1106	13550	EA3	EACMT	FRIENDLY FIRE.
1103	13546	EA3	EACMT	FROM TAPE THIS LOOKS LIKE ACCIDENTAL FIRING. NO AUDIO COMMENT THAT INDICATES CREW SAW ANYTHING THAT REPRESENTED A VALID TARGET.
1101	13545	EA3	EACMT	FIRED SAME SIDE. THEY SHOT AT THIS TARGET, THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE ONE OF THEIR TANKS, IT WAS T12.
1100	13541	EA3	EACMT	CREW WAS IGNORING WHAT THEY THOUGHT TO BE DECOYS THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE. CREW FIRED ON THIS DECOY BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THEY SAW IT FIRE.
1099	13470	EA3	EACMT	CREW DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WERE FIRING AT, JUST HOT SPOT.
1098	13715	EA3	EACMT	JUST HOT SPOT, UNKNOWN TARGET.

1097	13699	EA3	EACMT	WE COULD NOT TELL FROM VIDEO PICTURE BUT WE SUSPECT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN SECOND SHOT AT SAME TARGET.
1096	13658	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS OBVIOUSLY ALREADY DEAD. CREWMEN WERE STANDING ON TOP. THERE WAS NO REASON TO FIRE THE LAST ROUND OF AMMO.
1095	13657	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRED THIS TARGET AND PREVIOUS TARGET AT THE SAME TIME.
1094	13656	EA3	EACMT	CREW DID NOT KNOW WHAT TARGET WAS.
1093	13655	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS A HOT SPOT, BARELY VISIBLE. MAY HAVE BEEN A VEHICLE BEHIND A BERM.
1090	13460	EA3	EACMT	CREW DID NOT KNOW JUST WHAT THEY WERE FIRING AT.
1087	13445	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED AT HOT SPOT AND HIT FT4.
1086	13602	EA3	EACMT	KILLED EACH OTHER.
1085	8110	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER CALLED THIS TARGET A DC BUY VCO SAID IT WAS NOTHING. I COULDN'T TELL ON THE VIDEO.
1084	13572	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER THOUGHT TARGET WAS TOO WELL HIDDEN TO FIRE ON, SO THEY TRACKED HIM UNTIL HE FIRED.
1083	8105	EA3	EACMT	AT 21:52:59 TT1 WAS KILLED.
1082	8104	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER DETERMINED FRIENDLY TANK BECAUSE THE GUN TUBE WAS POINTED AT "OBJECTIVE CAT" AND NOT TOWARDS REDFOR.
1080	13427	EA3	EACMT	THIS IS THE VEHICLE ACQUIRED AT 16:19. IT HAS BEEN HIDING BEHIND A HILL SINCE THEN, AND FINALLY MOVED INTO VIEW.
1079	13426	EA3	EACMT	IDENTIFIED HOFFMAN FLASH AND DETERMINED LOCATION OF TARGET.
1074	13410	EA3	EACMT	ACCIDENTAL FIRING.
1073	8102	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRED BY HOFFMAN FLASH THEN TRACKED IT UNTIL 16:19:15 WHEN THEY MOVED TO A NEW TARGET. OLD TARGET WAS HIDING BEHIND A HILL.
1072	13412	EA3	EACMT	ACCIDENTAL FIRING.
1069	13401	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRED BY DUST CLOUD.
1067	8098	EA3	EACMT	AT 16:38:13 BMP5 WAS KILLED.
1066	8096	EA3	EACMT	TARGET MOVED BEHIND A HILL AFTER ACQUISITION.
1065	13423	EA3	EACMT	TARGET STOPPED WITH LEAVES AND BRANCHES BLOCKING DIRECT LINE OF SIGHT. POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR FIRE NO PAIR.
1064	13420	EA3	EACMT	TARGET STOPPED WITH LEAVES AND BRANCHES BLOCKING DIRECT LINE OF SIGHT. POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR FIRE NO PAIR.
1063	8091	EA3	EACMT	21:27:16 TT1 WAS KILLED.
1062	8088	EA3	EACMT	BMP5 KILLED AT 21:24:16.
1060	12744	EA3	EACMT	CREW KNEW IT WAS A DECOY BEFORE FIRING.
1059	12717	EA3	EACMT	THERE WAS NO TARGET IN SIGHT, GUNNER FIRED BY ACCIDENT.
1054	12685	EA3	EACMT	TARGET IS UNKNOWN, JUST A HOT SPOT.
1051	13197	EA3	EACMT	ACQUISITION & DETERMINATION MADE FROM HOFFMAN FLASH. GUNNER SNAPPED OFF A QUICK SHOT WHILE VEHICLE WAS RETREATING. ASSESSMENT: TOTAL KILL.
1050	13188	EA3	EACMT	STILL FIRING AT HILLSIDE.
1049	13183	EA3	EACMT	ANOTHER BURST INTO THE HILLS AS BMP2 MOVES TO RE-ENGAGE. THE VCO CAN'T SEE THE STROBE.
1047	12735	EA3	EACMT	TT5 WAS VERY CLOSE TO TARGET. CROSSHAIRS WERE RIGHT ON TARGET. SHOT TWICE AND RECEIVED FIRE NO PAIR BOTH TIMES TARGET WENT BEHIND HILL, CAME BACK OUT. BOTH TANKS SHOT AT EACH OTHER AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, BLUE TANK KILLED TT5 AT 21:25:22.
1046	13165	EA3	EACMT	STILL FIRING AT HILLSIDE AS VEHICLE MOVES TO RE-ENGAGE.
1045	13157	EA3	EACMT	ANOTHER BURST INTO THE HILL.
1044	13147	EA3	EACMT	ANOTHER BURST INTO THE HILLSIDE AS VEHICLE MOVES BEHIND COVER.
1043	13126	EA3	EACMT	ONE MORE BURST INTO THE HILLSIDE. TARGET NOT YET IN VIEW.
1041	13120	EA3	EACMT	AFTER BURST INTO THE GROUND, GUNNER WANTS TO BE FIRING ALREADY AS TARGET MOVES INTO VIEW. BMP2 IS MOVING TO REACQUIRE AFTER DUCKING INTO HIDING.
1040	13110	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER PULLED TRIGGER AS DRIVER MOVED OUT OF LINE OF FIRE. THIS BURST WENT INTO A HILLSIDE AT POINT BLANK RANGE.
1032	13290	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRING UNIT HAS MOVED TO NEW POSITION. MULTIPLE FIRINGS, NO PAIRS.
1027	13097	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED ON POSSIBLE "SILHOUETTE" OF A TANK UP ON A HILLSIDE.
1026	8083	EA3	EACMT	CREW WAS TRYING TO MOVE INTO A GOOD FIRING POSITION AND LOST VIEW OF TARGET, AND COULD NOT FIND IT AGAIN.
1025	13071	EA3	EACMT	VCO NEVER SAW TARGET. GUNNER ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL FIRING; 16:02:35.126.
1024	8084	EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 16:23:29 BEFORE THEY HAD TIME TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.
1023	8086	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED AND IDENTIFIED ENEMY BRADLEY, BUT IT WAS OUT OF RANGE SO HE RADIOED IN LOCATION.
1022	8087	EA3	EACMT	RADIOED LOCATION WITHOUT FIRING.
1021	13198	EA3	EACMT	FT3 & BMP2 KILLED EACH OTHER.
1020	13329	EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED WITHOUT CLEAR TARGET.
1019	13106	EA3	EACMT	16:21:58 FT1 WAS KILLED.
1018	13324	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER IS FIRING THROUGH LEAVES AND BRANCHES.
1017	13074	EA3	EACMT	FIRST PAIRING, TARGET IDENTIFIED AS FT3.
1016	13070	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRE & DETERMINATION TIME TAKEN FROM THE TIME THE TARGET FIRED A HOFFMAN. TRACKING SAME TARGET AS LAST ENGAGEMENT.

1015	13066	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED A WILD SHOT AS BMP2 RETREATED.
1014	13059	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FOUND HOT SPOT, SWITCHED TO CLEAR VIEW AND FIRED. AFTER BMP2 FIRED, THE TARGET FIRED A HOFFMAN.
1012	13312	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER'S AIM WAS OFF. HE WASN'T AIMING DIRECTLY AT THE TARGET.
1011	13310	EA3	EACMT	ACQUIRED AND DETERMINED BY FLASH AND SMOKE. GUNNER WAS AIMING HIGH AND LEFT, FIRE NO PAIR. UNKNOWN TARGET ID.
1008	13305	EA3	EACMT	DRIVER AND VCO ARGUED OVER TYPE OF TARGET. DRIVER SAW THERMAL PICTURE AND IDENTIFIED TANK, VCO SAID PC. THAT'S WHY IT TOOK SO LONG TO SHOOT AT THE TARGET.
1006	13045	EA3	EACMT	THIS WAS ACCIDENTAL FIRING. RETICLE OF SIGHT WAS POINTED SKYWARD. NO VISIBLE TARGET LOCATION.
1005	13044	EA3	EACMT	GUN WOULD NOT FIRE WHEN TANK WAS IN SIGHT PICTURE FROM 16:24:26 TO 16:24:33. GUN FIRED AT SIDE OF HILL WHEN CREW BACKED FT3 OFF TOP HILL.
1004	13043	EA3	EACMT	FIRST TRIED TO FIRE AT 16:21, NO FIRING. 2ND WAS A TEST SHOT TO GET EQUIPMENT TO OPERATE, GUN POINTED SKYWARD. FIRST TIME GUN DEPRESSED TOO FAR, WOULD NOT FIRE.
1001	13021	EA3	EACMT	THIS IS THE SAME TARGET AS IN THE PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT. TARGET IS MOVING TO A NEW LOCATION, TRYING TO FIND A SAFE ROUTE.
1000	8076	EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 16:10:49 BEFORE HE COULD ENGAGE ANY TARGETS.
999	8075	EA3	EACMT	VCO AND GUNNER SPOTTED TARGET BUT WERE UNABLE TO FIRE ON IT BECAUSE IT MOVED BEHIND A HILL. THESE TWO VEHICLES SPENT THE REMAINDER OF THE BATTLE TRYING TO ACQUIRE EACH OTHER. NEITHER ONE FIRED.
998	8074	EA3	EACMT	SPOTTED ENEMY TANK, BUT WERE KILLED BEFORE THEY COULD FIRE ON IT.
997	8073	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO PICTURE WAS OUT OF FOCUS. BMP3 DIED AT 16:11:49, AND THAT WAS ALL HE DID.
995	12452	EA3	EACMT	LOST TIME BAR AND VIDEO IS BAD. CANNOT DETERMINE ANY DETAIL. AUDIO SOUNDS LIKE FIRING MAY HAVE BEEN ACCIDENTAL. TIME BAR CAME BACK LATER.
994	13000	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS FAR AWAY. THEY KEPT SCANNING AND WAITING FOR THE TARGET TO MOVE. AT 16:16:58 BMP5 WAS KILLED.
993	12433	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED THAT ENEMY TANK WAS HIDDEN BEHIND A HILLSIDE. GUNNER MAY HAVE BEEN FIRING AT ANTENNA POKING OVER TOP OF HILL, DIFFICULT TO TELL FROM VIDEO.
992	12423	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED AT TARGET, AND FIRST ROUND STRUCK DT4. GUNNER THEN SWUNG TURRET LEFT, WITH TRIGGER PRESSED, TO SCAN BY FIRE INTO THE TREELINE. HELD TRIGGER SEVEN SECONDS.
991	12451	EA3	EACMT	CREW KNEW BMP1 WAS DEAD TARGET BEFORE ENGAGING.
989	12409	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO IS BAD.
988	12444	EA3	EACMT	TT1 WAS KILLED AT 21:30:05.
987	12439	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AT THE TOP OF A HILL AND TRACKED IT AS IT MOVED DOWN THE HILL AND INTO RANGE.
986	12390	EA3	EACMT	THE TARGET IS A BRIGHT SPOT ON THERMAL.
984	12431	EA3	EACMT	CREW DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THEY WERE SHOOTING AT.
983	12385	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER MOVED CROSSHAIR TO SOMETHING INVISIBLE ON TAPE AND FIRED ON IT.
982	12380	EA3	EACMT	FIRE NO PAIR, POSSIBLY DUE TO BMP1 MOVEMENT.
981	12370	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SPOTTED TARGET, FIRED ON IT FOR SEVERAL SECONDS, AND THEN ANNOUNCED, "LOOKS LIKE A DECOY".
979	12398	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SAID AFTER ENGAGEMENT, I GUESS IT'S NOTHING.
978	12364	EA3	EACMT	THE PICTURE IS BLURRY, CAMERA IS OUT OF FOCUS.
977	12411	EA3	EACMT	JUST CALLED HOT SPOT, DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TARGET WAS.
976	8081	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET, BUT LOST IT AS TT2 PULLED AROUND BEHIND COVER.
975	8066	EA3	EACMT	CANNOT SEE TARGET ON VIDEO, CREW CANNOT TELL THE TYPE OF THE TARGET.
974	8064	EA3	EACMT	REPORTED TO HIGHER COMMAND AS "1 TANK AND 1 PC". SAW A TANK AND A BMP AT THE SAME TIME.
973	8063	EA3	EACMT	REPORTED TO HIGHER COMMAND AS "TWO BIG BOYS".
972	8062	EA3	EACMT	REPORTED TO A HIGHER COMMAND A 2ND PC.
971	8061	EA3	EACMT	REPORTED TO HIGHER COMMAND AS 1 PC AT 21:51:44.
969	12156	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SCANNED A MOMENT AND RETURNED TO THIS TARGET.
964	12140	EA3	EACMT	WHEN TANK ACQUIRED TARGET, COULD NOT SEE ON VIDEO.
963	12138	EA3	EACMT	VCO POSSIBLY CONCERNED ABOUT INSTRUMENTATION. HE ORDERED GUNNER TO FIRE A ROUND "FOR THE HELL OF IT". GUNNER AIMED AT A TREE AND FIRED.
962	12122	EA3	EACMT	FIRING AT HOT SPOT ON HILLTOP.
961	12121	EA3	EACMT	LIGHT INTENSITY ON FILM WAS VERY BRIGHT. COULD NOT SEE ANY DETAIL ON FILM.
960	12120	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FOUND AND IDENTIFIED TARGET AS POSSIBLE VEHICLE AT 21:12:53, SCANNED SOME MORE, THEN RETURNED TO TARGET AT 21:14:48 AND FIRED ON IT.
958	8071	EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 21:32:20.
956	12130	EA3	EACMT	BMP2 IS MOVING, POSSIBLY TO FIND A BETTER ANGLE TO ATTACK THIS TARGET. THIS ROUND WAS FIRED AT THIS SUSPECTED TARGET, BUT IT MAY HAVE BEEN ACCIDENTAL FROM THE MOVEMENT OF BMP2.
953	8068	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FOUND TARGET, VCO ANNOUNCED TARGET LOCATION. VCO SAID TARGET WAS MOSTLY BEHIND HILL, AND THAT THEY WERE UNABLE TO FIRE ON IT.
951	8067	EA3	EACMT	THE VIDEO HAD A BAD PICTURE. MOST OF THE TIME ONLY THE TIME BAR WAS VISIBLE. THERE WAS INTERFERENCE WITH AUDIO AND VIDEO AND THE CONTRAST WAS TOO BRIGHT.
949	12182	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SPOTTED ANOTHER VEHICLE PARTIALLY HIDDEN BY TREES NEAR THE LAST TARGET

948 12177 EA3	EACMT	FIRE UPON. LATER IDENTIFIED THIS TARGET AS A HMMWV.
947 12159 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SPOTTED TANK AT MEDIUM RANGE AND FIRED ON DEAD REDFOR TANK TT4. LATER SWITCHED TO NORMAL VIEW AND SAW STROBE.
946 11926 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FOUND TARGET, THEN SCANNED SOME MORE WHILE VCO REPORTED TARGET LOCATION.
942 12016 EA3	EACMT	BMP2 WAS ORDERED TO FIRE ON TARGET AND THEY DID.
941 11886 EA3	EACMT	DETERMINE TIME AFTER FIRE TIME.
938 11881 EA3	EACMT	APPEARED TO BE ACCIDENTAL FIRING. NO TARGETS VISIBLE ON SCREEN.
937 12008 EA3	EACMT	AUDIO/VIDEO VERY BAD. MOST OF THE TIME COULD NOT HEAR OR SEE ANYTHING.
		JUST A HEAT SPOT. AUDIO/VIDEO REAL BAD IN PLACES.
		THIS SHOT WAS FIRED THROUGH THE TT2 VCO, WHO WAS STANDING ON HIS VEHICLE WHEN IT HAPPENED.
936 12006 EA3	EACMT	INSTRUMENTATION KEPT ANNOUNCING, "HEAT AMMO DEPLETED", REGARDLESS OF SWITCH SETTING. FOR 35 SECONDS GUNNER RETURNED TO ORIGINAL TARGET, TT2.
935 11991 EA3	EACMT	FIRED AGAIN WITH NO PAIRING AT 22:30:28.962. GUNNER THOUGHT TARGET MIGHT NOW BE A COYOTE. CONVINCED IT WAS A TANK AFTER ALL AT 22:31:00. AT 22:35:35 THEY DECIDED IT WAS A RABBIT.
934 11990 EA3	EACMT	HEAT AMMO NOW DEPLETED.
933 11988 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER CLAIMED THAT A HOT SPOT MOVED AND HE FIRED ON IT SEVERAL TIMES. ALL SHOTS FIRE NO PAIR.
932 11987 EA3	EACMT	THIS TANK CAME UP BEHIND THE PREVIOUS TARGET. GUNNER STOPPED FIRING ON TT2 AND FIRED ON THIS ONE. UNKNOWN WHICH TANK THIS TARGET IS.
930 11976 EA3	EACMT	CLOSE RANGE TANK DUEL BETWEEN TT2 AND FT5 RESULTED IN FIRE NO PAIR. THE TWO TANKS FIRED AT EACH OTHER AND NEVER GOT A HIT. WHEN THEY CAME WITHIN 10 FEET OF EACH OTHER. AT 22:34 THE VCO OF TT2 DISCONNECTED HOFFMAN AND FIRED, STILL NO PAIRING. THE TT2 VCO THEN GAVE UP AND THEY PULLED THE VEHICLES SIDE TO SIDE AND DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT.
929 11982 EA3	EACMT	TANKS ARE NOW MOTIONLESS AT POINT-BLANK RANGE.
928 11899 EA3	EACMT	CREW IS JUST FIRING AT HOT SPOTS.
927 11972 EA3	EACMT	CREW WAS SO BUSY SHOOTING A DEAD DECOY THEY DIDN'T SEE A TANK JUST A FEW YARDS DOWN THE ROAD UNTIL IT BEGAN FIRING ON THEM.
926 11897 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SAID HE HAS MORE HOT SPOTS.
925 11970 EA3	EACMT	CREW SAW AND IGNORED TARGET A FEW MINUTES EARLIER AND SAID IT WAS DEAD. VCO THEN GAVE ORDERS TO FIRE ON IT.
924 11894 EA3	EACMT	VCO SAID, "WHAT IS IT?", GUNNER SAID, "IT'S A TARGET".
923 11968 EA3	EACMT	ALL SHOTS FIRED BY THIS TANK AT THIS TARGET WERE DEAD-ON IN THE SIGHTS. BUT ALL WERE ASSESSED AS FIRE NO PAIR. IN ALL, TT5 FIRED 21 ROUNDS OF BOTH HEAT AND SABOT AT TWO TARGETS AS CLOSE AS TWENTY FEET AND NONE HIT. GUNNER SET SWITCH TO SABOT, BUT SWITCH DID NOT REGISTER. INSTRUMENTATION SHOWS ENGAGEMENT FIRING HEAT UNTIL HEAT AMMO DEPLETED. THIS VEHICLE WAS APPARENTLY ADMIN KILL AT 22:37:12. NO ONE WAS SHOOTING WHEN "YOU ARE DEAD" WAS ANNOUNCED.
921 11958 EA3	EACMT	VCO: "IT'S A DECOY. KILL IT ANYWAY."
920 11891 EA3	EACMT	WENT BACK AND LOOKED AT ALL THE HOT SPOTS. THAT'S WHAT THE GUNNER CALLED ALL THE TARGETS HE FIRED AT. AT 22:11:35 GUNNER SAID, "I THINK WE FIRED AT ALL DECOYS".
919 11890 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER DETERMINED TARGET AFTER HE ENGAGED IT.
918 11889 EA3	EACMT	THE HOFFMAN DIDN'T GO OFF. GUNNER DETERMINED TARGET AFTER HE ENGAGED IT.
915 12087 EA3	EACMT	COULD NOT ID TARGET, CREW DID NOT ID TARGET.
914 12071 EA3	EACMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGET ON VIDEO. CREW DID NOT ID TARGET.
912 12082 EA3	EACMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGET ON VIDEO, SO COULD NOT ID. CREW DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WERE SHOOTING AT.
911 8057 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FOUND TARGET USING THERMAL SIGHT. VCO IDENTIFIED TARGET AS DECOY IN CLEAR SIGHT, WHEN STANDING OUT OF TANK.
910 8056 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AND SHOUTED, "I GOT DECOY!", AND CONTINUED SCANNING.
909 8054 EA3	EACMT	KILLED AT 15:54:49.
908 1245 MD3	MDFCMT	PARENT TANK WAS FT1 TO DT2 WITH CREW 66 (MADE8530, ANDE5922, ADAM1176 AND VARG3971) BUT PROU6256 AND INGR2580 (FROM CREW 58) PERFORMED THE SET UP.
905 12104 EA3	EACMT	CAN'T SEE TARGET ON VIDEO DUE TO RETICLE BRIGHTNESS. CANNOT DETERMINE MOTION OR COVER.
902 12094 EA3	EACMT	VCO SPOTTED TARGET, IDENTIFIED ENEMY TANK, AND GUIDED GUNNER TO FIRE ON IT.
900 12077 EA3	EACMT	AFTER SHOOTING TARGET, VCO CALLED "ENGAGED AND DESTROYED 1 DECOY."
896 12068 EA3	EACMT	KILLED EACH OTHER.
894 12227 EA3	EACMT	CANNOT SEE TARGET ON VIDEO, CREW DOES NOT ID TARGET, VCO JUST SAID FIRE.
893 11436 EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS NEVER SEEN ON VIDEO. THE VCO ASKED, "WHAT ARE YOU SHOOTING AT?", AND THE GUNNER REPLIED, "I DON'T KNOW, I THOUGHT I SAW A TARGET".
890 11359 EA3	EACMT	FIRING AT HOT SPOT, FOUND LIVE TARGET.
889 8049 EA3	EACMT	TARGETS AT LONG RANGE AND ARE MOVING ALONG ROAD.
887 11323 EA3	EACMT	FIRING ON HOT SPOT.
882 12300 EA3	EACMT	BORESIGHT MAY BE OFF.
881 12293 EA3	EACMT	BAD VIDEO WHEN FIRING, COULD NOT TELL WHAT WEAPON SYSTEM USED. VCO CALLED FOR MISSILE, NO IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET BY VCO OR GUNNER.

880	12239	EA3	EACMT	BORESIGHT MAY BE OFF. DIRECT HIT ASSESSED FIRE NO PAIR.
879	12238	EA3	EACMT	BORESIGHT MAY BE OFF. SIGHT WAS DEAD ON STATIONARY TARGET, BUT ASSESSMENT WAS FIRE NO PAIR.
878	8048	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER PULLED TRIGGER, CANNON DID NOT FIRE. NO ENGAGEMENT.
877	12280	EA3	EACMT	CREW MOVED VEHICLE TO GET BETTER ATTACK POSITION ON SAME FT.
876	12261	EA3	EACMT	MOVING VEHICLE TO GET BETTER ATTACK POSITION.
875	12244	EA3	EACMT	FIRE NO PAIR, EITHER GUNNER IS A BAD SHOT OR INSTRUMENTATION IS NOT PROPERLY LINED-UP OR LASER IS NOT WORKING. FT5 SHOT 8 TIMES AND GOT NO PAIRINGS.
873	8047	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO FLAG BAR PROBLEM- FLAG SHOWED 990.
872	8045	EA3	EACMT	AUDIO WAS WEAK, PICTURE OUT OF FOCUS, CANNOT TRULY DETERMINE IF THIS IS ACTIVE PLAYER.
871	12224	EA3	EACMT	THIS WAS SECOND SHOT AT FIRST TARGET. NO AUDIO TO IDENTIFY TYPE OF TARGET.
870	12283	EA3	EACMT	ITEM C3, BLUE FORCE VEHICLE NEVER IDENTIFIED. VCO SAID HE COULD SEE TANK COMMANDER AND GUNNER.
868	12223	EA3	EACMT	BLUEFORCE VEHICLE NOT IDENTIFIED BY EITHER VCO OR GUNNER FOR THIS SEQUENCE. FROM TAPE AUDIO THEY COULD IDENTIFY AND SHOT "JUST IN CASE".
867	12221	EA3	EACMT	NO WAY TO IDENTIFY RED FORCE VEHICLE.
863	12302	EA3	EACMT	BORESIGHT MAY BE OFF. NO ASSESSMENT LISTED FOR THIS ENGAGEMENT.
861	12222	EA3	EACMT	ATTEMPT TO CLEAR THE PROBLEM OF GUN NOT FIRING THAT OCCURRED IN LAST ENGAGEMENT. THIS ROUND WENT INTO THE AIR.
860	12226	EA3	EACMT	COULD NEVER SEE THE TARGET ON TAPE.
859	12225	EA3	EACMT	COULD NEVER SEE THE TARGET ON TAPE.
856	11302	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED AT 22:35:29. VCO SAW STROBE AND SAID, "HE'S DEAD", AT 22:35:36.
855	11301	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS MOVING INTO COVER BEHIND TREES.
852	11297	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED EXTRA ROUNDS AT DEAD TARGET. DUE TO CONFLICTING INFORMATION FROM COMMANDER AND STROBE THAT STOPPED FLASHING.
851	11235	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER SAID, "I'M ENGAGING A DECOY."
850	11287	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER HAS HAD SEVERAL CHANCES TO SHOOT THIS TARGET, IT SAT EXPOSED AND STATIONARY ON A HILL FOR FIVE MINUTES, BUT THE GUNNER WAS CONVINCED IT WAS TOO FAR AWAY. FINALLY FIRED BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HIT IT AT EXTREME RANGE.
849	11232	EA3	EACMT	AT 16:09:33 TT1 WAS KILLED.
848	11229	EA3	EACMT	ON THIS FIRING THEY CALLED IT A REAL ONE.
846	11276	EA3	EACMT	FOUND TARGET HIDDEN IN TREES, WAITED ALMOST THREE MINUTES FOR TARGET TO MOVE INTO CLEAR SIGHT BEFORE FIRING.
845	11273	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS AT A LONG RANGE WHEN SHOT AT. VCO SAID IT COULD BE 4000 TO 5000 METERS. CREW DID NOT KNOW THEY WERE FIRING HEAT UNTIL 21:28:41.
843	11275	EA3	EACMT	DETERMINATION HAPPENED WHEN VCO SAID TARGET MOVED.
842	11270	EA3	EACMT	VIDEO COULD NEVER SEE WHAT GUNNER WAS ENGAGING.
841	11216	EA3	EACMT	NEVER COULD SEE VEHICLE ON TAPE. VCO EVEN ASK GNR WHAT HE WAS SHOOTING AT!
839	11259	EA3	EACMT	CREW JUST SAW SOMETHING THAT HAD A HEAT SOURCE AND PICKED IT UP. THEY DID NOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS.
838	11253	EA3	EACMT	SHOOTING AT HOT SPOT.
833	8041	EA3	EACMT	TT1 WAS KILLED AT 22:13:07.
832	8040	EA3	EACMT	THE CREW MADE NO ACQUISITIONS, NO DETERMINATIONS, NO ENGAGEMENTS. THEY JUST CAME ALONG FOR THE RIDE, AND DIED AT 22:00:29.
830	8039	EA3	EACMT	THE TARGET WAS TOO FAR AWAY FOR CREW TO ENGAGE. REPORTED THIS TO HIGHER COMMAND AND WERE TOLD NOT TO ENGAGE.
827	11140	EA3	EACMT	VCO CALLED DECOY AFTER TARGET WAS DESTROYED.
826	11221	EA3	EACMT	VERY CLOSE RANGE ENGAGEMENT.
818	1248	MD3	MDFCMT	13:16:07 POWER SUPPLY ASSEMBLY (PSA) STARTED. FRONT GUIDE WIRES GO OVER IMAGE CLOTH INSTEAD OF GOING THROUGH EYE HOLES IN FRONT. 13:25:47 PSA TURNED OFF.
817	1247	MD3	MDFCMT	ALT12193: NO GLOVES. KIRB4260: WORK GLOVES & LINERS. DMC CMT: GLOVES SET TO "NO GLOVES WORN" PER DAC.
816	11098	EA3	EACMT	RECON BY FIRE. SHOOTING AT A HOT SPOT AND LOOKING FOR THE VEHICLE WHICH HAD JUST FIRED ON THEM.
815	11030	EA3	EACMT	AFTER FIRING, ENGAGING CREW SAID "THAT'S NOT A TARGET". DETERMINATION TIME IS AFTER ENGAGEMENT TIME.
814	10993	EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED ON HOT SPOT.
813	11078	EA3	EACMT	TARGET IS PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK, DUCKING IN AND OUT OF COVER BEHIND A HILL.
810	11027	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER MADE DETERMINATION WHEN HE SAID "I SEE HIS HEAD POKING UP OUT OF THE VEHICLE".
809	11090	EA3	EACMT	GNR DESCRIBED A "TANK WITH TWO PEOPLE STANDING ON TOP." APPARENTLY FIRING ON DEAD TANK BUT ASSESSMENT WAS "FIRE NO PAIR". UNKNOWN WHO WAS FIRED ON.
808	10866	EA3	EACMT	AT 15:59:59 SCOM SAID "YOU ARE DEAD". THE TARGET THEY WERE FIRING AT WAS NEVER PAIRED. COULDN'T SEE TARGET ON THE VIDEO.
806	10997	EA3	EACMT	DRIVER SAID, "I SAW A LIGHT OVER ON THE RIGHT". TARGET WAS ALREADY DEAD. HIT DEAD TARGET.
805	10996	EA3	EACMT	FT2 WAS FIRING AT BMP5 AT THE SAME TIME, THEN BMP5 GOT KILLED AT 21:07:59.

804	48 CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M077B ONLY 3 TT WERE PLAYERS TO MATCH THE CORRESPONDING NON-MCCD TRIAL WHICH HAD ONLY 3 TTS. AT 09:45 OPFOR WAS INSTRUCTED TO EXPEDITE MISSION. (TAPES WOULD RUN OUT SOON). 21:50 P2 WENT TO ZERO RESPONSE. 21:58 P2 CAME BACK UP. LOST AGAIN AT 22:01. BMP4 STUCK IN MUD IN TRIAL.
803	8035 EA3	EACMT	AT 21:25:50 FT1 ACQUIRED A TARGET, BUT GOT KILLED, BEFORE FIRING.
802	8034 EA3	EACMT	TT4 SCANNED AND MANEUVERED, BUT DIDN'T ACQUIRE OR ENGAGE.
801	8033 EA3	EACMT	TT5 MOVED THROUGH AREA, DID NOT FIRE.
800	8032 EA3	EACMT	BMP4 DID NOT FIRE, DID NOT SEE ANY TARGETS.
799	10921 EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED ON A MOVING HOT SPOT. UNABLE TO IDENTIFY TARGET. IT WAS MOVING AND FULLY EXPOSED ON VIDEO.
798	10923 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER CALLED "RECON BY FIRE" AND ENGAGED FT1. TARGET NOT VISIBLE ON VIDEO.
797	10956 EA3	EACMT	STROBE WAS CLEARLY VISIBLE WHEN GUNNER FIRED.
796	10986 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER CALLED "SCAN BY FIRE", NO TARGET FOUND.
795	8030 EA3	EACMT	TT4 VIDEO TURNED ON AT 16:17:30. THEY TRAVELED BUT NO ENGAGEMENTS OR ACQUIRES.
785	10906 EA3	EACMT	SPOTTED TARGET WHEN IT FIRED AT 16:11:16, BUT THIS SHOT AT 16:11:20 WAS ASSESSED AS "FIRE NO PAIR". UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHO WAS FIRED ON.
780	10864 EA3	EACMT	CREW ACQUIRED TARGET BY WATCHING DUST CLOUD. THEY WERE READY WHEN THE TARGET POPPED OVER HILL. THIS IS THE SAME TARGET FIRED ON AT 15:57, BUT IT HAS MOVED TO A DIFFERENT LOCATION.
774	10981 EA3	EACMT	COMMANDER SPOTTED TARGET BY TURRET FLASH, ORDERED GUNNER TO SPIN TURRET. UNKNOWN WHAT TARGET WAS FIRED ON.
771	10955 EA3	EACMT	16:20:54: GUNNER SAID, "I FOUND HIM AGAIN". GUNNER WAS CONVINCED HE WAS FIRING ON THE SAME TARGET CONTACTED AT 16:19.
770	10933 EA3	EACMT	THIS TARGET MASKED BEHIND A HILL, THEREFORE TT3 WASN'T KILLED AND THEY WENT ON TO NEXT TARGET.
769	10903 EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS NEVER SEEN ON VIDEO.
768	10940 EA3	EACMT	TT3 WAS MOBILITY KILLED AT 16:15:43. HOWEVER, TT3 JUST KEPT MOVING ALONG. THE CREW DID KNOW IT HAD A MOBILITY KILL. REPORTED TO RED 1 BY RADIO, RED 1 TOLD THEM TO MOVE OUT. CREW SAID THEY WERE REVIVED AND KEPT ON PLAYING. TARGET WAS NEVER SEEN OR IDENTIFIED ON VIDEO.
767	10947 EA3	EACMT	THEY LEFT THEIR LAST TARGET AND JUST FIRED, NEVER CALLING ANY TARGET.
766	10954 EA3	EACMT	AFTER FIRING ON TT2, FT1, WAS KILLED AT 16:21:03.
765	10982 EA3	EACMT	TT3 WAS MOBILITY KILLED AT 16:15:43, KEPT MOVING AND PLAYING.
764	1242 MD3	MDFCMT	DT3 HAS SAME REFLECTOR DAMAGE AS OF YESTERDAYS TRIAL (M075B). NO REPAIRS MADE. REFER TO M075B LOG FOR DETAIL.
763	46 CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M076A 16:25:56-16:26:20 A NUMBER OF PAIR-NO-MATCHES FOR BM4 OF FT2. CAUSED BY 2-10 SECOND DELAYS ON FT2 PAIRINGS.
762	8029 EA3	EACMT	THEY CALLED THE TARGET A BRADLEY BUT WENT OFF IT TO THE NEXT TARGET.
760	11692 EA3	EACMT	FIRED ON THE SAME TARGET. TARGET WAS DEAD.
758	11466 EA3	EACMT	NEVER SAW TARGET AND CREW NEVER SAID WHAT THEY WERE SHOOTING AT. MOVED AT 15:35:59.
757	11530 EA3	EACMT	COULD NEVER SEE WHAT CREW WAS FIRING AT, JUST TREES. NO THERMAL IMAGE OF ANY VEHICLE AT ANY TIME.
756	11795 EA3	EACMT	TARGET MASKED. THEY WERE SCANNING FOR IT, BUT WENT TO ANOTHER TARGET.
755	11479 EA3	EACMT	RECON BY FIRE, HOSED BULLETS ACROSS TREE LINE HOPING FOR A "TARGET ENGAGED".
754	11489 EA3	EACMT	CREW NEVER IDENTIFIED ENGAGED TARGET. TARGET WAS NOT SEEN ON VIDEO. HOWEVER, EVERYWHERE THAT THE CREW SHOT, ALL THAT COULD BE SEEN WAS TREES.
751	8028 EA3	EACMT	FT3 DID A LOT OF SEARCHING, BUT NEVER ACQUIRED ANY TARGETS OR SHOT ANYTHING.
750	8026 EA3	EACMT	COMMAND TO FIRE WAS GIVEN BUT GUNNER STATED GUN WOULD NOT FIRE. GUNNER STATED HE HAD A FAULT ON FIRE MOVE.
749	8025 EA3	EACMT	KILLED, NO FIRINGS.
748	11697 EA3	EACMT	NEVER SAW BLUE FORCE, SO IDENTIFICATION IS NOT KNOWN. IT IS NEVER SHOWN ON TAPE.
747	8024 EA3	EACMT	TT3 KILLED AT 15:46:18.307 BEFORE HE COULD DO ANYTHING OR SEE ANYONE.
746	11756 EA3	EACMT	THERE WERE AT LEAST THREE COMMANDS BY VCO TO SCAN BY FIRE. THERE WERE NO TARGETS VISIBLE ON TAPES. ONLY ONE MENTION OF TARGET BY CREW AT 15:38:01. BMP4 KILLED SHORTLY AFTER 15:56:24.
745	11540 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER WAS AIMING HIGH.
744	11845 EA3	EACMT	THEY CALLED THE TARGET A TANK WHEN THEY ENGAGED, BUT THEN LATER SAID IT WAS A BRADLEY.
743	11543 EA3	EACMT	GUNNER HELD TRIGGER DOWN UNTIL 15:41:07 WHILE VEHICLE MOVED AND DODGED. GUNNER WAS NOT ALWAYS POINTED AT TARGET.
741	10739 EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED AT HOT SPOT.
740	10744 EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED AT HOT SPOT.
739	10746 EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED AT HOT SPOT.
738	10748 EA3	EACMT	FIRED AT HOT SPOT.
737	11819 EA3	EACMT	LEFT THIS TARGET. STARTED SCANNING FOR THE LAST TARGET. THEY HAD FIRED ON TT5.
736	10728 EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED AT HOT SPOT TO SEE IF IT WAS A TARGET. CONTINUED USING SCAN BY FIRE TO FIRE ON HOT SPOTS.
735	10754 EA3	EACMT	GNR CALLED DECOY AFTER ENGAGING 1ST TIME, HOWEVER VCO WAS GOING TO CALL DECOY,

734	10729	EA3	EACMT	BUT RED 1 CALLED HIM ON RADIO. VCO SAID IT COULD BE ONLY A POSSIBLE TARGET, AND CALLED IT IN. HE WAS TOLD TO ENGAGE IT ANYWAY. AFTER ENGAGING, VCO SAID IT WAS NO TARGET.
732	10734	EA3	EACMT	VCO SAID, "THAT'S A TARGET", AT 20:08:30.
730	10766	EA3	EACMT	CREW COULD NOT DETERMINE VEHICLE TYPE.
729	10737	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER FIRED AT A HOT SPOT TO SEE IF IT WAS A TARGET.
728	10782	EA3	EACMT	FIRER DETERMINED TARGET AFTER ENGAGEMENT.
727	10785	EA3	EACMT	NEVER SAID WHAT TYPE OF VEHICLE. COULD NOT ID BY VIDEO.
726	10789	EA3	EACMT	CREW NEVER ID BLUEFOR VEHICLE. TARGET WAS SHOT AT FROM BETWEEN TWO TREES, AND DID NOT HAVE CLEAN SHOT.
725	11841	EA3	EACMT	BACKED THEIR TANK UP WHILE FIRING AT THIS TARGET, THEN FT1 GOT KILLED.
724	10862	EA3	EACMT	CREW DETERMINED TARGET WAS REAL AND ACQUIRED IT WHEN IT FIRED ON THEM. RETURNED FIRE AFTER MANEUVERING THROUGH TREES, APPARENTLY HIT TARGET BECAUSE VCO ANNOUNCED STROBE LIT. NO ASSESSMENT TIME BECAUSE IT OCCURRED AFTER THE OFFICIAL END OF EXERCISE, SHOT FIRED BEFORE END OF EXPERIMENT.
723	10790	EA3	EACMT	VEHICLE FIRED AT THIS TARGET AT 20:23:15. THEN RETREATED, AND RETURNED TO FIRE AGAIN.
722	10797	EA3	EACMT	CREW FIRED, HELD DOWN TRIGGER, SWITCHED TO CLEAR TO WATCH FOR STROBE. GNR SHOUTED DECOY AT 20:25:31.
721	10846	EA3	EACMT	FT1 WAS KILLED AFTER 3 FIRINGS ON TT2. GUNNER SAID THEY MUST HAVE PUT SOMETHING ON THEIR SENSORS.
720	10847	EA3	EACMT	DETERMINATION TIME IS THE SAME AS ACQUISITION TIME BECAUSE GUNNER SPOTTED TARGET WHEN IT FIRED, OBVIOUSLY A REAL TARGET. THIS IS THE SAME TARGET ACQUIRED BUT NOT FIRED ON AT 20:26, BUT UNKNOWN IF CREW KNEW THAT.
719	10850	EA3	EACMT	VCO SAID TARGET WAS BLINKING SO SOMEONE KILLED THE TARGET. THEY HAD NO PAIRINGS.
717	8022	EA3	EACMT	THIS TARGET WAS A DECOY, SO THEY SCANNED FOR ANOTHER TARGET.
716	8021	EA3	EACMT	THERE WERE NO ACQUISITIONS, DETERMINATIONS OR FIRINGS, THEY JUST TRAVELED AND SCANNED. THEY WERE NEVER KILLED.
715	8020	EA3	EACMT	CREW KNEW IT WAS DECOY, SO DID NOT ENGAGE, JUST BY-PASSED TARGET.
714	8019	EA3	EACMT	NO CONTACT OR FIRE EVENT.
713	8018	EA3	EACMT	GNR TRACKED TARGET FROM 20:19:49 UNTIL 20:21:20 WITHOUT FIRING ON IT. JUDGING BY THE DRAWN SCHEMATIC, THIS TARGET WAS PROBABLY DT2 AT P3.
712	8017	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AT 20:26:52. TARGET FIRED BACK AT 20:26:55. VCO THEN DETERMINED TARGET WAS REAL. DRIVER SPUN TANK, OR COLLIDED WITH DITCH OR TREE, BEFORE GUNNER COULD FIRE ON TARGET. BECAUSE OF THIS, GUNNER LOST TARGET UNTIL 20:28.
711	8016	EA3	EACMT	GNR FOUND TARGET ON THERMAL, UNKNOWN WHAT IT WAS AT SHORT RANGE ON THERMAL. IT LOOKED LIKE A REAL VEHICLE GNR DECLARED REAL, VCO DECLARED DECOY WITH A LIGHT. CREW DID NOT ENGAGE TARGET.
709	10779	EA3	EACMT	GNR FIRED AGAIN TO ENSURE TARGET WAS DEAD.
707	10820	EA3	EACMT	TARGET WAS BARELY VISIBLE ON THERMAL SCOPE.
706	10752	EA3	EACMT	GNR FIRED ON HOT SPOT. NO MORE THAN SMALL GREY MARK ON SCREEN. JUST HAPPENED TO BE DECOY AT P1.
705	1239	MD3	MDFCMT	BOTH CREW HAD PROBLEMS WITH FOGGED UP GAS MASKS DURING SETUP!
704	1238	MD3	MDFCMT	DURING SET UP, RADAR REFLECTOR WAS DISCOVERED DAMAGED. ONE TUBE GOING INTO BLOCK IS SMASHED FLAT & WILL NOT FIT INTO THE BLOCK, ONE RADAR REFLECTOR WAS NOT USED, MALC9999 IS MADE AWARE OF THE PROBLEM.
702	10159	EA3	EACMT	BMP4 KILLED AT 16:14:03. AS VIEWED ON FILM, THE FIRING LOOKS ACCIDENTAL AS NO MENTION WAS MADE REGARDING TARGETS. VEHICLE WAS MOVING RAPIDLY FROM ONE LOCATION TO ANOTHER. DMC NOTE: AT THIS TIME, BMP4 HAD COME UNDER FIRE BY FT3 (REF FCN 10153.) RAPID START MAY HAVE JERKED GUNNER, CAUSING ACCIDENTAL FIRING.
701	45	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M075B 21:03:03 MOB KILL & 21:03:48 ADMIN KILL OF BMP3 TO BALANCE FORCE W/ EARLIER TRIAL THAT HAD A MOB KILL OF A PLAYER THAT WAS STUCK.
700	8006	EA3	EACMT	BMP3 JUST MOVED FROM PLACE TO PLACE, NEVER SEEING ANYTHING OR DOING ANYTHING.
699	8010	EA3	EACMT	TT3 JUST MOVED THE WHOLE TRIAL, DID NOT SEE OR ENGAGE ANYONE.
698	8009	EA3	EACMT	DID A LOT OF MOVING & SCANNING. THEN BMP5 GOT KILLED.
697	8008	EA3	EACMT	TT1 MOVED AND SCANNED BUT NEVER FIRED ON ANY TARGETS.
696	10206	EA3	EACMT	CREW SPOTTED HOT SPOT, COULD NOT IDENTIFY, FIRED 1 30MM ROUND TO CHECK FOR "TARGET ENGAGED" MESSAGE, ASSESSED AS "FIRE NO PAIR", CREW DECIDED IT WASN'T A TARGET.
695	8007	EA3	EACMT	TT5 HAD COMMO PROBLEMS. COULD NOT COMMUNICATE WITH OTHER UNIT. TT5 DID NOT DO ANYTHING BUT MOVE.
694	10219	EA3	EACMT	VEHICLE MOVED, RE-ENGAGED SAME TARGET THINKING IT WAS A NEW TARGET.
693	10230	EA3	EACMT	THEY KILLED BMP5 WHILE TRYING TO ENGAGE THE PREVIOUS TANK.
692	10240	EA3	EACMT	AT 21:30:11 THEY GOT "YOU ARE DEAD" TRANSMISSION.
691	10271	EA3	EACMT	FIRING AT HOT SPOT, NO IDENTIFICATION.
690	10291	EA3	EACMT	CONTINUED FIRING ON TARGET FROM 21:46:49 TO 21:47:35. FIREPOWER KILL AT 21:47:05, STROBE LIT AT 21:47:34.
688	8014	EA3	EACMT	THE GUNNER SAID HE WAS ON TARGET BUT NEVER ENGAGED IT AND MOVED OFF THE TARGET.

687	8013	EA3	EACMT	THEY ACQUIRED THIS TANK AND WHEN THEY FIRED, IT PASSED BEHIND BMP5 SO BMP5 WAS KILLED INSTEAD OF ENGAGING THE TANK.
686	8012	EA3	EACMT	NO ENGAGEMENT DATA. FT4 DROVE AROUND UNTIL 21:24:31 WHEN THEY SURVIVED SEVERAL SHOTS. THEY WERE KILLED AT 21:24:40.
685	8011	EA3	EACMT	FT3 NO ENGAGEMENTS, NO ACQUISITIONS.
684	10000	EA3	EACMT	TIME/DATA BAR DOES NOT WORK. ACQUIRE AND DETERMINATION TIMES TAKEN BY STOP WATCH.
683	10131	EA3	EACMT	THIS VEHICLE SCORED A MOBILITY KILL ON FT1 WITH SHOT AT 16:11:37.262 BUT FT1 RETREATED DESPITE THE MOBILITY KILL. CREW NEVER DECLARED REAL OR DECOY ON TARGET FT1. THEY JUST FIRED ON IT.
681	8005	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AND DETERMINED IT TO BE DECOY. NO FIRE EVENT.
680	8004	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AND DETERMINED IT TO BE DECOY. NO FIRE EVENT.
679	8003	EA3	EACMT	GUNNER ACQUIRED TARGET AND DETERMINED IT TO BE DECOY. NO FIRE EVENT.
678	10007	EA3	EACMT	BMP2 WAS MOVING AT TIME OF FIRING, THEN MASKED BEHIND A HILL.
677	8002	EA3	EACMT	TRIAL ENDED BEFORE VEHICLE MOVED: APPEARS PLAYER STAYED IN ASSEMBLY AREA BEHIND BLUE LINE AND DID NOT MOVE TO ENGAGE RED FORCE.
676	8001	EA3	EACMT	LOST PICTURE AND TIME BAR AT 15:51:56 BEFORE TRIAL EVEN BEGAN. AUDIO ONLY ON TAPE, CANNOT REDUCE.
675	8000	EA3	EACMT	AT 16:25:19, TT1 WAS KILLED.
674	10026	EA3	EACMT	FIRED ON BMP3, WENT OFF TARGET, THEN CAME BACK ON IT AND KEPT SCANNING. THEY SAW A DECOY WITH A BMP SOMEWHERE CLOSE TO THE DECOY AND FIRED ON THEM. THE GUNNER DIDN'T HAVE THE BMP IN HIS SIGHTS SO THEY BACKED DOWN OUT OF SIGHT, THEY GOT A MOBILITY KILL.
673	1235	MD3	MDFCMT	MISSING 1 RADAR CONE. AT 16:46 GODS ABOVE SAID "HOLD IN PLACE". AT 16:58 CONTINUING WITH TAKEDOWN.
672	1232	MD3	MDFCMT	13:47:10 POWER SUPPLY SHUT DOWN. 13:47:45 INGR2580 TURNED POWER SUPPLY "ON" SECOND TIME. 13:48:25 POWER SUPPLY OPERATING SECOND TIME. 13:52:06 POWER SUPPLY SHUT DOWN SECOND TIME. JOHN7947 REPORTS THAT POWER SUPPLY IS OUT OF GAS. 14:19:50 JOHN7947 PUTS FUEL IN POWER SUPPLY. 14:20:19 INGR2580 SWITCHES POWER SUPPLY "ON" (#3). 14:21:10 POWER SUPPLY OPERATING.
671	1231	MD3	MDFCMT	18:32:40 PROU6256 NOTICED THAT ON DT4 (L) SECOND FROM TOP CHANNEL IMAGE STIFFENER WAS COMPLETELY MISSING.
670	1230	MD3	MDFCMT	MISSING 2 STAKES THAT SECURE RADAR CONES TO THE GROUND. A POLE ON ONE OF THE RADAR CONE ASSEMBLIES IS CRUSHED ON THE END. THIS PREVENTS ASSEMBLY OF THIS RADAR CONE. GENERATOR RAN OUT OF GAS AND SHUTDOWN. PWR SUP SWITCHED OFF: POWER SUPPLY SHUT DOWN WHEN I ARRIVED CROK4325 SAID IT RAN OUT OF GAS.
669	1228	MD3	MDFCMT	AT 23:12 GENERATOR WAS NOT RUNNING WHEN I ARRIVED. CREW ASSESSMENT WAS "RAN OUT OF GAS". CREW 52 AND DECOY DT1 ARE USUALLY WITH FT2.
668	41	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M071B BMP3 STUCK. END REALTIME SESSION AND END TRIAL FOR R071B WAS CHANGED FROM 22:45:07 TO 22:42:33 ON MARCH 19TH. TRIAL WAS TO TERMINATE AT END EXPERIMENT TIME BUT PLAYING CONTINUED.
667	1096	MD3	MDFCMT	ALT12193 & MCCU3630 HAD DIFFICULTY ERECTING THEIR DECOY DUE TO POOR VISIBILITY WITH MOPP GEAR.
664	5507	TD3	TDCMT	FOUND TARGET TOO LATE, NEVER FIRED. NOT FOUND IN TIME.
663	6086	TD3	TDCMT	NO INDICATIONS AT ALL ON THE THERMAL SIGHT, CREW UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE ANYTHING.
662	6087	TD3	TDCMT	NO INDICATIONS AT ALL ON THE THERMAL SIGHT, CREW UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE ANYTHING.
661	6088	TD3	TDCMT	NO INDICATIONS AT ALL ON THE THERMAL SIGHT, CREW UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE ANYTHING.
660	6089	TD3	TDCMT	NO INDICATIONS AT ALL ON THE THERMAL SIGHT, CREW UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE ANYTHING.
659	6653	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER OVERRULED BY VCO. GUNNER SAID REAL, VCO SAID DECOY. TARGET WAS ACTUALLY REAL.
658	6632	TD3	TDCMT	PER RMS THEY SHOT AT FT2 INSTEAD OF TARGET 1.
657	6996	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SAID IT WAS A DECOY BECAUSE IT WAS VERY BRIGHT.
656	6998	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULDN'T FIND STROBE, GOT LOST, AND FOUND P4 (DB3) AND USED IT AS SECOND TARGET.
655	7000	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FIRED ON WRONG TARGET, VCO OVERRODE GUNNER ON TARGET DETERMINATION.
654	7002	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COMMENTED DECOY WAS EXTREMELY BRIGHT, GUNNER FIRST CALLED A "REAL MICROWAVE".
653	5646	TD3	TDCMT	CREW STAYED ON TARGET FOR 8 SECONDS IN DVO BEFORE GOING TO THERMAL.
652	6044	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID TARGET IS UNIDENTIFIABLE, BUT CALLED IT A DECOY.
651	6667	TD3	TDCMT	AT 19:45:41 GUNNER CALLED DECOY, AT 19:45:51 VCO OVERRODE AND CALLED REAL.
650	6683	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID REAL AND VCO SAID DECOY, ACTUALLY REAL.
649	6684	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID REAL, VCO SAID DECOY, WAS ACTUALLY A DECOY.
645	1227	MD3	MDFCMT	KIRB4200 WAS WEARING WORK GLOVES & LINERS MCCU3630 DIDN'T TAKEDOWN: ALT:2193 & MCCU3630.
644	1224	MD3	MDFCMT	POWER SUPPLY WAS ACCIDENTALLY SHUT OFF DURING SETUP. SECOND TIMES 14:38:09 AND 14:38:42 ARE RESTART TIMES.
643	40	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M070B FT1 FIRES ONLY HEAT.
642	39	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M070A FT5 HAD A NUMBER OF FIRE NO PAIRS. AFTER TRIAL FOUND TO HAVE A "WEAK LASER".
641	38	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M069B BMP1 STUCK IN MUD, ADMIN MOB KILL AT 22:16:13. BMP4 GOT UNSTUCK.

640	37 CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M069A 16:00:43 ADMIN KILL TT2, IN WRONG AREA. VIOLATION OF TACTICAL PLAY RULES. 16:12:10 FT5 FIRED HEAT.
639	6692 TD3	TDCMT	CONTROL DIDN'T CALL TARGET AT POSITION 2, SO THEY NEVER FIRED AT IT.
638	6696 TD3	TDCMT	CREW NEVER FIRED ON TARGET, BUT THEY DID SWITCH BACK TO CLEAR TO SEE STROBE.
637	6697 TD3	TDCMT	CREW NEVER FIRED ON TARGET, BUT THEY DID SWITCH BACK TO CLEAR TO SEE STROBE.
636	6698 TD3	TDCMT	CREW NEVER FIRED ON TARGET, BUT THEY DID SWITCH BACK TO CLEAR TO SEE STROBE.
635	6699 TD3	TDCMT	CREW NEVER FIRED ON TARGET, BUT THEY DID SWITCH BACK TO CLEAR TO SEE STROBE.
634	6701 TD3	TDCMT	AT POSITION 4 THE GUNNER SAID DECOY, VCO SAID REAL.
633	6728 TD3	TDCMT	ON TARGET AT POSITION 4 THERE WERE 2 LIGHT FLASHING, SO THEY WERE TOLD WHICH LIGHT TO GO TO.
632	6734 TD3	TDCMT	VCO OVERRULED THE GUNNER, HE CALLED REAL AND GUNNER CALLED DECOY.
631	6737 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT CHECK FOR STROBE, FIRED ON POSITION 4 WHEN TRUE TARGET WAS POSITION 5.
630	6738 TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER DECLARED TWO STROBES WERE ACTIVE. CREW FOUND CORRECT TARGET.
629	7037 TD3	TDCMT	VCO CHANGED HIS MIND FROM REAL TO DECOY, GUNNER SAID REAL.
628	7042 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED REAL, VCO COULDN'T TELL.
627	6919 TD3	TDCMT	CREWMAN SAID "AND WE GOT DECOY, DECOY" AT 20:13:20, BEFORE TARGET WAS PRESENTED.
			CREWMAN KNEW THIS LANE HELD TWO DECOYS IN ADVANCE.
626	6920 TD3	TDCMT	CREWMAN SAID "AND WE GOT DECOY, DECOY" AT 20:13:20, BEFORE TARGET WAS PRESENTED.
			CREWMAN KNEW THIS LANE HELD TWO DECOYS IN ADVANCE.
625	6918 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID REAL, VCO SAID DECOY.
624	6929 TD3	TDCMT	FOUND TARGET AT FIRST, THEN LOST IT, AND NEVER COULD FIND IT AGAIN.
623	6930 TD3	TDCMT	FOUND TARGET AT FIRST, THEN LOST IT, AND NEVER COULD FIND IT AGAIN.
622	6451 TD3	TDCMT	CREW 1 FIRED AT WRONG TARGET FOR FIRST PRESENTATION.
621	6189 TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER DID NOT TELL PLAYERS WHAT TARGET TO GO FOR PRESENTATION 5.
620	6137 TD3	TDCMT	09 NEVER CALLED PRESENTATION 1 TARGET.
619	6139 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID BECAUSE OF THERMAL HE CANNOT IDENTIFY THIS TARGET.
618	6142 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF THIS TARGET, THEY FOUND IT BY SCANNING.
617	6146 TD3	TDCMT	PRESENTATION 2 (P2) DID NOT HAPPEN. IT WAS NOT ANNOUNCED OR FIRED ON.
616	6156 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF THIS TARGET. THEY FOUND IT BY SCANNING.
615	6157 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF THIS TARGET. THEY FOUND IT BY SCANNING.
614	6166 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SCANNED FOR TARGET IN WIDE FOV, WENT TO NARROW FOV AND CALLED IN NARROW.
613	6168 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SCANNED FOR TARGET IN WIDE FOV, WENT TO NARROW FOV AND CALLED IN NARROW.
612	6169 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SCANNED FOR TARGET IN WIDE FOV, WENT TO NARROW FOV AND CALLED IN NARROW.
611	6174 TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THIS PRESENTATION. THEY FOUND THE TARGET BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY TARGET LEFT, AND WERE WAITING ON IT FOR THE STROBE TO FLASH.
610	6046 TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS COULD FIND VERY LITTLE HEAT TRACE FOR ANY OF THE VEHICLE.
609	6047 TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS COULD FIND VERY LITTLE HEAT TRACE FOR ANY OF THE VEHICLE.
608	6048 TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS COULD FIND VERY LITTLE HEAT TRACE FOR ANY OF THE VEHICLE.
607	6049 TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS COULD FIND VERY LITTLE HEAT TRACE FOR ANY OF THE VEHICLE.
606	6071 TD3	TDCMT	CALLED TARGET TYPE BEFORE STROBE CAME ON.
605	6074 TD3	TDCMT	CALLED TARGET TYPE BEFORE STROBE CAME ON.
604	6093 TD3	TDCMT	THE CREW SAID THE THERMAL IMAGE WAS TOO BRIGHT, JUST TOO HOT.
603	6094 TD3	TDCMT	THE CREW SAID THE THERMAL IMAGE WAS TOO BRIGHT, JUST TOO HOT.
602	6117 TD3	TDCMT	09 DID NOT ANNOUNCE PRESENTATION TARGET 3. CREW LOCATED BY SCANNING.
601	6119 TD3	TDCMT	09 DID NOT ANNOUNCE PRESENTATION TARGET 5. CREW LOCATED BY SCANNING.
600	6121 TD3	TDCMT	AFTER THE LAST TARGET, GUNNER RETURNED TO THIS TARGET AT P2 AND SAID THAT IS A REAL TANK, BUT THE ITERATION WAS OVER.
599	6127 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF PRESENTATION 3 (P5) TARGET. THEY FOUND THE TARGET WHILE SCANNING.
598	6129 TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION OF PRESENTATION 5 (P4) TARGET. THEY FOUND THE TARGET WHILE SCANNING.
597	6041 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID WHATEVER IT IS, IT'S A DECOY.
596	6043 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED TARGET A DECOY, BUT HE SAID HE WASN'T SURE BECAUSE OF SEEING MORE HEAT, BUT NEVER CHANGED THE CALL.
594	1222 MD3	MDFCMT	1357 CREW LEVELED SITE BEFORE SET UP. STANDOFF MISSING FOR LEFT MIDDLE HINGE. ROLLED DECOY DOWN HILL. DMC CMT: SETUP TIMES INVALID DUE TO TIME EXPENDED ON SITE LEVELING.
593	1221 MD3	MDFCMT	14:21:57 ANDE5922 BROKE IMAGE STIFFENER. PN 97403-13228E9633-11. 14:25:30 ADAM1176 BROKE ELASTIC CORD INSIDE TUBE OF RADAR REFLECTOR. 14:26:21 ADAM1176 COMPLETED TEMPORARY FIX OF RADAR REFLECTOR.
592	5761 TD3	TDCMT	VCO HURRIED GUNNER TO ID. CREW HAD A HARD TIME FINDING THE TARGET.
591	5764 TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND THE STROBE ON VIDEO TAPE TO DETERMINE IF CREW WAS LOOKING AT CORRECT TARGET. CREW CALLED INCORRECT TARGET TYPE.
590	36 CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M068B FT3 & FT1 FIRE HEAT ROUNDS AFTER TRIAL, CANNOT FIRE SABOT.
589	5793 TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER WAS UNSURE OF TARGET, ASKED VCO FOR DECISION AT 09:44:46.
588	35 CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M068A 16:17:30 TT4 WAS TURNED ON.
587	5781 TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT ID TARGET FOR THIS PRESENTATION BECAUSE OF FOG AND WEATHER. THEY DID SEE THE STROBE FOR THE PRESENTATION.

586	5782	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT ID TARGET FOR THIS PRESENTATION BECAUSE OF FOG AND WEATHER. THEY DID SEE THE STROBE FOR THE PRESENTATION.
585	5776	TD3	TDCMT	VCO ID TARGET FOR PRESENTATION 2 BEFORE SWITCHING FROM DAY SIGHT TO THERMAL.
584	5766	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND TARGET FOR PRESENTATION 2 (P2), THEY DID NOT TALK ABOUT IT OR SAY WHAT IT WAS BEFORE TIME RAN OUT.
583	5767	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT ID PRESENTATION 3 (P3).
582	5768	TD3	TDCMT	VCO COULD NOT ID PRESENTATION 4 (P4) WHILE IN DAY SIGHT.
581	5769	TD3	TDCMT	VCO COULD NOT ID PRESENTATION 5 (P1) WHILE IN DAY SIGHT.
580	5711	TD3	TDCMT	TANK CREW DISAGREED ON WHAT THE TARGET WAS, VCO DECLARED DECOY WHEN NEXT TARGET WAS ANNOUNCED.
579	5696	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND TARGETS DUE TO FOG.
578	5697	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND TARGETS DUE TO FOG.
577	5698	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND TARGETS DUE TO FOG.
576	5699	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND TARGETS DUE TO FOG.
575	5694	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET WASN'T CALLED OUT.
574	5686	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COULD BARELY MAKE IT OUT, VCO MADE DETERMINATION.
573	5687	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS ON CORRECT TARGET BUT NEITHER GUNNER NOR VCO COULD SEE ANYTHING.
572	5688	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS ON CORRECT TARGET BUT NEITHER GUNNER NOR VCO COULD SEE ANYTHING.
571	5689	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS ON CORRECT TARGET BUT NEITHER GUNNER NOR VCO COULD SEE ANYTHING.
570	5676	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED DECOY, VC CALLED REAL.
569	5679	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER ASKED VCO WHAT HE THOUGHT, VCO SAID HE WAS GOING WITH DECOY.
568	5671	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T MAKE OUT IF IT WAS THE TARGET.
567	5672	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER FOUND THE TARGET.
566	5673	TD3	TDCMT	AT 12:10:34 THE GUNNER SAID "THERE IT IS" BUT COULDN'T TELL WHAT IT WAS IN THERMAL.
565	5674	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER SAW THE TARGET, WAS TOLD TO CLOSE THE BALLISTIC DOORS.
564	5666	TD3	TDCMT	LOCATED BUT DID NOT MAKE DETERMINATION.
563	5667	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DISCUSSED HIGH-LOW THERMAL AND NEVER FOUND TARGET.
562	5668	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SCANNING IN WIDE, DIRECT VIEW, NEVER FOUND TARGET.
561	5669	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CLAIMS TO HAVE FOUND TARGET IN DIRECT VIEW, SWITCHED TO THERMAL AND COULD NOT LOCATE TARGET.
560	5657	TD3	TDCMT	INITIAL CALL BY VCO WAS THAT THE TARGET WAS A DECOY, THE GUNNER SAID IT LOOKED REAL AND THE VCO DECIDED IT WAS A DECOY.
559	5659	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED REAL BUT THEN SAID HE COULDN'T TELL. VCO CONFIRMED REAL.
558	5648	TD3	TDCMT	THERE WAS A PRESENTATION ERROR WHICH CAUSED THE CREW TO GO TO PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED TARGETS. THE CREW EVENTUALLY MOVED TO THE CORRECT TARGET BUT DID NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION.
557	5647	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED REAL, VC CALLED DECOY, DISCUSSION FOLLOWED, VC SAID THE TARGET LOOKED SLOTCY.
556	1218	MD3	MDFCMT	134028 CROK4325 NOTICED THAT ONE POLE WAS BENT ON ONE RADAR DEFLECTOR. THEREFORE HE COULDN'T SET IT UP.
552	1152	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
551	7092	TD3	TDCMT	VIDEO IS BAD, CAN'T SEE ANYTHING. SOMETIMES AUDIO IS BAD.
550	7091	TD3	TDCMT	VIDEO IS BAD, CAN'T SEE ANYTHING. SOMETIMES AUDIO IS BAD.
549	7090	TD3	TDCMT	VIDEO IS BAD, CAN'T SEE ANYTHING. SOMETIMES AUDIO IS BAD.
548	7089	TD3	TDCMT	VIDEO IS BAD, CAN'T SEE ANYTHING. SOMETIMES AUDIO IS BAD.
547	7088	TD3	TDCMT	AUDIO WAS BAD. CREW COULDN'T HEAR CONTROL CALL FOR TARGET SO THEY PRESENTED TARGET 2 AGAIN.
545	7086	TD3	TDCMT	THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY STROBE LIGHTS THEY JUST FIRE ON TGTS.
544	7085	TD3	TDCMT	THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY STROBE LIGHTS THEY JUST FIRE ON TGTS.
543	7084	TD3	TDCMT	THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY STROBE LIGHTS THEY JUST FIRE ON TGTS.
542	7083	TD3	TDCMT	THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY STROBE LIGHTS THEY JUST FIRE ON TGTS.
538	7081	TD3	TDCMT	AT 02:13:24 CREW TOLD CONTROL THEY HAD A PROBLEM WITH BALLISTIC SHIELD DOOR, IT WOULDN'T OPEN. AT 02:15:18 CREW SAID THEY WERE SLEWING TO THE FRONT. LANE 4 IS SET. ON THIS FIRING AUDIO WAS BAD, I COULDN'T HEAR WHAT THE CREW SAID.
529	7070	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER HAPPENED ON VIDEO OR RMS.
528	7069	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER HAPPENED ON VIDEO OR RMS.
527	33	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M064A MANY FIRE NO PAIRS WITH 30MM BY ALL BMPS. LIKELY RECON BY FIRE.
526	32	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M063B BMP5 RECORDER OFF & ON DURING TRIAL.
525	31	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M063A BMP5 GOES TO ZERO RESPONSE. STILL GETS PAIRINGS AT 16:08:09-16:08:20 TILL GETS NO TGT ENGAGED.
524	6000	TD3	TDCMT	DIDN'T HEAR THIS TARGET CALLED BY '09'.
523	6023	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET NOT CALLED BY '09'.
522	6151	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT HEAR 09 CALL THIS TARGET.
521	6152	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT HEAR 09 CALL THIS TARGET.
520	5783	TD3	TDCMT	CREW LOST PLAYING AREA WHILE SEARCHING FOR THIS PRESENTATION (4) BECAUSE OF FOG. BY THE TIME THEY WERE BACK INTO THE PLAYING AREA, THEIR TIME WAS UP.
519	5784	TD3	TDCMT	CREW LOST PLAYING AREA WHILE SEARCHING FOR THIS PRESENTATION (5) BECAUSE OF FOG.

516 1210 MD3 MDFCMT BY THE TIME THEY WERE BACK INTO THE PLAYING AREA, THEIR TIME WAS UP. NONCREW MEMBER SHUT OFF POWER SUPPLY. AT 14:30:01 BEGAN TO REMOVE MOPP GEAR WHILE WAITING FOR POWER SUPPLY TO RECHARGE. DMC CMT: COMPLETED TEARDOWN AFTER REMOVING MOPP GEAR - LIMITED USE RECORD.

515 1189 MD3 MDFCMT EXP 42 LIGHTS SHUT OFF.

514 1177 MD3 MDFCMT SET UP & TAKE DOWN PERFORMED AT EXP 42 (8J).

513 1176 MD3 MDFCMT PMCS PERFORMED AT EXP 42 (8J).

512 1215 MD3 MDFCMT CREW USED ROCKS TO HAMMER IN STAKES. ALT12193 AND MCCU3630 TOOK DOWN DECOY.

511 1214 MD3 MDFCMT CROK4325 WEARING WORK GLOVES WITH LINERS DURING SETUP. EICH6945 WORE NO GLOVES. THERE WERE NO STAKE FOR RADAR REFLECTORS.

510 1202 MD3 MDFCMT 15:06:19 FOUND A FRONT BROKEN GUY WIRE AND REPAIRED IT. AT 15:09:29 BROKE AN IMAGE STIFFENER RETAINER CORD. DID NOT DO A REPAIR. WHEN FIXING THE FRONT GUY WIRE, DIDN'T PUT IT THROUGH THE MANUFACTURED HOLE IN FRONT OF DECOY, BUT WENT OVER THE TOP OF THE IMAGE. TAKE DOWN CREW WAS INGR2580, PROU6256, AND GIBS9999. DMC CMT: EVENT INVALIDATED PER DAC.

509 1201 MD3 MDFCMT 1 1/2" TEAR ON BOTTOM LEFT ABOVE HINGE ADAPTER. SEVEN RIPS FROM 1/4" TO 1" TEARS & HOLES ON LEFT SIDE OF MANIFOLD TRACK. 1 1/4" TEAR ON RIGHT FRONT ABOVE HINGE ADAPTER.

508 1200 MD3 MDFCMT AT 14:55 DECOY WAS MOVED TO ANOTHER SITE. DMC CMT: SET-UP TIMES ARE NO TEST.

507 1174 MD3 MDFCMT MISSING 2 PEGS FOR RADAR CONES. CREW WEARING GLOVES. NO REPAIR KIT.

506 1173 MD3 MDFCMT CREW WORE WORK GLOVES DURING TAKE DOWN. DECOY & POWER SUPPLY WAS CARRIED BY ONE PERSON EACH.

505 1172 MD3 MDFCMT DURING SETUP FALK4942 WAS WEARING WORK GLOVES W/LINERS AND IRBY0241 WASN'T WEARING ANY GLOVES. DURING TAKE DOWN: BOTH CREW MEMBERS WERE WEARING WORK GLOVES W/LINERS. DMC CMT: EVENT SPLIT INTO TWO RECORDS; RECORD FCN 1172 HAS SETUP WITH NO GLOVES; RECORD 1253 HAS TEARDOWN WITH WORK GLOVES AND INSERTS.

499 6978 TD3 TDCMT HAD THERMAL PROBLEMS.

498 6977 TD3 TDCMT HAD THERMAL PROBLEMS.

495 7011 TD3 TDCMT VCO AND GUNNER BOTH SAID "THAT DAMN THING IS LIGHT EVERYWHERE".

489 6965 TD3 TDCMT FT4 (P5S) WAS PRESENTED IN PLACE OF DT3 (P3S).

488 6963 TD3 TDCMT FT4 (P5S) WAS PRESENTED IN PLACE OF DT3 (P3S).

485 6960 TD3 TDCMT GNR CALLED DECOY TANK AT 20:53:22, AT 20:53:27 VCO CALLED DECOY UNKNOWN.

483 6953 TD3 TDCMT VCO SAID DECOY, GNR SAID REAL.

482 6946 TD3 TDCMT GNR SAID REAL TANK, VCO SAID REAL BRADLEY.

481 6941 TD3 TDCMT GNR SAID DECOY, VCO SAID REAL.

480 6912 TD3 TDCMT VCO COMMENTED "MUST BE DECOY..NEVER SEEN A REAL BRADLEY THAT BRIGHT ON THERMAL BEFORE."

479 6909 TD3 TDCMT CREW REDID PRESENTATION. FOUND CORRECT TARGET. GNR SAID REAL, VCO OVERRODE WITH DECOY.

477 6905 TD3 TDCMT THEY MISSED THE CALL ON THE FIRST TARGET, THEN CAME BACK AND CALLED IT AND FIRED ON IT AFTER THE SECOND TARGET. THEY CALLED IT REAL.

475 6881 TD3 TDCMT GNR CALLED REAL, VCO OVERRULED CALLING DECOY.

473 6790 TD3 TDCMT JUST TOO SLOW, THEN WENT TO WRONG TARGET.

472 6784 TD3 TDCMT CREW TRIED TO SCAN IN NARROW NORMAL, COULD NOT FIND STROBES OR TARGETS UNTIL THEY USED WIDE FOV FOR FINAL TARGET.

471 6783 TD3 TDCMT CREW TRIED TO SCAN IN NARROW NORMAL, COULD NOT FIND STROBES OR TARGETS UNTIL THEY USED WIDE FOV FOR FINAL TARGET.

470 6782 TD3 TDCMT CREW TRIED TO SCAN IN NARROW NORMAL, COULD NOT FIND STROBES OR TARGETS UNTIL THEY USED WIDE FOV FOR FINAL TARGET.

469 6781 TD3 TDCMT CREW TRIED TO SCAN IN NARROW NORMAL, COULD NOT FIND STROBES OR TARGETS UNTIL THEY USED WIDE FOV FOR FINAL TARGET.

468 6780 TD3 TDCMT CREW TRIED TO SCAN IN NARROW NORMAL, COULD NOT FIND STROBES OR TARGETS UNTIL THEY USED WIDE FOV FOR FINAL TARGET.

467 6870 TD3 TDCMT NEVER FOUND TARGET.

466 6866 TD3 TDCMT NEVER FOUND TARGET.

465 6865 TD3 TDCMT NEVER FOUND TARGET.

464 6854 TD3 TDCMT COULD NOT FIND TARGET, GOT A LITTLE LOST.

463 6750 TD3 TDCMT GUNNER KEPT SAYING DECOY AS VCO SAID REAL.

462 6845 TD3 TDCMT CREW JUST COULD NOT FIND TARGET LINE.

458 6804 TD3 TDCMT DID NOT LOCATE TARGET OR FIRE.

457 6803 TD3 TDCMT DID NOT LOCATE TARGET OR FIRE.

456 6802 TD3 TDCMT DID NOT LOCATE TARGET OR FIRE.

455 6801 TD3 TDCMT DID NOT LOCATE TARGET OR FIRE.

454 6800 TD3 TDCMT DID NOT LOCATE TARGET OR FIRE.

453 6639 TD3 TDCMT CREW SCANNED ALL FIVE TARGETS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION. FOUND TARGET IN THERMAL BEFORE FIRST POSITION WAS CALLED. EVENT WAS THERMAL AND CREW USED ONLY THERMAL TO LOCATE TARGET IN PREPARATION FOR EVENT.

452 6638 TD3 TDCMT CREW SCANNED ALL FIVE TARGETS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION. FOUND TARGET IN THERMAL BEFORE FIRST POSITION WAS CALLED. EVENT WAS THERMAL AND

451	6637	TD3	TDCMT	CREW USED ONLY THERMAL TO LOCATE TARGET IN PREPARATION FOR EVENT. CREW SCANNED ALL FIVE TARGETS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION. FOUND TARGET IN THERMAL BEFORE FIRST POSITION WAS CALLED. EVENT WAS THERMAL AND CREW USED ONLY THERMAL TO LOCATE TARGET IN PREPARATION FOR EVENT.
450	6636	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SCANNED ALL FIVE TARGETS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION. FOUND TARGET IN THERMAL BEFORE FIRST POSITION WAS CALLED. EVENT WAS THERMAL AND CREW USED ONLY THERMAL TO LOCATE TARGET IN PREPARATION FOR EVENT.
449	6635	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SCANNED ALL FIVE TARGETS SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION. FOUND TARGET IN THERMAL BEFORE FIRST POSITION WAS CALLED. EVENT WAS THERMAL AND CREW USED ONLY THERMAL TO LOCATE TARGET IN PREPARATION FOR EVENT.
448	6634	TD3	TDCMT	TIME BAR WENT OFF AT 01:23:00 CAME BACK ON AFTER ALL FIRINGS 01:26:00.
447	6633	TD3	TDCMT	TIME BAR WENT OFF AT 01:23:00 CAME BACK ON AFTER ALL FIRINGS 01:26:00.
446	6632	TD3	TDCMT	TIME BAR WENT OFF AT 01:23:00 CAME BACK ON AFTER ALL FIRINGS 01:26:00.
445	6631	TD3	TDCMT	TIME BAR WENT OFF AT 01:23:00 CAME BACK ON AFTER ALL FIRINGS 01:26:00.
444	6630	TD3	TDCMT	TIME BAR WENT OFF AT 01:23:00 CAME BACK ON AFTER ALL FIRINGS 01:26:00.
442	6695	TD3	TDCMT	CREW NEVER FIRED ON TARGET, BUT THEY DID SWITCH BACK TO CLEAR TO SEE STROBE.
440	6614	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COMPLAINED OFTEN OF TROUBLE WITH KNOBS. GNR WAS SCANNING FOR TARGETS IN NARROW VIEW, AND THEN IDENTIFYING TARGETS IN WIDE.
439	6613	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COMPLAINED OFTEN OF TROUBLE WITH KNOBS. GNR WAS SCANNING FOR TARGETS IN NARROW VIEW, AND THEN IDENTIFYING TARGETS IN WIDE.
438	6612	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COMPLAINED OFTEN OF TROUBLE WITH KNOBS. GNR WAS SCANNING FOR TARGETS IN NARROW VIEW, AND THEN IDENTIFYING TARGETS IN WIDE.
437	6611	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COMPLAINED OFTEN OF TROUBLE WITH KNOBS. GNR WAS SCANNING FOR TARGETS IN NARROW VIEW, AND THEN IDENTIFYING TARGETS IN WIDE.
436	6610	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COMPLAINED OFTEN OF TROUBLE WITH KNOBS. GNR WAS SCANNING FOR TARGETS IN NARROW VIEW, AND THEN IDENTIFYING TARGETS IN WIDE.
435	6690	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MADE AN IDENTIFICATION ON TARGET AT POSITION 3 AFTER THEY FIRED ON TARGET AT POSITION 4. CALLED IT REAL BUT NO FIRING.
434	6608	TD3	TDCMT	VCO SAID, "THIS LOOKS LIKE A DECOY, BUT INDISTINGUISHABLE."
433	6605	TD3	TDCMT	CREW CALLED TARGET 1 WHILE LOOKING AT TARGET 2, 30 SECONDS AFTER THEY LEFT IT. THEY DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO IDENTIFY IT BEFORE THE NEXT PRESENTATION WAS CALLED. COMMENT CLARIFICATION REQUESTED BY DAK: FOUND FIRST TARGET AT POS 4 AT 01:16:22. FIRED ON IT AT 01:16:28. SAID NOTHING. FOUND SECOND TARGET AT POS 1 AT 01:16:54. FIRED ON IT AT 01:16:55. AT 01:17:01 VCO SAID, "FIRST TARGET WAS UNDISTINGUISHABLE, SECOND TARGET IS UNDISTINGUISHABLE."
432	6604	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND THE TARGET.
431	6602	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND THE TARGET.
429	6593	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT FIND TARGET.
428	6592	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT FIND TARGET.
427	6590	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT FIND TARGET.
426	6583	TD3	TDCMT	GNR SAID REAL, VCO OVERRODE HIM.
425	6581	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MISSED TARGET 2 AND AIMED AT TARGET 1 INSTEAD. INFORMATION IS FOR TARGET 1, FT4. THEY SAID REAL.
423	6564	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET OR TARGET LINE. DID NOT FIRE ON TARGET. LOST THE HOLD TIME.
422	6563	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET OR TARGET LINE. DID NOT FIRE ON TARGET. LOST THE HOLD TIME.
421	6562	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET OR TARGET LINE. DID NOT FIRE ON TARGET. LOST THE HOLD TIME.
420	6561	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET OR TARGET LINE. DID NOT FIRE ON TARGET. LOST THE HOLD TIME.
419	6560	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET OR TARGET LINE. DID NOT FIRE ON TARGET. LOST THE HOLD TIME.
418	6558	TD3	TDCMT	CREW GOT LOST, COULD NOT FIND TARGET AT POSITION 5.
416	6544	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T MAKE OUT THIS TARGET, NO HEAT SIGNATURE.
415	6543	TD3	TDCMT	09 NEVER CALLED TARGET 5.
414	6542	TD3	TDCMT	NO HEAT SIGNATURE, COULDN'T FIND A TARGET.
413	6541	TD3	TDCMT	VC ASKED THE GNR "WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE RETICLE?"
412	6540	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER SAW ANYTHING WITH THE THERMAL. NO BLINKING LIGHT.
411	6538	TD3	TDCMT	NO HEAT SIGNATURES.
410	6536	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T MAKE OUT ANY HEAT SIGNATURES IN THE FIELD.
409	6535	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T SEE THE TARGET SO '09' CALLED THIS TARGET AGAIN.
408	6530	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET LINE UNTIL TIME RAN OUT FOR PRESENTATION OF THE TARGET AT POSITION 4.
407	6528	TD3	TDCMT	CREW PAIRED TARGET AT POSITION 4 NOT POSITION 5, WHICH WAS THE TARGET.
406	6526	TD3	TDCMT	CREW STILL HAD HARD TIME FINDING TARGETS, BUT WHEN THEY FOUND THE TARGET AT POSITION 1 TIME HAD RUN OUT.
404	6525	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET LINE OR TARGETS.
401	6508	TD3	TDCMT	THE DECOYS LOOK TOO HIGH.

400	6507	TD3	TDCMT	THE DECOYS LOOK TOO HIGH.
399	6500	TD3	TDCMT	GNR THOUGHT TARGET WAS REAL AND THEY WERE TRYING TO DISGUISE IT TO LOOK LIKE A DECOY.
398	6499	TD3	TDCMT	GNR COULDN'T TELL FOR SURE WHAT THE TARGET WAS BECAUSE HE THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS IN FRONT OF IT.
397	5631	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER HAD THE CREW START TOO LATE AND SO THEY MISSED THE PRESENTATION OF POSITION 4.
396	6487	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MISSED THE TARGET.
387	6457	TD3	TDCMT	CREW 8 FIRED AT WRONG TARGET FOR FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION.
386	6449	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MISSED TARGET 1. AFTER IDENTIFYING TARGET 2, THEY RETURNED TO IDENTIFY THE FIRST TARGET AS A DECOY.
385	6447	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DECLARED "REAL" AT 17:03:03, THEN IDENTIFIED THE OTHER TARGET, THEN RETURNED TO CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION OF THIS TARGET TO "DECOY". INITIAL IDENTIFICATION HAS BEEN USED.
384	6442	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS COMPLETELY OFF TARGET, FIRED AT POSITION 4 INSTEAD OF POSITION 1.
383	6441	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS COMPLETELY OFF TARGET, FIRED AT POSITION 3 INSTEAD OF POSITION 2.
382	6406	TD3	TDCMT	CREW 7 WENT TO TGT 7 THEN 8.
381	6405	TD3	TDCMT	CREW 7 WENT TO TGT 7 THEN 8.
380	6402	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MADE COMMENT "IT HELPS WHEN THE ENGINE IS RUNNING," (COULD SEE EXHAUST).
379	6401	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MADE COMMENT "IT HELPS WHEN THE ENGINE IS RUNNING," (COULD SEE EXHAUST).
377	6397	TD3	TDCMT	THE CREW WANTED TO KNOW THEIR MILS. BECAUSE THEY COULDN'T FIND THE FIRST TARGET.
376	6388	TD3	TDCMT	GNR CALLED TARGET REAL, THEN VC SAID WAIT FOR THE LIGHT TO BLINK. THE CREW ANNOUNCED AGAIN, REAL TARGET.
374	6386	TD3	TDCMT	VCO OVERRULED GNR AND CHANGED ID FROM DECOY TO REAL.
373	6385	TD3	TDCMT	VCO OVERRULED GNR AND CHANGED ID FROM DECOY TO REAL.
372	6360	TD3	TDCMT	CREW 2 DID NOT RECEIVE INSTRUCTION TO FIRE. DID NOT FIRE. SCANNED WRONG TARGET.
371	6359	TD3	TDCMT	CREW 2 DID NOT RECEIVE INSTRUCTION TO FIRE. DID NOT FIRE. SCANNED WRONG TARGET.
370	6333	TD3	TDCMT	AT 15:23:54 & 15:24:12 CREW WENT TO WRONG SET OF TARGETS P5S & P6S AND DETERMINED WHAT TYPE TARGET AND ENGAGED THEM. AFTER ENGAGING P6S THEY WERE TOLD TO MOVE TO THE LEFT AND FIRE THEIR RIGHT TARGETS, WHICH THEY DID.
369	6314	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ENGAGED POSITION 6 NOT POSITION 4, BUT DID CALL DECOY, WHICH IS AT POSITION 6.
368	6313	TD3	TDCMT	CREW LOST AND LOOKING AT WRONG TARGET AND LET TIME JUST SLIP AWAY.
367	6304	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ENGAGED POSITION 6 NOT POSITION 3. POSITION 6 IS DB1. CREW WAS LOST AND MISSED THEIR SCRIPTED TARGET AT POSITION 3.
365	6298	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS NEVER TOLD WHAT TARGET TO LOOK FOR BY CONTROLLER.
364	6297	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS NEVER TOLD WHAT TARGET TO LOOK FOR BY CONTROLLER.
363	6295	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET AT POSITION P2S WAS PRESENTED AND DETERMINED INSTEAD OF TARGET AT P5S.
362	6294	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS NEVER TOLD WHAT TARGET TO LOOK FOR BY CONTROLLER.
361	6293	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET AT POSITION P2S WAS PRESENTED AND DETERMINED INSTEAD OF TARGET AT P5S.
360	6292	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER NEVER TOLD CREW WHAT TARGET TO VIEW OR TO GO TO POSITION 3 AFTER VIEWING POSITION 4.
359	6279	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DID NOT RECEIVE NOTICE OF WHICH TARGET WAS FIRST DUE TO RADIO STATIC. WHEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT FOR TARGET 2 ARRIVED, THEY IDENTIFIED TARGET 2 (AT 12:03:18) AND THEN WENT BACK TO IDENTIFY TARGET 1 AT 12:03:26.
358	6278	TD3	TDCMT	CREWMAN COMMENTED THERE WAS NO HEAT SIGNATURE AT ALL FROM THE REAL VEHICLE.
357	6277	TD3	TDCMT	AT 11:42:35, ONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS STATED "THE TRACKS AREN'T HEATED UP, JUST THE DECOYS." THIS WAS BEFORE BEGINNING THE SEQUENCE, AND WAS PROBABLY WORD-OF-MOUTH FROM OTHER CREW MEMBERS BETWEEN SEQUENCES.
356	6276	TD3	TDCMT	VCO DID NOT BELIEVE THAT GUNNER HAD FOUND TARGET 2, CLAIMING IT WAS A TRUCK, GNR SWITCHED BRIEFLY TO NORMAL TO SHOW FLASHING STROBE.
355	6275	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBER STATED "FAKE" WHILE GUNNER WAS SWITCHING FROM NORMAL TO THERMAL VIEWING MODE.
354	6271	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FIRED ON POSITION 3 AT 10:55:21 AND DECLARED "REAL" AT 10:55:25. CREW NEVER FOUND THEIR OWN SET OF TARGETS.
353	6267	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND TARGET 2 ASSUMING IT TO BE TARGET 1. THEY IDENTIFIED IT AS REAL AND NEVER FOUND TARGET 1. AT 10:37:15, THEY RETURNED TO TARGET 1 AND LABELLED IT A DECOY, JUST BEFORE TIME RAN OUT FOR THE SEQUENCE.
352	6234	TD3	TDCMT	M2 BRADLEY AT POSITION 8 STARTED IT'S ENGINE AS IT WAS BEING PRESENTED TO THE OBSERVER; GIVING AWAY THE FACT THAT IT WAS A REAL VEHICLE.
351	5431	TD3	TDCMT	EQUIPMENT FAILURE. LIGHT DID NOT LIGHT. DATA TECH TIMED OBSERVERS IDENTIFICATION OF TARGET.
349	1166	MD3	MDFCMT	HELD START SWITCH UP UNTIL POWER SUPPLY STARTED "CLICKING".
348	1159	MD3	MDFCMT	DID NOT PLACE 1/2 ANTENNA BACK IN BAG.
347	1158	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
346	1158	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
345	1158	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.

344	1154	MD3	MDFCMT	UP. ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
343	1153	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
342	1153	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
341	1153	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
340	1152	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE PLAYER WORE GLOVES AND ONE PLAYER DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CODED AS NO GLOVES SET UP.
328	1150	MD3	MDFCMT	NO TIME RECORDED FOR POWER SUPPLY SWITCHED OFF; IT SHUT OFF SOMETIME DURING THIRD TRIAL, OUT OF FUEL.
327	1147	MD3	MDFCMT	NO TIME RECORDED FOR POWER SUPPLY SWITCHED OFF. POWER SUPPLY WAS NOT RUNNING WHEN DATA COLLECTOR ARRIVED ON SCENE. IT RAN OUT OF FUEL DURING TRIAL.
326	1146	MD3	MDFCMT	ONE RADAR REFLECTOR HAS 3 POLES NOT ATTACHED & 1 STAKE MISSING. MAINTAINER REPLACED REFLECTOR & STAKE TO DT7 FROM DT1.
325	1145	MD3	MDFCMT	AT 02:34 DISCOVERED THAT DECOY WAS BLOWN DOWN DURING TRIAL.
324	1142	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW HAD PROBLEMS WITH SETUP. MOPP MASKS WERE FOGGED UP AND SOLDIER HAD DIFFICULTY FINDING ANTENNA IN MUD. ANTENNA GOT MIXED UP AND NEEDED TO BE SWITCHED. SET UP COMPLETE AT 19:31:38. MANIFOLD WAS TWISTED & CREW FIXED IT WITHOUT WEARING MASKS. COMPLETED AT 19:35:00. DECOY WAS STOWED BUT IMAGE FRAME WAS BROKEN IN TWO ON UPPER LEFT CORNER. DECOY WAS EVACUATED FROM THE TARGET LINE FOR DIRECT SUPPORT REPAIR.
323	1141	MD3	MDFCMT	POWER SUP STALLED AT 19:10:30 WHEN POWER SWITCH WAS BUMPED. RESTARTED AT 19:16:31.
322	1139	MD3	MDFCMT	POWER SUPPLY ACCIDENTALLY SHUT OFF. 19:04:22 SHUT OFF TIME. 19:07:35 IS RESTART TIME. 19:08:15 POWER SUPPLY OPERATING. CREW REMAINED IN MOPP4 THROUGHOUT ERECTION. DECOY FELL DOWN SOMETIME DURING TRIAL AND WAS LYING ON THE GROUND WHEN DATA COLLECTOR ARRIVED.
321	28	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M057A AFTER SECOND ITERATION BMP5 DID NOT PAIR, GUN SIGHT WAS OFF. IN ITERATION 2: BMP5 PAIRED BOTH TARGETS AT EACH PRESENTATION. BMP2 WAS PRESENTED THE TARGET IN THE WRONG SEQUENCE AND PAIRED THE WRONG ARRAY. AT THE END OF THE SEQUENCE BMP1 WAS PRESENTED WITH THE TARGET IN THE CORRECT SEQUENCE.
320	27	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M056C BF3, BF4 HAVE DEAD BATTERIES. POSITIONS 2,3,4,5,6,7,8 HAVE LOW BATTERIES. P7 STROBE RESPONDING BEFORE BEING PAIRED. P3 IS DEAD AFTER SECOND ITERATION. P5 IS DEAD THEN FIXED. TWILIGHT TIME AND STILL GOING. P1 LOW BATTERY. DAYLIGHT! SEQUENCE CONFUSED AT END.
319	25	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M056A BMP2 WAS HAVING A CABLE FIXED DURING ITERATION 3 SO ITERATION 4 WAS BEGUN BEFORE ITERATION3 WAS FINISHED.
318	24	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M055D PAIRING BF2 BEFORE P4 STROBE ON.
317	23	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M055C BIG DELAY ON CON1 STROBE DURING A DUPLICATE EVENT CAUSED STROBE OF P5 TO GO ON WITH P4 STROBE DURING FIRST ITERATION. ALSO, WHEN BF4 SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAIRED, P4 WAS PAIRED.
316	6191	TD3	TDCMT	VCO SAID, "THAT LOOKS ALMOST SQUARE. LOOKS LIKE A DECOY."
315	6186	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER DID NOT TELL PLAYERS WHAT TARGET TO GO FOR PRESENTATION 2.
313	6182	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH VCO & GNR TALKED ABOUT HOW GOOD THE SIGHT PICTURE IS FOR A REAL TARGET.
312	6180	TD3	TDCMT	GNR CALLED DECOY AND SAID, "YOU CAN SEE THAT BOX" (GENERATOR) AT 16:25:04.
309	6177	TD3	TDCMT	AFTER PRESENTATION 2, THE CREW TOOK A GOOD HARD LOOK AT ALL TARGET SITES AND TALKED ABOUT WHAT TYPE TARGET WAS AT EACH BEFORE DETERMINATION OF TARGET TYPE AT POSITION 5.
306	6031	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SAID THERMAL IMAGE WAS GLOWING REAL HOT BECAUSE OF GENERATOR.
305	6010	TD3	TDCMT	CREW JUST DID NOT FIND TARGET AT POSITION 4 BEFORE TIME RAN OUT. CREW SAID THEY MISUNDERSTAND CONTROLLER.
304	5993	TD3	TDCMT	CREW RECEIVED NO THERMAL IMAGE AT ALL FROM TARGET AT POSITION 5.
303	5992	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER DID NOT CALL POSITION 4 NOR WAS THE STROBE LIGHT TURNED ON.
302	5991	TD3	TDCMT	CREW HAD THERMAL IMAGE, BUT JUST COULD NOT ID TARGET.
301	5990	TD3	TDCMT	CREW HAD THERMAL IMAGE, BUT JUST COULD NOT ID TARGET.
300	5987	TD3	TDCMT	PRESENTATION OF THIS TARGET WAS NOT RECORDED OR RECEIVED BY THE CREW.
299	5985	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF STICKY CONTROLS ON SIGHTS. DIFFICULT TO SWITCH QUICKLY. USED TOO MUCH TIME TRYING TO OPERATE SIGHTS TO FIND THE FIRST TARGET. VCO ORDERED GNR NOT TO USE NARROW, DIRECT WHILE SCANNING. ORDERS WERE TO USE LOW MAG, WIDE VIEW TO FIND THE TARGET AND GO IMMEDIATELY TO THERMAL, HIGH MAG/NARROW TO ACQUIRE TARGET.
297	6165	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SCANNED FOR TARGET IN WIDE FOV, WENT TO NARROW FOV AND CALLED IN NARROW.
292	5969	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATED THAT THE DECOYS LOOKED FAKE, AND THEY NOTICED THAT ONE DID NOT HAVE BUMPER NUMBERS.
290	5965	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATED THAT THE DECOYS LOOKED FAKE, AND THEY NOTICED THAT ONE DID NOT HAVE BUMPER NUMBERS.

289	5966	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATED THAT THE DECOYS LOOKED FAKE, AND THEY NOTICED THAT ONE DID NOT HAVE BUMPER NUMBERS.
288	5967	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATED THAT THE DECOYS LOOKED FAKE, AND THEY NOTICED THAT ONE DID NOT HAVE BUMPER NUMBERS.
287	5968	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH CREW MEMBERS STATED THAT THE DECOYS LOOKED FAKE, AND THEY NOTICED THAT ONE DID NOT HAVE BUMPER NUMBERS.
286	6130	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH VCO AND GUNNER SEEMED TO CONCUR ON ID OF TARGET. JUDGEMENT CALL USED TO DETERMINE WHICH OBSERVER WAS MAKING THE DETERMINATION.
283	6115	TD3	TDCMT	O9 DID NOT ANNOUNCE PRESENTATION TARGET 1. CREW LOCATED BY SCANNING.
282	5929	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMMENTED THAT DECOY DOESN'T HAVE AS MUCH DETAIL AS REAL VEHICLE.
281	5917	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT FIND TARGET AT POSITION 4 BEFORE TIME RAN OUT. NEVER DID FIND IT.
279	5916	TD3	TDCMT	CREW TOOK TOO LONG TO SEARCH AND FIND TARGET AT POSITION 5. ID DID NOT OCCUR UNTIL AFTER TIME RAN OUT, AND CONTROLLER CALLED NEW TARGET.
278	5915	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET AT POSITION 2 IN TIME.
277	6085	TD3	TDCMT	NO INDICATIONS AT ALL ON THE THERMAL SIGHT, CREW UNABLE TO RECOGNIZE ANYTHING.
276	5903	TD3	TDCMT	ONLY REASON TARGET AT POSITION 4 WAS CALLED DECOY IS BECAUSE GNR & VCO SAID TOW TUBES ARE TOO HIGH.
275	5899	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET 5 WAS HIDDEN IN A FOG BANK.
274	5898	TD3	TDCMT	CREW RADIO DID NOT ANNOUNCE TARGET 4 PRESENTATION. CREW WAS NEVER TOLD TO HUNT TARGET 4.
272	5897	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID NO ANTENNA AND LESS DETAIL THAN PRIOR TARGET. CREW SWINGING BETWEEN POSITION 1 AND POSITION 3 COMPARING OUTLINES OF TARGETS AT 11:39:10.
271	6060	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER WAS USING WIDE FIELD OF VIEW TO FIND THE TARGET, THEN WENT TO NARROW FIELD OF VIEW FOR DETERMINING TARGET ID.
270	5895	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER SAID REAL BECAUSE HE COULD SEE THE ANTENNAE.
269	5888	TD3	TDCMT	GNR, WHEN CALLING TARGET DECOY, DID SAY IT LOOKS LIKE A TANK.
268	5886	TD3	TDCMT	CREW STARTED SEARCH IN THERMAL AND WENT TO WRONG TARGET. THEY COULD NOT ID TARGET AND DID NOT KNOW THEY WERE ON WRONG TARGET UNTIL NEXT TARGET WAS CALLED, THEN THEY WENT TO DAY SIGHT AND SAW THEY WERE ON WRONG TARGET.
267	6045	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS COULD FIND VERY LITTLE HEAT TRACE FOR ANY OF THE VEHICLES.
266	5885	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SAID TARGET WAS REAL BRADLEY BECAUSE OF HIGH PROFILE.
265	5883	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COMMENTED THAT TARGET HAD LOTS OF DETAIL, SO IT MUST BE REAL.
264	5882	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER USED BOTH WHITE HOT AND BLACK HOT AT 11:34:10.
262	5871	TD3	TDCMT	CREW STATED TARGET WAS TOO BRIGHT TO BE A REAL VEHICLE.
261	5869	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET TOO COLD TO BE ANYTHING ELSE, SO SAID VCO.
260	5868	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED DECOY BECAUSE THERMAL IMAGE TOO HOT.
259	5867	TD3	TDCMT	VCO CALLED TARGET DECOY BECAUSE SHAPE WAS TOO ROUND.
258	5865	TD3	TDCMT	VCO CALLED TARGET TYPE AFTER STROBE WAS OFF, CREW TOOK LONG TIME TO FIRE TARGET.
257	5859	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER DECLARED REAL AT 10:23:43 BECAUSE THE "TOW LAUNCHER WAS UP." VCO OVERRODE HIM, DECLARING DECOY AT 10:23:49.
256	5839	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF "WET HANDS", SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO TURN THERMAL DIAL QUICKLY ENOUGH.
255	5838	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF "WET HANDS", SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO TURN THERMAL DIAL QUICKLY ENOUGH.
254	5837	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF "WET HANDS", SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO TURN THERMAL DIAL QUICKLY ENOUGH.
253	5836	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF "WET HANDS", SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO TURN THERMAL DIAL QUICKLY ENOUGH.
252	5835	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COMPLAINED OF "WET HANDS", SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO TURN THERMAL DIAL QUICKLY ENOUGH.
251	5822	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS DISCUSSING TARGET, DID NOT HEAR PRESENTATION ON TARGET BF2.
250	5814	TD3	TDCMT	A LITTLE FOG OUTSIDE, CREW JUST CALLED TARGETS WRONG.
249	5813	TD3	TDCMT	A LITTLE FOG OUTSIDE, CREW JUST CALLED TARGETS WRONG.
248	5812	TD3	TDCMT	A LITTLE FOG OUTSIDE, CREW JUST CALLED TARGETS WRONG.
246	5810	TD3	TDCMT	THERMAL IMAGE WAS NOT VERY STRONG ON P2 IN PRESENTATION 1. A LITTLE FOG OUTSIDE, CREW CALLED TARGET INCORRECTLY.
245	5809	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER IDENTIFIED WARM TRUCK AS LIVE M1 AND FIRED ON IT AT 09:49:06, THEN SAID NEGATIVE, LOCATED PROPER TARGET AND IDENTIFIED IT CORRECTLY AT 09:49:17.
244	5805	TD3	TDCMT	CREW SAW NO IMAGE OF TARGET IN THERMAL VIEWER.
243	5797	TD3	TDCMT	BOTH GNR AND VCO CALLED TARGET DECOY ON PRESENTATION 3. VCO SAID THE REASON WAS BECAUSE IT LOOKED TOO THIN ON TOP.
242	5796	TD3	TDCMT	ON PRESENTATION #2 GNR CALLED REAL AT 09:43:57, HOWEVER VCO OVERRODE GNR AT 09:44:04 AND CALLED TARGET DECOY.
240	5760	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS LATE FINDING TARGET FOR PRESENTATION 1, TIME RAN OUT. VCO TOLD GUNNER TO ID BEFORE TIME RAN OUT.
239	5749	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND TARGET BUT COULD NOT MAKE ID FOR PRESENTATION 5.
238	5748	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND TARGET BUT JUST COULD NOT ID IT. THIS WAS PRESENTATION #4.
237	5747	TD3	TDCMT	NEITHER VCO OR GNR COULD ID TARGET ON PRESENTATION #3. BOTH SAID THEY COULD NOT ID AT SAME TIME.

236	5780	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT ID TARGET FOR THIS PRESENTATION BECAUSE OF FOG AND WEATHER. THEY DID SEE THE STROBE FOR THE PRESENTATION.
235	5746	TD3	TDCMT	CREW STARTING SEARCHING FOR PRESENTATION #2 IN NARROW THERMAL, THEN CHANGED TO WIDE DVO SIGHT, BUT FOUND THEY WEREN'T IN THE PLAYING AREA. BEFORE THEY COULD FIRE AT THE TARGET, THE NEXT PRESENTATION WAS CALLED BY CONTROLLER.
234	5745	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND PRESENTATION #1, BUT JUST COULD NOT ID TARGET.
233	5744	TD3	TDCMT	VCO CALLED REAL BRADLEY BEFORE STROBE EVEN CAME ON PRESENTATION #5.
232	5775	TD3	TDCMT	CREW COULD NOT FIND TARGET FOR PRESENTATION 1, BECAUSE THEY SEARCHED PAST RANGE LIMITS AND BY THE TIME THEY WERE BACK IN PLAYING AREA TIME WAS UP.
231	5739	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE OBSCURED VISIBILITY.
230	5738	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE OBSCURED VISIBILITY.
229	5737	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE OBSCURED VISIBILITY.
228	5736	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE OBSCURED VISIBILITY.
227	5735	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE OBSCURED VISIBILITY.
226	5770	TD3	TDCMT	CREW CANNOT ID PRESENTATION 1 TARGET BECAUSE OF FOG. ALL THEY CAN SEE IS THE STROBE.
225	5729	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE RUINED VISIBILITY.
224	5728	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE RUINED VISIBILITY.
223	5727	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE RUINED VISIBILITY.
222	5765	TD3	TDCMT	CREW FOUND TARGET FOR PRESENTATION 1 (P5), THEY DID NOT TALK ABOUT IT OR SAY WHAT IT WAS BEFORE TIME RAN OUT.
221	5726	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE RUINED VISIBILITY.
220	5725	TD3	TDCMT	HEAVY FOG ON TARGET LINE RUINED VISIBILITY.
218	5695	TD3	TDCMT	COULDN'T FIND TARGETS DUE TO FOG.
217	5690	TD3	TDCMT	NEVER FOUND TARGET.
216	1124	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW WORE WORK GLOVES.
215	5685	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS ON CORRECT TARGET BUT COULD NOT FIND IN THERMAL.
214	1123	MD3	MDFCMT	ARCTIC GLOVES, NO FLASHLIGHT.
213	5680	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED THE TARGET REAL, THEN CHANGED HIS MIND BECAUSE THE VCO SAID DECOY.
212	5675	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER COULD NOT DETERMINE, VCO CALLED REAL.
211	1118	MD3	MDFCMT	PFC DID NOT WEAR GLOVES. CPL WORE GLOVES.
210	5670	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET WASN'T FOUND.
209	5665	TD3	TDCMT	WAS LATE ACQUIRING TARGET, TOO LATE TO MAKE DETERMINATION.
205	5630	TD3	TDCMT	THE CONTROLLER HAD THE CREW START TOO LATE, THEY MISSED P1 AND P4 BECAUSE OF IT.
204	5625	TD3	TDCMT	GUNNER CALLED DECOY, BUT VEHICLE COMMANDER OVERRODE AND CALLED REAL.
203	1087	MD3	MDFCMT	DATA COLLECTOR CIRCLED "GLOVES" BUT DID NOT SPECIFY THE TYPE OF GLOVE. GLOVE CODING WAS DERIVED FROM PLAYER DATA AND MATRIX.
202	5276	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE TARGET DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE, BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS. GLOVE CODING WAS DERIVED FROM PLAYER DATA AND MATRIX.
201	5602	TD3	TDCMT	ON PRESENTATION 3 THE VCO CALLED REAL AT 17:03:35.
200	5600	TD3	TDCMT	THE CREW WAS SLOW TO START AND ALMOST MISSED THE FIRST PRESENTATION.
199	5599	TD3	TDCMT	NO FIRE EVENTS, FOG OBSCURED TARGETS.
198	5598	TD3	TDCMT	NO FIRE EVENTS, FOG OBSCURED TARGETS.
197	5597	TD3	TDCMT	NO FIRE EVENTS, FOG OBSCURED TARGETS.
196	5596	TD3	TDCMT	NO FIRE EVENTS, FOG OBSCURED TARGETS.
195	5595	TD3	TDCMT	NO FIRE EVENTS, FOG OBSCURED TARGETS.
194	5614	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS CANNOT ID TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOGGY WEATHER.
193	5594	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOG, AND OUT OF FOCUS SIGHT.
192	5613	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS CANNOT ID TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOGGY WEATHER.
191	5593	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOG, AND OUT OF FOCUS SIGHT.
190	5612	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS CANNOT ID TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOGGY WEATHER.
189	5592	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOG, AND OUT OF FOCUS SIGHT.
188	5611	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS CANNOT ID TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOGGY WEATHER.
187	5591	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOG, AND OUT OF FOCUS SIGHT.
186	5610	TD3	TDCMT	CREW MEMBERS CANNOT ID TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOGGY WEATHER.
185	5590	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE TARGETS BECAUSE OF FOG, AND OUT OF FOCUS SIGHT.
184	5574	TD3	TDCMT	SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS, CREW CANNOT ID ANYTHING WHEN USING THERMAL OR DVO SIGHTS.
183	5588	TD3	TDCMT	ON PRESENTATION #4 GUNNER ID TARGET BEFORE HE WENT TO THERMAL SIGHT.
182	5587	TD3	TDCMT	ON PRESENTATION #3 GUNNER ID TARGET BEFORE HE WENT TO THERMAL SIGHT.
181	5572	TD3	TDCMT	SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS, CREW CANNOT ID ANYTHING WHEN USING THERMAL OR DVO SIGHTS.
180	5571	TD3	TDCMT	SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS, CREW CANNOT ID ANYTHING WHEN USING THERMAL OR DVO SIGHTS.
179	5580	TD3	TDCMT	CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS, CREW CAN'T SEE ANYTHING BUT RED IN THERMAL, BUT OUT OFF FOCUS ANYWAY.
178	5570	TD3	TDCMT	SIGHT IS OUT OF FOCUS, CREW CANNOT ID ANYTHING WHEN USING THERMAL OR DVO SIGHTS.
177	5576	TD3	TDCMT	CREW PLAYING AROUND WITH SIGHT GOING FROM WIDE TO NARROW FOV SO THEY MISSED THIS TARGET.
176	5569	TD3	TDCMT	CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS.
175	5568	TD3	TDCMT	CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS.
174	5567	TD3	TDCMT	CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS. CREW CALLED WRONG TARGET TYPE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN

173	5566	TD3	TDCMT	DECOY.
172	5565	TD3	TDCMT	CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS.
				CAMERA OR SIGHT OUT OF FOCUS. CREW CALLED WRONG TARGET TYPE, SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECOY.
170	5554	TD3	TDCMT	WAS UNABLE TO ID WITH OR WITH OUT THERMAL, DUE TO WEATHER.
169	5553	TD3	TDCMT	WAS UNABLE TO ID WITH OR WITH OUT THERMAL, DUE TO WEATHER.
168	5552	TD3	TDCMT	WAS UNABLE TO ID WITH OR WITH OUT THERMAL, DUE TO WEATHER.
167	5551	TD3	TDCMT	WAS UNABLE TO ID WITH OR WITH OUT THERMAL, DUE TO WEATHER.
166	5550	TD3	TDCMT	WAS UNABLE TO ID WITH OR WITH OUT THERMAL, DUE TO WEATHER.
164	16	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M054A ITERATION 1, BMP3 PAIRS P4 WHEN P5 WAS STROBING (19:27:50). FOR ITERATION 1, THE FIELD VERIFIES BM5 DID NOT FIRE. BF4 NOT PAIRING DURING TRIAL. IT HAD BAD SENSORS.
163	5545	TD3	TDCMT	VCO OVERRODE GUNNER.
159	5515	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED POSITION 2 BY GNR BUT FIRED AT PROPER LOCATION (P4).
158	5514	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET 1 NOT LOCATED, DIDN'T FIRE.
157	5538	TD3	TDCMT	CREW DIDN'T USE THERMAL AT ALL.
155	5537	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS LOST AND COULD NOT FIND ANY TARGETS UNTIL THE 4TH PRESENTATION. CREW DIDN'T USE THERMAL AT ALL.
153	5536	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS LOST AND COULD NOT FIND ANY TARGETS UNTIL THE LAST ONE. CREW DIDN'T USE THERMAL AT ALL.
150	5535	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS LOST AND COULD NOT FIND ANY TARGETS UNTIL THE LAST ONE. CREW DIDN'T USE THERMAL AT ALL.
149	5504	TD3	TDCMT	FOUND TARGET BUT NEVER IDENTIFIED OR FIRED, WENT ON TO NEXT TARGET.
148	5534	TD3	TDCMT	CREW WAS LOST AND COULD NOT FIND ANY TARGETS UNTIL THE LAST ONE. CREW DIDN'T USE THERMAL AT ALL.
144	5500	TD3	TDCMT	B2 DID NOT ID #2.
142	5529	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED DC A REAL TANK.
140	5498	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED REAL AT 09:51:52 VC CALLED DECOY. GUNNER STATED "IT'S REAL", VC RESPONDED "A DECOY, M1S ARE CUT HARDER THAN THAT". MADE DETERMINATIONS BEFORE GUNNER ANNOUNCED. GUNNER BASICALLY CONFIRMED.
136	5526	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED TARGET BF.
134	5525	TD3	TDCMT	CALLED TARGET BF.
132	5524	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT FIND TARGET, OUT OF RANGE LIMITS.
130	5492	TD3	TDCMT	AFTER LEAVING THE TARGET, ONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS SAID, "I THINK IT WAS A REAL TANK".
129	5491	TD3	TDCMT	AFTER LEAVING THE TARGET, ONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS SAID, "I THINK IT WAS A REAL TANK".
128	5523	TD3	TDCMT	TRIAL ENDED. THEY DID NOT ENGAGE P4 OR P2.
127	5490	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER HAD THE CREW START LATE, THEREFORE THEY MISSED THIS PRESENTATION (P2).
126	5522	TD3	TDCMT	TRIAL ENDED. THEY DID NOT ENGAGE P4 OR P2.
125	5489	TD3	TDCMT	CONTROLLER HAD THE CREW START LATE, THEREFORE THEY MISSED THIS PRESENTATION (P1).
124	5521	TD3	TDCMT	ON THE TARGET MATRIX THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO PAIR TARGET 2, BUT THEY WERE TOLD AND IDENTIFIED TARGET 3.
122	5520	TD3	TDCMT	ON THE TARGET MATRIX THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO PAIR TARGET 4, BUT THEY WERE TOLD AND IDENTIFIED TARGET 5.
118	5485	TD3	TDCMT	COMMAND DID NOT GIVE ORDER TO OPEN BALLISTIC DOORS UNTIL 09:35:07. MISSED TARGET FOR THIS PRESENTATION.
117	5484	TD3	TDCMT	COMMAND DID NOT GIVE ORDER TO OPEN BALLISTIC DOORS UNTIL 09:35:07. MISSED THIS TARGET PRESENTATION.
116	5483	TD3	TDCMT	DETERMINATION WAS MADE IN DIRECT VIEW PRIOR TO SWITCHING TO THERMAL.
113	5480	TD3	TDCMT	DETERMINATION WAS THEN REPEATED IN THERMAL.
112	5479	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ACTIVITY STARTED WITH THIS PRESENTATION.
				CONTROL ELEMENT FAILED TO ADVISE CREWS TO OPEN BALLISTIC SHIELDS UNTIL AFTER FIRST TARGET PRESENTATION.
106	5473	TD3	TDCMT	VCO OVERRODE GNR ON THIS TARGET PRESENTATION.
101	15	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M050B FIELD CONTROLLER NOTATION: DURING DVO TRIAL, POSITION 8 LOST POWER TOWARDS END OF SEQUENCE AND DID NOT ACKNOWLEDGE STROBE ON SCOMS.
100	5468	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ID: DID NOT ANNOUNCED OVER AUDIO. TAKEN FROM MATRIX.
99	5467	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ID: DID NOT ANNOUNCED OVER AUDIO. TAKEN FROM MATRIX.
98	5465	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ID: DID NOT ANNOUNCED OVER AUDIO. TAKEN FROM MATRIX.
97	5466	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ID: DID NOT ANNOUNCED OVER AUDIO. TAKEN FROM MAIRIX.
94	5464	TD3	TDCMT	CREW ID: DID NOT ANNOUNCED OVER AUDIO. TAKEN FROM MATRIX.
93	5364	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE THE TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
92	5363	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE THE TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
91	5362	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE THE TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
90	5361	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE THE TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
89	5360	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT SEE THE TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
88	5349	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE THROUGH BINOCULARS AND USED NAKED EYE TO DETERMINE TARGET TYPES

87	5348	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE THROUGH BINOCULARS AND USED NAKED EYE TO DETERMINE TARGET TYPES
86	5347	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE THROUGH BINOCULARS AND USED NAKED EYE TO DETERMINE TARGET TYPES
85	5346	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE THROUGH BINOCULARS AND USED NAKED EYE TO DETERMINE TARGET TYPES
84	5345	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE THROUGH BINOCULARS AND USED NAKED EYE TO DETERMINE TARGET TYPES.
83	5294	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
82	5293	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
81	5292	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
80	5291	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
79	5290	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP.
77	5286	TD3	TDCMT	MISSED TARGET #2.
73	5279	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE TARGET DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.
72	5278	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE TARGET DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.
71	5277	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE TARGET DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.
69	5275	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT SEE TARGET DUE TO EQUIPMENT FAILURE; BINOCULARS WERE FOGGED UP DUE TO WEATHER CONDITIONS.
68	5184	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER.
67	5183	TD3	TDCMT	TARGET COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED BECAUSE OF BAD WEATHER.
63	5169	TD3	TDCMT	DUE TO OBSCURE WEATHER CONDITIONS, OBSERVER COULD NOT SPOT TARGET #5.
62	5168	TD3	TDCMT	DUE TO OBSCURE WEATHER CONDITIONS, OBSERVER COULD NOT SPOT TARGET #4.
61	5167	TD3	TDCMT	DUE TO OBSCURE WEATHER CONDITIONS, OBSERVER COULD NOT SPOT TARGET #3.
60	5166	TD3	TDCMT	DUE TO OBSCURE WEATHER CONDITIONS, OBSERVER COULD NOT SPOT TARGET #2.
59	5165	TD3	TDCMT	DUE TO OBSCURE WEATHER CONDITIONS, OBSERVER COULD NOT SPOT TARGET #1.
54	5125	TD3	TDCMT	OBSERVER COULD NOT LOCATE THIS TARGET. DATATECH INFORMED OBSERVER OF TARGET LOCATION BUT OBSERVER COULD NOT LOCATE.
53	5124	TD3	TDCMT	COULD NOT IDENTIFY TARGET 5.
48	1086	MD3	MDFCMT	NOTE: BETWEEN UNPACK & ERECTION, CREW WAS DELAYED FOR REPAIRS. BETWEEN TAKE DOWN & DECOY STOWED, CREW WAS AGAIN DELAYED FOR REPAIRS.
47	1083	MD3	MDFCMT	PMCS ERECTION AND TAKE DOWN.
46	1082	MD3	MDFCMT	AT 14:10 MANIFOLD OFF. AT 14:13 MANIFOLD REPLACED BY ME AT REQUEST OF OPERATIONS OFFICER.
45	1076	MD3	MDFCMT	TWO TEARS AT 14:03:26 ON MANIFOLD TO TURRET. 1 INCH & 1/2 INCH TEARS. NO REPAIRS MADE. PATCHWORK ON BACKSIDE OF DECOY COMING OFF, BY TURRET MANIFOLD GOING TO CLOTH IMAGE.
44	1072	MD3	MDFCMT	MANIFOLD COMES OFF POWER SUPPLY SOMETIME BETWEEN 8:44:51 & 9:36:51. HOOKED BACK UP AT 9:39:18 BY OPERATIONS OFFICER.
43	1069	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW WAS WEARING KEVLAR HELMETS AND LBE.
42	1066	MD3	MDFCMT	NO TIME COLLECTED FOR DECOY SET ERECTED. NOTE SAYS CREW HAD TO LEAVE.
41	1064	MD3	MDFCMT	TWO TEARS TO LOWER RIGHT TRACK MANIFOLD. 3/4 INCH TEAR ABOVE UPPER HORIZONTAL ASSEMBLY IN CENTER OF IMAGE CLOTH. NO REPAIRS MADE.
40	1053	MD3	MDFCMT	TIME POWER SUPPLY DECLARED OPERATING WAS NOT DECLARED.
39	1052	MD3	MDFCMT	NO MASKS OR GLOVES WORN DURING TAKE DOWN.
38	1051	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW HAD PROBLEMS ERECTING IMAGE IN THE REALLY STRONG WIND.
37	050	MD3	MDFCMT	12:58:18 DECOY BLOWN DOWN. 13:02:02 DECOY UP. 13:05 DECOY BLOWN DOWN. 13:17 DECOY BACK UP. TIME THAT POWER SUPPLY WAS DECLARED OPERATING WAS NEVER DECLARED.
36	1046	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW DID NOT WEAR ARCTIC GLOVES WHEN THEY DISASSEMBLED.
35	10	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M049B IN ITERATION 1, P4 "STROBE ON" OCCURRED ALONG WITH P1'S STROBE. PL ON P5 IS SUSPECT. UNCLEAR IF BMP3 PLAYED ON ITERATIONS 5 & 6.
34	9	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M049A IN ITERATION 3 ONLY BMP4 PLAYED. IN ITERATION 4 ONLY BMP4 & BMP2 PLAYED. IN ITERATION 5 IT WAS STATED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH P1 STROBE. IN ITERATION 6 POSITION P1 TURNED ON SEVERAL TIMES.
33	1034	MD3	MDFCMT	AT 15:36, STOP FOR 30 SECONDS TO VERIFY UPDATE ON GLOVES FROM MOPP4 TO ARCTIC.
32	1032	MD3	MDFCMT	FALK4942 WAS NOT WEARING WORK GLOVES BUT GLOVES.
31	1029	MD3	MDFCMT	MANIFOLD DUCT GOING TO TURRET & BOTTOM RIGHT. TRACK IS PINCHED BETWEEN STRAP ASSEMBLY & RIGHT. VERTICAL FRAME. NO CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN MEAD9803 USED NO GLOVES DURING SET UP BUT HE WORE WORK GLOVES DURING BREAK DOWN.
30	1026	MD3	MDFCMT	11:03:03 DISCOVERED NO FUEL. 11:11 FUEL ARRIVED
29	1025	MD3	MDFCMT	CREW FORGOT TO HIDE CARRYING CASE (HEATER) BEHIND DECOY.
28	7	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M048C ITERATION 5 WAS WITH BMP2 AND A DIFFERENT CREW. RESULTED IN NO FIRES.
27	6	CON	TRCMCON	TRIAL: M048B IN ITERATION 1 TWO STROBES REPEATED. ALTHOUGH BMP4 FIRED AND PAIRED IN ITERATION 2, IT WAS NOT A PLAYER. P4 STROBE WAS INTERMITTENT. P4 STROBED A NUMBER OF TIMES BUT WAS NOT PAIRING. ITERATIONS 5 & 6 WERE CONDUCTED

26 5 CON TRCMCON

FOR CREWS THAT WERE TO USE BMP4. BMP2 AND 5 ONLY USED. (SHOULD NOT HAVE USED 5 SINCE IT WAS NOT PAIRING).

TRIAL: M048A ICF NOTATION: DUPLICATE STROBES ON EVENTS FOR P5 (09:36:06). BMP2 & BMP5 PAIRING POORLY. FIELD CONTROLLER NOTATION: DURING THERMAL TRIAL, COMPUTER HELD DUPLICATE "SCOM ON" FOR POSITION 5 AND RELEASED IT WHEN POSITION 3 SCOM ON SWITCH WAS THROWN. THUS, BOTH POSITIONS 3 AND 5 STROBES WERE FLASHING.

APPENDIX C
MCCD IOTE DATABASE STRUCTURE

APPENDIX A

PERFORMANCE AND HUMAN FACTORS DATA BASE STRUCTURE AND DATA BASE

A-1. **INTRODUCTION.** This appendix contains the detailed description of the structure and contents of the MCCD IOTE Level 3 performance and human factors (HF) data base. MCCD IOTE RAM data is presented in Appendix B of this report. Actual data are too voluminous to be presented here; paragraph A-8 details the process of requesting data. Paragraph A-2 presents the structure of the data base, including file descriptions, delivered format, and an index of files and total record count. In paragraph A-3, descriptions and definitions of key and linking variables are presented. Paragraph A-4 includes a data dictionary listing codes and values for all fields in delivered records. Paragraph A-5 presents the record formats for each delivered file. In paragraph A-6, data file creation schematics are presented showing the data reduction and file creation process. Paragraph A-7 includes the data collection forms used to collect and transfer data within the reduction process.

A-2. **DATA BASE STRUCTURE.** The following describes the overall data base as collected during the conduct of the MCCD IOTE. The delivered file names, file format, and number of records in each file are indexed in table A-1.

a. MCCD deployment and recovery data, Phase II and Phase III. The data in this file records the times required to deploy (setup) and recover (repack) the MCCDs under various light, uniform, and gloves worn conditions. The file reference is 'MD3'.

TABLE A-1. DATA BASE INDEX

Table No.	Description	File Name/ Format/Data Classification	No. of Records
Performance Data Files			
A-4.	MCCD Deployment and Recovery	MD3.SASEB\$DATA SAS <SECRET>	356
A-5	Target Determination	TD3.SASEB\$DATA SAS <SECRET>	1997
A-6	FOF Engagement Assessment	EA3.SASEB\$DATA SAS <SECRET>	2635
HF Data Files			
A-7	Player Demographics/ Anthropometrics - (HF1, HF1A, HF1B) Note 1.	HF1.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	83
A-8	Player Training Certification - Operators	HF3.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	32
A-9	Player Training Questionnaire - Operators	HF4A.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	32
A-10	Player Training Questionnaire - Doctrine and Tactics	HF4B.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	20
A-11	Unit/Direct Support Training Questionnaire: Fuel/ Electrical System Repair Course	HF4C.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	2
A-12	Unit/Direct Support Training Questionnaire: Power Supply	HF4D.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	1
A-13	Trainer Training Questionnaire	HF4E.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	6
A-14	Observer Questionnaire: Day (HF5) and Night (HF6) Note 2.	HF5.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	42

TABLE A-1 (CONT). DATA BASE INDEX

Table No.	Description	File Name/ Format/Data Classification	No. of Records
A-15	Observer Questionnaire: Phase 3	HF5A.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	20
A-16	Observer Questionnaire:	HF5B.SASEB\$DATA	20

	Summary	SAS	
A-17	Operator Questionnaire	<Unclass> HF7.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	52
A-18	Operator Questionnaire: Phase 3	HF7A.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	30
A-19	SME Assessment Form	HF8.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	3
Comment Data Files			
A-20	Performance Data Comments	CMT.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	833
A-20	HF Data Comments	HFCMT.SASEB\$DATA SAS <Unclass>	1233

Note 1. The Player Demographics file includes records collected from manual data collection forms HF1 (Trainers), HF1A (Observers), and HF1B (Operators).

Note 2. The Observer Questionnaire file includes records collected from manual data collection forms HF5 (Day) and HF6 (Night).

Note 3. There were no observations for two HF forms; Test Directorate Observation Form (HF9) and Safety & Health Hazards Incident Report (HF10).

b. Target determination data, Phase II. This data file contains target determinations made against set target arrays from the various range bands by vehicle crews using either day vision or night vision optics or by individual observers using binoculars. The file reference is 'TD3'.

c. Engagement assessment data, Phase III. This data file records the engagements during force-on-force (FOF) trials for blue forces and red forces under day and night conditions. The blue force use of MCCDs was controlled. The file reference is 'EA3'.

d. HF data, all phases. These 13 data files record demographic data and subjective assessment data regarding areas such as training, proposed tactics, doctrine, and player and SME assessment of the utility of the MCCD. Incident data encompasses the suitability areas of RAM, human factors engineering

(HFE), safety, and health hazards. The file reference is 'HFnn' for the 13 files. For a list of the files, see table A-1.

e. Comment data. Comment data relevant to data records in other files are stored in two comment files, one for performance data comments and one for HF data comments. The format is identical for the two files. Comments are linked to data records by comment control numbers, form control numbers, source form or file ID, and the variable associated to the comment. The comment control number is a unique number assigned to a comment and reflected in the comment record and the associated data record. The form control number matches the data record form control number, which identifies a unique data record. The source form or file ID identifies what data file the comment record originates from. The variable associated to the comment identifies the data record field that the comment originates from (HF data records may contain multiple comment fields. These control data form a complete link from comment to data record. The file reference is CMT for performance data comments and HFCMT for HF comments.

A-3. **KEY VARIABLES.** This paragraph presents definitions of certain key or linking data variables or data types in the performance and HF data. Not all variables are defined here; a brief description of each field is contained in the file record formats (paragraph A-5). A distinction is made between unique record field variables and data types. A record field variable defines a specific data collected and stored within a record field. A data type defines a set of acceptable values or codes that may apply to numerous record field variables. For example, values of data type ID (vehicle, MCCD, and target array positions) may be used in multiple fields in all the deliverable performance files. The codes and values for each data type are presented in paragraph A-4. The file record formats in paragraph A-5 identify the data type applicable to each record field.

a. Key variables/data types - Control data and comment linking, applicable to all files. These variables or data types are important in many or all of the deliverable files.

1) Form control numbers (data type FCN). The FCN numbers relate the file record back to the original manual form data was extracted from to create or fill the record. The level 1 data forms are as easily referenced as the file record itself utilizing this unique number. This number is also cross-referenced in the appropriate comment file (CMT or HFCMT).

2) Trial (data type TR). The trial identification (Mjjja) identifies the Julian date (jjj) of trial execution and an alpha character (a) signifying the running sequence of that trial within a real time session (values A through E). An "X" value indicates MCCD erections in holding areas outside of normal trial times.

3) Comment control number (data type CMT). This number is a unique link from a comment in either the performance (CMT) or HF comment (HFCMT) file to a specific data record field in the data files. This unique number can be cross-referenced in either direction.

4) Vehicle/MCCD identification (data type ID). Vehicles are defined uniquely with an assigned ID. Crews are matched to the vehicles.

b. Key variables/data types - MCCD Deployment and Recovery Data (MD3). In addition to the key control variables listed in paragraph A-3-a above, the following key variables apply to deployment and recovery data.

1) Target line or holding area (variable LINEHOLD). This variable identifies whether the decoy was setup on the target line in Phase II or in a defensive position in Phase III or in a holding area for RAM counts.

2) MCCD type (variable MCCDTYPE). Which MCCD type was deployed and retrieved.

3) Uniform (variable UNIFORM). The uniform worn during deployment and recovery.

4) Glove type (variable GLOVE). The type of gloves worn during deployment and recovery.

5) Time start unpack decoy set (variable TMSTUNP). This was the time the soldiers began unpacking the decoy set. The decoy set was located at the erection site, so no transportation times from vehicle to site were required.

6) Time power supply declared operating (variable TMP SOP). The time when the power supply has been started and remains running. In holding area setups the power supply was not started.

7) Time decoy set erected (variable TMDECER). The time when the decoy set erection and connection to power supply is complete. Decoy set erection and power supply declared operating may not occur in the same time sequence. The later of these two times was considered the ending time for calculating setup time under the various conditions.

8) Time power supply switched off (variable TMP SOFF). This is the time the power supply was turned off.

9) Time start take down decoy (variable TMSTTDD). This is the time the crew began taking down the decoy set. The earlier of this time or the power supply switched off was considered the starting time for calculating takedown time under the various conditions.

10) Time decoy set repacked (variable TMREPACK). This is the time the decoy set and power supply were completely repacked and ready for transport.

c. Key variables/data types - Target determination data (TD3). In addition to the key control variables listed in paragraph A-3-a above, the following key variables apply to target determination data.

1) Target category determined by observer (variable TCATOBS). This field presents what type of target - real or decoy - the observer determined he was presented under various conditions.

2) Actual target category (variable ACTCAT). The actual type of target the observer was making a determination about.

3) Method/optics required at determination (variable OPRDET). For a record to be used in analysis, the optics required during a trial required a match in the optics used (variable OPTUSED).

4) Field-of-view (FOV) required at determination (variable FVRDET). For a record to be used in analysis, the FOV required during a trial required a match in the FOV used (variable FOVUSED).

5) Range at determination (variable RNGDETRM). This is the calculated range in meters at the time of determination.

6) Range band (variable RNGBAND). This is the range band that the ranges between the target line and the observer line were designed to fall into.

d. Key variables/data types - FOF engagement data (EA3). In addition to the key control variables listed in paragraph A-3-a above, the following key variables apply to engagement assessment data.

1) Engagement assessment (variable ENGASMT). The engagement assessment is the outcome of a weapons firing against a target.

2) Time of acquisition event (variable TMAQ). This is the time that a target was detected/acquired by the vehicle personnel.

3) Time of determination event (variable TMDETEVT). This is the time that a target type was announced or inferred by crew action.

4) Time of engagement (variable TMENGAGE). This is the time a weapon system was fired (that is, trigger pull). For BMP 30-mm cannon fire, a new engagement assessment record was generated each second for up to 10 records if the trigger was not released before 10 seconds. These records, called sub-bursts, reflect the same initial time of engagement but different assessment times.

5) Firer ID (variable FIRERID). This is the identification of the player whose activities have generated this record. Although "firer ID" implies a firing, not all records are built around a firing engagement.

6) Target ID (variable TARGETID). This is the identification of the target vehicle or MCCD acquired, determined, and/or engaged by the firing/engaging vehicle. When target is unknown, then a standard code of "99999" signifies an unknown target.

7) Actual Type of Target (variable TYTARGET). This is the type of target that is actually being engaged.

8) Determination sequence (variable DSEQ). This is a count of how many times a Red vehicle crew has made a target determination about this target within a certain trial.

9) Engagement sequence (variable ESEQ). This is a count of how many times a Red vehicle has engaged a target. It is a count linked to a specific target determination; if a Red crew redetermines a target, then the engagement sequence resets and starts counting with the new determination.

10) Target type determined (variable TCAOBS). This is the type of target that the Red crew has announced or decided it is engaging or observing.

11) Range at determination (variable RNGDETRM). This is a range calculated posttrial based on the determination time and position locations (PL) for the two vehicles at that time. If PL for either player was not available at that time, the field would show a "99999" unknown code.

12) Target status at engagement (variable TSEMG). For known targets, it's status (live or dead) at the time of engagement (trigger pull) is recorded.

13) Weapon type fired (variable WPNFIRD). This field codes the type of weapon fired at the target.

14) Ammunition type fired (variable AMMOFIRD). This field codes the type of ammunition fired at the target.

15) Range at engagement (variable RNGENGAG). This is the range between firers and known targets at the time of engagement (trigger pull). The range was calculated during real time unless the record was reconstructed posttrial.

16) Mobility Kill P_k (variable MPK). The MPK represents the combined PK values for total kill, firepower kill, and mobility kill.

17) Record flag (variable FLAG1). This flag identifies broad categories that the records fall into. They roughly correspond to the Record Type Flag.

18) QC flag (variable FLAG2). This flag identifies reconstructed or corrected records.

19) Record Type Flag (variable RECTYPE). Each EA3 record is categorized by a record type as defined by the Data Authentication Group. Table A-2 describes the different EA3 record types.

TABLE A-2. EA3 RECORD TYPE CATEGORIES

Record Type Category	Description of Record Type	Number of EA3 Records
A	Normal engagement, Red firing at Blue.	669
B	Normal engagement, Blue firing at Red.	330
C	Normal engagement by either side, with target identified but PKs not reconstructed.	539
D	Normal engagement by either side, but target unknown and no Pks.	280
E	Accidental firing/ test firing.	14
F	Player did not maneuver, acquire, or engage a target during this trial.	14
G	Player maneuvered but did not acquire or engage a target during this trial.	41
H	Engagement sequence ends at acquisition.	47
I	Engagement sequence ends at determination.	18
J	Player engaged suspected target/hot spot.	142
K	Player recon by fire.	472
L	Normal engagement by either side, but weapon system or instrumentation malfunctioned at firing.	2
M	Player fired and hit same side.	46
Z	Non-data records such as lost player video.	21

e. Key variables - HF data. In addition to the key control variables listed in paragraph A-3-a above, the following key variables apply to HF data.

1) Service member identification (datatype SM). This is a unique ID assigned to each service member. When referred to as an individual, this ID is used. This identification carries into the performance data also.

2) Form Identification (datatype FRM). This datatype identifies the form from which the record's data is taken from. Two files (HF1 and HF5) have data from different forms combined into one file. The comment files also include an identification of the form or file from which the comment originates.

3) Player position (datatype POS). This datatype covers the types of player positions being filled by personnel.

4) Role played in MCCD setup (datatype ROL). This identifies whether a service member acted as lead or assistant or as both in setting up and taking down the MCCD.

A-4. DATA DICTIONARY. The codes and values used during MCCD IOTE by data type as identified for each field in the file formats are presented in table A-3. Data types may be used multiple times within a record or across files based on the data collected. The actual data presented in each field is described in the data record formats presented in paragraph A-5 below or for key variables in paragraph A-2 above.

TABLE A-3. DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/Size	Codes
AA	Aspect Angle	I5	1 - 6400 MILs 99999 = Unknown
ABI	Rating Adequacy	A1	A = Adequate B = Borderline I = Inadequate N = No Response 7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown
AL	Ammo Load	I5	0 - 2000 77777 = Not Applicable 99999 = Unknown
AM	Ammo Type Fired	A2	KE = Kinetic Energy HE = High Explosive AT = ATGM 30 = 30-mm Cannon 77 = Not Applicable
ASN	Always-Sometimes- Never	A1	A = Always S = Sometimes N = Never 7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown
BM	Type of Blue Mission	A3	DWM = Defend With MCCDs DWO = Defend W/O MCCDs STA = Stationary Target Array 777 = Not Applicable
BU	Blue Unit ID	A10	Phase II: TNK1CFV1M3 TNK1CFV2M2 TNK2CFV1M2 TNK2CFV2M4 Phase III: TANK4MCCD0 TANK4MCCD3

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
			TANK4MCCD4
CMT	Comment Reference Number	I5	This number is a linking variable to a comment in the performance data or HF data comment file.
CRT	Certification Rating	A1	R = Ready
CRW	Crew ID	A5	Unique Crew ID CR1-CR15 = Red Crew ID CR50-CR66 = Blue Crew IDs BOB1-BOB9 = Individual Observers
DB	Average Dry Bulb Temperature	A5	38.0 - 73.0 degrees F +/- 0.9 degrees accuracy, 2 meter height, 15 minute average
DMY	Day/Month/Year	A8	Varies according to birthdate reported by soldier used for birthdate
EA	Engagement Assessment	I3	100 = Fire No Pair 101 = Same Side 112 = Target Total Killed 113 = Target Firepower Killed 114 = Target Mobility Killed 116 = Target Mobility and Firepower Killed 130 = Max Range violation 131 = Min Range violation 136 = Hit Dead Target 138 = Firer/Desig Killed While Missile in Flight 141 = Target Survive 157 = Missile Track lost 180 = Assessment Unknown 185 = Video Recon-structured Record 190 = Ammo Selection Corrected and Reconstructed 777 = Not Applicable 999 = Assessment Unknown
ED	Civilian Education	I1	1 = No HS diploma 2 = GED 3 = HS diploma 4 = Some College 5 = AA degree 6 = BA/BS 7 = Other

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
EX	Exposure	A1	P = Partial F = Full 7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown
FCN	Form Control Number	I5	Reference number to Form Storage Sequence 1-499 = ICC 500-749 = Blue Player data 750-999 = Red Player data 1000-1999 = MDF 2000-4999 = TDF 5000-7000 = VID1 8000-8127 = VID2, VID3 & RTCA QC added records 10000-29999 = VED 30000-39999 = HF 40000-49999 = RAM 50000-59999 = VED
FI	Force ID	A1	0 = Red 1 = Blue
FIL	File Names	A3	TD3, MD3, EA3
FOV	FOV	A1	N = Narrow W = Wide B = Both Narrow and Wide used I = Individual with bins 7 = Not Applicable 8 = Did Not Occur 9 = Unknown
FRM	Form ID	A4	HF1, HF1A, HF1B, HF2, HF4A, HF4B, HF4C, HF4D, HF4E, HF5, HF5A, HF5B, HF6, HF7, HF7A, HF8, HF9, HF10, CON, MD2, PLL, TAL, TD2, VED
FSN	Form Sequence Number	I2	If data collected on one form requires being entered as two forms, then the FSN, matched by the FCN, identifies the two halves.
GC	Glasses or Contacts	A1	G = Glasses C = Contacts B = Both glasses & contacts 7 = N/A (wears neither) 9 = Unknown
GL	Glove Type	I1	1 = No Gloves Worn 2 = BDU Gloves With

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
			Inserts 3 = BDU Gloves, no Inserts 4 = MOFF Gloves 5 = Mittens 6 = Cold Weather (Arctic) Gloves 7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown
HND	Handedness	A1	R = Right L = Left 7 = Not Applicable
HT	Height - Inches	I2	60 - 80 99 = Unknown
I2	Integers, 2 digits	I2	0-99
I3	Integers, 3 digits	I3	0-99
I4	Integers, 4 digits	I4	0-999
ID	Vehicle/MCCD ID	A5	P1 - P8 FT1 - FT5 BF1 - BF5 TT1 - TT5 BMP1 - BMP5 CR1 - CR9 DB1 - DB8 DT1 - DT8 BOB1 - BOB9
JU	Julian date	I3	020 - 082
LBU	Logical B-Unit	I4	1 - 8, 10 - 30 7777 = Not Applicable
LH	Line or Holding Area	A1	L = Target Line H = Holding Area D = Defensive Position, Phase III
LL	Light Level	A1	D = Day N = Night
LSR	Laser ID	I3	0, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 777
MD	Number of MCCD's Deployed	I1	0 - 4 7 = Not Applicable
MDY	Month/Day/Year	A8	MM/DD/YY
MO	Motion	A1	M = Moving S = Stationary

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
			7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty	A5	As recorded by soldier 77777 = Not Applicable
MT	MCCD Type	A2	DT = M1A1 MCCD DB = M2 BFV MCCD
OBL	Objective Location	I2	1 - 10
OL	Observer Location in Observation Line	A4	BOS1-BOS4 = Bino Short OBS1-OBS4 = Short OBM1-OBM8 = Medium OBL1-OBL8 = Long
OR	Direction MCCD is Oriented	I5	1 - 6400 MILs from Grid North 77777 = Not Applicable 99999 = Unknown
OU	Optics	A1	1 = No Optics (Eyes Only) 2 = M1 GPS 3 = M1 GPS Thermal A = Both M1 GPS/GPS Thermal 4 = Binoculars 5 = M3 ISU (DVO) T = M3 ISU Thermal C = Both M3 ISU/ISU Thermal 7 = Not Applicable 8 = Did Not Occur 9 = Unknown
PBU	Physical B-Unit	I4	3, 23-57, 117, 206-270, 317-347, 410-461, 500, 510, 511, 531, 676, 756 7777 = Not Applicable
PK	Pk Assessed (x 1000)	I3	0 - 999 = Valid PKs -77 = Not Applicable -99 = Pk not Calculated
PLF	PL Flag	I3	777 = Not Applicable
PLX	PL, X-coordinate	I5	0, 50000 - 70000 Grid Coordinate to Meters, X Value
PLY	PL, Y-coordinate	I5	0, 74000 - 87000 Grid Coordinate to Meters, Y Value
PN	Phase Number	I1	2 = Phase II 3 = Phase III
POS	Player Position (HF demographics)	A3	VC = Vehicle Commander GNR = Gunner LDR = Loader

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
			DVR = Driver MEC = Mechanic OBS = Observer TNR = Trainer OTH = Other
PP	Player Position	A3	VCO = Vehicle Commander GNR = Vehicle Gunner DVR = Driver IND = Individual, binocular CRW = Crew 777 = Not Applicable 888 = Did Not Occur 999 = Unknown
PR	15 Minute Total Precipitation	A5	0.00 - 0.40 Inches +/-0.5% accuracy at 0.5 Inches per Hour
PS	Position Stake ID	A4	BOS1-BOS4 = Bino Short OBS1-OBS4 = Short OBM1-OBM8 = Medium OBL1-OBL8 = Long P1 - P5 = Decoy Positions (Long & Medium) P1S - P8S = Decoy Positions (Short)
PSM	Primary or Secondary MOS	A1	P = Primary MOS S = Secondary MOS O = Other
PVX	Player Velocity, X-meters per second	I3	-63 to 783
PVY	Player Velocity, Y-meters per second	I3	-61 to 102
QCF	Quality Control Flag	I3	RTCA Flags: 185 = Video reconstructed record 190 = Ammo Selection Correction & Reconstruct 201 = Firing Assessment Missed by RTCA, Record Added 202 = Fire No Pair/ Pair No Match or Missed Assessment due to delayed pairing 210 = Assessment Corrected Posttrial Video Flags: 300 = Normal Engagement 303 = Engagement of suspected target/hot spot 305 = Hit Same Side 310 = Recon by Fire into

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/Size	Codes
			treeline
			313 = Accidental Firing/Test Firing
			321 = Sequence ends at Determination
			322 = Sequence ends at Acquisition
			325 = Active Player; maneuvered but did not acquire or engage targets
			327 = Active Player; did not maneuver, acquire, or engage targets
			397 = Video & Time Bar Lost
			398 = Time Bar Lost
			399 = Video Lost
			777 = Not Applicable
			999 = Assessment Unknown
RAN	Random number (x 1000)	I3	000 - 999 -77 = Not Applicable
RB	Range Band	A2	LO = Long ME = Medium SH = Short
RC	Record Type Red Engaging Blue Blue Engaging Red	A1	A = Normal Engagement; - B = Normal Engagement; C = Normal Engagement; target identified but not assessed D = Normal Engagement; target Not Identified E = Accidental/Test Firing - F = Player didn't maneuver, acquire or engage - G = Player Maneuvered but didn't acquire or engage H = Sequence Ends at Acquisition I = Sequence Ends at determination J = Engaged Suspected target/Hot Spot - K = Recon by Fire L = Normal Engagement; Equipment or Instrumentation Malfunction Prevented Firing M = Engagement of Same Side - Z = Non-Data Record
REC	Record Number	I1	1 - 8
RH	Average Relative Humidity	I3	0 - 100 percent, +/-5% Accuracy over range of 12 - 100%, 2 Meter Height, 15 Minute Average

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
RM	Type of Red Mission	A2	Phase II: SO = Stationary Observation Phase III: DA = Deliberate Attack MC = Movement to Contact 77 = Not Applicable
RN	Range (Meters)	I5	1 - 10000 77777 = Not Applicable 99999 = Unknown
RNK	Rank	A3	CPL, PFC, MSG, SFC, SGT, SPC, SSG
ROL	Role Played in MCCD setup	A1	L = Lead A = Assistant B = Played Both Roles 9 = Unknown
RT	Real Time Session ID	A5	Rjjja R = MCCD Real Time Session jjj = Julian date a = Alpha Sequence of Session that Julian Day (A, B, C etc.)
RU	Red Unit ID	A10	Phase II: BMP3INDV8 BMP4INDV8 BMP4 Phase III: TANK3BMP4 TANK4BMP4
SEQ	Sequence	I2	1 - 60 77 = Not Applicable 88 = Did not Occur 99 = Unknown
SL	MET Station Location -	I6	Approximate Grid Location: Approx. Grid Coordinate: Central Stony 557817 Nacimiento Valley 527811 Lower Gabilan 609744 Upper Gabilan 589772 East San Miguelito 578784 West San Miguelito 547796 Site 8-Delta 592798
SM	Service Member ID	A8	aaaaannnn aaaa = First 4 Alpha of Last Name; nnnn = Last 4 Numeric of SSN
T5	Hours, Minutes 24 hour clock	A5	HH:MM
T8	Hours, Minutes	A8	HH:MM:SS

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
	Seconds 24 hour clock		
T12	Hours, Minutes, Seconds, Milliseconds 24 hour clock	A12	HH:MM:SS.sss
TC	Player Type Category	A2	DB = M2 MCCD DC = Decoy DU = Decoy, Type Unknown IT = Invalid Target FT = Actual M1A1 BF = Actual M3 BFV DT = M1A1 MCCD RB = Red BMP RE = Real Vehicle RT = Red Tank U1 = M1A1, Unknown if Actual or Decoy U2 = Bradley, Unknown if Actual or Decoy VU = Vehicle, Type Unknown NF = Target Not Found NR = Not Ready CD = Cannot Determine if Real or Decoy 77 = Not Applicable 88 = Did Not Occur 99 = Unknown
TE	Type of Engagement	I2	10 = Red Tank Engaging Blue Tank 11 = Red Tank Engaging Blue Tank MCCD 12 = Red Tank Engaging Blue Unknown Target 13 = Red BMP Engaging Blue Tank 14 = Red BMP Engaging Blue Tank MCCD 15 = Red BMP Engaging Blue Unknown Target 30 = Blue Tank Engaging Red Tank 31 = Blue Tank Engaging Red BMP 32 = Blue Tank Engaging Unknown Red Target 55 = Friendly Fire 56 = Incomplete Engagement Sequence 77 = Not Applicable 99 = Unknown

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
TI	Type of Incident	A1	No Incidents were reported on the HF10 manual form
TL	Approximate Trial Location	A3	CSV = Central Stony NAV = Nacimiento Valley LGV = Lower Gabilan UGV = Upper Gabilan ESM = East San Miguelito WSM = West San Miguelito S8D = Site 8-Delta
TOF	Projectile Time of Flight (Milliseconds)	I5	0 - 20000
TOV	Type of Vehicle	A5	M1A1 = M1A1 M3CFV = M3 CFV RTANK = REDFOR Tank RBMP = REDFOR BMP
TP	Target Array Position	A4	P1-P5 = Long & Medium Range P1S-P8S = Short Range
TR	Trial ID	A5	Mjjja M = MCCD Trial Data jjj = Julian date a = Alpha sequence of trial that Julian day MjjjX=ID for holding area decoy set erection/take down not related to a specific trial or Real Time Session. Also used for Phase II makeup done on Phase III julian dates. * Note: Multiple trials may occur within one Real Time session (see data type RT)
TSE	Target Status at Engagement	A1	L = Alive D = Dead 7 = Not Applicable 9 = Unknown Target
TXT	Text Data Varies		Text as recorded and entered
UF	Uniform	A2	M0 = MOPPO M4 = MOPP4 99 = Unknown Uniform
UNT	Unit (Unstandardized)	A20	As recorded by soldier.
VA	Visual Acuity	A7	< 200/200 777/777 = Corrected

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
			Vision if no glasses or contacts are worn 999/999 = Unknown
VAR	File Variable Field	A8	In the CMT or HFCMT files identification, this field is used to link comments to specific fields within another file, referring to the field within a file which is assigned this unique variable name. Also used as the SAS variable name.
VI	Visibility	A4	0 - 10 (Miles)
WB	Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT)	A5	35.0 - 64.0, 999.9 Degrees F, +/-0.9 Degrees F Accuracy, 1.5 Meter Height for Wet Bulb and Black Globe, 15 Min Average; Not Available from Trial locationsCSV, S8D, or UGV
WD	Average Wind Direction	I3	10 - 360 Degrees Azimuth, +/-5 Degrees Azimuth Accuracy, 2 Meter Height, 15 Min Avg
WP	Weapon Type	A2	M1 = Blue Tank Main Gun BA = BMP ATGM BM = BMP 30-mm Cannon AT = Threat ATGM TT = Threat Tank Main Gun NW = No Weapon 77 = Not Applicable
WS	Average Wind Speed	A4	0.0 - 42.0 knots, +/-2% Accuracy, 2 Meter Height, 15 Min Average
WT	Weight - Pounds	I3	138 - 252 777 = Not Applicable 999 = Unknown
YM	Year/Month	A5	YY/MM (00/00 - 30/11) 77/77 = Not Applicable 99/99 = Unknown
YN	Yes/No	A1	Y = Yes N = No C = Cannot Assess 7 = Not Applicable 8 = Did Not Occur

TABLE A-3 (CONT). DATA DICTIONARY

Data Type	Definition	Format/ Size	Codes
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9 = Unknown

A-5. DATA RECORD FORMATS. This section contains the record formats of all the level 3 data base files created during the conduct of the MCCD IOTE. Comments applicable to records in other files are linked as described in paragraph A-2 above and the comment record formats presented in paragraph A-5-p. Comment record formats are presented in table A-20.

a. MCCD Deployment and Recovery (MD3) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-4.

b. Target Determination (TD3) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-5.

c. Engagement Assessment (EA3) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-6.

TABLE A-4. MCCD DEPLOYMENT AND RECOVERY (MD3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE)

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
CONTROL DATA						
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	MD2	FCN	N/A
2	I1	Record Number	REC	MD2	RECNUM	
3	A1	Target Line or Holding Area	LH	MD2	LINEHOLD	
4	A5	Trial ID	TR	CON	TRIAL	9.9.0.2
5	A8	Time of Start Trial	T8	CON	TMSTIRL	9.9.0.3
6	A8	Time of End Trial	T8	CON	TMNDTRL	9.9.0.4
7	A10	Blue Unit ID	BU	CON	BLUEUNIT	9.9.0.6
8	A3	Type of Blue Mission	BM	CON	TYELUMSN	9.9.0.14
9	A2	Type of Red Mission	RM	CON	TYREDMSN	9.9.0.15
10	A3	Trial Location	TL	CON	TRIALLOC	9.9.0.16
11	A1	Light Level	LL	CON	LIGHTLEV	9.9.0.17, 2.2.1.3
12	I5	Control Comments	CMT	CON	CONCMT	9.9.0.18
PLAYER DATA						
13	A5	Blue Vehicle Transporting MCCD	ID	MD2	BLUEVEID	9.9.0.7
14	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank/CFV CO	SM	PLL	BLUEVC	9.9.0.8
15	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank/CFV Gunner	SM	PLL	BLUEGNR	9.9.0.8
16	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank/CFV Driver	SM	PLL	BLUEDVR	9.9.0.8
17	A5	MCCD ID Being Deployed/Redeployed	ID	MD2	MCCDID	9.9.0.9
18	A8	MCCD Crew Member - Lead	SM	MD2	MCCDCRWL	9.9.0.10, 2.2.1.1a
19	A8	MCCD Crew Member - Assistant	SM	MD2	MCCDCRW2	9.9.0.10, 2.2.1.1b
METEOROLOGICAL DATA						
20	F4.1	Dry Bulb Temperature	DB	MET	DBTEMP	9.9.0.25
21	F5.1	Wet Bulb Temperature	WB	MET	WBTEMP	9.9.0.26
22	F4.1	Visibility	VI	MET	VISIRL	9.9.0.27
23	F5.2	Precipitation	PR	MET	PRECIP	9.9.0.28
24	I3	Relative Humidity	RH	MET	RELHUMID	9.9.0.29

TABLE A-4 (CONT). MCCD DEPLOYMENT AND RECOVERY (MD3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE)

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
25	F4.1	Wind Speed	WS	MET	WINDSPD	9.9.0.30
26	I3	Wind Direction	WD	MET	WINDDIR	9.9.0.31

MCCD DEPLOYMENT/RECOVERY DATA

27	A2	MCCD Type	MT	DMC/CODES	MCCDTYPE	2.2.1.2
28	A2	Uniform	UF	MD2	UNIFORM	2.2.1.4
29	I1	Glove Type	GL	ML2	GLOVE	2.2.1.5
30	A8	Time Start Unpack Decoy Set	T8	MD2	TMSTUNP	
31	A8	Time Start Pwr Sply, First Attempt	T8	MD2	TMSTPS1	
32	A8	Time Start Pwr Sply, Second Attempt	T8	MD2	TMSTPS2	
33	A8	Time Pwr Sply Declared Operating	T8	MD2	TMPSOP	
34	A3	Time Decoy Set Erected	T8	MD2	TMDECER	
35	A8	Time Power Supply Switched Off	T8	MD2	TMPSOFF	
36	A8	Time Start Take Down Decoy Set	T8	MD2	TMSTTDD	
37	A8	Time Decoy Set Repacked	T8	MD2	TMREPACK	
38	A5	Blue Crew	CRW	MD2	BLUECRW	9.9.0.5d
39	A5	Red Crew	CRW	MD2	REDCRW	9.9.0.13d
40	I5	MDf Event Comment	CMT	MD2	MDFCMT	

TABLE A-5. TARGET DETERMINATION (TD3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE)

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
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CONTROL DATA

1	I5	Form Control Number - VID1	FCN	TD2	FCNVID1	N/A
2	I5	Form Control Number - TDF	FCN	TD2	FCNTDF	N/A
3	I4	Record Number / Target Sequence	REC	TD2	RECNUM	N/A
4	A5	Trial ID	TR	TD2	TRIAL	9.9.0.2
5	A5	Real Time ID	RT	TD2	RTID	9.9.0.5

TABLE A-5 (CONT). TARGET DETERMINATION (TD3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE)

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
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6	A5	Target ID	ID	TD2	BLUEID	9.9.0.7, 9.9.0.9
7	A5	Red Vehicle/Observer ID	ID	TD2	REDID	9.9.0.12
8	A4	Observer Location in Obsrvtn Line	OL	TD2	OBSLOCIN	1.1.1.19
9	A4	Target Array Position	TP	TD2	TGTARLOC	1.1.1.20
10	A3	Type of Red Observer	PP	TD2	TYREDEL	1.1.1.11
11	A8	Time of Start Trial	T8	CON	TMSTTRL	9.9.0.3b
12	A8	Time of End Trial	T8	CON	TMNDTRL	9.9.0.4b
13	A10	Blue Unit ID	BU	CON	BLUEUNIT	9.9.0.6
14	A3	Type of Blue Mission	BM	CON	BLUEMSN	9.9.0.14
15	A2	Type of Red Mission	RM	CON	REDMSN	9.9.0.15
16	A3	Trial Location	TL	CON	TRILOC	9.9.0.16

17	A2	Range Band	RR	CON	RNGBAND	1.1.1.22
18	A1	Light Level	LL	CON	LIGHTLEV	9.9.0.17
19	A10	Red Unit ID	RU	CON	REDUNIT	9.9.0.11
20	I5	Control Comments	CMT	CON	CONCMT	9.9.0.18
PLAYER DATA						
21	A5	Blue Vehicle ID	ID	PLL	BLUEVEID	9.9.0.7, 1.1.1.2
22	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank CO	SM	PLL	BLUEVC	9.9.0.8a
23	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank Gunner	SM	PLL	BLUEGNR	9.9.0.8b
24	A8	Blue Vehicle Crew - Tank Driver	SM	PLL	BLUEDVR	9.9.0.8c
25	A5	MCCD ID	ID	PLL	MCCDID	9.9.0.9
26	A8	MCCD Crew Member - Lead	SM	PLL	MCCDCRW1	9.9.0.10a
27	A8	MCCD Crew Member - Assistant	SM	PLL	MCCDCRW2	9.9.0.10b
28	A5	Red Vehicle ID	ID	PLL	REDVEID	
29	A8	Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle CO	SM	PLL	REDVC	9.9.0.13a
30	A8	Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Gunner	SM	PLL	REDGNR	9.9.0.13b
31	A8	Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Driver	SM	PLL	REDDVR	9.9.0.13c

TABLE A-5 (CONT) TARGET DETERMINATION (TD3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE)

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
METEOROLOGICAL DATA						
32	F4.1	Dry Bulb Temperature	DB	MET	DBTEMP	9.9.0.25
33	F5.1	Wet Bulb Temperature	WB	MET	WBTEMP	9.9.0.26
34	F4.1	Visibility	VI	MET	VISIBL	9.9.0.27
35	F5.2	Precipitation	PR	MET	PRECIP	9.9.0.28
36	I3	Relative Humidity	RH	MET	RELHUMID	9.9.0.29
37	F4.1	Wind Speed	WS	MET	WINDSPD	9.9.0.30
38	I3	Wind Direction	WD	MET	WINDDIR	9.9.0.31
PHASE II: TARGET DETERMINATION DATA						
39	A8	Time of Determination Event	T8	TD2	TMDETEVT	1.1.1.1
40	A2	Trgt Category Determined by Obsrvr	TC	TD2	TCATOBS	1.1.1.14
41	A2	Actual Target Category	TC	TD2	ACTCAT	1.1.1.5, 1.1.1.6
42	A1	Target Exposure at Determination	EX	TD2	TGTEXPO	1.1.1.7
43	I5	Target PL at Determination-X-Coord	PLX	RPL	TGTPLX	1.1.1.3a
44	I5	Target PL at Determination-Y-Coord	PLY	RPL	TGTPLY	1.1.1.3b
45	A1	Observer Motion at Determination	MO	TD2	OBSMOTN	1.1.1.12
46	A3	Type of Observer Making Determination	PP	TD2	TYPEOBSR	1.1.1.13a
47	I5	Obsrvr PL at Determination-X-Coord	PLX	RPL	OBSPLX	1.1.1.10a
48	I5	Obsrvr PL at Determination-Y-Coord	PLY	RPL	OBSPLY	1.1.1.10b
49	A1	Method/Optics Used for Deter.	OU	TD2	OPTUSED	1.1.1.15
50	A1	Method/Optics Req'd for Deter.	OU	TD2	OPRDET	1.1.1.16
51	A1	FOV Used at Determination	FOV	TD2	FOVUSED	1.1.1.17
52	A1	FOV Req'd at Determination	FOV	TD2	FVRDET	1.1.1.18
53	I5	Range at Determination	RN	CALC	RNGDETRM	N/A
54	I5	Direction M CCD is Oriented	OR	RPL	MCCDOR	1.1.1.21
55	I5	Aspect Angle of Observer from M CCD	AA	CALC	AADETRM	N/A
56	A5	Blue Crew	CRW	PLL	BLUECRW	9.9.0.8d
57	A5	Red Crew	CRW	PLL	REDCRW	9.9.0.13d
58	I5	Comment	CMT	TD2/DMC	TDCMT	9.9.0.18

TABLE A-6. ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT (EA3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE) Phase III (FOF) Performance Data

Field #	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
CONTROL DATA					
1	A1 Record Type	RC	VED	RECTYPE	N/A
2	I5 Form Control Number - VED	FCN	VED	FCNVID1	N/A
3	A5 Real Time Session ID	RT	CON	RTID	9.9.0.5
4	A5 Trial ID	TR	VED	TRIAL	9.9.0.2
5	A8 Time of Start Trial	T8	CON	TMSTTRL	9.9.0.3
6	A8 Time of End Trial	T8	CON	TMDTRL	9.9.0.4
7	A10 Blue Unit ID	BU	CON	BLUEUNIT	9.9.0.6
8	A3 Type of Blue Mission	BM	CON	TYBLUMSN	9.9.0.14
9	A2 Type of Red Mission	RM	CON	TYREDMSN	9.9.0.15
10	A3 Trial Location	TL	CON	TRIALLOC	9.9.0.16
11	A1 Light Level	LL	CON	LIGHTLEV	9.9.0.17
12	A10 Red Unit ID	RU	CON	REDUNIT	9.9.0.11
13	I5 Control Comments	CMT	CON	CONCMT	9.9.0.18
PLAYER DATA					
14	A5 Blue Vehicle ID	ID	PLL	BLUEVEID	9.9.0.7, 1.1.1.2
15	A8 Blue Vehicle Crew - Vehicle CO	SM	PLL	BLUEVC	9.9.0.8a
16	A8 Blue Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Gunner	SM	PLL	BLUEGNR	9.9.0.8b
17	A8 Blue Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Driver	SM	PLL	BLUEDVR	9.9.0.8c
18	A5 MCD ID	ID	PLL	MCCDID	9.9.0.9
19	A8 MCD Crew Member - Lead	SM	PLL	MCCDCRW1	9.9.0.10a
20	A8 MCD Crew Member - Assistant	SM	PLL	MCCDCRW2	9.9.0.10b
21	A5 Red Vehicle ID	ID	PLL	REDVEID	9.9.0.12, 1.1.1.9
22	A8 Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle CO	SM	PLL	REDVC	9.9.0.13a
23	A8 Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Gunner	SM	PLL	REDGNR	9.9.0.13b
24	A8 Red Vehicle Crew - Vehicle Driver	SM	PLL	REDDVR	9.9.0.13c
25	A2 Type of Red Element	TC	DMC/BACKFILL	TYREDEL	1.1.1.11

TABLE A-6 (CONT). ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT (EA3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE) Phase III (FOF)
Performance Data

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
METEOROLOGICAL DATA						
26	F4.1	Dry Bulb Temperature	DB	MET	DBTEMP	9.9.0.25
27	F5.1	Wet Bulb Temperature	WB	MET	WBTEMP	9.9.0.26
28	F4.1	Visibility	VI	MET	VISIBL	9.9.0.27
29	F5.2	Precipitation	PR	MET	PRECIP	9.9.0.28
30	I3	Relative Humidity	RH	MET	RELHUMID	9.9.0.29
31	F4.1	Wind Speed	WS	MET	WINDSPD	9.9.0.30
32	I3	Wind Direction	WD	MET	WINDDIR	9.9.0.31
TARGET ACQUISITION DATA						
33	A5	Acquirer/Firer ID	ID	VED	FIRERID	8.1.1.8, 8.1.1.23
34	A2	Type of Acquirer/Firer	TC	VED	TYFIRER	8.1.1.10, 8.1.1.24
35	A5	Acquired/Engaged Target ID	ID	VED	TARGETID	8.1.1.16, 8.1.1.2
36	A2	Actual Type of Acqrd/Engaged Trgt	TC	VED	TYTARGET	8.1.1.18, 8.1.1.19, 1.1.1.5, 1.1.1.6, 8.1.1.4, 8.1.1.5
37	A8	Acquiring Red Crew Member ID	SM	VED	CRWAQ	8.1.1.12b
38	A3	Player Position Acquiring Target	PP	VED	PPAQ	8.1.1.12a
39	A1	Optics Used for Acquisition	OU	VED	OPAQ	8.1.1.13
40	A8	Time of Acquisition	T8	VED	TMAQ	8.1.1.1
41	A2	Target Category Acqrd by Observer	TC	VED	TCATAQ	N/A
42	A1	FOV Used at Acquisition	FOV	VED	FOVUSDAQ	8.1.1.14

TABLE A-6 (CONT). ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT (EA3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE) Phase III (FOF)
Performance Data

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R.(s)
43	A1	Target Exposure at Acquisition	EX	VED	TGTXPXA	8.1.1.6
44	A1	Target Motion at Acquisition	MO	VED	TGTMOAQ	8.1.1.7
45	I5	Target PL at Acquisition - X-Coord	PLX	PL2	TGTAPLX	8.1.1.3a
46	I5	Target PL at Acquisition - Y-Coord	PLY	PL2	TGTAPLY	8.1.1.3b
47	A1	Observer Motion at Acquisition	MO	VED	OBSMOTNA	8.1.1.11
48	I5	Observer PL at Acquisition-X-Coord	PLX	PL2	OBSAPLX	8.1.1.9a
49	I5	Observer PL at Acquisition -Y-Coord	PLY	PL2	OBSAPLY	8.1.1.9b

TARGET DETERMINATION DATA - REDFOR ENGAGING BLUEFOR ONLY

50	A8	Time of Determination Event	T8	VED	TMDTEVT	1.1.1.1
51	I2	Determ Sequence Against This Target	SEQ	VED	DSEQ	1.1.1.4
52	A2	Ttgt Category Determined by Obsvr	TC	VED	TCATOB	1.1.1.14
53	A1	Ttgt Exposure at Determination	EX	VED	TGTXPXA	1.1.1.7
54	I5	Target PL at Determination -X-Coord	PLX	PL2	TGTPLX	1.1.1.3a
55	I5	Target PL at Determination -Y-Coord	PLY	PL2	TGTPLY	1.1.1.3b
56	A8	REDFOR Observer/Crew Member ID	SM	VED	OBSMID	1.1.1.13b
57	A3	Player Position of Observer	PP	VED	PPOBSR	1.1.1.13a
58	A1	Method/Optics Used for Deter.	OU	VED	OPTUSED	1.1.1.15
59	A1	FOV Used at Determination	FOV	VED	FOVUSED	1.1.1.17
60	A1	Observer Motion at Determination	MO	VED	OBSMOTN	1.1.1.12
61	I5	Obsvr PL at Determination-X-Coord	PLX	PL2	OBSPLX	1.1.1.10a
62	I5	Obsvr PL at Determination -Y-Coord	PLY	PL2	OBSPLY	1.1.1.10b
63	I5	Range at Determination	RN	CALC	RNGDTRM	N/A
64	A2	Range Band	RB	VED	RNGBAND	1.1.1.22
65	A1	Target Motion at Determination	MO	VED	TGMDT	1.1.1.8

ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT DATA

66	I2	Type of Engagement	TE	CALC	TYPENG	8.1.1.31
67	I2	Engag. Sequence Against this Target	SEQ	VED	ESEQ	9.1.1.17

TABLE A-6 (CONT). ENGAGEMENT ASSESSMENT (EA3) FILE RECORD FORMAT (DELIVERABLE) Phase III (FOF)
Performance Data

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R.(s)
68	A1	Target Status at Engagement	TSE	VED	TSEMG	8.1.1.22
69	A12	Time of Engagement	T12	VED	TMENGAGE	8.1.1.15

70	A12	Time of Assessment	TI2	VED	TMSSMT	8.1.2.3
71	A1	Method/Optics Used at Engagement	OU	VED	OPTUSDEN	8.1.1.27
72	A1	FOV Used at Engagement	FOV	VED	FOVUSDEN	8.1.1.28
73	A2	Weapon Type Fired	WP	VED	WPNFIRD	8.1.1.29
74	A2	Ammo Type Fired	AM	VED	AMMOFIRD	8.1.1.30
75	A8	ID Engaging Crew Member	SM	VED	SMENGA	8.1.1.26b
76	A3	Player Pos. of Engaging Crew Mem	PP	VED	PPENGA	8.1.1.26a
77	I5	Firer PL at Engagement - X-Coord	PLX	VED	FRPLXE	8.1.6.2a
78	I5	Firer PL at Engagement - Y-Coord	PLY	VED	FRPLYE	8.1.6.2b
79	I5	Target PL at Engagement - X-Coord	PLX	VED	TGTPLEXE	8.1.6.1a
80	I5	Target PL at Engagement - Y-Coord	PLY	VED	TGTPLYE	8.1.6.1b
81	I5	Range at Engagement	RN	VED	RNGENGAG	N/A
82	A2	Range Band at Engagement	RB	VED/DMC	RBENGAG	N/A
83	A1	Firer Motion at Engagement	MO	VED	FRMOENG	8.1.1.25
84	A1	Target Motion at Engagement	MO	VED	TGTMOENG	8.1.1.21
85	A1	Target Exposure at Engagement	EX	VED	TGTEXENG	8.1.1.20
86	I3	Total Kill Pk	PK	VED	TPK	8.1.2.2a
87	I3	Firepower Kill Pk	PK	VED	FPK	8.1.2.2b
88	I3	Mobility Kill Pk	PK	VED	MPK	8.1.2.2c
89	I3	Engagement Assessment Code	EA	CALC	ENGASMT	8.1.2.1
90	I3	Record Flag	QCF	VED/DMC	FLAG1	N/A
91	I3	QC Flag	QCF	VED/DMC	FLAG2	N/A
92	A5	Blue Crew	ID	PLL	BLUECRW	9.9.0.8d
93	A5	Red Crew	ID	PLL	REDCRW	9.9.0.13d
94	I5	Video/DMC Record Comment	CMT	VED/DMC	EACMT	9.9.0.18

d. Player Demographics/Anthropometrics (HF1) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-7.

e. Player Training Certification (HF3) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-8.

f. Player Training Questionnaire (HF4A) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-9.

g. Player Training Questionnaire - Doctrine and Tactics (HF4B) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-10.

h. Unit/DS Training Questionnaire: Fuel/Electrical System Repair Course (HF4C) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-11.

i. Unit/DS Training Questionnaire: Power Supply (HF4D) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-12.

j. Trainer Training Questionnaire (HF4E) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-13.

k. Observer Questionnaire: Day and Night (HF5) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-14.

l. Observer Questionnaire: Phase 3 (HF5A) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-15.

TABLE A-7. PLAYER AND TRAINER DEMOGRAPHICS/ANTHROPOMETRICS (HF1) FILE RECORD
FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I4	Form ID	FRM	HF1	FORMID	N/A
2	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF1	FCN	N/A
3	A8	Player identification	SM	HF1	PLAYER	N/A
4	A8	Date of Birth	DMY	HF1	DOB	N/A
5	A3	Rank	RNK	HF1	RANK	N/A
6	A5	Time in Service (Years/Months)	YM	HF1	TIMESERV	N/A
7	A20	Unit	UNT	HF1	UNIT	N/A
8	A5	Time in Unit (Years/Months)	YM	HF1	TIMEUNIT	N/A
9	A5	Full Primary MOS	MOS	HF1	PRIMOS	N/A
10	A5	Time in Primary MOS (Years/Months)	YM	HF1	TMPRIMOS	N/A
11	A5	Secondary MOS	MOS	HF1	SECMOS	N/A
12	A5	Time in Secondary MOS (Years/Months)	YM	HF1	TMSECMOS	N/A
13	A1	MOS Currently Working In	PSM	HF1	CURRMOS	N/A
14	A3	Position During Test	POS	HF1	POSITION	N/A
15	A1	First Experience with MCCD	YN	HF1	MCCDEXP1	N/A
16	I5	MCCD Experience and Training	CMT	HF1	MCCDTRN	N/A
17	I5	Relevant Military Courses/Assignments	CMT	HF1	COURSES	N/A
18	A1	Combat Experience	YN	HF1	CMBTEXP	N/A
19	I5	Combat Experience location and dates	CMT	HF1	CMBTEXPD	N/A
20	I1	Civilian Education	ED	HF1	CIVILED	N/A
21	I5	Civilian Education - Other	CMT	HF1	EDOTHER	N/A
22	I3	Weight	WT	HF1B	WEIGHT	N/A
23	I2	Height	HT	HF1B	HEIGHT	N/A
24	A1	Handedness	HRD	HF1B	HANDED	N/A
25	A1	Color Blind	YN	HF1A	CLBLIND	N/A
26	I5	Color Blind Test Plate #	CMT	HF1A	PLATES	N/A
27	A1	Corrective lenses	YN	HF1A	LENSES	N/A
28	A1	Glasses or Contacts	GC	HF1A	GLASCONT	N/A
29	A1	Glasses or Contacts worn in field	GC	HF1A	FLDLENS	N/A
30	A7	Vision - Corrected - Right	VA	HF1A	RVISCOR	N/A

TABLE A-7 (CONT). PLAYER AND TRAINER DEMOGRAPHICS/ANTHROPOMETRICS (HF1) FILE RECORD
FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
31	A7	Vision - Uncorrected - Right	VA	HF1A	RVISUCOR	N/A
32	A7	Vision - Corrected - Left	VA	HF1A	LVISCOR	N/A
33	A7	Vision - Uncorrected - Left	VA	HF1A	LVISUCOR	N/A
34	A7	Vision - Corrected - Both	VA	HF1A	BVISCOR	N/A
35	A7	Vision - Uncorrected - Both	VA	HF1A	BVISUCOR	N/A

TABLE A-8. SME CRITICAL TASK EVALUATION FORM (HF3) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	A8	Player identification	SM	HF3	PLAYER	N/A
2	A3	Position During Test	POS	HF3	POSITION	N/A
3	A1	Certification Rating	CRT	HF3	CERT	2.1.1.1, 2.1.1.2

TABLE A-9. PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4A) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCN	N/A
2	A8	player identification	SM	DMC	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF4A	DATE	
4	A1	Assy: Put Decoy image on Ground	YN	HF4A	MCCD GRND	SA 2.1.1.1.7
5	A1	Assy: Inspect Image Front & Adjust	YN	HF4A	IMAGEFRT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
6	A1	PMCS Before Oper: Performance	YN	HF4A	BOPPMCS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
7	A1	PMCS Before Oper: Using Table 2-1	YN	HF4A	PMCST2-1	SA 2.1.1.1.7
8	A1	PMCS Before Oper: Visual Inspect	YN	HF4A	BVISINSP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
9	A1	Oper. Ind Pwr Source: Install/Oper	YN	HF4A	PWRINST	SA 2.1.1.1.7
10	A1	Oper. Ind Pwr Source: Start/Release	YN	HF4A	PWRSTART	SA 2.1.1.1.7

TABLE A-9 (CONT). PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4A) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
11	A1	Oper Ind Pwr Source: Check Warm Air	YN	HF4A	WARMAIR	SA 2.1.1.1.7
12	A1	PMCS during Operation: Performance	YN	HF4A	DOPPMCS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
13	A1	PMCS during Oper: Visual Inspect	YN	HF4A	OVISINSP	SA 2.1.1.1.7

14	A1	PMCS during Oper: Check Radar Relf	YN	HF4A	RADARREF	SA 2.1.1.1.7
15	A1	Troubleshoot MCCD: System	YN	HF4A	TRBLSHOT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
16	A1	Troubleshoot MCCD: Index & Tble 4-1	YN	HF4A	TRBLT4-1	SA 2.1.1.1.7
17	A1	PMCS after Operation: Performance	YN	HF4A	AOPPMCS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
18	A1	PMCS after Oper: Fuel Leak/Spill	YN	HF4A	FUELLEAK	SA 2.1.1.1.7
19	A1	PMCS after Oper: Visual Inspect	YN	HF4A	AVISINSP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
20	A1	Recover MCCD: System	YN	HF4A	RECOVER	SA 2.1.1.1.7
21	A1	Recover MCCD: Disassemble MCCD	YN	HF4A	DISASSEM	SA 2.1.1.1.7
22	A1	Recover MCCD: Image in Trans. Bag	YN	HF4A	INBAG	SA 2.1.1.1.7
23	A1	Recover MCCD: Close Trans. Bag	YN	HF4A	CLOSEBAG	SA 2.1.1.1.7
24	I5	Recover MCCD: Comment	CMT	HF4A	RECOVCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
25	A1	Problems with Other Tasks	YN	HF4A	PROBLEMS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
26	I5	Comments on Problems w/ Other Tasks	CMT	HF4A	PROBCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
27	I5	Topics Covered Comments	CMT	HF4A	TOPICCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
28	I5	Time Spent on Topics Comments	CMT	HF4A	TIMECMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
29	I5	Training Manuals/Materials Comments	CMT	HF4A	TRMANCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
30	I5	General Comments/Concerns	CMT	HF4A	TRCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7

TABLE A-10. PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: DOCTRINE AND TACTICS (HF4B) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCN	N/A
2	A8	Player identification	SM	DMC	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF4B	DATE	
4	A1	Add MCCD use PLT SOP for Prep Def	YN	HF4B	SOPDEF	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
5	A1	Use MCCD enhance own survivability	YN	HF4B	SURVIVE	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
6	A1	Use MCCD improv lethality to enemy	YN	HF4B	LETHAL	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
TABLE A-10 (CONT). PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: DOCTRINE AND TACTICS (HF4B) FILE RECORD FORMAT						

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
7	A1	Bene. place MCCD near friendly Veh	YN	HF4B	PLACBENE	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
8	A1	Restrict Placing MCCD Near Friendly	YN	HF4B	PLACREST	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
9	A1	Technique to make MCCD Realistic	YN	HF4B	REALIST	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
10	A1	MCCD use add to PLT SOP/FRAG Orders	YN	HF4B	SOPFRAG	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
11	A1	Understand/Apply Deception Principle	YN	HF4B	DECEPTN	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
12	A1	MCCD Employ. in High Command Intent	YN	HF4B	EMPHCMD	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
13	A1	Report MCCD Use to Other Units/HQ	YN	HF4B	RPTUSE	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
14	A1	MCCD Never used to Replace Real Veh	YN	HF4B	REPLREAL	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
15	I5	General Doctrine and Tactics Comnts	CMT	HF4B	GENCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
16	A1	Problems Performing Other Tasks	YN	HF4B	PROBLEM	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
17	I5	Comments on Problems w/ Other Tasks	CMT	HF4B	PROBCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3

18	I5	Topics Covered Comments	CMT	HF4B	TOPICCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
19	I5	Time Spent on Topics Comments	CMT	HF4B	TIMECMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
20	I5	Training Manuals/Materials Comments	CMT	HF4B	TRMANCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3
21	I5	General Comments/Concerns	CMT	HF4B	TRCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7, SA 4.1.1.1.3

TABLE A-11. UNIT/DIRECT SUPPORT TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: FUEL/ELECTRICAL SYSTEM REPAIR (HF4C) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCN	N/A
2	A8	Player identification	SM	DMC	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF4C	DATE	N/A
4	A1	Trained to repair DC-DC Converter	YN	HF4C	DCCONV	SA 2.1.1.1.7
5	A1	Repair Control Unit	YN	HF4C	CONTUN	SA 2.1.1.1.7
6	A1	Test, Repair Power Supply	YN	HF4C	PWRSUP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
7	A1	Troubleshoot Power Supply	YN	HF4C	TRPWRSUP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
8	A1	Perform PMCS	YN	HF4C	PMCS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
9	I5	Comments on Critical Tasks	CMT	HF4C	CTCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
10	A1	Problems Performing Other Tasks	YN	HF4C	PROBLEMS	SA 2.1.1.1.7

TABLE A-11 (CONT). UNIT/DIRECT SUPPORT TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: FUEL/ELECTRICAL SYSTEM REPAIR (HF4C) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
11	I5	Topics Covered Comments	CMT	HF4C	TOPICCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
12	I5	Time Spent on Topics Comments	CMT	HF4C	TIMECMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
13	I5	Training Manuals/Materials Comments	CMT	HF4C	TRMANCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
14	I5	General Comments/Concerns	CMT	HF4C	TRCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7

TABLE A-12. UNIT/DIRECT SUPPORT TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE: POWER SUPPLY UNIT (HF4D) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCN	N/A
2	A8	Player identification	SM	DMC	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF4D	DATE	N/A
4	A1	Test, Repair Power Supply	YN	HF4D	PWRSUP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
5	A1	Troubleshoot Power Supply	YN	HF4D	TRPWRSUP	SA 2.1.1.1.7
6	A1	Perform Preventive Maintenance	YN	HF4D	MAINT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
7	A1	Checks and Services (PMCS)	YN	HF4D	PMCS	SA 2.1.1.1.7

8	A1	Repair and Replace Image Assembly	YN	HF4D	IMAGE	SA 2.1.1.1.7
9	I5	Comments on Critical Tasks	CMT	HF4D	CTCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
10	A1	Problems Performing Other Tasks	YN	HF4D	PROBLEMS	SA 2.1.1.1.7
11	I5	Topics Covered Comments	CMT	HF4D	TOPICCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
12	I5	Time Spent on Topics Comments	CMT	HF4D	TIMECMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
13	I5	Training Manuals/Materials Comments	CMT	HF4D	TRMANCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7
14	I5	General Comments/Concerns	CMT	HF4D	TRCMT	SA 2.1.1.1.7

TABLE A-13. TRAINER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4E) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCN	N/A
2	A8	Player Identification	SM	DMC	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF4E	DATE	N/A
4	A1	Plr Adgte Trained Critical Tasks	YN	HF4E	CTRN	SA 2.1.1.8
5	I5	Comments: Adgte Critical Task Train	CMT	HF4E	CTTRNCMT	SA 2.1.1.8
6	A1	Problems Performing Other Tasks	YN	HF4E	PROBLEMS	SA 2.1.1.8
7	I5	Topics Covered Comments	CMT	HF4E	TOPICCMT	SA 2.1.1.8
8	I5	Time Spent on Topics Comments	CMT	HF4E	TIMECMT	SA 2.1.1.8
9	I5	Training Manuals/Materials Comments	CMT	HF4E	TRMANCMT	SA 2.1.1.8
10	A1	Training Follow POI	YN	HF4E	POI	SA 2.1.1.8
11	A1	Suggest to Improve POI or Training	YN	HF4E	IMPPOI	SA 2.1.1.8
12	I5	Comnts on Improving POI or Training	CMT	HF4E	IMPOICMT	SA 2.1.1.8
13	I5	General Comments/Concerns: Training	CMT	HF4E	TRCMT	SA 2.1.1.8
14	I5	Comments/Concerns: MCD Maintenance	CMT	HF4E	MAINTCMT	SA 2.1.1.8

TABLE A-14. OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE - DAYTIME CONDITION (HF5) AND NIGHTTIME CONDITION (HF6) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	A3	Form ID	FRM	HF5, HF6	FORMID	N/A
2	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF5, HF6	FCN	
3	A8	Observer Name	SM	HF5, HF6	OBSERVER	
4	A3	Position	POS	HF5, HF6	POSITION	
5	A1	Long Range-Target Backgrnd/Contrast	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRTGTBCKSA	1.1.1.23
6	A1	Long Range - Noise	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRNOISE	
7	A1	Long Range - Color	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRCOLOR	
8	A1	Long Range - Shape	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRSHAPE	
9	A1	Long Range - Signature	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRSIGN	
10	A1	Long Range - Aspect Angle	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRANGLE	
11	A1	Long Range - Reflection	ASN	HF5, HF6	LRREFL	
TABLE A-14 (CONT). OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE - DAYTIME CONDITION (HF5) AND NIGHTTIME CONDITION (HF6) FILE RECORD FORMAT						

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
12	A1	Long Range - Other	ASN	HF5, HF6	LROTHR	
13	I5	Long Range - Other Description	CMT	HF5, HF6	LROTHCMT	

54	A1	Interference - Dust	YN	HF5, HF6	DUST
55	A1	Interference - Heat	YN	HF5, HF6	HEAT
56	A1	Interference - Fog	YN	HF5, HF6	FOG
57	A1	Interference - Darkness	YN	HF5, HF6	DARK
58	A1	Interference - Noise Distractions	YN	HF5, HF6	NOISE
59	A1	Interference - Visual Distractions	YN	HF5, HF6	VISUAL
60	A1	Interference - Boredom	YN	HF5, HF6	BOREDOM
61	A1	Interference - Fatigue	YN	HF5, HF6	FATIGUE
62	A1	Interference - Physical Discomfort	YN	HF5, HF6	PHYSDISC
63	A1	Interference - Dirty/Damaged Sights	YN	HF5, HF6	BADSIGHT
64	A1	Interference - Thermal Imagery	YN	HF5, HF6	THIMAGE
65	A1	Interference - Mag Level of Optics	YN	HF5, HF6	OPTICMAG
66	A1	Interference - Orient. of Lighting	YN	HF5, HF6	LIGHTOR
67	A1	Interference - Other	YN	HF5, HF6	INTOTHR
68	I5	Interference - Other Description	CMT	HF5, HF6	INTOTHR
69	I5	Interference - Comment	CMT	HF5, HF6	INTOTHR
70	A1	Wanted to Respond "I don't Know"	YN	HF5, HF6	NOTKNOW
71	I2	No. Times Couldn't see Target	I2	HF5, HF6	NOTGT
72	I2	Could not Determine Real or Decoy	I2	HF5, HF6	NORE DC
73	I5	Other "I don't Know" Comments	CMT	HF5, HF6	NKNOWCMT
74	I5	Comments on Target Determination	CMT	HF5, HF6	TGTCMT

TABLE A-15. OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE: PHASE III ONLY (HF5A) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF5A	FCN	
2	A8	Observer Name	SM	HF5A	OBSERVER	
3	A3	Position	POS	HF5A	POSITION	
4	A1	FOF - Tgt Backgrnd/Contrast	ASN	HF5A	FFGTBCK	SA 1.1.1.23
5	A1	FOF - Noise	ASN	HF5A	FFNOISE	
6	A1	FOF - Color	ASN	HF5A	FFCOLOR	
7	A1	FOF - Shape	ASN	HF5A	FFSHAPE	
8	A1	FOF - Signature	ASN	HF5A	FFSIGN	
9	A1	FOF - Aspect Angle	ASN	HF5A	FFANGLE	
10	A1	FOF - Reflection	ASN	HF5A	FFREFL	
11	A1	FOF - Other	ASN	HF5A	FFOTHR	
12	I5	FOF - Other Description	CMT	HF5A	FFOTHCMT	
13	I5	FOF - Comment	CMT	HF5A	FFCMT	
14	A1	FOF - Engage Decoy Target?	YN	HF5A	FFENGDC	
15	I5	FOF - Engage Decoy Tgt? Cmt	CMT	HF5A	FFENGCMT	
16	A1	Interference - Sun Glare	YN	HF5A	GLARE	
17	A1	Interference - Dust	YN	HF5A	DUST	
18	A1	Interference - Heat	YN	HF5A	HEAT	
19	A1	Interference - Fog	YN	HF5A	FOG	
20	A1	Interference - Darkness	YN	HF5A	DARK	
21	A1	Interference - Noise Distractions	YN	HF5A	NOISE	
22	A1	Interference - Visual Distractions	YN	HF5A	VISUAL	
23	A1	Interference - Boredom	YN	HF5A	BOREDOM	
24	A1	Interference - Fatigue	YN	HF5A	FATIGUE	
25	A1	Interference - Physical Discomfort	YN	HF5A	PHYSDISC	
26	A1	Interference - Dirty/Damaged Sights	YN	HF5A	BADSIGHT	
27	A1	Interference - Thermal Imagery	YN	HF5A	THIMAGE	
28	A1	Interference - Mag Level of Optics	YN	HF5A	OPTICMAG	
29	A1	Interference - Orient. Lighting	YN	HF5A	LIGHTOR	
30	A1	Interference - Other	YN	HF5A	INTOTHR	
31	I5	Interference - Other Description	CMT	HF5A	INOTHCMT	
32	I5	Interference - Comment	CMT	HF5A	INTERCMT	
33	I5	Comments on Target Acquisition/ID	CMT	HF5A	TGTCMT	

m. Observer Questionnaire: Summary (HF5B) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-16.

n. Operator Questionnaire (HF7) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-17.

o. Operator Questionnaire: Phase 3 (HF7A) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-18.

p. SME Assessment Form (HF8) record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-19.

q. Performance comment and HF comment files record format. The record format for this data file is presented in table A-20.

TABLE A-16. OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE: SUMMARY (HF5B) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF5B	FCN	
2	A8	Observer Name	SM	HF5B	OBSERVER	
3	A3	Position	POS	HF5B	POSITION	
4	A2	Long Range Day: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrast	I2	HF5B	LRDTGTBK	
5	A2	Long Range Day: Noise	I2	HF5B	LRDNOISE	
6	A2	Long Range Day: Color	I2	HF5B	LRDCOLOR	
7	A2	Long Range Day: Shape	I2	HF5B	LRDSHAPE	
8	A2	Long Range Day: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	LRDIIMAGE	
9	A2	Long Range Day: Signature	I2	HF5B	LRDSIGN	
10	A2	Long Range Day: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	LRDAngle	
11	A2	Long Range Day: Reflection	I2	HF5B	LRDR3FL	
12	A2	Long Range Day: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	LRDWDMV	
13	A2	Long Range Day: Shadows	I2	HF5B	LRDSHAD	
14	A2	Long Range Nite: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrast	I2	HF5B	LRNTGTBK	
15	A2	Long Range Nite: Noise	I2	HF5B	LRNNOISE	
16	A2	Long Range Night: Color	I2	HF5B	LRNCOLOR	
17	A2	Long Range Night: Shape	I2	HF5B	LRNSEAPE	
18	A2	Long Range Night: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	LRNIMAGE	
19	A2	Long Range Night: Signature	I2	HF5B	LRNSIGN	
20	A2	Long Range Night: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	LRNANGLE	
21	A2	Long Range Night: Reflection	I2	HF5B	LRNREFL	
22	A2	Long Range Night: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	LRNNDMV	
23	A2	Long Range Night: Shadows	I2	HF5B	LRNSHAD	
24	I5	Long Range Cues - Comment	CMT	HF5B	LRGMT	
25	A2	Medium Range Day: Tgt Bckgnd/Cntrst	I2	HF5B	MRDTGTBK	
26	A2	Medium Range Day: Noise	I2	HF5B	MRDNOISE	
27	A2	Medium Range Day: Color	I2	HF5B	MRDCOLOR	
28	A2	Medium Range Day: Shape	I2	HF5B	MRDSHAPE	
29	A2	Medium Range Day: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	MRDIMAGE	
30	A2	Medium Range Day: Signature	I2	HF5B	MRDSIGN	
31	A2	Medium Range Day: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	MRDANGLE	
32	A2	Medium Range Day: Reflection	I2	HF5B	MRDREFL	
33	A2	Medium Range Day: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	MRDNDMV	

TABLE A-16 (CONT). OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE: SUMMARY (HF5B) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
34	A2	Medium Range Day: Shadows	I2	HF5B	MRDSHAD	
35	A2	Med. Rnge Nite: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrast	I2	HF5B	MRNTGTBK	
36	A2	Medium Range Night: Noise	I2	HF5B	MRNNOISE	

37	A2	Medium Range Night: Color	I2	HF5B	MRNCOLOR
38	A2	Medium Range Night: Shape	I2	HF5B	MRNSHAPE
39	A2	Medium Range Night: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	MRNIMAGE
40	A2	Medium Range Night: Signature	I2	HF5B	MRNSIGN
41	A2	Medium Range Night: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	MRNANGLE
42	A2	Medium Range Night: Reflection	I2	HF5B	MRNREFL
43	A2	Medium Range Night: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	MRNWDMV
44	A2	Medium Range Night: Shadows	I2	HF5B	MRNSHAD
45	I5	Medium Range Cues - Comment	CMT	HF5B	MRCMT
46	A2	Short Range Day: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrst	I2	HF5B	SRDTGTBK
47	A2	Short Range Day: Noise	I2	HF5B	SRDNOISE
48	A2	Short Range Day: Color	I2	HF5B	SRDCOLOR
49	A2	Short Range Day: Shape	I2	HF5B	SRDSHAPE
50	A2	Short Range Day: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	SRDIMAGE
51	A2	Short Range Day: Signature	I2	HF5B	SRDSIGN
52	A2	Short Range Day: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	SRDANGLE
53	A2	Short Range Day: Reflection	I2	HF5B	SRDREFL
54	A2	Short Range Day: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	SRDNDMV
55	A2	Short Range Day: Shadows	I2	HF5B	SRDSHAD
56	A2	Short Range Nite: Tgt Bckgnd/Cntrst	I2	HF5B	SRNTGTBK
57	A2	Short Range Night: Noise	I2	HF5B	SRNNOISE
58	A2	Short Range Night: Color	I2	HF5B	SRNCOLOR
59	A2	Short Range Night: Shape	I2	HF5B	SRNSHAPE
60	A2	Short Range Night: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	SRNIMAGE
61	A2	Short Range Night: Signature	I2	HF5B	SRNSIGN
62	A2	Short Range Night: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	SRNANGLE
63	A2	Short Range Night: Reflection	I2	HF5B	SRNREFL
64	A2	Short Range Night: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	SRNWDMV
65	A2	Short Range Night: Shadows	I2	HF5B	SRNSHAD
66	I5	Short Range Cues - Comment	CMT	HF5B	SRCMT

TABLE A-16 (CONT). OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE: SUMMARY (HF5B) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
67	A2	Moving Day: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrast	I2	HF5B	MVDTGTBK	
68	A2	Moving Day: Noise	I2	HF5B	MVDNOISE	
69	A2	Moving Day: Color	I2	HF5B	MVDCOLOR	
70	A2	Moving Day: Shape	I2	HF5B	MVDSHAPE	
71	A2	Moving Day: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	MVDIMAGE	
72	A2	Moving Day: Signature	I2	HF5B	MVDSIGN	
73	A2	Moving Day: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	MVDANGLE	
74	A2	Moving Day: Reflection	I2	HF5B	MVDREFL	
75	A2	Moving Day: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	MVDNDMV	
76	A2	Moving Day: Shadows	I2	HF5B	MVDSHAD	
77	A2	Moving Night: Tgt Bckgnd/Contrast	I2	HF5B	MVNTGTBK	

78	A2	Moving Night: Noise	I2	HF5B	MVNNOISE
79	A2	Moving Night: Color	I2	HF5B	MVNOCOLOR
80	A2	Moving Night: Shape	I2	HF5B	MVNSHAPE
81	A2	Moving Night: Thermal Image	I2	HF5B	MVNIMAGE
82	A2	Moving Night: Signature	I2	HF5B	MVNSIGN
83	A2	Moving Night: Aspect Angle	I2	HF5B	MVNANGLE
84	A2	Moving Night: Reflection	I2	HF5B	MVNREFL
85	A2	Moving Night: Wind Movement	I2	HF5B	MVNWINDMV
86	A2	Moving Night: Shadows	I2	HF5B	MVNSHAD
87	I5	Moving Cues - Comment	CMT	HF5B	MVCMT
88	A2	Interference Day: Sun Glare	I2	HF5B	GLARED
89	A2	Interference Day: Dust	I2	HF5B	DUSTD
90	A2	Interference Day: Heat	I2	HF5B	HEATD
91	A2	Interference Day: Fog	I2	HF5B	FOG
92	A2	Interference Day: Darkness	I2	HF5B	DARKD
93	A2	Inter. Day: Noise Distractions	I2	HF5B	NOISED
94	A2	Inter. Day: Visual Distractions	I2	HF5B	VISUALD
95	A2	Inter. Day: Boredom	I2	HF5B	BOREDOMD
96	A2	Interference Day: Fatigue	I2	HF5B	FATIGUED
97	A2	Inter. Day: Physical Discomfort	I2	HF5B	PHYSDISD
98	A2	Inter. Day: Dirty/Damaged Sights	I2	HF5B	BADSGHTD
99	A2	Interference Day: Thermal Imagery	I2	HF5B	TEIMAGED

TABLE A-16 (CONT). OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE: SUMMARY (HF5B) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
100	A2	Inter. Day: Mag Level of Optics	I2	HF5B	OPTMAGD	
101	A2	Inter. Day: Light Orientation	I2	HF5B	LIGHTORD	
102	A2	Inter. Night: Sun Glare	I2	HF5B	GLAREN	
103	A2	Interference Night: Dust	I2	HF5B	DUSTN	
104	A2	Interference Night: Heat	I2	HF5B	HEATN	
105	A2	Interference Night: Fog	I2	HF5B	FOG	
106	A2	Interference Night: Darkness	I2	HF5B	DARKN	
107	A2	Inter. Night: Noise Distractions	I2	HF5B	NOISEN	
108	A2	Inter. Night: Visual Distractions	I2	HF5B	VISUALN	
109	A2	Inter. Night: Boredom	I2	HF5B	BOREDOMN	
110	A2	Inter. Night: Fatigue	I2	HF5B	FATIGUEN	
111	A2	Inter. Night: Physical Discomfort	I2	HF5B	PHYSDISN	
112	A2	Inter. Night: Dirty/Damage Sights	I2	HF5B	BADSGHTN	
113	A2	Inter. Night: Thermal Imagery	I2	HF5B	THIMPGEN	
114	A2	Inter. Night: Mag Level of Optics	I2	HF5B	OPTMAGN	
115	A2	Inter. Night: Light Orientation	I2	HF5B	LIGHTORN	
116	I5	Inter. - Comment	CMT	HF5B	INTERCMT	

TABLE A-17. OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF7) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	A5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF7	FCN	
2	A8	Player Identification	SM	HF7	PLAYER	N/A
3	A3	Julian Date	JU	HF7	DATE	N/A
4	A1	Operator Role(s) Performed	ROL	HF7	ROLE	N/A
5	A8	Other Crew Member	SM	HF7	OTHRCRW	N/A
6	A1	Moving Problems - MOPP 0	YN	HF7	MVM0	SA 2.2.1.19
7	A1	Moving Problems - MOPP 4	YN	HF7	MVM4	SA 2.2.1.19
8	A1	Moving Problems-Wear Work Gloves	YN	HF7	MVWRKGL	SA 2.2.1.19
9	A1	Moving Problems-Wear Arctic Gloves	YN	HF7	MVARGL	SA 2.2.1.19

TABLE A-17 (CONT). OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF7) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
10	A1	Moving Problems-Nighttime	YN	HF7	MVNIGHT	SA 2.2.1.19
11	A1	Moving Problems - Other Described	YN	HF7	MVOTH	SA 2.2.1.19
12	I5	Moving Problems - Other	CMT	HF7	MVOTHDES	SA 2.2.1.19
13	I5	Moving Problems - Comment	CMT	HF7	MVCMT	SA 2.2.1.19
14	A1	Problems Assembling-MOPP 0	YN	HF7	ASEM0	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
15	A1	Problems Assembling-MOPP 4	YN	HF7	ASEM4	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
16	A1	Problems Assembling-Wear Work Glvs	YN	HF7	ASBWRKGL	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
17	A1	Problems Assembling-Wear Arctic Glvs	YN	HF7	ASBARGL	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
18	A1	Problems Assembling - Nighttime	YN	HF7	ASBNIGHT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
19	A1	Problems Assembling-Other Described	YN	HF7	ASBGOTH	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
20	I5	Problems Assembling - Other	CMT	HF7	ASBOTDES	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
21	I5	Problems Assembling - Comment	CMT	HF7	ASBGCMT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
22	A1	During Assembly Prob - Power Supply	YN	HF7	ASBPWR	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
23	A1	During Assembly Prob - Decoy Image	YN	HF7	ASBDCIMG	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
24	A1	During Assembly Prob - Antenna	YN	HF7	ASBANT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
25	A1	During Assembly Prob-Stakes	YN	HF7	ASBSTAKE	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
26	A1	During Assembly Prob-Radar Reflector	YN	HF7	ASBREFL	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
27	A1	During Assembly Prob-Repair Kit	YN	HF7	ASBKIT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
28	A1	During Assembly Prob - Poles	YN	HF7	ASBPOL	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
29	A1	During Assembly Prob-Transport Bags	YN	HF7	ASBHAGS	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
30	A1	During Assembly Prob-Other	YN	HF7	ASBOTH	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
31	I5	During Assembly Prob-Other Describe	CMT	HF7	ASBODES	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
32	I5	During Assembly Prob - Comment	CMT	HF7	ASBCMT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
33	A1	Two Soldier Requirement Appropriate	YN	HF7	TWORQD	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
34	I5	Two Soldier Requirement Comment	CMT	HF7	TWORQCMT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
35	I5	Concerns with Deployment	CMT	HF7	DEPLCMT	SA 2.2.1.19, SA 2.2.1.20
36	A1	Power Supply Assy, On/Off - MOPP 0	YN	HF7	PSAMO	SA 2.2.1.20

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
37	A1	Power Supply Assy, On/Off - MOPP 4	YN	HF7	PSAM4	SA 2.2.1.20
38	A1	PSA, On/Off - Work Gloves	YN	HF7	PSAWRKGL	SA 2.2.1.20
39	A1	PSA, On/Off - Arctic Gloves	YN	HF7	PSAARGL	SA 2.2.1.20
40	A1	PSA, On/Off - Nighttime	YN	HF7	PSANIGHT	SA 2.2.1.20
41	A1	PSA, On/Off - Other	YN	HF7	PSAOTH	SA 2.2.1.20
42	I5	PSA, On/Off - Other Described	CMT	HF7	PSAOTDES	SA 2.2.1.20

TABLE A-17 (CONT). OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF7) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #

43	I5	PSA, On/Off - Comment	CMT	HF7	PSACMT	SA 2.2.1.20
44	A1	Operating Instructions - Content	YN	HF7	CONTENT	SA 2.2.1.20
45	A1	Operating Instructions - Quantity	YN	HF7	QUANT	SA 2.2.1.20
46	A1	Operating Instructions - Location	YN	HF7	LOC	SA 2.2.1.20
47	A1	Operating Instructions - Other	YN	HF7	INSOTH	SA 2.2.1.20
48	I5	Operating Instrct - Other Describe	CMT	HF7	INSOTDES	SA 2.2.1.20
49	I5	Operating Instrct - Comment	CMT	HF7	INSCMT	SA 2.2.1.20
50	I5	Other Operating Problems	CMT	HF7	OPPROB	SA 2.2.1.20
51	A1	Disassembly Conditions - MOPP 0	YN	HF7	DASBM0	SA 2.2.1.20
52	A1	Disassembly Conditions - MOPP 4	YN	HF7	DASBM4	SA 2.2.1.20
53	A1	Disassembly Conditions - Wk Gloves	YN	HF7	DASBWKGL	SA 2.2.1.20
54	A1	Disassembly Conditions - Arctic Gloves	YN	HF7	DASBARGL	SA 2.2.1.20
55	A1	Disassy Conditions - Nighttime	YN	HF7	DASBNITE	SA 2.2.1.20
56	A1	Disassy Conditions - Other	YN	HF7	DASBOTH	SA 2.2.1.20
57	I5	Disassy Conditions - Other Describe	CMT	HF7	DASBODES	SA 2.2.1.20
58	I5	Disassy Conditions - Comment	CMT	HF7	DASECMT	SA 2.2.1.20
59	A1	Disassembly Parts - Power Supply	YN	HF7	DASEPOWR	SA 2.2.1.20
60	A1	Disassembly Parts - Decoy Image	YN	HF7	DASBDCIM	SA 2.2.1.20
61	A1	Disassembly Parts - Antenna	YN	HF7	DASBANT	SA 2.2.1.20
62	A1	Disassembly Parts - Stakes	YN	HF7	DASBSTAK	SA 2.2.1.20
63	A1	Disassy Parts - Radar Reflectors	YN	HF7	DASBREFL	SA 2.2.1.20
64	A1	Disassy Parts - Repair Kit	YN	HF7	DASBKIT	SA 2.2.1.20
65	A1	Disassembly Parts - Poles	YN	HF7	DASBPOL	SA 2.2.1.20
66	A1	Disassembly Parts - Transport Bags	YN	HF7	DASBBAGS	SA 2.2.1.20
67	A1	Disassembly Parts - Other	YN	HF7	DASBPOTH	SA 2.2.1.20
68	I5	Disassembly Parts - Other Described	CMT	HF7	DASBPDES	SA 2.2.1.20
69	I5	Disassembly Parts - Comment	CMT	HF7	DASBPCMT	SA 2.2.1.20
70	A1	Repackaging Conditions - MOPP 0	YN	HF7	RPKM0	SA 2.2.1.20
71	A1	Repackaging Conditions - MOPP 4	YN	HF7	RPKM4	SA 2.2.1.20
72	A1	Repackaging Conditions - Wk Gloves	YN	HF7	RPKWRKGL	SA 2.2.1.20
73	A1	Repackaging Cond. - Arctic Glvs	YN	HF7	RPKARGL	SA 2.2.1.20
74	A1	Repackaging Conditions - Nighttime	YN	HF7	RPKNIGHT	SA 2.2.1.20
75	A1	Repackaging Conditions - Other	YN	HF7	RPKOTH	SA 2.2.1.20

TABLE A-17 (CONT). OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF7) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
76	I5	Repackaging Cond. - Other Describe	CMT	HF7	RPKOTDES	SA 2.2.1.20
77	I5	Repackaging Cond. - Comment	CMT	HF7	RPKCMT	SA 2.2.1.20
78	A1	Repackaging Parts - Power Supply	YN	HF7	RPKPOWR	SA 2.2.1.20
79	A1	Repackaging Parts - Decoy Image	YN	HF7	RPKDECOY	SA 2.2.1.20
80	A1	Repackaging Parts - Antenna	YN	HF7	RPKANT	SA 2.2.1.20
81	A1	Repackaging Parts - Stakes	YN	HF7	RPKSTAKE	SA 2.2.1.20
82	A1	Repackaging Parts - Radar Refectors	YN	HF7	RPKREFL	SA 2.2.1.20
83	A1	Repackaging Parts - Repair Kit	YN	HF7	RPLKIT	SA 2.2.1.20
84	A1	Repackaging Parts - Poles	YN	HF7	RPKPOLE	SA 2.2.1.20
85	A1	Repackaging Parts - Transport Bags	YN	HF7	RPKBAG	SA 2.2.1.20
86	A1	Repackaging Parts - Other	YN	HF7	RPKPOTH	SA 2.2.1.20
87	I5	Repackaging Parts - Other Described	CMT	HF7	RPKPODES	SA 2.2.1.20
88	I5	Repackaging Parts - Comment	CMT	HF7	RPKPCMT	SA 2.2.1.20
89	I5	Concerns re: Disassembly/Repack	CMT	HF7	CONCERNS	SA 2.2.1.20
90	A1	Rate HFE Design of MCCD	ABI	HF7	HFEMCCD	SA 6.1.2.1
91	I5	Rate HFE Design of MCCD - Comment	CMT	HF7	HFECMT	SA 6.1.2.1
92	I5	Safety/Health - Deploying	CMT	HF7	SHDEPLOY	SA 7.1.2.1
93	I5	Safety/Health - Setting Up	CMT	HF7	SHSETUP	SA 7.1.2.1
94	I5	Safety/Health - Operating	CMT	HF7	SHOPER	SA 7.1.2.1
95	I5	Safety/Health - Prep to Move	CMT	HF7	SHMOVE	SA 7.1.2.1
96	I5	Safety/Health - Repackaging	CMT	HF7	SHREPKG	SA 7.1.2.1
97	A1	Safety/Health - Other	CMT	HF7	SHOTHR	SA 7.1.2.1
98	I5	Rate Warning Labels Adequacy	ABI	HF7	LABELS	SA 7.1.2.1
99	I5	Warning Labels - Comment	CMT	HF7	LABELCMT	SA 7.1.2.1
100	A1	Other Safety/Health Concerns	CMT	HF7	SHCMT	SA 7.1.2.1
101	A1	PMCS - Power Supply Assembly	YN	HF7	PMCSPPWR	
102	A1	PMCS - Image Assembly	YN	HF7	PMCSDCIM	
103	A1	PMCS - Antenna Assembly	YN	HF7	PMCSANT	
104	A1	PMCS - Stakes	YN	HF7	PMCSSSTAK	
105	A1	PMCS - Radar Corner Reflector Assy	YN	HF7	PMCSREFL	
106	A1	PMCS - Repair Kit	YN	HF7	PMCSKIT	
107	A1	PMCS - Poles	YN	HF7	PMCSPOLE	
		PMCS - Decoy Transport Bag	YN	HF7	PMCSBAG	
TABLE A-17 (CONT). OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF7) FILE RECORD FORMAT						
Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
108	A1	PMCS - Other	YN	HF7	PMCSOTH	
109	I5	PMCS - Other Described	CMT	HF7	PMCSODES	
110	I5	PMCS - Comment	CMT	HF7	PMCSMT	
111	A1	Adequacy of Operator PMCS Proc	ABI	HF7	PMCSPROC	
112	I5	Adqcy of Operator PMCS Proc - Comt	CMT	HF7	PROCCMT	

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
113	A1	Adequacy of Oper Troubleshoot Proc	ABI	HF7	OPTRBL	
114	I5	Adqcy of Oprtr Trblshtg Proc - Comt	CMT	HF7	TRBLCMT	
115	A1	Adequacy of Oprtr Maintenance Proc	ABI	HF7	OPMAINT	
116	I5	Adqcy of Oprtr Maint Proc - Comment	CMT	HF7	MAINTCMT	
117	A1	Adequacy of Repair Kit	ABI	HF7	REPKIT	SA 3.1.2.1
118	I5	Adequacy of Repair Kit - Comment	CMT	HF7	KITCMT	SA 3.1.2.1
119	A1	Training Adequate After Experience	YN	HF7	TRNADEQ	
120	I5	Training Adequate After Experience	CMT	CMT	HF7	TRNADCMT
121	I5	Operator Training Concerns/Comments	CMT	HF7	OPTRNCMT	

TABLE A-18. OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE: PHASE III ONLY (HF7A) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	A5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF7A	FCN	
2	A8	Player Identification	SM	HF7A	PLAYER	N/A
3	A3	Julian Date	JU	HF7A	DATE	N/A
4	A1	Operator Role(s) Performed	ROL	HF7A	ROLE	N/A
5	A8	Other Crew Member	SM	HF7A	OTHRCRW	N/A
6	I5	Moving/Deploying MCCD Comments	CMT	HF7A	MVCMT	
7	I5	Operating the MCCD Comments	CMT	HF7A	OPCMT	
8	I5	Recovery/Repackaging MCCD Comments	CMT	HF7A	RECCMT	
9	I5	Human Factors Issues Comments	CMT	HF7A	HFCMT	
10	I5	Safety/Health Hazards Comments	CMT	HF7A	SHCMT	
11	I5	Operator PMCS/TRBL/MAINT Comments	CMT	HF7A	PMSCMT	
12	I5	Doctrine Assessment for MCCD Comts	CMT	HF7A	DOCTCMT	

TABLE A-18 (CONT). OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE: PHASE III ONLY (HF7A) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
13	I5	Tactics Assessment for MCCD Comts	CMT	HF7A	TACTCMT	
14	I5	Employ Techniques Assessment Comts	CMT	HF7A	EMPLCMT	
15	A1	Add Use of MCCD to Defense Prep SOP	YN	HF7A	SOPDEF	
16	A1	Use MCCD to Enhance Survivability	YN	HF7A	SURVIVE	
17	A1	Use MCCD Improve Lethality to Enemy	YN	HF7A	LETHAL	
18	A1	Benefits Locating by Friendly Veh	YN	HF7A	PLACBENE	
19	A1	Restrict Locating MCCD by Friendly	YN	HF7A	PLACREST	
20	A1	Make MCCD Appear More Realistic	YN	HF7A	REALIST	
21	A1	Use of MCCD Add to SOP/FRAG Orders	YN	HF7A	SOPFRAG	
22	I5	Add MCCD into Tactical Ops Comment	CMT	HF7A	TACOPCMT	
23	A1	Understand Basic Decept Principles	YN	HF7A	DECEPTN	
24	A1	Use of MCCD in High Command Intent	YN	HF7A	EMPHCMD	
25	A1	Rpt MCCD Use Other Units/High CMD	YN	HF7A	RPTUSE	

26	A1	MCCD not used in Place of Real	YN	HF7A	REPLREAL
27	A5	Use MCCD in Current Army Doctrine	CMT	HF7A	EMPCMT
28	I5	Actual MCCD Impact on Red Effect	CMT	HF7A	ACREDIMP
29	I5	Potential MCCD Impact of Red Effect	CMT	HF7A	POREDIMP
30	I5	Actual MCCD Impact of Blue Effect	CMT	HF7A	ACBLUIMP
31	I5	Potent MCCD Impact on Blue Effect	CMT	HF7A	POBLUIMP
32	I5	Tactics and Doctrine Concerns	CMT	HF7A	TACDOCMT
33	A1	Operator Training Adequate	YN	HF7A	OPTRADEQ
34	I5	Operator Training Adequacy Comments	CMT	HF7A	TRADQCMT
35	I5	Fastest Set Up Technique/Sequence	CMT	HF7A	SETUPCMT
36	I5	Operator Training Concerns Comments	CMT	HF7A	OPTRCMT

TABLE A-19. SME ASSESSMENT FORM (HF8) FILE RECORD FORMAT

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	HF8	FCN	N/A
2	A8	Player Identification	SM	HF8	PLAYER	N/A
3	I3	Julian Date	JU	HF8	DATE	N/A
4	I5	Assess Doctrine, Tactics, Employ	CMT	HF8	DOCTRINE	SA 4.1.1.4
5	I5	Assess Human Factors and Enguring	CMT	HF8	HFE	SA 6.1.2.2
6	I5	Describe Potential Safety Problems	CMT	HF8	SAFETY	SA 7.1.2.2
7	I5	Describe Potential Health Hazards	CMT	HF8	HEALTH	SA 7.1.2.2
8	I5	Obsrved MCCD Impact on Red Effctvnes	CMT	HF8	OBSRED	SA 8.1.9.1
9	I5	Potl MCCD Impact on Red Effctvns	CMT	HF8	IMPRED	SA 8.1.9.3
10	I5	Obsrvd MCCD Impact on Blue Effects	CMT	HF8	OBSBLUE	SA 8.1.9.2
11	I5	Potl MCCD Impact on Blue Effectvness	CMT	HF8	IMPBLUE	SA 8.1.9.4
12	I5	Adequacy of Repair Parts/Kit	CMT	HF8	REPAIR	DR 3.1.2.3
13	I5	Additional SME Comments	CMT	HF8	COMMENTS	

TABLE A-20. PERFORMANCE AND HUMAN FACTORS COMMENTS (CMT & HFCMT) FILE RECORD

Field #	Field Size	Field Label	Data Type	Source	Variable Name	Assoc. D.R. (s)
1	I5	Comment Control Number	CMT	DMC	CMCTRLNU	
2	I5	Form Control Number	FCN	DMC	FCNCMT	
3	A4	Source Form or File ID	FRM	DMC	FORMFILE	
4	A8	Variable Associated to Comment	VAR	DMC	VARIABLE	
5	A40	Description of Comment Text	TXT	DMC	DESCRIP	
6	A500	Comment	TXT	DMC	COMMENT	

NOTE: Each comment record is associated directly to a comment field in the data files. In the specific field identified by the form, form control number, form sequence number, and the variable name, the comment control number will be reflected in the data file field.

A-6. DATA FILE CREATION DIAGRAMS. The data reduction process that created the level 3 files is detailed in the following diagrams: creation of the MCCD Deployment and Recovery (MD3) file (figure A-1); creation of the Target Determination (TD3) file (figure A-2); creation of the Engagement Assessment (EA3) file (figure A-3); and creation of the HF files (figure A-4).

A-7. DATA COLLECTION FORMS. The following forms were used for manual data collection.

a. Performance data manual data collection forms. The following forms were used to collect performance data and control data.

1) Data Collection Form ICF, Phase II. Figure A-5 presents the manual form used to collect trial control data during phase II trials.

2) Data Collection Form ICF, Phase III. Figure A-6 presents the manual form used to collect trial control data during phase III trials.

3) Data Collection Form TDF. Figure A-7 presents the manual form was used to collect target determinations made by individual observers during phase II.




Figure A-1. Creation of the MCCR deployment and recovery (MD3) file.




Figure A-2. Creation of the target determination (TD3) file.




Figure A-3. Creation of the engagement assessment (EA3) file.




Figure A-4. Creation of the human factors files.

MCCD IOTE ICC LOG

CONTROL DATA

1. Data Collector: _____ 2.DMC Control No.: _____
3. Trial Date: ____/____/93 4.RT Session ID: _____
MM DD
5. Phase: II III
6. Real time Session: (Note on page 4 for interruptions)
Start Session ____:____:____ Stop Session ____:____:____

TRIAL DATA

1. Player Load List: Please attach a copy of the PLL and annotate active BLUE and RED players at start trial and make notations of any changes in B units, LBUs, player IDs, etc.
2. Trial ID: _____
3. TRIAL Start: ____:____:____ TRIAL Stop: ____:____:____
4. BLUE UNIT ID: Phase II Phase III
TNK ____ CFV ____ M ____
TANK4MCCD0
TANK4MCCD1
TANK4MCCD2
TANK4MCCD3
TANK4MCCD4
5. Number of Blue players and MCCDs, by type, initiating trial:

6. TYPE OF BLUE MISSION: STA = Stationary Target - II
DMW = Defend with MCCDs - III
DWO = Defend without MCCDs - III
7. Number of Red Players, by type, initiating trial:

Figure A-5. Data collection form ICF, phase II.

8. TYPE OF RED FORCE: SO = Stationary Observation - II
MO = Moving Observation - II
DA = Deliberate Attack - III
MC = Movement to Contact - III
9. RED UNIT ID: BMP ___ INDV ___ - II BM ___ - II
TANK ___ BMP ___ - III
10. Trial Location: (Observer's Position)
CSV = Central Stoney ESM = E. San Miguelito
NAV = Nacimiento Valley WSM = W. San Miguelito
UGV = Upper Gabilan S8D = 8-Delta
11. LIGHT LEVEL: D = Day 12. MOPP LEVEL: Mopp 0 (BD)
N = Night GLOVES: None (1)
13. RANGE BAND: LO = Long ME = Medium
SH = Short LM = Long to Medium
MS = Medium to Short
14. OBSERVER'S MOTION: M = Moving S = Stationary
15. NUMBER OF MCCDs DEPLOYED: _____
16. ITERATIONS:

	Start Times	Target Presentations	Stop Times
1.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___
2.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___
3.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___
4.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___
5.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___
6.	___:___:___	___	___:___:___

17. TRIAL INTERRUPTION (If Applicable):
Start of Interruption ___:___:___ End: ___:___:___
New Trial ID (If applicable) _____
Reason for interruption: _____

END OF TRIAL DATA

1. TRIAL TERMINATIONS Normal Weather
Instrumentation failure Safety
Go/No Go Criteria
Other (please explain) _____

Figure A-5. Data Collection Form ICF, Phase II. (Continued)

2. Number of Blue Players and MCCDs, by type, finishing the trial:

3. Number of Red Players, by type, finishing the trial:

4. ID of players that were combat losses:

BLUE:

RED:

5. Number of players that were admin losses:

BLUE:

RED:

6. Annotate any player or computer anomalies that occurred during the trial (i.e. 0% or low responders, constant "Fire No Pair" events, polling rate changes, etc.)

4) Data collection form red force player data log (RPD). Figure A-8 presents the manual form used during trials to record Red force control data and position.

5) Data collection form blue force player data log (BFP). Figure A-9 presents the manual form used during trials to record Blue Force control data such as vehicle or MCCD, crew IDs, and position.

6) Data collection form MCCD decoy operation - phase II (MDF/P1). Figure A-10 presents the form used to collect either target line or holding area deployment and recovery data during phase II. The form recorded up to three holding area deployments.

7) Data collection form MCCD decoy operation - phase III (MDF/P2). Figure A-11 presents the form used to collect defensive position deployment and recovery data during phase III FOF.

8) Data collection form VID1. Figure A-12 (in 14" by 11" computer size) presents the form used by video reduction to record determination event data during phase II. Multiple records were generated using this form.

9) Data Collection Form VID2. Figure A-13 presents the form used by video reduction to record FOF engagement data, specifically red engagements of blue.

Form VID2 (2/16/93)VED FCN: _____
MCCD IOTE

Form VID2 - PHASE III, REDFOR ENGAGING BLUEFOR

Added Acquisition/Engagement? Y / N

A. Control Data.

A1. Trial ID: _____ (CON)
A2. Real Time ID: _____ (CON)
A3. BLUEFOR Vehicle/MCCD Target ID: _____
(Circle Source) _____ (QC4/Video)
A4. REDFOR Vehicle/ID: _____ (Assigned)

Target Acquisition Data

B1. Acquirer/Firer ID: _____ (Video)
B2. Type of Acquirer/Firer ID: _____ (Video)
B3. Target ID: _____ (Video)
B4. Actual Target Type: _____ (Video)
B5. Position of acquiring crew member: _____ (Audio)
B6. Time of target acquisition: ____:____:____.____ (Video)
B7. Type BLUEFOR Target Acquired: _____ (Audio)
B8. Method/Optics Used to Acquire: _____ (Video)
B9. Field of View Used to Acquire: _____ (Video)
B10. Exposure of Acquired Target: _____ (Video)
B11. Motion of Acquired Target: _____ (Video)
B12. Motion of Acquiring Vehicle: _____ (Video)

Figure A-13. Data Collection Form VID2.

Target Determination Data (REDFOR Determining BLUEFOR Targets):

- C1. Time of Target Determination: _____:_____:_____._____
(Video)
- C2. Determination sequence of this same target
by the same determiner: _____ (Video)
- C3. Target Category Determined by Observer: _____ (Audio)
- C4. Exposure of BLUEFOR Target at Determination: _____ (Video)
- C5. Position Determining REDFOR crew member: _____ (Audio)
- C6. Method/Optics Used at Determination: _____ (Video)
- C7. Field of View Used at Determination: _____ (Video)
- C8. REDFOR Vehicle Motion at Determination: _____ (Video)
- C9. BLUEFOR Vehicle Motion at Determination: _____ (Video)

Target Engagement Data (Phase III)

- D1. Engagement Sequence, Same Target, Same Firer: _____ (Video)
- D2. Status of Target at Engagement Time: (Alive Dead) (Video)
- D3. Time of Engagement (Firing): _____:_____:_____._____ (QC4/Video)
- D4. Time of Engagement Assessment: _____:_____:_____._____
(QC4)
- D5. Optics Used for Engagement: _____ (Video)
- D6. Field of View Used for Engagement: _____ (Video)
- D7. Weapon Used for Engagement: _____ (QC4/Video)
- D8. Ammo Type Used for Engagement: _____ (QC4/Video)
- D9. Position of Engaging Crew Member: _____ (Audio)
- D10. Motion of Engaging Vehicle at Engagement: _____ (Video)
- D11. Motion of Target at Time Of Engagement: _____ (Video)
- D12. Exposure of Target at Time Of Engagement: _____ (Video)

*** Video Record Flag : _____

COMMENT REGARDING THIS EVENT :

Figure A-13 (CONT). Data collection form VID2.

10) Data Collection Form VID3. Used by video reduction, this form was used to record FOF engagement data, specifically blue engagements of red. The VID3 does not have determination data requirements that the VID2 does have. This manual form is presented in figure A-14.

b. HF data manual data collection forms. The HF manual data collection forms are presented in the following figures. Table A-21 lists the HF forms. Two forms, HF9 and HF10, were never used to collect data.

1) Data Collection Form Player Demographics (HF1). This manual form is presented in figure A-15.

2) Data Collection Form Player Demographics/Anthropometrics - Observers (HF1A). This manual form is presented in figure A-16.

3) Data Collection Form Player Demographics/Anthropometrics - Operators (HF1B). This manual form is presented in figure A-17.

4) Data Collection Form Player Training Certification (HF3). A manual form was not used to collect this data; certification data was presented in a memo, and data extracted for a file.

5) Data Collection Form Player Training Questionnaire (HF4A). This manual form is presented in figure A-18.

6) Data Collection Form Player Training Questionnaire - Doctrine and Tactics. (HF4B). This manual form is presented in figure A-19.

Form VID3 - PHASE III, BLUEFOR ENGAGING REDFOR

Added Acquisition/Engagement? Y / N

A. Control Data.

A1. Trial ID: _____ (CON)
 A2. Real Time ID: _____ (CON)
 A3. BLUEFOR Vehicle: _____ (Assigned)
 A4. REDFOR Vehicle Target ID: _____
 (Circle Source) _____ (QC4/Video)

Target Acquisition Data

B1. Acquirer/Firer ID: _____ (Video)
 B2. Type of Acquirer/Firer ID: _____ (Video)
 B3. Target ID: _____ (Video)
 B4. Actual Target Type: _____ (Video)
 B5. Position of acquiring crew member: _____ (Audio)
 B6. Time of target acquisition: _____:_____:_____.____ (Video)
 B7. Type REDFOR Target Acquired: _____ (Audio)
 B8. Method/Optics Used to Acquire: _____ (Video)
 B9. Field of View Used to Acquire: _____ (Video)
 B10. Exposure of Acquired Target: _____ (Video)
 B11. Motion of Acquired Target: _____ (Video)
 B12. Motion of Acquiring Vehicle: _____ (Video)

Figure A-14. Data collection form VID3.

Target Determination Data --- N/A BLUEFOR ENGAGING REDFOR

Data Entry - code fields "777"

Target Engagement Data (Phase III)

D1. Engagement Sequence, Same Target, Same Firer: ____ (Video)

D2. Status of Target at Engagement Time: (Alive Dead) (Video)

D3. Time of Engagement (Firing):

(QC4/Video)

____:____:____.____

D4. Time of Engagement Assessment:

(QC4)

____:____:____.____

D5. Optics Used for Engagement:

____ (Video)

D6. Field of View Used for Engagement:

____ (Video)

D7. Weapon Used for Engagement:

____ (QC4/Video)

D8. Ammo Type Used for Engagement:

____ (QC4/Video)

D9. Position of Engaging Crew Member:

____ (Audio)

D10. Motion of Engaging Vehicle at Engagement:

____ (Video)

D11. Motion of Target at Time Of Engagement:

____ (Video)

D12. Exposure of Target at Time Of Engagement:

____ (Video)

*** Video Record Flag : _____

COMMENT REGARDING THIS EVENT :

Figure A-14 (CONT). Data collection form VID3.

TABLE A-21. MCCD IOTE MANPRINT DATA COLLECTION FORMS

Collection Form	Data	Collected	
		From	Period
HF1	Player Demographics	Trainers	Phase I
HF1A	Player Demographics Anthropometrics	Observers	Phase I
HF1B	Player Demographics/ Anthropometrics	Operators	Phase I
HF3	Player Training Certification	Operators	Phase I
HF4A	Player Training Questionnaire	Operators	Phase I, Post
HF4B	Player Training Questionnaire: Doctrine and Tactics	OPFOR	Phase I, Post
HF4C	Unit/Direct Support Training Questionnaire: Fuel/Electrical System Repair Course	Mechanics/ Direct Spt	Phase I, Post
HF4D	Unit/Direct Support Training Questionnaire: Power Supply	Mechanics/ Direct Spt	Phase I, Post
HF4E	Trainer Training Questionnaire	Trainers	Phase I, Post
HF5	Observer Questionnaire: Day	Observers	Phase II
HF5A	Observer Questionnaire: Phase 3	Observers	Phase III
HF5B	Observer Questionnaire: Summary	Observers	Phase III
HF6	Observer Questionnaire: Night	Observers	Phase II
HF7	Operator Questionnaire	Operators	Phase II
HF7A	Operator Questionnaire: Phase 3	Operators	Phase III
HF8 III	SME Assessment Form	SMEs	Phase II,

TABLE A-21 (CONT). MCCD IOTE MANPRINT DATA COLLECTION FORMS

Collection		Collected	
Form	Data	From	Period
HF9 III	Test Directorate Observation Form	Key Personnel	Phase II,
HF10 II,	Safety and Health Hazards Incident Report	All	Phase I, III

MCCD PLAYER DEMOGRAPHIC AND ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (HF 1)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. Demographic and anthropometric information is being collected to assist TEC in describing the MCCD IOTE test participants. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publications of this information will not include your name. Your name is required on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. Any information you provide will be disclosed only to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Name: _____/_____/_____
 Last name First name MI

Date of Birth: ____/____/_____
 Day Month Year

Rank: _____ Time in Service (yrs/months): _____

Unit: _____ Time in Unit (yrs/months): _____

Full Primary MOS: _____

Time in Primary MOS (yrs/months): _____

Full Secondary MOS: _____

Time in Secondary MOS (yrs/months): _____

Which MOS are you currently working in (check one):

Primary: _____ Secondary: _____ Other: _____

What is your position during this test?

BC/TC _____ Gunner _____ Loader _____ Driver _____ Mechanic _____

Observer _____ Other: _____

Figure A-15. Data collection form HF1.

MILITARY EXPERIENCE

Is this your first experience with the Multispectral Close Combat Decoy (MCCD)?

Yes _____ No _____

If not, what other MCCD training, testing, etc. have you been involved with?

List all military courses and assignments which you have received training or practical experience you feel is relevant to the MCCD IOTE (use back side if necessary).

Course / Assignment	Location	Date
_____	_____	From _____ To _____
_____	_____	From _____ To _____
_____	_____	From _____ To _____
_____	_____	From _____ To _____

Do you have combat experience?

Yes _____ No _____

If yes, location: _____ Date: From _____ To _____

CIVILIAN EDUCATION

_____ No High School Diploma _____ Some College

_____ GED _____ Associate Degree

_____ High School Diploma _____ Bachelors Degree

Other: _____

ANTHROPOMETRIC FORM FOR MCCD IOTE BLUE FORCE PARTICIPANTS (HF1A)

Name: _____

WEIGHT _____ HEIGHT _____

HANDEDNESS: Right _____ Left _____

Figure A-16. Data collection form HF1A.

ANTHROPOMETRIC FORM FOR MCCD IOTE OBSERVERS (HF1B)

Name: _____

Color Blind:

Yes _____ No _____ Which plate(s): _____

Do you wear corrective lenses?

Yes _____ No _____

If yes, glasses or contacts? _____

What will you wear in the field? _____

Visual Acuity:

CORRECTED UNCORRECTED

(R) _____ (R) _____

(L) _____ (L) _____

(Both) _____ (Both) _____

Figure A-17. Data collection form HF1B.

MCCD IOTE PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 4A)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name on this form is required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S.C. 3012. If you need additional space for comments, please use the back of this form.

NAME: _____

Do you feel adequately trained to perform the following tasks? If no, please comment below.

1. Assemble the MCCD for Operation:

Place decoy image assembly on the ground. YES NO N/A

Inspect front of image assembly and remove kinks or wrinkles from image material by tugging and adjusting position of material. YES NO N/A

2. Perform Before Operation PMCS on the MCCD.

YES NO N/A

Using Table 2-1. YES NO N/A

Perform visual inspection of decoy image assembly. YES NO N/A

3. Install/Operate Independent Power Source.

YES NO N/A

Position power switch to start, hold for 2 to 3 seconds, then release. YES NO N/A

Check warm air outlet to see whether heater starts and produces warm air. YES NO N/A

4. Perform During-Operation PMCS on MCCD.

YES NO N/A

Visually inspect decoy image assembly setup. YES NO N/A

Verify that radar corner reflector assemblies are expanded, set up, and properly aligned with front of decoy image assembly. YES NO N/A

5. Troubleshoot the MCCD System.

YES NO N/A

Use the symptom index and Table 4-1. YES NO N/A

Figure A-18. Data collection form HF4A.

- | | | | |
|---|-----|----|-----|
| 6. Perform After-Operation PMCS. | YES | NO | N/A |
| Wipe fuel spillage or leaks with a dry cloth. | YES | NO | N/A |
| Verify classification of fuel leak. | | | |
| Perform visual inspection of decoy set, looking for muddy, dirty, or wet parts. Clean, if necessary, using a cloth dampened with clean water. Dry all wet parts with a dry cloth or air-dry all components before placing in transport bag. | YES | NO | N/A |
| 7. Recover the MCCD System. | YES | NO | N/A |
| Disassemble the MCCD System. | YES | NO | N/A |
| Place decoy image assembly into transport bag, then place antenna assembly, stakes, radar corner reflector assemblies, and repair kit into transport bag. | YES | NO | N/A |
| Close transport bag, hook keeper with snap hook, then tighten side straps. | YES | NO | N/A |

COMMENTS:

Did have any problems performing any other tasks? YES NO N/A

Explain:

Do you have any comments concerning the following:

TopicsCovered: _____

Time Spent on Topics: _____

TrainingManuals/Materials: _____

Additional comments, concern, suggestions, etc. about the training program:

Figure A-18 (CONT). Data collection form HF4A.

MCCD IOTW PLAYER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 4B)

DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name on this form is required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S.C. 3012. If you need additional space for comments, please use the back of this form.

NAME: _____

DATE: _____

Do you feel adequately trained to perform the following tasks? If no, please comment below.

1. Incorporate the MCCD into tactical operations at platoon level:

Add use of the MCCD to standard operating procedures for preparing the defense.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Use the MCCD so as to enhance own survivability.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Use the MCCD to improve own lethality against the enemy/OPFOR.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Understand the benefits or disadvantages of placing the MCCD in front of, among, or behind friendly vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand the restrictions on placing the MCCD near friendly vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand techniques to make the MCCD appear more realistic when observed by the enemy/OPFOR.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Understand how use of the MCCD may be added to the standard operational orders and fragmentary orders issued to the platoon (to include graphic control measures).	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

2. Correctly employ the MCCD in accordance with current U.S. Army Doctrine:

Understand and apply the basic principles of deception.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Figure A-19. Data collection form HF4B.

Understand employment of the MCCD within the framework of the higher commanders' intent.	YES	NO	N/A
Understand requirements and methods for reporting use of MCCDs to adjacent units and higher headquarters.	YES	NO	N/A
Understand why the MCCD should never be used in place of real vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A

COMMENTS:

Did you have any problems performing any other tasks? YES NO N/A

Explain:

Do you have any comments concerning the following:

Topics Covered: _____

Time Spent on Topics: _____

Training Manuals/Materials: _____

Additional comments, concern, suggestions, etc. about the training program:

7) Data Collection Form Unit/DS Training Questionnaire: Fuel/Electrical System Repair Course (HF4C). This manual form is presented in figure A-20.

8) Data Collection Form Unit/DS Training Questionnaire: Power Supply (HF4D). This manual form is presented in figure A-21.

9) Data Collection Form Trainer Training Questionnaire (HF4E). This manual form is presented in figure A-22.

10) Data Collection Form Observer Questionnaire: Day (HF5). This manual form is presented in figure A-23.

11) Data Collection Form Observer Questionnaire: Phase 3 (HF5A). This manual form is presented in figure A-24.

12) Data Collection Form Observer Questionnaire: Summary (HF5B). This manual form is presented in figure A-25.

13) Data Collection Form Observer Questionnaire: Night (HF6). This manual form is presented in figure A-26.

14) Data Collection Form Operator Questionnaire (HF7). This manual form is presented in figure A-27.

15) Data Collection Form Operator Questionnaire: Phase 3 (HF7A). This manual form is presented in figure A-28.

MCCD IOTE UNIT/DIRECT SUPPORT TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4C)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name on this form is required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S.C. 3012. If you need additional space for comments, please use the back of this form.

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

1. Do you feel adequately trained to perform the following critical tasks?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Repair DC to DC Converter	Y	N	CA
Repair Control Unit	Y	N	CA
Test, Repair and Power Supply	Y	N	CA
Troubleshoot Power Supply	Y	N	CA
Perform Preventive Maintenance Checks And Services	Y	N	CA

COMMENTS:

2. Did you have any problems performing any other tasks? YES NO N/A

Explain:

3. Do you have any comments concerning the following:

Topics Covered: _____

Time Spent on Topics: _____

Training Manuals/Materials: _____

Additional comments, concerns, suggestions, etc. about the training program:

Figure A-20. Data collection form HF4C.

MCCD IOTE UNIT/DIRECT SUPPORT TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4D)

Multispectral Close Combat Decoy (MCCD) Power Supply Unit Maintenance
Training Course (63E/63T)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name on this form is required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S.C. 3012. If you need additional space for comments, please use the back of this form.

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

1. Do you feel adequately trained to perform the following critical tasks?

If no, then comment below:

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Test, Repair and Power Supply	Y	N	CA
Troubleshoot Power Supply	Y	N	CA
Perform Preventive Maintenance	Y	N	CA
Checks and Services (PMCS)	Y	N	CA
Repair or Replace Image Assembly	Y	N	CA

COMMENTS:

2. Did you have any problems performing any other tasks? YES NO N/A

Explain:

3. Do you have any comments concerning the following:

Topics Covered: _____

Time Spent on Topics: _____

Training Manuals/Materials: _____

Additional comments, concerns, suggestions, etc. about the training program:

Figure A-21. Data collection form HF4D.

MCCD IOTE TRAINER TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE (HF4E)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name on this form is required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S.C. 3012. If you need additional space for comments, please use the back of this form.

NAME: _____

DATE: _____

Do you feel the soldiers are adequately trained to perform all critical tasks?

YES NO N/A

If no, explain:

Did the soldiers have any problems performing any other tasks? YES NO N/A

Explain:

Do you have any comments concerning the following:

Topics Covered: _____

Time Spent on Topics: _____

Training Manuals/Materials: _____

Did you follow the POI?

YES NO N/A

Explain:

Do you have any suggestions to improve the POI or training? YES NO N/A

Explain:

Additional comments, concern, suggestions, etc. about the training program:

Additional comments, concerns, suggestions, etc. about the MCCD maintenance program.

Figure A-22. Data collection form HF4E.

MCCD IOTE OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 5)

--DAYTIME CONDITIONS ONLY--

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Observer Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

Position: _____ Crew ID: _____ Date: _____

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

1. At the LONG RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

2. At the MEDIUM RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A

Figure A-23. Data collection form HF5.

Please explain: _____

3. At the SHORT RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

4. ON THE MOVE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

5. Prior to the MCCD IOTE, what was your gunnery experience?
(Including previous assignments)

Vehicle Commander	_____ months	_____ Gunneries
Gunner	_____ months	_____ Gunneries
Driver	_____ months	_____ Gunneries

6. Have you ever participated in force-on-force maneuvers involving the MCCD or previous versions of vehicle decoys?

NO

YES ---> How many times?

Where? _____

7. Did any of the following items interfere with your ability to identify targets as REAL or DECOY?

	YES	NO	N/A
Sun Glare.....	Y	N	N/A
Dust.....	Y	N	N/A
Heat.....	Y	N	N/A
Fog.....	Y	N	N/A
Darkness.....	Y	N	N/A
Noise Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Visual Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Boredom.....	Y	N	N/A
Fatigue.....	Y	N	N/A
Physical Discomfort.....	Y	N	N/A
Dirty or Damaged Sights.....	Y	N	N/A
Quality of Thermal Imagery.....	Y	N	N/A
Magnification Level of Optics..	Y	N	N/A
Orientation of Lighting.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

8. During the trials, was there ever a point at which you felt like responding "I don't know" when asked if a target was REAL or DECOY?

NO (Please go to question 9.)

YES ---> Please check the statement that applies to you:

_____ I couldn't see a target at all.
(Happened approximately _____ times)

_____ I could see a target, but couldn't tell if it was REAL or DECOY.
(Happened approximately _____ times)

_____ Other: _____

9. Please comment on anything else having to do with target acquisition/identification that you feel affects the performance of the system:

MCCD IOTE OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 5A)

--PHASE III ONLY--

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Observer Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

Position: _____ Crew ID: _____ Date: _____

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

1. During any of the force-on-force engagements, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

Figure A-24. Data collection form HF5A.

2. During the force-on-force trials, did you ever engage a target that you felt was a decoy?

NO (Please go to question 3.)

YES ---> I engaged a target I felt was a decoy because:

(Happened approximately _____ times)

3. Did any of the following items interfere with your ability to identify targets as REAL or DECOY?

	YES	NO	N/A
Sun Glare.....	Y	N	N/A
Dust.....	Y	N	N/A
Heat.....	Y	N	N/A
Fog.....	Y	N	N/A
Darkness.....	Y	N	N/A
Noise Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Visual Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Boredom.....	Y	N	N/A
Fatigue.....	Y	N	N/A
Physical Discomfort.....	Y	N	N/A
Dirty or Damaged Sights.....	Y	N	N/A
Quality of Thermal Imagery.....	Y	N	N/A
Magnification Level of Optics..	Y	N	N/A
Orientation of Lighting.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

4. Please comment on anything else having to do with target acquisition/identification that you feel affects the performance of the system:

MCCD IOTE OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 5B)

--SUMMARY QUESTIONNAIRE--

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Observer Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

Position: _____ Crew ID: _____ Date: _____

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

1. At the LONG RANGE, please rank order the importance of the following cues in helping you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY (1 = Most Important, 10 = Least Important).

	DAYTIME	NIGHTTIME
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	_____	_____
NOISE.....	_____	_____
COLOR.....	_____	_____
SHAPE.....	_____	_____
THERMAL IMAGE.....	_____	_____
SIGNATURE.....	_____	_____
ASPECT ANGLE ("DEPTH").....	_____	_____
REFLECTION.....	_____	_____
WIND MOVEMENT.....	_____	_____
SHADOWS.....	_____	_____

Comments: _____

Figure A-25. Data collection form HF5B.

2. At the MEDIUM RANGE, please rank order the importance of the following cues in helping you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY (1 = Most Important, 10 = Least Important).

	DAYTIME	NIGHTTIME
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	_____	_____
NOISE.....	_____	_____
COLOR.....	_____	_____
SHAPE.....	_____	_____
THERMAL IMAGE.....	_____	_____
SIGNATURE.....	_____	_____
ASPECT ANGLE ("DEPTH").....	_____	_____
REFLECTION.....	_____	_____
WIND MOVEMENT.....	_____	_____
SHADOWS.....	_____	_____

Comments: _____

3. At the SHORT RANGE, please rank order the importance of the following cues in helping you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY (1 = Most Important, 10 = Least Important).

	DAYTIME	NIGHTTIME
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	_____	_____
NOISE.....	_____	_____
COLOR.....	_____	_____
SHAPE.....	_____	_____
THERMAL IMAGE.....	_____	_____
SIGNATURE.....	_____	_____
ASPECT ANGLE ("DEPTH").....	_____	_____
REFLECTION.....	_____	_____
WIND MOVEMENT.....	_____	_____
SHADOWS.....	_____	_____

Comments: _____

4. ON THE MOVE, please rank order the importance of the following cues in helping you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY (1 = Most Important, 10 = Least Important).

	DAYTIME	NIGHTTIME
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	_____	_____
NOISE.....	_____	_____
COLOR.....	_____	_____
SHAPE.....	_____	_____
THERMAL IMAGE.....	_____	_____
SIGNATURE.....	_____	_____
ASPECT ANGLE ("DEPTH").....	_____	_____
REFLECTION.....	_____	_____
WIND MOVEMENT.....	_____	_____
SHADOWS.....	_____	_____

Comments: _____

5. Please rank in order the following in terms of their ability to interfere with your ability to identify targets as REAL or DECOY (1 = Most Interference, 14 = Least Interference).

	DAYTIME	NIGHTTIME
Sun Glare.....	_____	_____
Dust.....	_____	_____
Heat.....	_____	_____
Fog.....	_____	_____
Darkness.....	_____	_____
Noise Distractions.....	_____	_____
Visual Distractions.....	_____	_____
Boredom.....	_____	_____
Fatigue.....	_____	_____
Physical Discomfort.....	_____	_____
Dirty or Damaged Sights.....	_____	_____
Quality of Thermal Imagery.....	_____	_____
Magnification Level of Optics..	_____	_____
Orientation of Lighting.....	_____	_____

Comments: _____

MCCD IOTE OBSERVER QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 6)

--NIGHTTIME CONDITIONS ONLY--

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Observer Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

Position: _____ Crew ID: _____ Date: _____

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

1. At the LONG RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

2. At the MEDIUM RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:.....	A	S	N	N/A

Figure A-26. Data collection form HF6.

Please explain: _____

3. At the SHORT RANGE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

4. ON THE MOVE, which of the following cues helped you to discern whether the target was REAL or DECOY?

	Always	Sometimes	Never	N/A
TARGET/BACKGROUND CONTRAST...	A	S	N	N/A
NOISE.....	A	S	N	N/A
COLOR.....	A	S	N	N/A
SHAPE.....	A	S	N	N/A
SIGNATURE.....	A	S	N	N/A
ASPECT ANGLE.....	A	S	N	N/A
REFLECTION.....	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A
OTHER:	A	S	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

5. Prior to the MCCD IOTE, what was your gunnery experience?
(Including previous assignments)

Vehicle Commander	_____ months	_____ Gunneries
Gunner	_____ months	_____ Gunneries
Driver	_____ months	_____ Gunneries

6. Have you ever participated in force-on-force maneuvers involving the MCCD or previous versions of vehicle decoys?

NO YES ---> How many times? _____
Where? _____

7. Did any of the following items interfere with your ability to identify targets as REAL or DECOY?

	YES	NO	N/A
Dust.....	Y	N	N/A
Heat.....	Y	N	N/A
Fog.....	Y	N	N/A
Darkness.....	Y	N	N/A
Noise Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Visual Distractions.....	Y	N	N/A
Boredom.....	Y	N	N/A
Fatigue.....	Y	N	N/A
Physical Discomfort.....	Y	N	N/A
Dirty or Damaged Sights.....	Y	N	N/A
Quality of Thermal Imagery.....	Y	N	N/A
Magnification Level of Optics..	Y	N	N/A
Orientation of Lighting.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A
Other:.....	Y	N	N/A

Please explain: _____

8. During the trials, was there ever a point at which you felt like responding "I don't know" when asked if a target was REAL or DECOY?

NO (Please go to question 9.)

YES ---> Please check the statement that applies to you:

_____ I couldn't see a target at all.
(Happened approximately _____ times)

_____ I could see a target, but couldn't tell if it was REAL or DECOY.
(Happened approximately _____ times)

_____ Other: _____

9. Please comment on anything else having to do with target acquisition/identification that you feel affects the performance of the system:

MCCD IOTE OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 7)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

MCCD Operator Role (Circle one): Leader Assistant

Other MCCD crew member: _____ Date: _____

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

1. Did you encounter any problems MOVING the MCCD to the assembly site under any of the following conditions?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
MOPP 0.....	Y	N	CA
MOPP 4.....	Y	N	CA
Wearing standard Army work gloves..	Y	N	CA
Wearing cold weather gloves.....	Y	N	CA
Nighttime.....	Y	N	CA
Other: ..	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

2. Did you encounter any problems ASSEMBLING the MCCD under any of the following conditions?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
MOPP 0.....	Y	N	CA
MOPP 4.....	Y	N	CA
Wearing standard Army work gloves..	Y	N	CA
Wearing cold weather gloves.....	Y	N	CA
Nighttime.....	Y	N	CA
Other: ..	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

Figure A-27. Data collection form HF7.

3. During MCCD ASSEMBLY did you encounter problems with any of the following components?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Power Supply Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Decoy Image Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Antenna Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Stakes.....	Y	N	CA
Radar corner reflector assemblies..	Y	N	CA
Repair kit.....	Y	N	CA
Poles.....	Y	N	CA
Transport Bags.....	Y	N	CA
Other: ..	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

4. Do you feel the TWO SOLDIER REQUIREMENT to deploy the MCCD is appropriate?

YES _____ NO _____ Cannot Assess _____

Please explain: _____

5. Please explain any other concerns you have associated with the DEPLOYMENT of the MCCD.

PART II. OPERATION

1. Did you encounter any problems turning the Power Supply ON or OFF under any of the following conditions?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
MOPP 0.....	Y	N	CA
MOPP 4.....	Y	N	CA
Wearing standard Army work gloves..	Y	N	CA
Wearing cold weather gloves.....	Y	N	CA
Nighttime.....	Y	N	CA
Other: ..	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

2. Do you feel that the OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS located on decals and instruction plates of the MCCD are adequate in terms of:

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Content.....	Y	N	CA
Quantity.....	Y	N	CA
Location.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "NO" responses: _____

3. Explain any other problems you encountered or concerns you have with the OPERATION of the MCCD:

PART III. RECOVERY AND REPACKAGING

1. Did you encounter any problems with PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT and DISASSEMBLY of the MCCD under any of the following conditions?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
MOPP 0.....	Y	N	CA
MOPP 4.....	Y	N	CA
Wearing standard Army work gloves..	Y	N	CA
Wearing cold weather gloves.....	Y	N	CA
Nighttime.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

2. During the PREPARATION FOR MOVEMENT and DISASSEMBLY of the MCCD did you encounter problems with any of the following components?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Power Supply Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Decoy Image Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Antenna Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Stakes.....	Y	N	CA
Radar corner reflector assemblies..	Y	N	CA
Repair kit.....	Y	N	CA
Poles.....	Y	N	CA
Transport Bags.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

3. Did you encounter any problems REPACKAGING the MCCD under any of the following conditions?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
MOFP 0.....	Y	N	CA
MOFP 4.....	Y	N	CA
Wearing standard Army work gloves..	Y	N	CA
Wearing cold weather gloves.....	Y	N	CA
Nighttime.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

4. During the REPACKAGING of the MCCD did you encounter problems with any of the following components?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Power Supply Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Decoy Image Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Antenna Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Stakes.....	Y	N	CA
Radar corner reflector assemblies..	Y	N	CA
Repair kit.....	Y	N	CA
Poles.....	Y	N	CA
Transport Bags.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

5. Please explain any other concerns you have associated with DISASSEMBLING and REPACKAGING the MCCD:

6. Please rate the adequacy of the overall human factors engineering (HFE) design of the MCCD.

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

Figure A-27 (CONT). Data collection form HF7.

PART V. SAFETY AND HEALTH HAZARDS.

1. Describe in detail any SAFETY PROBLEMS or HEALTH HAZARDS you have experienced while operating or maintaining the MCCD during the following MCCD IOTE activities:

Deploying the MCCD to the assembly site: _____

Setting up the MCCD: _____

Operating the MCCD: _____

Preparing for movement and disassembling the MCCD: _____

Repackaging the MCCD: _____

Other (please specify): _____

2. Are the emergency or warning labels for the MCCD adequate for alerting operators to SAFETY HAZARDS?

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

3. Please describe any other SAFETY or HEALTH HAZARD concerns you have regarding the MCCD:

PART VI. OPERATOR PMCS, TROUBLESHOOTING, AND MAINTENANCE.

1. While performing operator PMCS on the MCCD did you encounter problems with any of the following components?

	YES	NO	CANNOT ASSESS
Power Supply Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Decoy Image Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Antenna Assembly.....	Y	N	CA
Stakes.....	Y	N	CA
Radar corner reflector assemblies..	Y	N	CA
Repair kit.....	Y	N	CA
Poles.....	Y	N	CA
Transport Bags.....	Y	N	CA
Other:.....	Y	N	CA

Please explain any "YES" responses: _____

2. Rate the adequacy of MCCD OPERATOR PMCS procedures:

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

3. Rate the adequacy of MCCD OPERATOR TROUBLESHOOTING procedures:

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

4. Rate the adequacy of MCCD OPERATOR MAINTENANCE procedures:

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

5. Rate the adequacy of the MCCD Repair Kit to perform repairs:

Adequate___ Borderline___ Inadequate___ N/A___

Please explain: _____

PART VII. MCCD DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

(Will be addressed upon completion of Phase III)

PART VIII. TRAINING

1. Now that you have had experience operating the MCCD in the field, do you feel that the OPERATOR TRAINING conducted prior to beginning record trials provided you with the skills necessary to adequately operate the MCCD?

YES___ NO___

If "NO", please explain:_____

2. Please explain any other concerns you have associated with the OPERATOR TRAINING for the MCCD:

MCCD IOTE OPERATOR QUESTIONNAIRE (HF 7A)

(Phase III Only)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT. These data will be used for research purposes only. To preserve the anonymity of responses, any future publication of these data will be in summary form and will not include any player identification. Your name and last four digits of your Social Security Number on this form are required for administrative purposes only and will not be released to anyone other than TEC personnel. The authority for the collection of these data is 10 U.S. C 3012.

Name: _____ SSN Last 4: _____

MCCD Operator Role (Circle one): Leader Assistant

Other MCCD crew member: _____ Date: _____

PLEASE NOTE THAT PARTS I THRU VI HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN SCOPE, AS YOU HAVE ALREADY RESPONDED TO THOSE SECTIONS TWICE. IF, BASED ON PHASE III, YOU HAVE SOMETHING NEW TO ADD FOR THOSE SECTIONS, PLEASE FILL IN THE COMMENTS SECTION AS APPROPRIATE. IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL SPACE FOR COMMENTS, PLEASE USE THE BACK OF THIS FORM OR CONTINUATION SHEETS AS NECESSARY.

PART I. MOVING/DEPLOYING THE MCCD.

PART II. OPERATING THE MCCD.

PART III. RECOVERY/REPACKAGING THE MCCD.

Figure A-28. Data collection form HF7A.

PART IV. HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES WITH THE MCCD.

PART V. SAFETY AND HEALTH HAZARDS.

PART VI. OPERATOR PMCS, TROUBLESHOOTING, AND MAINTENANCE.

PART VII. MCCD DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

1. "Doctrine" refers to the overall principles and general approach to fighting campaigns and major engagements. Please give your assessment of the MCCD doctrine defined for this test:

2. "Tactics" refers to the art by which Corps and smaller commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. Please give your assessment of the MCCD tactics defined for this test:

3. "Employment techniques" are the practical and detailed instructions allowing the user at the lowest level to efficiently and effectively use the equipment so as to achieve the desired results. Please give your assessment of the MCCD employment techniques defined for this test:

Having used the MCCD in tactical operations, do you feel you were adequately trained to perform the following tasks? If no, please comment below.

4. Incorporate the MCCD into tactical operations at platoon level:

Add use of the MCCD to standard operating procedures for preparing the defense.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Use the MCCD to enhance own survivability.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Use the MCCD to improve own lethality against enemy/OPFOR.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Understand the benefits or disadvantages of placing the MCCD in front of, among, or behind friendly vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand the restrictions on placing the MCCD near friendly vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand techniques to make the MCCD appear more realistic when observed by the enemy/OPFOR.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Understand how use of the MCCD may be added to the standard operational orders and fragmentary orders issued to the platoon (to include graphic control measures).	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Please explain any "NO" responses: _____

Figure A-28 (CONT). Data collection form HF7A.

5. Correctly employ the MCCD in accordance with current U.S. Army Doctrine:

Understand and apply the basic principles of deception.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand employment of the MCCD within the framework of the higher commanders' intent.	YES	NO	N/A
--	-----	----	-----

Understand requirements and methods for reporting use of MCCDs to adjacent units and higher headquarters.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Understand why the MCCD should never be used in place of real vehicles.	YES	NO	N/A
---	-----	----	-----

Please explain any "NO" responses: _____

6. What is your assessment of the actual MCCD impact on REDFOR combat effectiveness?

7. What is your assessment of the potential MCCD impact on REDFOR combat effectiveness?

8. What is your assessment of the actual MCCD impact on BLUEFOR combat effectiveness?

9. What is your assessment of the potential MCCD impact on BLUEFOR combat effectiveness?

10. Please explain any other concerns you may have with the tactics and doctrine of the MCCD:

PART VIII. OPERATOR TRAINING

1. Now that you have had experience operating the MCCD in the field, do you feel that the OPERATOR TRAINING conducted prior to beginning record trials provided you with the skills necessary to adequately operate the MCCD?

YES___ NO___

If "NO", please explain:_____

2. What do you feel is the fastest technique and/or sequence for setting up the MCCD?

3. Please explain any other concerns you have associated with the OPERATOR TRAINING for the MCCD:

16) Data Collection Form SME Assessment Form (HF8). This manual form is presented in figure A-29.

17) Data Collection Form Test Directorate Observation Form (HF9). This manual form is presented in figure A-30. Please note that no data were collected using this form.

18) Data Collection Form Safety and Health Hazards Incident Report (HF10). This manual form is presented in figure A-31. Please note that no data was collected using this form.

A-8. REQUESTS FOR MCCD IOTE DATA. Requests for MCCD IOTE data will be directed to:

CDR, TEC.....

AUTOVON

COMMERCIAL

The files are available in SAS datasets for the performance and HF files or in OTERAM DBASE III+ format for the RAM files. Performance files are classified secret.

MCCD IOTF SME ASSESSMENT FORM (HF 8)

As a Subject Matter Expert for the MCCD, your assessment of the system is an extremely valuable source of test data. Please make your assessments as complete as possible. Feel free to use the back of the page or continuation sheets as needed.

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

POSITION/ORGANIZATION: _____

1. What is your assessment of the MCCD human factors engineering design?

2. Please describe in detail any potential or observed safety problems associated with the MCCD:

3. "Doctrine" refers to the overall principles and general approach to fighting campaigns and major engagements. Please give your assessment of the MCCD doctrine defined for this test:

4. "Tactics" refers to the art by which Corps and smaller commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. Please give your assessment of the MCCD tactics defined for this test:

Figure A-29. Data collection form HF8.

5. "Employment techniques" are the practical and detailed instructions allowing the user at the lowest level to efficiently and effectively use the equipment so as to achieve the desired results. Please give your assessment of the MCCD employment techniques defined for this test:

6. Please describe in detail any potential or observed health hazards associated with the MCCD:

7. What is your assessment of the actual MCCD impact on REDFOR combat effectiveness?

8. What is your assessment of the potential MCCD impact on REDFOR combat effectiveness?

9. What is your assessment of the actual MCCD impact on BLUEFOR combat effectiveness?

MCCD IOTE TEST DIRECTORATE OBSERVATIONS (HF 9)

We are interested in your observations, opinions, and suggestions concerning the MCCD IOTE. Inputs specifically related to the topics below would be especially valuable. Please feel free to use the back of the page or additional sheets as needed.

NAME: _____ DATE: _____

POSITION/ORGANIZATION: _____

TARGET IDENTIFICATION -- REAL VS DECOY

Long Range: _____

Medium Range: _____

Short Range: _____

MCCD DEPLOYMENT: _____

MCCD OPERATIONS: _____

MCCD MAINTENANCE: _____

MCCD DOCTRINE, TACTICS, AND EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES: _____

Figure A-30. Data collection form HF9.

MCCD RAM REQUIREMENTS/CHARACTERISTICS: _____

MCCD HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING DESIGN: _____

MCCD SAFETY AND HEALTH HAZARD CONCERNS: _____

OTHER OBSERVATIONS: _____

Figure A-30 (CONT). Data collection form HF9.

Disposition of incident _____